State v. McDougald ( 2022 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-526
    No. COA21-286
    Filed 2 August 2022
    Harnett County, Nos. 01 CRS 920, 4612
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    WILLIAM MCDOUGALD
    Appeal by Defendant from Order entered 26 November 2019 by Judge C.
    Winston Gilchrist in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
    8 February 2022.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Nicholas R.
    Sanders, for the State.
    Christopher J. Heaney for defendant-appellant.
    Juvenile Law Center, by Marsha L. Levick, Aryn Williams-Vann, Katrina L.
    Goodjoint, and Riya Saha Shah, and Phillips Black, Inc., by John R. Mills, for
    amici curiae.
    HAMPSON, Judge.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    ¶1         William McDougald (Defendant) appeals from an Order denying his Motion for
    Appropriate Relief (MAR). Relevant to this appeal, the Record before us tends to
    reflect the following:
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶2         On 12 October 2001, a jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of
    second-degree kidnapping, misdemeanor breaking or entering, and assault on a
    female. Defendant had two prior convictions including: a guilty plea to second degree
    kidnapping, a class E felony, with judgment entered on 16 May 1984 when Defendant
    was sixteen years old; and a no contest plea to one count of second-degree sexual
    offense (class H felony), two counts of common law robbery (class D felonies), and one
    count of armed robbery (a class D felony) with judgment entered on 1 February 1988.
    Due to these prior felonies, a jury found Defendant guilty of violent habitual felon
    status on 14 November 2001. On the same day, as required by the violent habitual
    felon statute, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life without parole
    (LWOP). Defendant appealed from the Judgment and this Court found no error by
    Opinion entered on 20 May 2008. See State v. McDougald, 
    190 N.C. App. 675
    , 
    661 S.E.2d 789
     (2008) (unpublished).
    ¶3         Subsequently, on 26 June 2017, Defendant filed a MAR in Harnett County
    Superior Court asserting the mandatory sentence of LWOP for violent habitual
    felons, as applied to him, violated Defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights where one
    of the predicate violent felony convictions was obtained when Defendant was a
    juvenile and that the LWOP sentence was disproportionate.         On 22 May 2018,
    Defendant amended his MAR to also include claims of ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel during plea negotiations and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
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    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant requested the trial court to vacate his convictions for second-degree
    kidnapping and violent habitual felon status.
    ¶4         On 9 August 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the MAR including both
    the Eighth Amendment and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Prior to the
    hearing, the parties stipulated the trial court could determine the Eighth
    Amendment claims as a matter of law without the introduction of evidence.
    Defendant elected to abandon his claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
    during the hearing.
    ¶5         In support of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, Defendant called
    Mark Key (Key), his trial attorney, to testify. Key testified Defendant’s file was
    destroyed as part of a routine purge, and to prepare for this hearing, Key tried to
    remember “as much as I could” by reviewing the trial transcript and the time sheet
    Key kept during Defendant’s trial. Based on this time sheet from 2001, Key testified
    he visited Defendant on 25 April 2001 and told Defendant the prosecutor was offering
    a plea deal in which Defendant would serve a sentence of approximately twelve to
    thirteen years. At the time of this meeting, Defendant had not yet been indicted for
    violent habitual felon status; however, the charge was pending. Key testified he did
    not explain or mention the mandatory punishment of LWOP for the pending violent
    habitual felon status charge during this meeting. Defendant rejected the plea deal.
    Thereafter, the State obtained a superseding indictment for violent habitual felon
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
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    Opinion of the Court
    status on 14 May 2001. Key testified he did not meet with Defendant to discuss the
    potential consequences of a conviction for violent habitual felon status until the
    morning of the trial on the substantive felonies, 1 October 2001. At this time, Key
    told Defendant there was a potential punishment of LWOP depending on the outcome
    of the trial but was “not sure [he] told [Defendant] it was mandatory [LWOP].” Key
    admitted Defendant might not have understood what he meant.
    ¶6         Defendant also called Attorney Michael G. Howell (Howell) who had almost
    twenty years of experience representing clients facing the death penalty and LWOP
    in North Carolina. Howell testified Key’s performance was “deficient” because Key
    failed to “fully explain[] to [Defendant] on 25 April 2001 the full ramifications of the
    plea offer and the rejection of it[,]” including exposure to mandatory LWOP sentence.
    ¶7         On 26 November 2010, the trial court entered an Order denying the MAR. The
    Order makes the following relevant Findings of Fact:
    11. On October 1, 2001, Defendant stated during a colloquy with
    Judge Bowen before trial began that Mr. Key “on several
    occasions he [Key] brought-he told me that the DA brought up . .
    . habitual felony charges on me.”
    12. Defendant further stated during the same colloquy, “First
    time I seen him (Mr. Key) when I got down here to Superior Court,
    second time, third time, and fourth time I seen him when I was
    offered a plea bargain.”
    13. Defendant further stated on the record on October 1, “Then I
    came back here, which was today and [Key tells me] . . . If you
    don’t go to trial you can take the plea bargain for thirteen years
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
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    Opinion of the Court
    and a half . . . .”
    14. Defendant also stated on the record on October 1, “I’m already
    facing my life with no parole in prison.”
    15. At no time during his colloquy with the court on October 1st
    did Defendant express a desire to accept the plea offer of thirteen
    and one-half years which had been tendered by the State. There
    is no credible evidence before the court that Defendant expressed
    to anyone, including his lawyer or the court, at any time prior to
    his conviction and final sentencing that he wished to accept such
    plea offer or any plea offer that was made by the State.
    19. On November 14, 2001 the trial court denied Defendant’s
    Motion to Dismiss indictment. Judge Bowen found in the order
    denying the Motion to Dismiss that “defendant and [his[ counsel
    were well aware of the Violent Habitual Felon indictment . . . far
    in advance of the trial of the underlying felony” on October 1,
    2001.
    23. Eighteen years have passed since the events at issue. Mr. Key
    did not have a perfect or complete recollection of all his
    statements to his client.
    25. The Defendant was informed that he was subject to a sentence
    of life without parole. The credible evidence does not establish
    the Defendant was not informed by Mr. Key well in advance of
    the first day of his trial, October 1, 2001, that he faced a
    mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole as a
    violent habitual felon.
    27. The credible evidence does not establish that Defendant
    lacked a full and informed understanding well in advance of
    October 1, 2001, of the impact of the violent habitual felon charge,
    of its potential consequences and of the consequences of rejecting
    the plea arrangement which had been offered by the State. The
    credible evidence does not establish that the defense counsel
    failed to fully, timely, and competently advise Defendant on these
    issues. The credible evidence does not establish that defense
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    Opinion of the Court
    counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable in any
    way.
    28. The prior convictions used to establish Defendant’s status as
    a violent habitual felon were as follows: (1) Second Degree
    Kidnapping, date of offense March 14, 1984, conviction date May
    16, 1984 and (2) Second Degree Sexual Offense, offense date
    November 3, 1987 and conviction date February 1, 1988.
    29. Defendant’s date of birth was February 24, 1968. Defendant
    was sixteen years of age at the time he committed and was
    convicted of the predicate offense of Second Degree Kidnapping in
    1984. Defendant was over the age of eighteen when convicted of
    the second predicate felony of Second Degree Sexual offense in
    1988.
    33. The credible evidence does not establish that the frequency,
    content or timing of attorney Mark Key’s communications with
    Defendant were objectively unreasonable. The credible evidence
    does not establish that the methods Mr. Key used to communicate
    with Defendant about his case were objectively unreasonable.
    34. The credible evidence does not demonstrate a reasonable
    probability that but for any error or insufficiency in the frequency,
    timing, content or methods of communication used by attorney
    Key with Defendant that the outcome of the case would have been
    any different or that Defendant would have accepted a plea to a
    sentence of less than life without parole.
    The Order also makes the following relevant Conclusions of Law:
    2. Defendant’s sentence of life without parole was not imposed for
    conduct committed before Defendant was eighteen years of age in
    violation of Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
     (2010), Miller v.
    Alabama, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
     (2012), or Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
     (2016). Defendant’s sentence did not violate the
    constitutional prohibitions against mandatory sentences of life
    without parole for juveniles. Defendant’s sentence is therefore
    not unconstitutional as applied to the Defendant.
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    Opinion of the Court
    3. No inference of disproportionality arises from a comparison of
    the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence in
    question.
    4. As applied to Defendant, a sentence of life without parole is not
    grossly disproportionate to the conduct punished.
    5. Defendant’s sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment
    to the Constitution of the United States.
    7. Defendant has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that the performance of his trial counsel, Mark Key, was
    objectively unreasonable or deficient.
    8. In addition, and in the alternative, the Defendant has failed to
    establish that there is a reasonable probability that but for any
    unprofessional error committed by Mr. Key the result of the
    proceeding would have been any different.
    9. There is no reasonable probability that Defendant would have
    accepted the plea offer made by the State but for any
    unprofessional error by attorney Key.
    ¶8         On 20 November 2020, Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this
    Court seeking review of the 26 November 2019 Order denying his MAR. This Court
    allowed Defendant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in an Order entered 6 January
    2021 to permit appellate review of the trial court’s Order.
    Issues
    ¶9         The issues on appeal are whether: (I) the trial court erred in concluding Key
    acted reasonably and without prejudice during plea negotiations; (II) the trial court
    erred in upholding a mandatory LWOP sentence that relies, in part, on a conviction
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    Opinion of the Court
    for a violent felony committed while Defendant was a juvenile; and (III) the trial court
    erred in concluding Defendant’s sentence is not disproportionate.
    Analysis
    ¶ 10         This Court reviews a trial court’s order denying a MAR to determine “whether
    the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support
    the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order entered
    by the trial court.” State v. Hyman, 
    371 N.C. 363
    , 382, 
    817 S.E.2d 157
    , 169 (2018)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted).       “[T]he trial court’s findings of fact are
    conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is
    conflicting.” State v. Buchanan, 
    353 N.C. 332
    , 336, 
    543 S.E.2d 823
    , 826 (2001)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted). Unchallenged findings of fact are “presumed
    to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” Hyman, 371 N.C.
    at 382, 817 S.E.2d at 169. We review conclusions of law de novo. Id. Under de novo
    review, this Court “considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
    judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Biber, 
    365 N.C. 162
    , 168, 
    712 S.E.2d 874
    , 878 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    I.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    ¶ 11         Defendant contends the trial court erred by concluding Key acted reasonably
    during plea negotiations and by concluding Key’s conduct did not prejudice Defendant
    and, therefore, did not provide Defendant ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
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    Opinion of the Court
    on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy a two-part
    test:
    First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
    deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
    serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
    guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
    defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
    the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
    serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
    result is reliable.
    State v. Banks, 
    367 N.C. 652
    , 655, 
    766 S.E.2d 334
    , 337 (2014) (quoting Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    , 693 (1984)). See also, Hill v.
    Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 57, 
    88 L. Ed. 2d 203
    , 209 (1985) (applying the two-part
    Strickland test to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process).
    A. Reasonableness of Key’s Performance
    ¶ 12           Defendant contends Key’s testimony, his contemporaneous timesheet,
    Defendant’s affidavit, and the trial transcript, shows Key did not adequately inform
    Defendant he was subject to mandatory LWOP prior to the morning of 1 October
    2001, and a reasonable attorney would have explained the potential consequences of
    rejecting the plea deal prior to the morning before trial on the underlying felony.
    Thus, Defendant contends Key’s performance was constitutionally deficient.
    ¶ 13           In the context of pleas, “deficient performance may be established by showing
    that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
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    Opinion of the Court
    Hill, 
    474 U.S. at 57
    , 
    88 L. Ed. 2d at
    209 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 
    539 U.S. 510
    , 521,
    
    156 L. Ed. 2d 471
    , 484 (2003)). “An attorney’s failure to inform his client of a plea
    bargain offers amounts to ineffective assistance unless counsel effectively proves that
    he did inform his client of the offer or provides an adequate explanation for not
    advising his client of the offer.” State v. Simmons, 
    65 N.C. App. 294
    , 299, 
    309 S.E.2d 493
    , 497 (1983). Moreover, “[a] defense attorney in a criminal case has a duty to
    advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge is desirable, but the
    ultimate decision on what plea to enter remains exclusively with the client.” 
    Id.
    ¶ 14         Nevertheless, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
    effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
    circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
    counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d at
    694-
    695. Moreover, “because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court
    must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
    of reasonable professional assistance” and defendants have the burden of overcoming
    this presumption. 
    Id.
    ¶ 15         Here, the trial court’s Findings indicate Defendant failed to meet his burden
    to overcome the “strong presumption” Key’s performance was reasonable.              For
    example, the trial court found: the evidence did not establish Defendant lacked a full
    and informed understanding well in advance of trial of the impact of the violent
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    Opinion of the Court
    habitual felon charge including its potential consequences and the consequences of
    rejecting the plea deal; the evidence did not establish Key failed to fully, timely, and
    competently advise Defendant of the desirability of the plea deal; and the evidence
    did not establish Key’s performance was objectively unreasonable in any way.
    Moreover, although Howell testified that a reasonable attorney would have informed
    Defendant he was facing mandatory LWOP, Key could not remember whether “[he]
    told [Defendant] it was mandatory [LWOP]” and was not sure Defendant understood
    the full ramifications. Indeed, Key’s incomplete or imperfect recollection of all his
    statements to his client in addition to the passage of eighteen years and the
    destruction of Key’s case file including a complete record of written communications
    with Defendant and file notes—as found by the trial court—prevented the trial court
    from “reconstruct[ing] the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct and []
    evaluat[ing] the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-695
    .
    ¶ 16         Furthermore, a review of the Record shows Key met with Defendant on 25
    April 2001, before the trial on 1 October 2001, to discuss the plea offer with
    Defendant, and at the very least, informed Defendant he was facing the potential of
    LWOP depending on the outcome of the trial. Indeed, Defendant acknowledged he
    knew he was “facing my life with no parole in prison” in discussions with the trial
    court on 1 October 2001. Thus, the evidence supports the trial court’s Findings that
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    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant was informed of the plea deal before trial, knew of the possibility of LWOP,
    and Key fully, timely, and competently advised Defendant of the desirability of the
    plea deal. Based on these Findings, the trial court did not err by determining Key’s
    performance was not objectively unreasonable.
    B. Prejudicial Effect of Key’s Performance
    ¶ 17         Since the trial court properly concluded Key’s performance was not objectively
    unreasonable, we do not need to reach the issue of whether Key’s performance was
    prejudicial. See State v. Braswell, 
    312 N.C. 553
    , 563, 
    324 S.E.2d 241
    , 248 (1985)
    (quoting Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 697
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d at 690
    ) (“[T]here is no reason for a
    court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the
    inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”). Nevertheless, for
    purposes of reviewing each of the arguments presented upon Defendant’s MAR, and
    assuming arguendo Key’s performance was constitutionally deficient, Defendant also
    contends the evidence—as reflected in Key’s testimony and Defendant’s affidavit—
    establishes that if Key had ensured Defendant “understood [the] violent habitual
    felon status and its mandatory punishment, he would have taken [the] plea . . .” Thus,
    Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding, in the alternative, Key’s
    performance did not otherwise prejudice Defendant.
    ¶ 18         “The second, or ‘prejudice,’ requirement . . . focuses on whether counsel’s
    constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.”
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    Opinion of the Court
    Hill, 
    474 U.S. at 58-59
    , 
    88 L. Ed. 2d at 210
    . To show prejudice from ineffective
    assistance of counsel where a plea offer has been rejected,
    defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they
    would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded
    effective assistance of counsel.         Defendants must also
    demonstrate a reasonable probability the plea would have been
    entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court
    refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that
    discretion under state law. To establish prejudice in this
    instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable probability that the
    end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable
    by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison
    time. Cf. Glover v. United States, 
    531 U.S. 198
    , 203, 
    121 S. Ct. 696
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 604
     (2001) (“[A]ny amount of [additional] jail
    time has Sixth Amendment significance”).
    Missouri v. Frye, 
    566 U.S. 134
    , 147, 
    182 L. Ed. 2d 379
    , 392 (2012). Moreover, “[c]ourts
    should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about
    how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Lee v. United States,
    
    137 S. Ct. 1958
    , 1967, 
    198 L. Ed. 2d 476
    , 487 (2017). “Judges should instead look to
    contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.” 
    Id.
    ¶ 19         Here, the trial court found Defendant never expressed to anyone a desire to
    accept the plea deal; knew he faced a sentence of LWOP, but still declined to accept
    a plea bargain; and the evidence did not demonstrate a reasonable probability
    Defendant would have accepted a plea. Thus, evidence in the Record supports the
    trial court’s Findings. In turn, those Findings support the determination Defendant
    had not established he was prejudiced by Key’s allegedly deficient performance.
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    Opinion of the Court
    Therefore, the trial did not err in concluding Defendant failed to establish his
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Buchanan, 
    353 N.C. at 336
    , 
    543 S.E.2d at 826
    . Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s MAR based on
    a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    II.    Application of the Violent Habitual Felon Status Law
    ¶ 20         Defendant contends the application of the violent habitual felon status law—
    and specifically its mandatory LWOP sentence—violates the prohibition against
    cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution. Specifically, Defendant contends the trial court’s reliance on an
    offense committed while Defendant was under the age of eighteen as a predicate
    offense in sentencing Defendant to mandatory LWOP violates the constitutional
    constraints embodied in Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
    , 
    183 L. Ed. 2d 407
     (2012),
    which prohibits the imposition of mandatory LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.
    ¶ 21         The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states “[e]xcessive
    bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
    punishments inflicted[,]” U.S. Const. amend. VIII, and is made applicable to the
    States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
    Id.
     amend. XIV. The Constitution of North
    Carolina similarly states, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
    imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 27. “To
    determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond
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    Opinion of the Court
    historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
    a maturing society.” Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    , 58, 
    176 L. Ed. 2d 825
    , 835
    (2010). “The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of
    inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances.” 
    Id.
     However, generally
    punishments are “challenged not as inherently barbaric but as disproportionate to
    the crime.” 
    Id.
     Indeed, “the basic precept of justice [is] that punishment for crime
    should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.”     Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
    554 U.S. 407
    , 419, 
    171 L. Ed. 2d 525
    , 538 (citations and quotations omitted), opinion
    modified on denial of reh’g, 
    554 U.S. 945
    , 
    171 L. Ed. 2d 932
     (2008).
    The Court’s cases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall
    within two general classifications. The first involves challenges
    to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the
    circumstances in a particular case. The second comprises cases
    in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by
    certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty.
    Graham, 560 U.S. at 59, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 836.
    ¶ 22         Generally, the second line of analysis is applied in the death penalty context;
    however, the Supreme Court applied a categorical ban on mandatory sentences of
    LWOP for juvenile offenders in Graham and Miller.          The Court reasoned this
    categorical rule was necessary because “children are constitutionally different from
    adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 
    567 U.S. at 471
    , 
    183 L. Ed. 2d at 418
    .
    Moreover, “because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for
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    Opinion of the Court
    reform . . . they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 841). Thus, the Miller Court held mandatory
    LWOP for juveniles was violative of the Eighth Amendment as
    [i]t prevents taking into account the family and home
    environment that surrounds [the juvenile]—and from which he
    cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or
    dysfunctional. . . . Indeed, it ignores that he might have been
    charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
    associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with
    police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or
    his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. See, e.g., Graham, 560
    U.S., at 78, 
    130 S. Ct. 2011
    , 
    176 L. Ed. 2d 825
     (“[T]he features
    that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a
    significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings”); J.D.B. v. N.C.,
    
    564 U.S. 261
    , 269, 
    131 S. Ct. 2394
    , 
    180 L. Ed. 2d 310
     (2011)
    (discussing children’s responses to interrogation). And finally,
    this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of
    rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.
    
    Id.
     at 477–478, 
    183 L. Ed. 2d at 423
    . Nevertheless, the Miller Court did not preclude
    a sentence of LWOP for juveniles so long as the court considers a youthful offender’s
    “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity,
    and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” before imposing a LWOP sentence.
    
    Id.
    ¶ 23         Here, Defendant asserts a categorical challenge to the sentencing practice of
    using juvenile convictions as a predicate offense for violent habitual felon status.
    Categorical challenges are subject to the following analysis:
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    Opinion of the Court
    The Court first considers objective indicia of society’s standards,
    as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to
    determine whether there is a national consensus against the
    sentencing practice at issue. Next, guided by the standards
    elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own
    understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
    text, history, meaning, and purpose, the Court must determine in
    the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the
    punishment in question violates the Constitution.
    Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    ¶ 24         North Carolina defines a violent habitual felon as “any person who has been
    convicted of two violent felonies . . . . ‘[C]onvicted’ means the person has been
    adjudged guilty of or has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to the violent felony
    charge, and judgment has been entered thereon . . . .” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.7
    (a)
    (2021). “For purposes of this Article, ‘violent felony’ includes . . . Class A through E
    felonies.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.7
    (b)(1) (2021).
    A person who is convicted of a violent felony and of being a violent
    habitual felon must, upon conviction (except where the death
    penalty is imposed), be sentenced to life imprisonment without
    parole. . . . The sentencing judge may not suspend the sentence
    and may not place the person sentenced on probation.
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.12
     (2021). This Court upheld the constitutionality of this
    legislation—colloquially known as the three-strikes law—more than twenty years ago
    in State v. Mason. See State v. Mason, 
    126 N.C. App. 318
    , 321, 
    484 S.E.2d 818
    , 820
    (1997) (concluding the reasoning in State v. Todd, 
    313 N.C. 110
    , 118, 
    326 S.E.2d 249
    ,
    253 (1985), affirming the constitutionality of the habitual felon statute, N.C. Gen.
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
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    Opinion of the Court
    Stat. §§ 14-7.1 through 14-7.6, “equally applies to the violent habitual felon statute.”),
    cert. denied, 
    354 N.C. 72
    , 
    553 S.E.2d 208
     (2001). In State v. Todd, our Supreme Court
    determined the habitual felon law does not deny a defendant due process and equal
    protection, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom from cruel and unusual
    punishment, and freedom from double jeopardy because “these challenges have been
    addressed and rejected by the United States Supreme Court.” State v. Todd, 
    313 N.C. 110
    , 117, 
    326 S.E.2d 249
    , 253 (1985). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
    repeatedly held recidivist laws do not violate the Eighth Amendment because:
    the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense ‘is not to
    be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the
    earlier crimes,’ but instead as ‘a stiffened penalty for the latest
    crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a
    repetitive one.’ Gryger v. Burke, 
    334 U.S. 728
    , 732, 
    92 L. Ed. 1683
    ,
    
    68 S. Ct. 1256
     (1948). See also Spencer v. Texas, 
    385 U.S. 554
    ,
    560, 
    17 L. Ed. 2d 606
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 648
     (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 
    368 U.S. 448
    , 451, 
    7 L. Ed. 2d 446
    , 
    82 S. Ct. 501
     (1962); Moore v. Missouri,
    
    159 U.S. 673
    , 677, 
    40 L. Ed. 301
    , 
    16 S. Ct. 179
     (1895) (under a
    recidivist statute, ‘the accused is not again punished for the first
    offence’ because “ ‘the punishment is for the last offence
    committed, and it is rendered more severe in consequence of the
    situation into which the party had previously brought himself’ ”).
    Witte v. United States, 
    515 U.S. 389
    , 400, 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 351
    , 364 (1995).
    ¶ 25         Moreover, although the question of whether a juvenile-age conviction may
    count towards a three-strikes law that mandates a sentence of LWOP appears to be
    an issue of first impression in our state, a review of laws in other jurisdictions reveals
    North Carolina was not alone in its enactment of such a law. Indeed, between 1993
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
    2022-NCCOA-526
    Opinion of the Court
    and 1995, twenty-four states enacted ‘three strikes and you’re out’ laws with most of
    these laws mandating life sentences without the possibility of release. See John Clark
    et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ 165369, Three Strikes and You’re Out: A Review of
    State Legislation 1 (Research in Brief 1997). Courts in several of these states have
    recognized the counting of juvenile-age convictions as “strikes” where the defendant
    was charged and/or tried as an adult1 even when the punishment under the three-
    strikes law is mandatory LWOP. See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 
    249 N.J. 581
    , 600–601, 
    268 A.3d 313
    , 322 (N.J. 2022); McDuffey v. State, 
    286 So. 3d 364
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2019);
    Wilson v. State, 
    2017 Ark. 217
    , 
    521 S.W.3d 123
    , 128 (Ark. 2017); Vickers v. State, 
    117 A.3d 516
    , 519–20 (Del. 2015); State v. Standard, 
    351 S.C. 199
    , 
    569 S.E.2d 325
    , 326,
    328–29 (S.C. 2002); State v. Teas, 10 Wn. App. 2d 111, 
    447 P.3d 606
    , 619–20 (Wash.
    1 The separate issue of whether a juvenile delinquency adjudication may be used as a
    predicate offense under a “Three Strikes Law” is more unsettled with the majority of
    jurisdictions preventing the use of juvenile adjudications in calculating prior offenses because
    juveniles in juvenile court have their cases adjudicated without a jury. Thus, these state
    courts reason, counting these offenses towards violent habitual felon status implicates
    Apprendi. See Vanesch v. State, 
    343 Ark. 381
    , 390, 
    37 S.W.3d 196
    , 2001 (Ark. 2001)
    (disallowing juvenile delinquency adjudications as predicate offenses for state’s three strikes
    law); Fletcher v. State, 
    409 A.2d 1254
    , 1256 (Del. 1979) (same); Paige v. Gaffney, 
    207 Kan. 170
    , 170, 
    483 P.2d 494
    , 495 (Kan. 1971) (same); State v. Brown, 
    879 So. 2d 1276
    , 1288-90 (La.
    2004) (same); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    1999 PA Super 301
    , ¶ 2, 
    743 A.2d 460
    , 461 (Pa.
    Super. Ct. 1999) (same); State v. Ellis, 
    345 S.C. 175
    , 179, 
    547 S.E.2d 490
    , 492 (S.C. 2001)
    (same); State v. Maxey, 
    2003 WI App 94
    , ¶ 14, 
    663 N.W.2d 811
    , 814 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)
    (same). But See People v. Davis, 
    15 Cal. 4th 1096
    , 1100, 
    938 P.2d 938
    , 940–42 (Cal. 1997)
    (allowing juvenile adjudications to count as strikes under the state’s three strikes law);
    Williams v. State, 
    994 So.2d 337
    , 339–40 (Fl. Ct. App. 2008) (same); Lindsay v. State, 
    102 S.W.3d 223
    , 226–27 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (same). Nevertheless, this issue is not before us and
    we do not decide it.
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
    2022-NCCOA-526
    Opinion of the Court
    Ct. App. 2019), review denied, 
    195 Wn. 2d 1008
    , 
    460 P.3d 182
     (Wash. 2020);
    Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    2014 PA Super 68
    , 
    90 A.3d 1
    , 6-8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
    Cf. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-120
    (e)(3) (providing that juvenile-age convictions in
    adult court count as predicate offenses so long as the conviction resulted in a custodial
    sentence).
    ¶ 26         In permitting juvenile-age convictions to count towards three strikes laws,
    these courts have concluded the reasoning of Miller is inapplicable in the case of an
    adult who commits a third violent felony. See e.g. Ryan, 249 N.J. at 601, 268 A.3d at
    322. In support of this conclusion, these courts generally rely on the basic principle
    embodied in United States Supreme Court precedent that under recidivist statutes,
    the defendant is not punished for the first offense, but rather the punishment is a
    “stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which was considered to be an aggravated
    offense because it is a repetitive one.” See e.g. Id. (quoting Witte, 
    515 U.S. at 400
    , 
    132 L. Ed. 2d at 364
     (1995)).
    ¶ 27         Here, applying these general principles as found in United States Supreme
    Court precedent, North Carolina Supreme Court precedent, and in the persuasive
    precedent from other jurisdictions, the application of the violent habitual felon
    statute to Defendant’s conviction of second-degree kidnapping, committed when
    Defendant was thirty-three years old, did not increase or enhance the sentence
    Defendant received for his prior second-degree kidnapping conviction, committed
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
    2022-NCCOA-526
    Opinion of the Court
    when Defendant was sixteen.         Rather, the violent habitual felon statute, and
    resulting LWOP sentence, applied only to the last conviction for second-degree
    kidnapping. See State v. Wolfe, 
    157 N.C. App. 22
    , 37, 
    577 S.E.2d 655
    , 665 (2003)
    (“Because defendant’s violent habitual felon status will only enhance his punishment
    for the second-degree murder conviction in the instant case, and not his punishment
    for the underlying voluntary manslaughter felony, there is no violation of the ex post
    facto clauses.”). As the Fourth Circuit explained in addressing whether violent felony
    convictions as a juvenile could be used towards a sentencing enhancement under the
    federal Armed Career Criminal Act:
    In this case, Defendant is not being punished for a crime he
    committed as a juvenile, because sentence enhancements do not
    themselves constitute punishment for the prior criminal
    convictions that trigger them. See Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 385–86,
    
    128 S. Ct. 1783
    . Instead, Defendant is being punished for the
    recent offense he committed at thirty-three, an age
    unquestionably sufficient to render him responsible for his
    actions. Accordingly, Miller’s concerns about juveniles’
    diminished culpability and increased capacity for reform do not
    apply here.
    United States v. Hunter, 
    735 F.3d 172
    , 176 (4th Cir. 2013).
    ¶ 28         Indeed, in this case, the trial court relied on these very principles in concluding:
    “Defendant’s sentence of [LWOP] was not imposed for conduct committed before
    Defendant was eighteen years of age in violation of Graham . . ., Miller . . . or
    Montgomery . . . .” Thus, consistent with this analysis, the trial court correctly further
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
    2022-NCCOA-526
    Opinion of the Court
    determined “Defendant’s sentence did not violate the constitutional prohibitions
    against mandatory sentences of [LWOP] for juveniles.” Therefore, the trial court, in
    turn, did not err by ultimately concluding “Defendant’s sentence is therefore not
    unconstitutional as applied to Defendant.” Consequently, the trial court did not err
    by denying Defendant’s MAR on this ground.
    III.   Disproportionality of Mandatory Life Without Parole
    ¶ 29         Defendant finally contends the trial court erred in concluding Defendant’s
    LWOP sentence is not disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.
    Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to
    substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the
    appropriateness of a particular sentence; rather, in applying the
    Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the
    sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of
    the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and
    sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to
    engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not
    constitutionally disproportionate.
    State v. Ysaguire, 
    309 N.C. 780
    , 786, 
    309 S.E.2d 436
    , 440–441 (1983). Moreover,
    “[o]nly in exceedingly unusual non-capital cases will the sentences imposed be so
    grossly disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel
    and unusual punishment.” 
    Id.
     Indeed, our Court has previously “determined that
    the General Assembly ‘acted within permissible bounds in enacting legislation
    designed to identify habitual criminals and to authorize enhanced punishment as
    provided.’ ” Mason, 126 N.C. App. at 321, 
    484 S.E.2d at 820
     (quoting Todd, 313 N.C.
    STATE V. MCDOUGALD
    2022-NCCOA-526
    Opinion of the Court
    at 118, 
    326 S.E.2d at 253
    ). Thus, in accordance with our decision in Mason, the trial
    court did not err in concluding Defendant’s sentence of LWOP for second-degree
    kidnapping is not disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the
    trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s MAR on this basis.
    Conclusion
    ¶ 30         Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s Order denying
    Defendant’s MAR is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges GORE and WOOD concur.