State v. Biddix , 776 S.E.2d 880 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA 15-161
    Filed: 6 October 2015
    Catawba County, No. 13 CRS 2878-79; 50847
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    MARK ALLAN BIDDIX
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 May 2014 by Judge Eric L.
    Levinson in Catawba County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25
    August 2015.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly N.
    Callahan, for the State.
    Tarlton Law PLLC, by Raymond C. Tarlton, for defendant-appellant.
    TYSON, Judge.
    Mark Allan Biddix (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment entered following his
    plea of guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, two counts of conspiracy to
    manufacture methamphetamine, ten counts of possession of an immediate precursor
    chemical used to manufacture methamphetamine, and continuing a criminal
    enterprise. Defendant does not have a statutory right to appeal the issue he has
    raised. This issue is also not a proper subject for review under a petition for writ of
    certiorari. We deny his petition for writ of certiorari and dismiss the appeal.
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    I. Background
    On 20 May 2014, Defendant appeared before the Catawba County Superior
    Court and pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, two counts of conspiracy
    to manufacture methamphetamine, ten counts of possession of an immediate
    precursor chemical used to manufacture methamphetamine, and continuing a
    criminal enterprise.    Defendant also admitted the existence of one statutory
    aggravating factor, that “defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more
    than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous
    to the lives of more than one person.” This aggravating factor was alleged on one of
    the three bills of indictment issued by the grand jury.
    At the plea hearing, the trial court conducted a colloquy with Defendant
    pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022. During the colloquy, Defendant stated he
    was aware that he was pleading guilty to the fourteen charged felonies and admitting
    to the existence of the aggravating factor in exchange for a consolidated, active
    sentence. Defendant was informed that the mandatory and minimum punishment
    was an active sentence of 58 months, and the maximum punishment was 1,500
    months in the Department of Correction. He was also informed that any sentence
    actually imposed rested within the discretion of the trial court. Defendant stated he
    understood the terms of the plea arrangement.
    -2-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    The prosecutor recited the factual basis for the plea to the court. Defendant
    stipulated to the factual basis for entry and acceptance of the plea. Defendant and
    numerous other individuals manufactured methamphetamine inside a residence in
    the town of Long View, North Carolina.          A search warrant was issued for the
    residence. Upon execution of the search, law enforcement discovered an operational
    methamphetamine lab. Chemicals used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine,
    such as pseudoephedrine and lithium, were found inside the residence. Defendant
    was responsible for the manufacturing of the drug. Following the State’s recitation
    of the factual basis, defense counsel stated to the court:
    [Defendant] understands how dangerous it was. He
    understands the aggravating factors that have been
    presented. He understands the danger that he presented
    to others and himself and he’s asking the Court to accept
    the active sentence on the Class C and to consider in
    mitigation that he cooperated when he was asked and that
    . . . his felony record is non-existent up until this point.
    Under the “Plea Arrangement” section on the Transcript of Plea form, the
    document states, “SEE ATTACHED PLEA ARRANGEMENT.” A document entitled
    “Plea Arrangement” is attached to the Transcript of Plea. The document states:
    The defendant shall plead guilty to the charges listed in the
    “Pleas” section on the Transcript of Plea. The defendant
    stipulates that he is a prior record level III with 6 prior
    points for felony sentencing purposes. The State does not
    oppose a consolidated active sentence judgment which
    shall be in the discretion of the Court.
    -3-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    In exchange for this plea and the State not seeking
    aggravating factors that may apply to this case, the
    defendant expressly waives the right to appeal the
    conviction and whatever sentence is imposed on any
    ground, including any appeal right conferred by Article 91
    of the Criminal Procedure Act, and to further waive any
    right to contest the conviction or sentence in any post-
    conviction proceeding under Articles 89 and 92 of the
    Criminal Procedure Act, excepting the defendant’s right to
    appeal for (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2)
    prosecutorial misconduct, (3) a sentence in excess of the
    statutory maximum, and (4) a sentence based on an
    unconstitutional factor, such as race, religion, national
    origin, or gender.
    This plea agreement shall be revocable by the State upon
    defendant’s filing of an appeal and the defendant hereby
    expressly waives his statutory rights that may apply under
    15A-1335. (Emphasis supplied)
    The “Plea Arrangement” document is dated 20 May 2014, the day of
    Defendant’s plea hearing, and is signed by Defendant, defense counsel, and the
    assistant district attorney.
    At the plea hearing, the trial court did not address the language of the “Plea
    Arrangement” under which the State agreed to refrain from seeking aggravating
    factors that may apply to this case. The court determined defendant’s plea was
    entered voluntarily. “Consistent with the arrangement and recommendation,” the
    court consolidated Defendant’s fourteen convictions into one Class C felony judgment.
    The court found the existence of one aggravating factor and one mitigating factor, as
    stipulated by Defendant. The court determined the factor in aggravation outweighed
    -4-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    the factor in mitigation, and sentenced defendant within the aggravated range to a
    minimum of 100 and a maximum of 132 months in prison. No objection or question
    was raised before the trial court to challenge the sentence imposed.        Defendant
    appeals.
    II. Issues
    Defendant argues the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea as a product
    of his informed choice, where the terms of Defendant’s written plea agreement are
    contradictory.
    III. Right of Appeal
    The State has filed a motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal, and argues two
    separate grounds in support of dismissal: (1) Defendant has no statutory right to
    appeal from his guilty plea; and, (2) Defendant failed to give timely notice of appeal.
    We agree that Defendant does not have a statutory right to appeal from the conviction
    entered upon his guilty plea.
    Absent statutory authority, a defendant does not have a right to appeal from
    judgment entered upon his conviction. State v. Pimental, 
    153 N.C. App. 69
    , 72, 
    568 S.E.2d 867
    , 869, disc. review denied, 
    356 N.C. 442
    , 
    573 S.E.2d 163
    (2002). A criminal
    defendant’s right to appeal in a criminal proceeding is entirely a creation of state
    statute. 
    Id. The North
    Carolina General Statutes must specifically set forth the right
    for a criminal defendant to appeal. 
    Id. -5- STATE
    V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    A. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444 governs a defendant’s right to appeal from
    judgment entered upon a guilty plea. A defendant who has entered a plea of guilty
    or no contest in superior court is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of
    whether the sentence imposed: (1) results from an incorrect finding of his prior record
    level; (2) contains a type of sentence disposition that is not statutorily authorized for
    his class of offense and prior record level; or (3) contains a term of imprisonment that
    is not statutorily authorized for his class of offense and prior record level. N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 15A-1444(a2) (2013). The statute further provides:
    (e) Except as provided in subsections (a1) and (a2) of this
    section and G.S. 15A-979 [pertaining to appeals from
    motions to suppress], and except when a motion to
    withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest has been denied, the
    defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of
    right when he has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to
    a criminal charge in the superior court, but he may petition
    the appellate division for review by writ of certiorari. . . .
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e) (2013).
    The issue Defendant has raised on appeal pertaining to the voluntariness of
    his guilty plea is not listed as a ground for appeal in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444.
    Defendant has cited subsection (e) and petitioned this Court to issue the writ of
    certiorari to review the merits of his appeal. Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari
    was filed contemporaneously with his brief.
    B. Appellate Rule 21
    -6-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
    The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate
    circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of
    the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right
    to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take
    timely action, or when no right of appeal from an
    interlocutory order exists, or for review pursuant to
    N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of the trial court
    denying a motion for appropriate relief.
    N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (2013).
    N.C. Gen Stat. § 15A-1444(e) states a defendant who enters a guilty plea may
    seek appellate review through a petition for writ of certiorari. However, Appellate
    Rule 21 only permits our Court to issue the writ of certiorari upon a showing that one
    of the three circumstances set forth in the Rule exists.
    The relationship between Appellate Rule 21 and N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-1444
    has been addressed by our Court on many occasions.
    Where a defendant has no appeal of right, our statute
    provides for defendant to seek appellate review by a
    petition for writ of certiorari. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e).
    However, our appellate rules limit our ability to grant
    petitions for writ of certiorari to cases where: (1) defendant
    lost his right to appeal by failing to take timely action; (2)
    the appeal is interlocutory; or (3) the trial court denied
    defendant’s motion for appropriate relief. N.C. R. App. P.
    21(a)(1) (2003). In considering appellate Rule 21 and N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444, this Court reasoned that since the
    appellate rules prevail over conflicting statutes, we are
    without authority to issue a writ of certiorari except as
    provided in Rule 21.
    -7-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    State v. Jones, 
    161 N.C. App. 60
    , 63, 
    588 S.E.2d 5
    , 8 (2003) (citations omitted); see
    also State v. Nance, 
    155 N.C. App. 773
    , 775, 
    574 S.E.2d 692
    , 693-94 (2003) (defendant
    does not have a right to appeal the issue presented here under G.S. § 15A-1444(a)(a1)
    or (a)(a2), and this Court is without authority under N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) to issue
    a writ of certiorari); State v. Jamerson, 
    161 N.C. App. 527
    , 529, 
    588 S.E.2d 5
    45, 547
    (2003) (where defendant entered a guilty plea, this Court is “without authority to
    review either by right or by certiorari the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
    dismiss the habitual felon indictment or defendant’s assertion the judgment violates
    his constitutional rights”); State v. Dickson, 
    151 N.C. App. 136
    , 138, 
    564 S.E.2d 640
    ,
    641 (2002) (this Court is without authority to issue writ of certiorari where the
    defendant had no statutory right to appeal from his guilty plea, and had not failed to
    take timely action, is not attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order, and is not
    seeking review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1422(c)(3)); accord State v. Sale, __
    N.C. App. __, ___, 
    754 S.E.2d 474
    , 477-78 (2014); State v. Mungo, 
    213 N.C. App. 400
    ,
    404, 
    713 S.E.2d 542
    , 545 (2011); State v. Smith, 
    193 N.C. App. 739
    , 742, 
    668 S.E.2d 612
    , 614 (2008); State v. Hadden, 
    175 N.C. App. 492
    , 497, 
    624 S.E.2d 417
    , 420, cert.
    denied, 
    360 N.C. 486
    , 
    631 S.E.2d 141
    (2006).
    Defendant cites cases in which panels of our Court have elected to issue the
    writ of certiorari to review issues pertaining to entry of the defendant’s guilty plea,
    even though the defendant had no statutory right to appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    -8-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    15A-1444. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 
    163 N.C. App. 191
    , 
    592 S.E.2d 731
    (2004) (holding
    this Court could issue the writ of certiorari to review the defendant’s challenge to the
    trial court’s procedures employed in accepting his guilty plea); State v. Demaio, 
    216 N.C. App. 558
    , 563-64, 
    716 S.E.2d 863
    , 866-67 (2011) (holding this Court could issue
    the writ of certiorari to review the defendant’s argument that his plea was not the
    product of informed choice); see also State v. Blount, 
    209 N.C. App. 340
    , 345, 
    703 S.E.2d 921
    , 925 (2011); State v. Keller, 
    198 N.C. App. 639
    , 641, 
    680 S.E.2d 212
    , 213
    (2009); State v. Carriker, 
    180 N.C. App. 470
    , 471, 
    637 S.E.2d 557
    , 558 (2006); State v.
    Carter, 
    167 N.C. App. 582
    , 585, 
    605 S.E.2d 676
    , 678 (2004).
    In State v. Bolinger, the defendant contended the trial judge violated N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 15A-1022 by accepting his guilty plea. 
    320 N.C. 596
    , 601, 359 SE.2d 459, 462
    (1987). Our Supreme Court held that “defendant is not entitled as a matter of right
    to appellate review of his contention that the trial court improperly accepted his
    guilty plea.” 
    Id. at 601,
    359 S.E.2d at 462. The Court further held that “[d]efendant
    may obtain appellate review of this issue only upon grant of a writ of certiorari.” 
    Id. Defendant failed
    to petition the Court for a writ of certiorari, and the Court
    nonetheless elected to review the merits of the defendant’s argument. 
    Id. In Bolinger,
    our Supreme Court did not cite nor address Appellate Rule 21.
    The Court stated: “Neither party to this appeal appears to have recognized the
    limited bases for appellate review of judgments entered upon pleas of guilty. For this
    -9-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    reason we nevertheless choose to review the merits of defendant’s contention.” 
    Id. In cases
    which precede Bollinger, our Supreme Court has specifically stated where there
    is a conflict between the General Statutes and the Appellate Rules, the Appellate
    Rules control. State v. Bennett, 
    308 N.C. 530
    , 535, 
    302 S.E.2d 786
    , 790 (1983); State
    v. Elam, 
    302 N.C. 157
    , 160-61, 
    273 S.E.2d 661
    , 664 (1981).
    Numerous panels of this Court have addressed the issue of whether Rule 21
    controls the conflicting provisions contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444. In cases
    which predate both Rhodes and Demaio, this Court has held it does not have the
    authority to issue the writ of certiorari unless the defendant has failed to take timely
    action, is attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order, or is seeking review of an
    order of the trial court denying a motion for appropriate relief. 
    Dickson, 151 N.C. App. at 138
    , 564 S.E.2d at 641; 
    Pimental, 153 N.C. App. at 76-77
    , 568 S.E.2d at 872;
    
    Jamerson, 161 N.C. App. at 529
    , 588 S.E.2d at 547.
    We are bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court and by prior decisions of
    another panel of our Court addressing the same question, unless overturned by an
    intervening decision from a higher court. In re Civil Penalty, 
    324 N.C. 373
    , 384, 
    379 S.E.2d 30
    , 37 (1989). Where apparent inconsistency exists between precedents of this
    Court, the oldest controlling case prevails. State v. Harris, __ N.C. App. __, __ S.E.2d
    __ (2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 767, filed 15 September 2015).
    IV. Conclusion
    - 10 -
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant does not raise any of the issues set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
    1444(a2), and does not have a statutory right to appeal from the judgment entered
    upon his guilty plea. The provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
    which provide the appropriate circumstances for this Court’s issuance of the writ of
    certiorari, prevail over § 15A-1444(e). 
    Bennett, 308 N.C. at 535
    , 302 S.E.2d at 790;
    
    Elam, 302 N.C. at 160-61
    , 273 S.E.2d at 664; Sale, __ N.C. App. at __, 754 S.E.2d at
    477-78.
    Under Appellate Rule 21, the issue Defendant has raised is not appropriate for
    the issuance of the writ of certiorari.     We deny Defendant’s petition for writ of
    certiorari. We are without authority to review, either by right or by certiorari, the
    trial court’s judgment entered upon Defendant’s plea of guilty. Defendant’s appeal is
    dismissed.
    DISMISSED.
    Judge BRYANT concurs.
    Judge GEER concurs in a separate opinion.
    - 11 -
    No. COA15-161 – State v. Biddix
    GEER, Judge, concurring in the result only.
    I agree with the majority opinion that defendant has no right to appeal, and I
    do not believe that this Court should, in this case, grant review by writ of certiorari.
    I cannot, however, agree with the majority’s attempt to effectively overrule decisions
    of prior panels of this Court and a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
    The majority asserts that State v. Rhodes, 
    163 N.C. App. 191
    , 
    592 S.E.2d 731
    (2004),
    and State v. Demaio, 
    216 N.C. App. 558
    , 
    716 S.E.2d 863
    (2011), are not controlling
    authority because they conflict with “decisions of our Supreme Court and by prior
    decisions of another panel of our Court addressing the same question[.]”
    In fact, Rhodes was squarely based on a Supreme Court holding that review
    pursuant to grant of a writ of certiorari was permissible when the trial court did not
    follow required procedures in accepting a guilty plea:
    In [State v.] Bolinger, [
    320 N.C. 596
    , 
    359 S.E.2d 459
                 (1987)], the defendant contended that the trial judge
    violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 (2003) in accepting his
    guilty plea.    Our Supreme Court recognized that a
    challenge to the procedures followed in accepting a guilty
    plea does not fall within the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
    1444 (2003), specifying the grounds giving rise to an appeal
    as of right.     320 N.C. at 
    601, 359 S.E.2d at 462
    .
    Accordingly, the Court held that “defendant is not entitled
    as a matter of right to appellate review of his contention
    that the trial court improperly accepted his guilty plea.”
    
    Id. The Court
    further held that “[d]efendant may obtain
    appellate review of this issue only upon grant of a writ of
    certiorari.” 
    Id. Although the
    defendant had failed to
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Geer, J., concurring in the result
    petition the Court for a writ of certiorari, the Court
    nonetheless elected to review the merits of the defendant’s
    contentions. 
    Id. at 602,
    359 S.E.2d at 462.
    Under Bolinger, defendant in this case is not entitled
    to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right, but his
    arguments may be reviewed pursuant to a petition for writ
    of 
    certiorari. 163 N.C. App. at 193
    , 592 S.E.2d at 732.
    This Court emphasized: “Although not argued by the State, we note that if
    defendant were not challenging the procedures employed in accepting a guilty plea,
    the decisions in State v. Dickson, 
    151 N.C. App. 136
    , 137-38, 
    564 S.E.2d 640
    , 640-41
    (2002) and State v. Pimental, 
    153 N.C. App. 69
    , 76-77, 
    568 S.E.2d 867
    , 872, disc.
    review denied, 
    356 N.C. 442
    , 
    573 S.E.2d 163
    (2002) would apply.” 
    Id. In short,
    this Court in Rhodes recognized that it was bound by the Supreme
    Court’s decision in Bolinger and this Court’s opinions in Dickson and Pimental to the
    extent that the latter two opinions did not conflict with Bolinger. Rhodes has since
    been cited repeatedly by this Court as controlling authority in cases challenging
    guilty plea procedures. See, e.g., State v. Blount, 
    209 N.C. App. 340
    , 345, 
    703 S.E.2d 921
    , 925 (2011); State v. Keller, 
    198 N.C. App. 639
    , 641, 
    680 S.E.2d 212
    , 213 (2009);
    State v. Carriker, 
    180 N.C. App. 470
    , 471, 
    637 S.E.2d 557
    , 558 (2006); State v. Carter,
    
    167 N.C. App. 582
    , 585, 
    605 S.E.2d 676
    , 678 (2004). The majority is bound by
    Bolinger, Rhodes, and the opinions of other panels of this Court following Bolinger
    and Rhodes. Since, however, I do not believe that defendant has made an adequate
    -2-
    STATE V. BIDDIX
    Geer, J., concurring in the result
    showing under Bolinger and Rhodes to warrant review by certiorari, I respectfully
    concur in the result.
    -3-