State v. Jones ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-859
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 18 February 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Guilford County
Nos. 10 CRS 76967,
10 CRS 76969,
10 CRS 76972
RICARDO DONNELL JONES
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 7 March 2013 by
Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General
Adrian Dellinger, for the State.
Daniel F. Read for Defendant.
DILLON, Judge.
Defendant Ricardo Donnell Jones appeals from judgments
entered after he admitted to violating his probation. Defendant
contends the trial court erred by finding all of the alleged
violations, when the State had abandoned some of the
allegations, and abused its discretion by failing to adequately
consider the impact of his mental illness on his ability to
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comply with the terms of his probation. After careful review,
we affirm.
I. Background
On 10 May 2011, Defendant pled guilty to one count of
misdemeanor larceny and two counts of felonious larceny. In the
misdemeanor case, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 120
days imprisonment, but suspended the sentence and placed
Defendant on supervised probation for 60 months. In the felony
cases, the trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms
of 10 to 12 months, but again suspended the sentences and placed
Defendant on supervised probation for 60 months.
On 27 July 2012, a probation officer filed a violation
report in the misdemeanor case alleging that Defendant had
tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. On 6 December 2012,
the officer signed additional violation reports in all three
cases alleging more positive drug screens, arrearages on
Defendant’s financial obligations, and new criminal convictions.
The officer signed violation reports in February of 2013
alleging that Defendant had committed an assault that could be
the basis for revocation if it resulted in conviction, but that
the charge was still pending.
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The matter of Defendant’s probation violations came on for
hearing on 27 February 2013. Defendant did not admit to a
violation based on the pending assault charge, but admitted to
the remaining violations. Defendant contended that he had
physical and mental health problems and requested that the trial
court allow him another chance to comply with the terms of his
probation. Defendant further requested that, if the court were
to revoke his probation, he be able to serve his activated
sentences concurrently rather than consecutively. The trial
court revoked probation, but ordered that Defendant’s activated
sentence in the misdemeanor case run concurrently with one of
the felony cases. Defendant appeals.
II. Analysis
Defendant’s first argument is that the trial court erred by
finding multiple grounds to revoke his probation when the State
abandoned all of the allegations other than the new convictions.
This argument lacks merit.
At the outset, we note that all of Defendant’s probation
violations occurred after 1 December 2011, and, therefore, his
probation was subject to revocation only for obtaining
additional criminal convictions or for absconding from
supervision. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2011); State v.
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Hunnicutt, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 740 S.E.2d 906, 910-11 (2013)
(citation omitted).
Defendant, however, admitted to willfully violating his
probation and stipulated to the factual basis to support the
violations, including the new criminal convictions. The trial
court found all of the violations alleged in the 6 December 2012
violation reports and further found that each violation, in and
of itself, was a sufficient basis upon which to revoke
Defendant’s probation. Accordingly, the trial court made
sufficient findings to support revocation of Defendant’s
probation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2011)
and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2011). State v. Henderson,
179 N.C. App. 191, 197, 632 S.E.2d 818, 822 (2006) (findings on
pre-printed form sufficient to support probation revocation).
In light of Defendant’s admitted violations, we decline to hold
that any findings of grounds other than those authorized by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) prejudiced Defendant or that the trial
court failed to exercise its discretion in revoking probation.
See State v. Seay, 59 N.C. App. 667, 670-71, 298 S.E.2d 53, 55
(1982) (a finding of a violation of any valid condition of
probation is sufficient to support revocation).
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In Defendant’s second argument, he contends the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to sufficiently consider his
mental health issues. We disagree.
Because “probation is an act of grace by the State to one
convicted of a crime[,] . . . an alleged violation of a
probationary condition need not be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Hill, 132 N.C. App. 209, 211, 510 S.E.2d 413,
414 (1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although a
trial court is required to make findings showing it considered
the evidence presented at a revocation hearing, it is not
required to make findings addressing each of the defendant’s
excuses for non-compliance. State v. Belcher, 173 N.C. App.
620, 625, 619 S.E.2d 567, 570 (2005) (citation omitted).
Here, Defendant admitted to violating the terms of his
probation and the trial court’s findings support its decision to
revoke probation. Furthermore, we note that Defendant asked the
trial court to allow him to continue on probation due to his
physical and mental health issues, or to consider running his
sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively, if they were
activated. The trial court revoked probation, but elected to
alter the original judgments to permit the misdemeanor sentence
to run concurrently with one of the felony sentences. Thus, the
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record demonstrates that the trial court not only considered
Defendant’s excuse, but also altered the judgments to
Defendant’s benefit. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s ruling.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).