State v. Williams , 796 S.E.2d 823 ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-592
Filed: 7 March 2017
Iredell County, No. 15 CRS 3580
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TEON JAMELL WILLIAMS, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 1 February 2016 and order
entered 3 February 2016 by Judge Julia Lynn Gullett in Iredell County Superior
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 2017.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas O.
Lawton, III, for the State.
Meghan Adelle Jones for the Defendant.
DILLON, Judge.
Teon Jamell Williams (“Defendant”) entered an Alford plea to possession with
intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver (“PWIMSD”) a Schedule I controlled substance
and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant reserved the right to appeal the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his
residence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
STATE V. WILLIAMS
Opinion of the Court
In 2013, during a routine search of Defendant’s residence, Defendant’s
probation officer discovered a bag containing a white, powdery substance. Laboratory
results determined that the bag contained two separate Schedule I substances,
Methylone and 4-Methylethcathinone. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89(5)(j) (2013).
Defendant was indicted for PWIMSD “Methylethcathinone,” where the prefix
“4” was inadvertently omitted from the drug name, and for PWIMSD Methylone.
Prior to his trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial
court. He was convicted on both counts and given consecutive sentences. In the first
appeal to this Court, we affirmed Defendant’s conviction for PWIMSD Methylone;
however, we vacated Defendant’s conviction for PWIMSD “Methylethcathinone”
because the name of the controlled substance, an essential element of the crime, was
not properly alleged in the indictment. State v. Williams, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 774
S.E.2d 880, 885-86 (2015) (unpublished).
In 2015, the State indicted Defendant for PWIMSD “4-Methylethcathinone”
rather than simply “Methylethcathinone.” Defendant filed a motion to suppress
which was functionally identical to the motion to suppress he filed prior to his first
trial. The trial court denied the second motion to suppress based on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, stating that the motion “relate[d] to the same chain of events and
same transaction and occurrence . . . and relate[d] to the same issues” as Defendant’s
first motion to suppress heard prior to the first appeal.
-2-
STATE V. WILLIAMS
Opinion of the Court
Following the denial of his second suppression motion, Defendant was found
guilty PWIMSD of 4-Methylethcathinone, a Schedule I substance, and was sentenced
accordingly. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.1
II. Analysis
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him a
second time for possession of what he contends was a single Schedule I substance.
Alternatively, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. We shall address each argument in turn.
A. Sentencing
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly convicted him of
PWIMSD 4-Methylethcathinone where he had already been convicted and sentenced
for PWIMSD Methylone because both substances were mixed together in the same
bag. Defendant’s argument is one of statutory interpretation, specifically the
language in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89 is the statute which classifies certain substances as
Schedule I controlled substances. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89(5) defines the relevant class
of Schedule I substances as “[a]ny material, compound, mixture, or preparation that
contains any quantity of the [listed] substances[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89(5)
1 To the extent that it may be necessary to correct any jurisdictional defect due to Defendant’s
failure to properly preserve grounds for his appeal, we hereby invoke Rule 2 of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure to address the merits of Defendant’s appeal. Defendant’s petition for
certiorari is therefore denied.
-3-
STATE V. WILLIAMS
Opinion of the Court
(emphasis added). Methylone and 4-Methylethcathinone, the substances found in the
bag in Defendant’s residence, are included in Subsection (5)(j) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-
89 as Schedule I controlled substances.
Defendant argues that, based on the words used by the General Assembly in
subsection (5) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89, it is the mixture that is the Schedule I
substance, not the individual listed substances therein. Essentially, Defendant
contends that because the “Methylone” and “4-Methylethcathinone” were found in
the same mixture, they constitute a single Schedule I controlled substance for
purposes of criminal prosecution. As Defendant’s argument goes, had the General
Assembly intended for these two substances found in the same mixture to be
punishable as two separate offenses, the General Assembly would have described a
Schedule I substance to include “any of the following substances found in a mixture,”
rather than to include “any mixture [] that contains” the listed substances. While
Defendant’s argument may have some logical appeal, we hold that Defendant was
properly subject to prosecution for two separate offenses.
We note that our Court has already rejected the argument advanced by
Defendant in another case where our Court affirmed a defendant’s convictions of
possession of ecstasy and possession of ketamine, where the ecstasy and ketamine
were in the same pill. State v. Hall, 203 N.C. App. 712, 716-18, 692 S.E.2d 446, 450-
51 (2010). In Hall, the defendant argued that she could not be sentenced for
-4-
STATE V. WILLIAMS
Opinion of the Court
possession of both ecstasy and ketamine because the statutes in question “[did] not
allow the State to charge separate offenses when there is a mixture.” Id. at 717, 692
S.E.2d at 450. We rejected this argument, reasoning as follows:
Defendant’s argument misses the mark. The quantity of
ecstasy and ketamine contained in each pill found in
Defendant’s possession was irrelevant to Defendant’s
convictions. Any amount of ecstasy and any amount of
ketamine found in Defendant’s possession would have been
sufficient to charge Defendant with possession of both
controlled substances. . . . A person will be deemed “to
possess” ecstasy if that person is in possession of “[a]ny . . .
mixture . . . which contains any quantity of [ecstasy].”
Likewise, a person is considered “to possess” ketamine if
that person is in possession of “[a]ny . . . mixture . . . which
contains any quantity of . . . Ketamine.” Neither the
presence nor the amount of ecstasy contained in each pill
had any bearing on Defendant’s conviction for possession
of ketamine, and vice versa. Accordingly, the double
jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment were not
implicated in this instance.
Id. at 717-18, 692 S.E.2d at 451 (internal citations omitted).
As in the present case, the applicable statutes in Hall both defined the
controlled substance as “any . . . mixture . . . which contains any quantity of [the
relevant substance]”; however, we nonetheless concluded that the defendant could be
punished for two offenses where two different drugs are found in the same “material,
compound, mixture, or preparation.” Id. Defendant’s argument, while creative,
ignores the quantitative element of the statute: possession of “[a]ny material,
compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity” of a Schedule I
-5-
STATE V. WILLIAMS
Opinion of the Court
controlled substance is sufficient to charge a defendant with possession of the
particular substance and to support a conviction for possession of the substance. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 90-89(5); see Hall, 203 N.C. App. at 717-18, 692 S.E.2d at 451.
Defendant contends that Hall is distinguishable because the defendant in Hall
was convicted of possession of a Schedule I substance and a Schedule III substance,
rather than two Schedule I substances. However, we do not believe that the Court’s
reasoning in Hall is limited to a situation where a person may be convicted for
possession of two controlled substances listed in separate schedules – it is equally
applicable where a defendant is convicted of possession of two separate, distinct
Schedule I substances. Applying the reasoning in Hall to the present case, we must
conclude that “neither the presence nor the amount of [Methylone] contained in [the
bag] had any bearing on Defendant’s conviction for possession of [4-
Methylethcathinone], and vice versa.” See id. at 718, 692 S.E.2d at 451.
B. Motion to Suppress
Defendant’s second argument on appeal relates to the trial court’s denial of his
second motion to suppress based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
After Defendant was indicted for PWIMSD 4-Methylethcathinone following his
first appeal to this Court, he filed a motion to suppress in the trial court which was
practically identical to the motion to suppress he filed after he was first – incorrectly
– indicted for PWIMSD Methylethcathinone. When Defendant filed the first motion
-6-
STATE V. WILLIAMS
Opinion of the Court
to suppress, the trial court held a full hearing, during which it received evidence and
ultimately denied the motion. In its ruling on Defendant’s second motion to suppress,
the trial court noted that the second motion “relate[d] to the same chain of events and
same transaction and occurrence as [the first motion to suppress] and relate[d] to the
same issues.”
Collateral estoppel precludes parties from “retrying fully litigated issues that
were decided in any prior determination and were necessary to the prior
determination.” King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 356, 200 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1973)
(internal marks omitted). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to both civil and
criminal actions. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948). Proper
application of collateral estoppel requires: (1) the same parties, (2) the same issue,
(3) that the issue was raised and actually litigated in the prior action, (4) that the
issue was material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action, and (5) that the
determination of the issue was necessary and essential to the prior judgment. State
v. Dial, 122 N.C. App. 298, 306, 470 S.E.2d 84, 89 (1996) (citing King, 284 N.C. at
358, 200 S.E.2d at 806).
It may be true, as Defendant argues, that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the PWIMSD 4-Methylethcathinone charge during the suppression hearing held
prior to the first appeal to this Court. However, “collateral estoppel” involves “issue
preclusion,” not “claim preclusion.” The issue in the second suppression hearing was
-7-
STATE V. WILLIAMS
Opinion of the Court
the same as the issue decided in the first suppression hearing regarding Defendant’s
possession of Methylone; namely, whether the bag was lawfully discovered. When
our Court vacated Defendant’s conviction for PWIMSD Methylethcathinone, it left
Defendant’s conviction for PWIMSD Methylone undisturbed, which included the trial
court’s conclusion that the bag was lawfully discovered.
Therefore, the trial court properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel
when it denied Defendant’s second motion to suppress because: (1) the parties were
the same, (2) the issues raised by the motion to suppress were the same – whether
the bag containing the powdery substance was lawfully obtained from Defendant’s
residence, (3) the issues raised were raised and fully litigated during the trial court’s
hearing on Defendant’s first motion to suppress, (4) the issue was material and
relevant to the disposition of the prior action, and (5) the trial court’s determination
was necessary and essential to the final judgment – Defendant’s conviction of
PWIMSD Methylone.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s
second motion to suppress based on collateral estoppel.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and ZACHARY concur.
-8-