Credit Union Auto Buying Serv., Inc. v. Burkshire Props. Grp. Corp. , 243 N.C. App. 12 ( 2015 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA15-187
    Filed: 15 September 2015
    Forsyth County, No. 14 CVS 3592
    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff,
    v.
    BURKSHIRE PROPERTIES GROUP CORP., JOSEPH FELIX STREVELL and
    CHAUNCEY STREVELL, all individually and D/B/A JOE’S GARAGE and RJC
    TRADING COMPANY; STATE LINE AUTO AUCTION, INC., STRAIGHT LINE,
    L.L.C., Defendants.
    Appeal by defendant Straight Line, L.L.C., from order entered 13 November
    2014 by Judge Anderson D. Cromer in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the
    Court of Appeals 26 August 2015.
    Spillman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, by Bryan G. Scott, for plaintiff-appellee.
    Connors Morgan, PLLC, by Jeffrey T. Workman and Daniel W. Koenig, for
    defendant-appellant.
    ZACHARY, Judge.
    Where the property at issue was located in North Carolina, the trial court did
    not err in exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction over the controversy.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    Credit Union Auto Buying Service, Inc. (appellee CUABS) is a not-for-profit
    corporation organized under North Carolina law, with its principal place of business
    in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. CUABS is an automobile dealer that sells cars,
    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the Court
    primarily to credit unions. State Line Auto Auction, Inc. (State Line) is a company
    incorporated in New York, with its principal place of business in Waverly, New York.
    State Line acts as a broker for vehicle sales at its auction location in Waverly.
    Burkshire Properties Group Corp., doing business as Joe’s Garage and RJC Trading
    Company, (Burkshire) is another corporation organized under New York law with its
    place of business in New York; it is owned by Joseph Felix Strevell and Chauncey
    Strevell (the Strevells).
    Burkshire purchased vehicles from State Line under a line of credit extended
    by Straight Line, L.L.C. (appellant Straight Line).            Appellant Straight Line
    maintained a security interest in the vehicles and retained the certificates of title to
    the vehicles as collateral.    All transactions between Burkshire, State Line, and
    appellant Straight Line occurred in New York.
    Appellee CUABS began purchasing vehicles from Burkshire in January of
    2013. Appellee CUABS would pay money to Burkshire to cover the price of the
    vehicles, the buyer’s fees, fees to transfer certificates of title, and fees for delivery of
    the vehicles to North Carolina for resale. In April of 2014, Burkshire failed to provide
    to appellee CUABS the certificates of title for 46 vehicles that appellee CUABS had
    purchased. The vehicles at issue had been purchased by Burkshire at a State Line
    auction with financing provided by appellant Straight Line, and appellant Straight
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    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Line claimed a security interest in the vehicles. Burkshire delivered these vehicles
    to appellee CUABS in North Carolina.
    On 10 June 2014, appellee CUABS brought this action against Burkshire, the
    Strevells, State Line, and appellant Straight Line, alleging breach of contract and
    unjust enrichment, and seeking a declaratory judgment and specific performance. On
    25 August 2014, appellant Straight Line moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
    Rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure due to an alleged lack of
    personal jurisdiction. On 13 November 2014, the trial court denied this motion.
    Appellant Straight Line filed timely notice of appeal.
    II. Standard of Review
    As a general rule, denial of a motion to dismiss is deemed to be interlocutory,
    and is not immediately reviewable by this Court. An exception lies, however, as
    concerns a denial of a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 1-277 “allows a party to immediately appeal an order that . . . constitutes
    an adverse ruling as to personal jurisdiction.” Can Am S., LLC v. State, ___ N.C. App.
    ___, ___, 
    759 S.E.2d 304
    , 307, review denied, 
    367 N.C. 791
    , 
    766 S.E.2d 624
    (2014).
    This right of immediate appeal “is limited to rulings on ‘minimum contacts’ questions,
    the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).” Love v. Moore, 
    305 N.C. 575
    , 581, 
    291 S.E.2d 141
    , 146 (1982). Accordingly, this matter is proper for review by this Court at this
    time.
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    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Additionally, it is well established that:
    [t]he determination of whether jurisdiction is statutorily
    and constitutionally permissible due to contact with the
    forum is a question of fact. The standard of [appellate]
    review of an order determining personal jurisdiction is
    whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported
    by competent evidence in the record; if so, this Court must
    affirm the order of the trial court.
    Wyatt v. Walt Disney World Co., 
    151 N.C. App. 158
    , 163, 
    565 S.E.2d 705
    , 708 (2002)
    (quoting Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 
    133 N.C. App. 139
    , 140–141, 
    515 S.E.2d 46
    , 48 (1999)).
    III. Personal Jurisdiction
    Appellant Straight Line contends that the trial court erred in denying its
    motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We disagree.
    The appropriate exercise of personal jurisdiction by our courts is determined
    first by the existence of a statutory basis for the exercise of jurisdictional authority,
    and second by the dictates of federal due process.
    The trial court in the instant case exercised quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
    controversy pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.8. This statute provides that quasi in
    rem jurisdiction may be invoked “[w]hen the subject of the action is real or personal
    property in this State and the defendant has or claims any lien or interest therein, or
    the relief demanded consists wholly or partially in excluding the defendant from any
    interest or lien therein.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.8(1) (2013). In the instant case,
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    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the Court
    appellee CUABS’s claim concerned the security interest in several vehicles it had
    purchased and the certificates of title to said vehicles.
    Even though quasi in rem jurisdiction is provided by statute, such jurisdiction
    must also meet the standards of federal law. “[T]he final determinative factor is
    whether the nonresident defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum
    state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
    play and substantial justice.’” Canterbury v. Monroe Lange Hardwood Imports Div.
    of Macrose Indus. Corp., 
    48 N.C. App. 90
    , 93, 
    268 S.E.2d 868
    , 870 (1980) (quoting
    International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
    , 316, 
    90 L. Ed. 95
    , 102 (1945)).
    There are two forms of personal jurisdiction which might bring this case within the
    jurisdiction of North Carolina courts: specific jurisdiction, in which the controversy
    arises from a defendant’s contact with the forum state; and general jurisdiction, in
    which, although the controversy is unrelated to defendant’s activities within the
    forum, sufficient contacts exist between defendant and the forum so as to permit
    jurisdiction. 
    Wyatt, 151 N.C. at 165
    , 565 S.E.2d at 709. Specific jurisdiction exists if
    the defendant has purposely directed his conduct towards a resident of the forum
    state, and thereby “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
    in-state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the forum state’s laws,”
    whereas general jurisdiction exists if the defendant has continuous and systematic
    contacts with the forum state. 
    Id. at 165,
    565 S.E.2d at 710.
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    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the Court
    The United States Supreme Court has held that “when claims to the property
    itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the
    defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have
    jurisdiction.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 
    433 U.S. 186
    , 207, 
    53 L. Ed. 2d 683
    , 700 (1977). This
    Court, relying on Shaffer, has upheld jurisdiction where the property at issue was
    located in North Carolina. For example, in Canterbury, the plaintiff, based in West
    Virginia, sought and obtained an order of attachment on a quantity of lumber owned
    by the defendant, a New York corporation. The lumber in question was located in
    North Carolina. The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint alleging that he had
    sold the lumber to the defendant and, pursuant to the defendant’s orders, shipped it
    to North Carolina. The defendant, in its answer, moved to dismiss the complaint for
    lack of jurisdiction. The trial court entered an order dismissing the complaint, and
    the plaintiff appealed. 
    Canterbury, 48 N.C. App. at 91-92
    , 268 S.E.2d at 869.
    On appeal, this Court held that statutory grounds existed for the exercise of
    personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.8, and then found a
    combination of several factors that established the requisite connection between the
    defendant and the forum: (1) the presence of the lumber in the forum state; (2) the
    relationship of the lumber to the controversy; (3) the defendant’s specific instruction
    to ship the lumber to North Carolina; and (4) the tangible nature of the property, as
    lumber is a physical object over which a court may exercise jurisdiction. 
    Id. at 93-95,
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    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the 
    Court 268 S.E.2d at 870-71
    .     Based on these factors, we held that jurisdiction was
    appropriate.
    The instant case presents similar facts. The vehicles in question are located
    in North Carolina, and their ownership is central to the controversy.        Further,
    appellant Straight Line was not unaware of the vehicles’ destination. In its responses
    to appellee CUABS’s interrogatories, appellant Straight Line acknowledged that it
    was aware that Burkshire “was purchasing vehicles at State Line Auto Auction to
    eventually send to a Burkshire customer in North Carolina.” Appellant Straight Line
    was informed that the North Carolina customer “paid Burkshire thirty days after any
    vehicles were purchased at the auction, thus necessitating Straight Line’s financing.”
    These conversations between Burkshire and appellant Straight Line took place in
    late June and early July of 2013.       On 26 July 2013, after having had these
    conversations and having been made aware of the destination of the vehicles it was
    financing, appellant Straight Line signed a financing and security agreement with
    Burkshire. Although appellant Straight Line did not direct the vehicles to be shipped
    to North Carolina, appellant had no reason to doubt that any challenge to its security
    interest would occur here. Lastly, the tangible nature of the vehicles as the subject
    of controversy and as objects over which quasi in rem jurisdiction can be exercised is
    parallel to that of the lumber in Canterbury. As the facts in the instant case satisfy
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    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the Court
    the same reasoning as Canterbury, it is evident that quasi in rem jurisdiction was
    appropriately exercised in this case.
    Appellant Straight Line makes extensive arguments regarding the fact that,
    aside from this transaction, it has had no contact with North Carolina. Appellant
    Straight Line contends that North Carolina has neither specific nor general
    jurisdiction over it, and that it would be unconstitutional to exercise quasi in rem
    jurisdiction under those circumstances.
    Even assuming arguendo that appellant Straight Line has had no contact with
    North Carolina beyond this transaction, the controversy at hand concerns a number
    of vehicles in which appellant Straight Line claims a security interest. These vehicles
    were purchased by a North Carolina plaintiff and the vehicles are located in North
    Carolina. Moreover, appellant Straight Line had prior knowledge that these vehicles
    would be sold in North Carolina. Shaffer and Canterbury make quite clear that the
    presence of these vehicles in the State is a perfectly reasonable basis upon which a
    trial court could find the existence of quasi in rem jurisdiction, as their presence
    constitutes evidence of contact with the State. We hold that the trial court’s finding
    of contact is supported by this evidence, and that the trial court did not err in denying
    appellant Straight Line’s motion to dismiss.
    This argument is without merit.
    AFFIRMED.
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    CREDIT UNION AUTO BUYING SERV., INC. V. BURKSHIRE PROPS. GRP. CORP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Judges STEPHENS and McCULLOUGH concur.
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