Biggs v. Brooks ( 2022 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-548
    No. COA21-653
    Filed 16 August 2022
    Durham County, No. 15 CVS 2972
    LISA BIGGS, Individually and as Administrator, ESTATE OF KELWIN BIGGS,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    DARYL BROOKS, NATHANIEL BROOKS, SR., KYLE OLLIS, Individually, and
    BOULEVARD PRE-OWNED, INC., Defendants.
    Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 4 May 2017 by Judge W. Osmond Smith,
    III, in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 April 2022.
    Couch & Associates, PC, by Finesse G. Couch and C. Destine A. Couch, for
    plaintiff-appellant.
    Sue, Anderson & Bordman, LLP, by Stephanie W. Anderson, for defendants-
    appellees.
    DIETZ, Judge.
    ¶1         In January 2015, Boulevard Pre-Owned, Inc., a used car business, sold a 1995
    Camaro to Nathaniel Brooks. Nathaniel Brooks and Boulevard executed a bill of sale;
    signed and notarized title transfer forms; and executed various other documents
    typically accompanying the sale of an automobile, such as insurance and registration
    paperwork. After executing this paperwork, an adult relative of Nathaniel Brooks,
    Daryl Brooks, arrived at the dealership and drove the Camaro off the lot.
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶2         Shortly after the sale, the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles rejected
    the title transfer paperwork because Boulevard had misplaced its copy of Nathaniel
    Brooks’s driver’s license. Boulevard tried unsuccessfully to contact Nathaniel Brooks
    multiple times between January and March 2015 to obtain a replacement copy.
    ¶3         Later in March 2015, Daryl Brooks was driving the Camaro while impaired
    and caused a serious automobile accident that led to the death of Kelwin Biggs.
    ¶4         Lisa Biggs, individually and as the representative of Kelwin Biggs, brought
    claims for negligence and negligent entrustment against Boulevard and its owner,
    Kyle Ollis. Biggs relied on a statute, 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-71.1
    , providing that proof
    of ownership of a motor vehicle—in this case the title and registration that had not
    yet been transferred to Nathaniel Brooks—was prima facie evidence that the motor
    vehicle was being operated with the authority, consent, and knowledge of Boulevard,
    the owner, and “being operated by and under the control of a person for whose conduct
    the owner was legally responsible.”
    ¶5         The trial court granted summary judgment for Boulevard and Ollis on these
    negligence claims. Following entry of final judgment against other parties in the case,
    Biggs appealed.
    ¶6         We affirm. As explained below, Boulevard and Ollis presented undisputed
    evidence that Boulevard relinquished authority and control over the Camaro when it
    completed the sale and released the Camaro to the buyer. Under controlling
    BIGGS V. BROOKS
    2022-NCCOA-548
    Opinion of the Court
    precedent from this Court, because Biggs did not forecast any evidence that rebutted
    Boulevard’s evidence and created a genuine issue of material fact on this issue,
    Boulevard and Ollis were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these negligence
    claims. We therefore affirm the trial court’s summary judgment order.
    Facts and Procedural History
    ¶7           Defendant Boulevard Pre-Owned, Inc. is a used car dealership. Defendant Kyle
    Ollis is the president and owner of Boulevard.
    ¶8           In January 2015, Boulevard sold a used 1995 Chevrolet Camaro to Nathaniel
    Brooks. At the time of the sale, the parties executed a bill of sale; signed and notarized
    reassignment of title paperwork on the form required by the North Carolina Division
    of Motor Vehicles; and signed various other paperwork typically accompanying an
    automobile sale such as an arbitration agreement governing the sale, and insurance
    and vehicle registration paperwork.
    ¶9           Following the sale, Daryl Brooks—who is an adult, younger relative of
    Nathaniel Brooks according to the record—arrived at the dealership and picked up
    the Camaro.
    ¶ 10         Although the parties undisputedly intended to transfer title of the Camaro as
    part of this sale, that transfer did not happen. When Boulevard submitted the title
    transfer paperwork to the Division of Motor Vehicles, Boulevard misplaced its copy
    of Nathaniel Brooks’s driver’s license, and the DMV rejected the title transfer for
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    Opinion of the Court
    insufficient documentation. From late January through early March, Boulevard
    called Nathaniel Brooks eight times seeking a replacement copy of his driver’s license
    but never heard back.
    ¶ 11          Two months after the sale, on 11 March 2015, Daryl Brooks was driving the
    Camaro. He was impaired at the time. At a speed of approximately 80 miles per hour,
    Brooks collided with the back of a vehicle occupied by Lisa and Kelwin Biggs. The
    crash pushed the Biggs’s vehicle into oncoming traffic and Kelwin Biggs suffered fatal
    injuries.
    ¶ 12          At the time of the collision, Daryl Brooks was driving with a suspended license
    due to earlier offenses of driving while impaired, driving while license revoked, and
    failure to appear.
    ¶ 13          As part of the crash investigation, the State notified Boulevard that a vehicle
    still titled and registered with the company had been involved in an accident. The
    DMV’s License and Theft Bureau later investigated and cited Boulevard for failure
    to timely deliver title as part of the sale.
    ¶ 14          After obtaining a copy of Nathaniel Brooks’s driver’s license, DMV ultimately
    transferred title of the Camaro to Nathaniel Brooks in late April 2015, long after the
    collision involving the Camaro.
    ¶ 15          Lisa Biggs, individually and as representative of her husband’s estate, sued
    Boulevard and its owner, Kyle Ollis, for negligence, negligent entrustment, emotional
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    Opinion of the Court
    distress, gross negligence, and punitive damages. Biggs also brought claims against
    both Daryl Brooks and Nathaniel Brooks.
    ¶ 16         At summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all claims against Boulevard
    and Ollis. Biggs sought to immediately appeal that ruling, but this Court dismissed
    that interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Biggs v. Brooks, 
    261 N.C. App. 773
    ,
    
    818 S.E.2d 643
     (2018) (unpublished).
    ¶ 17         The case against the remaining defendants was stayed repeatedly over the
    next several years because of Daryl Brooks’s pending criminal trial. In 2017, Brooks
    was convicted and sentenced for second degree murder and other related offenses in
    connection with the crash.
    ¶ 18         Following exhaustion of the criminal appeal process, the civil case against
    Daryl Brooks proceeded to trial. After the trial court entered judgment finding Daryl
    Brooks liable for wrongful death in causing the fatal collision, the court conducted a
    bench trial on compensatory and punitive damages and awarded $10,000,000 in
    damages.
    ¶ 19         In June 2021, following entry of final judgment on all remaining claims in this
    case, Biggs appealed the trial court’s May 2017 order granting summary judgment in
    favor of Boulevard and Kyle Ollis.
    Analysis
    ¶ 20         Biggs challenges the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor
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    Opinion of the Court
    of Defendants Boulevard Pre-Owned, Inc. and Kyle Ollis. We review that order de
    novo. In re Will of Jones, 
    362 N.C. 569
    , 573, 
    669 S.E.2d 572
    , 576 (2008).
    ¶ 21           Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
    judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To survive a motion for summary
    judgment, the non-movant must forecast sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
    of material fact on all essential elements of the asserted claims. Waddle v. Sparks,
    
    331 N.C. 73
    , 82, 
    414 S.E.2d 22
    , 27 (1992).
    I.      Agency theory of liability
    ¶ 22           We begin by addressing the various negligence claims that depend on an
    agency relationship between Daryl Brooks and Boulevard Pre-Owned, Inc.
    ¶ 23           Biggs asserts that Boulevard is liable for Daryl Brooks’s negligence under an
    agency theory that stems from a statutory provision governing ownership of motor
    vehicles. By law, proof of ownership of a motor vehicle at the time of a collision is
    prima facie evidence that the motor vehicle was being operated with the authority,
    consent, and knowledge of the owner and “being operated by and under the control of
    a person for whose conduct the owner was legally responsible”:
    (a) In all actions to recover damages for injury to the person
    or to property or for the death of a person, arising out of an
    accident or collision involving a motor vehicle, proof of
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    Opinion of the Court
    ownership of such motor vehicle at the time of such
    accident or collision shall be prima facie evidence that said
    motor vehicle was being operated and used with the
    authority, consent, and knowledge of the owner in the very
    transaction out of which said injury or cause of action
    arose.
    (b) Proof of the registration of a motor vehicle in the name
    of any person, firm, or corporation, shall for the purpose of
    any such action, be prima facie evidence of ownership and
    that such motor vehicle was then being operated by and
    under the control of a person for whose conduct the owner
    was legally responsible, for the owner’s benefit, and within
    the course and scope of his employment.
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-71.1
    .
    ¶ 24         “The purpose of the section is to facilitate proof of ownership and agency where
    a vehicle is operated by one other than the owner.” Winston v. Brodie, 
    134 N.C. App. 260
    , 266, 
    517 S.E.2d 203
    , 207 (1999). Proof of ownership under Section 20-71.1
    “creates a prima facie case of agency that permits, but does not compel a finding for
    plaintiff.” 
    Id.
     Importantly, Section 20-71.1 is “a rule of evidence and not substantive
    law.” 
    Id.
     This means that the plaintiff “continues to carry the burden of proving an
    agency relationship between the driver and owner at the time of the driver’s
    negligence.” 
    Id.
     The defendant “at no point carries the burden of proof.” 
    Id.
    ¶ 25         As a result, when a plaintiff relies on proof of ownership through this statute,
    “the defendant may offer positive, contradicting evidence which, if believed, would
    establish the absence of an agency relationship.” 
    Id.
     This contradictory evidence
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    Opinion of the Court
    entitles the defendant to “a peremptory instruction that if the jury does believe the
    contrary evidence, it must find for defendant on the agency issue.” 
    Id.
     In other words,
    when the defendant presents evidence contradicting this statutory agency principle,
    the “statutory presumption is not weighed against defendant’s evidence by the trier
    of facts.” DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp., 
    312 N.C. 749
    , 756, 
    325 S.E.2d 223
    , 228 (1985).
    Instead, the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence supporting the agency
    theory. 
    Id.
    ¶ 26         This, in turn, means that, at the summary judgment stage, when a defendant
    forecasts undisputed evidence that rebuts the agency relationship described by
    Section 20-71.1, the plaintiff must forecast at least some evidence, beyond the statute
    itself, that creates a genuine issue of material fact on this question. See Thompson v.
    Three Guys Furniture Co., 
    122 N.C. App. 340
    , 345, 
    469 S.E.2d 583
    , 586 (1996). The
    plaintiff cannot rely solely on the statute in the face of undisputed counter-evidence,
    because the statutory provision alone cannot be weighed against competing evidence
    at trial. DeArmon, 
    312 N.C. at 756
    , 
    325 S.E.2d at 228
    .
    ¶ 27         So, for example, in Thompson, this Court held that summary judgment for the
    defendant was inappropriate after the defendant presented evidence refuting an
    agency relationship because “plaintiff has submitted affidavits pursuant to Rule
    56(e), and thus has presented evidence in addition to the prima facie showing of
    agency provided by G.S. § 20–71.1.” Thompson, 
    122 N.C. App. at 345
    , 469 S.E.2d at
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    Opinion of the Court
    586 (emphasis added). Without that affidavit, raising credibility questions with
    defendant’s own evidence, the statute alone would have been insufficient to survive
    summary judgment. 
    Id.
    ¶ 28         Here, the unique facts of this case make it one of the rare cases where there
    are no genuine issues of fact, and thus the trial court properly entered summary
    judgment in favor of the defendants. It is undisputed that, on 8 January 2015,
    Nathaniel Brooks and Boulevard Pre-Owned, Inc. signed various documents
    collectively representing the sale and intended transfer of ownership of the Camaro
    from Boulevard to Nathaniel Brooks. These included a bill of sale for a total purchase
    price of $7,500 signed by both Brooks and Boulevard; a dealer’s reassignment of title
    on the form issued by the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, signed and
    notarized by both Brooks and Boulevard; vehicle registration information necessary
    to register the vehicle in Brooks’s name; and various other fully executed paperwork
    that often accompanies the purchase of an automobile, such as an arbitration
    agreement concerning the sale transaction, and various loan and insurance
    paperwork.
    ¶ 29         Boulevard and Kyle Ollis also submitted an affidavit from Ollis describing the
    sale of the Camaro to Nathaniel Brooks on 8 January 2015 and testifying that Daryl
    Brooks had no connection to Boulevard and was not an employee or agent of
    Boulevard at any time.
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    ¶ 30            This undisputed evidence demonstrates, as a matter of law, that there was no
    agency relationship between Boulevard and Daryl Brooks. Although the formal
    transfer of title to the Camaro did not occur because Boulevard misplaced its copy of
    Nathaniel Brooks’s driver’s license—and thus was unable to complete the title
    transfer through the DMV—Boulevard relinquished authority and control over the
    Camaro when it completed the sale and released the Camaro to the buyer.
    Accordingly, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of
    Boulevard and Ollis on all claims that depended on the agency theory of liability.1
    II.       Negligent entrustment theory
    ¶ 31            We next examine the negligent entrustment claim. Biggs contends that she
    forecast sufficient evidence of the direct negligence of Boulevard based on the
    company’s negligent entrustment of the Camaro to Daryl Brooks, who had a
    suspended license and a history of driving while impaired.
    ¶ 32            “Negligent entrustment occurs when the owner of an automobile entrusts its
    operation to a person whom he knows, or by the exercise of due care should have
    1Biggs also argues that under “North Carolina General Statutes § 20-279.21(b)(2),
    the owner of the vehicle is liable for the negligent conduct of the driver where the victim’s
    damages were ‘caused by an accident and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use
    of' the owner’s vehicle.”
    Section 20-279.21 is not a liability provision; it is an insurance coverage provision.
    Biggs did not raise this insurance coverage issue in the trial court and cannot assert it for
    the first time on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10. We therefore reject this argument as
    unpreserved.
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    Opinion of the Court
    known, to be an incompetent or reckless driver who is likely to cause injury to others
    in its use.” Thompson, 
    122 N.C. App. at 346
    , 
    469 S.E.2d at
    586–87.
    ¶ 33         There are two fatal flaws with this negligent entrustment theory. First, as
    explained above, undisputed evidence demonstrates that Boulevard relinquished
    authority and control over the Camaro when it completed the sale and title transfer
    paperwork on 8 January 2015, and that Daryl Brooks, when he drove the Camaro off
    Boulevard’s lot, was doing so on behalf of his relative, Nathaniel Brooks, who was the
    buyer of the Camaro and now had authority and control over the vehicle. Thus, the
    undisputed evidence demonstrates that it was not Boulevard who entrusted Daryl
    Brooks with the use of the Camaro at that time, but instead Nathaniel Brooks, who
    had recently purchased the vehicle.
    ¶ 34         Moreover, the collision at issue in this case did not occur when Daryl Brooks
    drove the Camaro off Boulevard’s lot following the sale. It occurred more than two
    months later, on 11 March 2015. There is no evidence in the record that Boulevard
    entrusted Daryl Brooks with the use of the Camaro—over which it relinquished
    authority and control two months earlier—at the time of the collision. Accordingly,
    the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Boulevard and
    Ollis on the negligent entrustment claim as well.
    III.   Remaining claims, legal theories, and requests for damages
    ¶ 35         Having determined that the trial court properly entered summary judgment
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    Opinion of the Court
    in favor of Boulevard and Ollis on all of Biggs’s negligence and negligent entrustment
    claims, we need not address Biggs’s other arguments on appeal—including issues of
    piercing the corporate veil and the award of costs—because these issues necessarily
    depended on rejection of the trial court’s summary judgment ruling on the negligence
    claims. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order in its entirety.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court’s order.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges GRIFFIN and JACKSON concur.