State v. Hill ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA14-344
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 7 October 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                      Cleveland County
    Nos. 12 CRS 56659
    13 CRS 386
    ANGELA WELCH HILL
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 17 October 2013
    by Judge Timothy S. Kincaid in Cleveland County Superior Court.
    Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 September 2014.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper by Assistant Attorney General
    Jane L. Oliver for the State.
    Russell J. Hollers III for defendant-appellant.
    STEELMAN, Judge.
    Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in its
    comments to the jury about the availability of a transcript for
    its review, defendant failed to show prejudice as a result of
    these comments.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    -2-
    In December 2012 Rick Rippy had romantic relationships with
    Karen Mobley and with Angela Hill (defendant). On the evening of
    3 December 2012 Mr. Rippy, his son, Brandon Huffman, and Ms.
    Mobley ate supper together in a camper trailer in the King’s
    Mountain area of Cleveland County, North Carolina. After supper
    defendant entered the trailer and began arguing and fighting
    with Ms. Mobley. In the course of the altercation, Ms. Mobley’s
    hand was injured. After the fight, defendant left the trailer
    and damaged Ms. Mobley’s car.
    On 11 February 2013 defendant was indicted for the felony
    of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and
    for the misdemeanor of injury to personal property. Defendant
    was   tried    before    a   jury   at   the   13   October   2013   Session   of
    Criminal      Superior   Court      of   Cleveland    County.   In   her   trial
    testimony, defendant admitted committing simple assault on Ms.
    Mobley and damaging her car, but denied possessing or using a
    knife. Witness testimony was in conflict as to whether defendant
    or Ms. Mobley was Mr. Rippy’s current girlfriend at the time of
    the incident, and whether it was defendant or Ms. Mobley who
    held a knife during the fight. On 17 October 2013 the jury
    returned guilty verdicts against defendant for assault with a
    deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and injury to personal
    -3-
    property.   The   trial    court   sentenced   defendant    to   an   active
    prison term of 38 to 55 months.
    Defendant appeals.
    II. Petition for Certiorari
    During the sentencing proceeding, defendant’s trial counsel
    informed the trial court that defendant was “adamant that she’s
    not guilty” and that “she is going to want to appeal.” However,
    defendant neither noted an appeal in open court nor filed a
    written notice of appeal. On 25 April 2014 defendant’s appellate
    counsel filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review
    of the judgment entered in this matter. In our discretion, we
    grant defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.
    III. Court’s Statement Concerning Review of Transcript
    Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
    violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1233(a) by failing to exercise
    its discretion regarding whether to allow the jury to review
    witness   testimony.   Defendant    contends   that   the   court’s    error
    entitles her to a new trial. We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1233(a) provides in part that:
    If the jury after retiring for deliberation
    requests a review of certain testimony or
    other evidence, the jurors must be conducted
    to   the   courtroom.  The   judge  in   his
    discretion, after notice to the prosecutor
    and defendant, may direct that requested
    -4-
    parts of the testimony be read to the jury
    and may permit the jury to reexamine in open
    court the requested materials admitted into
    evidence. In his discretion the judge may
    also have the jury review other evidence
    relating to the same factual issue so as not
    to give undue prominence to the evidence
    requested.
    “This statute imposes two duties upon the trial court when
    it receives a request from the jury to review evidence. First,
    the court must conduct all jurors to the courtroom. Second, the
    trial court must exercise its discretion in determining whether
    to permit requested evidence to be read to or examined by the
    jury[.] . . . Insofar as the statute requires the judge to
    exercise discretion, it is merely a codification of the common
    law rule.” State v. Ashe, 
    314 N.C. 28
    , 34, 
    331 S.E.2d 652
    , 656
    (1985) (citations omitted). “The trial court must uphold its
    duty   to   ‘exercise       its   discretion    in    determining      whether   to
    permit   requested     evidence     to   be    read   to    or   examined   by   the
    jury[.]’” State v. Presson, __ N.C. App. __, __, 
    747 S.E.2d 651
    ,
    656 (quoting State v. Hinton, __ N.C. App. __ , __, 
    738 S.E.2d 241
    , 248 (2013) (quoting 
    Ashe, 314 N.C. at 34
    , 331 S.E.2d at
    656)), disc. review denied, 
    367 N.C. 274
    , 
    752 S.E.2d 150
    (2013).
    “When    a   trial   court   violates     this      statutory   mandate    by
    denying the jury’s request to review the transcript ‘upon the
    ground that the trial court has no power to grant the motion in
    its discretion, the ruling is reviewable,’ and the alleged error
    -5-
    is preserved by law even when the defendant fails to object.”
    State v. Starr, 
    365 N.C. 314
    , 317, 
    718 S.E.2d 362
    , 365 (2011)
    (quoting State v. Barrow, 
    350 N.C. 640
    , 646, 
    517 S.E.2d 374
    , 378
    (1999) (internal quotation omitted)).
    However, to obtain relief, a defendant must show prejudice
    as a result of the trial court’s error. “This prejudice may be
    shown by demonstrating ‘a reasonable possibility that, had the
    error in question not been committed, a different result would
    have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.’”
    Hinton, __ N.C. App. at __, 738 S.E.2d at 248 (quoting N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 15A-1233).
    B. Analysis
    Just before the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court
    stated the following to the jury:
    Just a few things that have commonly come up
    recently and I’ll instruct you as follows.
    Often the juries will ask for the transcript
    of a witness and we can provide that. It’s
    going to take us about four weeks and you’ll
    have   to  be   here  while  we   prepare  a
    transcript and proof read and get it ready
    but we can do that if you want it. Generally
    speaking I deny those requests. It is
    discretionary with the Court but that’s just
    to let you know before you ask how long it
    takes.
    Defendant argues that the trial court erred by warning the
    jury that it would have to wait in court for a month in order to
    review   a   transcript,   thereby    “chilling   the   jury’s   right   to
    -6-
    review    trial       testimony”       and     “prevent[ing]           the    jury     from
    reviewing” “confusing, contradictory testimony by threatening to
    keep   the     jury    in    the    courthouse       for     a    month      waiting   for
    preparation of a transcript.” However, defendant does not argue
    that   the   court’s        alleged    error      affected       the   outcome    of    the
    trial. Therefore, even if we assume that (1) the court erred;
    (2) but for the court’s error, the jury would have asked to
    review testimony, and; (3) the court would have granted the
    jury’s request, defendant has failed to articulate any argument
    that   the   jury’s     hypothetical         review    of    testimony        would    have
    changed the outcome of the trial.
    Defendant attempts to distinguish the facts of the present
    case from those of State v. Johnson, 
    164 N.C. App. 1
    , 
    595 S.E.2d 176
    (2004), where we held that the defendant was not prejudiced
    by the trial court’s failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    15A-1233,      contending      that        “[u]nlike   in        Johnson,     there     was
    confusing and contradictory evidence [in this case] that the
    jury   would    have    wanted        to   review.”    Assuming,          arguendo,     the
    accuracy of defendant’s speculation that the jury would have
    wanted to review trial testimony,                   a defendant does not               show
    prejudice      simply       based     on    the    existence       of     confusing      or
    contradictory testimony:
    The test to determine whether a defendant
    should receive a new trial due to the trial
    -7-
    court’s failure to exercise discretion has
    two parts. First, we “must consider if the
    trial   court    failed    to   exercise   its
    discretion.” . . . Second, we must “consider
    whether this error was prejudicial.” The
    error is prejudicial if the testimony was
    “material to the determination of [the]
    defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Testimony
    is material if “the defendant can show that
    (1) such testimony or evidence involved
    issues of some confusion and contradiction,
    and (2) it is likely that a jury would want
    to review such testimony.” If the defendant
    satisfies    this    requirement,    we   will
    determine [if] the error was prejudicial
    because    there    exists    “a    reasonable
    possibility that, had the error in question
    not been committed, a different result would
    have been reached at the trial out of which
    the appeal arises. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
    1443(a).”
    (emphasis added). State v. Hatfield, __ N.C. App. __, __, 
    738 S.E.2d 236
    , 239-240 (2013) (quoting State v. Long, 
    196 N.C. App. 22
    , 28, 
    674 S.E.2d 696
    , 700 (2009) (internal citation omitted),
    State v. Johnson, 
    346 N.C. 119
    , 126, 
    484 S.E.2d 372
    , 377 (1997)
    (internal quotation omitted), and 
    Johnson, 164 N.C. App. at 20
    ,
    595 S.E.2d at 187 (internal quotation omitted)). Hatfield is
    clear that a defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from
    the court’s error.
    In State v. Starr our Supreme Court first “determined that
    there was error and that defendant’s failure to object at trial
    did not bar appellate review” and then “consider[ed] whether the
    trial   court’s   failure   to    exercise   its   discretion   was
    -8-
    prejudicial.”          
    Starr, 365 N.C. at 319
    ,    718     S.E.2d      at   366.
    Although the defendant in Starr argued that the “jury’s review
    of [a witness’s] testimony could have reasonably resulted in not
    guilty verdicts for Mr. Starr on one or more of the [charges,]”
    he   “d[id]      not     explain       how     the     review    of     [the       witness’s]
    testimony would have created a reasonable possibility that a
    different result would have been reached at his trial.” 
    Id. The Court
        held        that   “Defendant         thus     has     not    demonstrated         a
    reasonable possibility that a different result would have been
    reached    at    his     trial    had    the    error     not    been       committed”      and
    denied the defendant relief based on the trial court’s error.
    In this case, defendant does not even make the conclusory
    assertion proffered by the defendant in Starr that review of
    trial   testimony        “would       have   created     a     reasonable      possibility
    that a different result would have been reached at his trial.”
    Defendant       has    failed    to     establish,      or     even    to    put    forth   an
    argument, that the trial court’s comments to the jury affected
    the ultimate outcome of the trial. As a result, she has not
    demonstrated reversible error.
    NO ERROR.
    Judges GEER and DIETZ concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).