Frank v. Charlotte Symphony , 255 N.C. App. 269 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-211
    Filed: 5 September 2017
    North Carolina Industrial Commission, I.C. No. 14-743149
    CYNTHIA FRANK, Employee, Plaintiff,
    v.
    CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY, Employer, and SELECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
    OF AMERICA, Carrier, Defendants.
    Appeal by plaintiff from an opinion and award entered 7 December 2016 by the
    Full North Carolina Industrial Commission.        Heard in the Court of Appeals 23
    August 2017.
    Seth M. Bernanke for plaintiff-appellant.
    Rudisill, White & Kaplan, P.L.L.C., by Garth H. White, for defendant-appellees.
    TYSON, Judge.
    Cynthia Frank (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the Opinion and Award of the North
    Carolina Industrial Commission (“Commission”), which determined the amount of
    her average weekly wages and compensation rate. We affirm the Commission’s
    Opinion and Award.
    I. Background
    Plaintiff was employed by the Charlotte Symphony Orchestra (“Defendant-
    Employer”) as a violist. On 24 June 2012, Plaintiff filed a Form 18 (“Notice of
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    Accident to Employer and Claim of Employee, Representative, or Dependent”) with
    the Commission. She alleged sustaining a compensable injury and/or occupational
    disease to her right shoulder. Plaintiff listed her average weekly wages as “$760.00+”
    on the Form 18, and stated both the number of hours per day and the days of the
    week she worked “varies.” Plaintiff listed her date of injury as 15 December 2013.
    Defendant-Employer and its insurance carrier (collectively, “Defendants”) filed
    a Form 61 (“Denial of Workers’ Compensation Claim”). Plaintiff’s claim was heard
    before the deputy commissioner on 22 June 2015. Prior to the hearing, Defendants
    accepted Plaintiff’s shoulder injury as compensable. The parties agreed the only issue
    to be determined by the deputy commissioner was the calculation of Plaintiff’s
    average weekly wages.
    The deputy commissioner issued her Opinion and Award and determined
    Plaintiff’s average weekly wages to be $757.94, which produced a compensation rate
    of $505.32. Plaintiff appealed the determination of her average weekly wages to the
    Commission.
    By Opinion and Award dated 7 December 2016, the Commission unanimously
    affirmed the deputy commissioner’s determination of Plaintiff’s average weekly
    wages and compensation rate. Plaintiff appeals.
    II. Jurisdiction
    -2-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    Jurisdiction lies in this Court from opinion and award of the Commission
    pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-86
     and 7A-27(b) (2015).
    III. Average Weekly Wages
    Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal asserts the Commission erred by applying
    the incorrect method under 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5) (2015) to calculate her average
    weekly wages. We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
    This Court reviews an opinion and award of the Commission to determine
    whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the
    conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact. Barham v. Food World, 
    300 N.C. 329
    , 331, 
    266 S.E.2d 676
    , 678 (1980).        However, “[t]his Court reviews the
    Commission’s conclusions of law de novo.” McLaughlin v. Staffing Solutions, 
    206 N.C. App. 137
    , 143, 
    696 S.E.2d 839
    , 844 (2004) (citation omitted).
    “The determination of the plaintiff’s ‘average weekly wages’ requires
    application of the definition set forth in the Workers’ Compensation Act, [
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5)], and the case law construing that statute and thus raises an issue of
    law, not fact.” Swain v. C & N Evans Trucking Co., 
    126 N.C. App. 332
    , 335-36, 
    484 S.E.2d 845
    , 848 (1997).
    B. Commission’s Findings
    -3-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    No testimony was presented to the Commission as the parties stipulated to the
    facts:
    1. Plaintiff has been employed as a violist with Defendant-
    Employer for 17 years.
    2. Plaintiff’s contracts for the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014
    seasons and the referenced collective bargaining
    agreements for that period are stipulated. Wage
    printouts from the Defendant-Employer are stipulated.
    W-2 and contract from the Chautauqua Symphony are
    stipulated.
    3. Defendant-Employer’s regular season yearly runs from
    September through May. Each musician’s individual
    contract specifies a weekly wage. In addition, there are
    additional payments available, such as “move up” pay,
    which compensates the musician for sitting in at a
    higher level for an absent colleague; broadcast pay, for
    when the concert is recorded; overtime for special or
    specific programs; and seniority pay. Plaintiff also
    received additional compensation through the
    Defendant-Employer for clinics she taught at local high
    schools.
    4. Defendant-Employer operates a summer season, which
    usually runs 4 weeks in June and July. Participation in
    the summer season is optional for all musicians but, if
    a musician plays during the summer season, the
    musician is compensated at the weekly rate provided in
    the individual contract.
    5. Rehearsals and concerts are called “services.” Each
    regular season runs the number of weeks specified in
    the contract. Both the 2012-2013 regular season and the
    2013-2014 regular season were 33 weeks. During the
    course of the regular season, there are three weeks that
    are designated as vacation weeks. There are no services
    scheduled during the off season. Any week that has no
    -4-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    services scheduled and is not a designated vacation
    week is a layoff week. For all layoff weeks, musicians
    may file for unemployment checks from the N.C.
    Division of Employment Security. Until recently,
    Defendant-Employer applied for unemployment on
    behalf of its musicians. If a musician elects not to
    participate in the summer season, the musician cannot
    receive unemployment during that four week period.
    During 2013, plaintiff collected 3 weeks of
    unemployment benefits at a weekly rate of $535.00 per
    week. These benefits were charged to Defendant-
    Employer.
    6. The collective bargaining agreement expressly allows
    the musicians to have other employment as long as it
    does not interfere with performance of the contracted
    services. Even if it does conflict, there is a procedure by
    which the musician can request leave.
    7. In the summer of 2013, Plaintiff played for Defendant-
    Employer for two weeks out of the four-week summer
    season. Plaintiff played all 33 weeks of the portions of
    the 2012-2013 season and 2013-2014 that fell in the
    calendar year 2013. Therefore, of the 52 weeks
    preceding Plaintiff's accepted date of injury, December
    15, 2013, Plaintiff performed services for Defendant-
    Employer a total of 36 weeks. In the year prior to the
    injury date in this claim, the vacation weeks were
    December 24, 2012 through January 6, 2013 and March
    4, 2013 through March 10, 2013. (emphasis supplied).
    8. Plaintiff’s gross wages from Defendant-Employer for
    the 52 weeks preceding Plaintiff’s date of injury were
    $39,412.83, a figure which includes all compensation
    referenced in paragraph 3 above.
    9. For several years, including 2013, Plaintiff has worked
    during the summers as a violist for the Chautauqua
    Symphony in New York state. The Chautauqua season
    begins in the first week of July and continues for eight
    -5-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    weeks. Plaintiff’s weekly wages for this job were set by
    contract at $1,080.00 gross compensation per week.
    They also paid her approximately $6,000.00 as a
    housing allowance for the season. Plaintiff’s
    employment for the Chautauqua Symphony and
    Defendant-Employer did not overlap and was not
    concurrent.
    C. Statutory Methods for Calculating Average Weekly Wages
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5) governs the determination of an injured employee’s
    average weekly wages:
    (5) Average Weekly Wages. -- [1] “Average weekly wages”
    shall mean the earnings of the injured employee in the
    employment in which the employee was working at the
    time of the injury during the period of 52 weeks
    immediately preceding the date of the injury . . . divided by
    52; [2] but if the injured employee lost more than seven
    consecutive calendar days at one or more times during such
    period, although not in the same week, then the earnings
    for the remainder of such 52 weeks shall be divided by the
    number of weeks remaining after the time so lost has been
    deducted. [3] Where the employment prior to the injury
    extended over a period of fewer than 52 weeks, the method
    of dividing the earnings during that period by the number
    of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee
    earned wages shall be followed; provided, results fair and
    just to both parties will be thereby obtained. [4] Where, by
    reason of a shortness of time during which the employee
    has been in the employment of his employer or the casual
    nature or terms of his employment, it is impractical to
    compute the average weekly wages as above defined,
    regard shall be had to the average weekly amount which
    during the 52 weeks previous to the injury was being
    earned by a person of the same grade and character
    employed in the same class of employment in the same
    locality or community.
    -6-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    [5] But where for exceptional reasons the foregoing would
    be unfair, either to the employer or employee, such other
    method of computing average weekly wages may be
    resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount
    which the injured employee would be earning were it not
    for the injury.
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5) (bracketed numerals supplied).
    The statute provides five possible and hierarchal methods for calculating the
    injured employee’s average weekly wages. “[I]t is clear that this statute establishes
    an order of preference for the calculation method to be used[.]” Bond v. Foster
    Masonry, Inc., 
    139 N.C. App. 123
    , 128, 
    532 S.E.2d 583
    , 586 (2000) (citation omitted).
    “The final, or fifth method, as set forth in 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5), may not be used
    unless there has been a finding that unjust results would occur by using the
    previously enumerated methods.” 
    Id.
     (citing Wallace v. Music Shop, II, Inc., 
    11 N.C. App. 328
    , 331, 
    181 S.E.2d 237
    , 239 (1971)).
    Here, the Commission rejected the first four methods as inapplicable or unjust
    under these facts, and calculated Plaintiff’s average weekly wages by using the fifth,
    or final, method. See 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5). Plaintiff argues the Commission erred
    by employing this method to calculate her average weekly wages, and asserts the
    Commission should have employed the second method set forth in the statute.
    D. Commission’s Application of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5)
    The Commission explained its analysis and rejection of each of the first four
    statutory methods, and its choice and application of the fifth method as the most
    -7-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    appropriate, which we review de novo. See McLaughlin v. Staffing Solutions, 206 N.C.
    App. at 143, 696 S.E.2d at 844.
    Methods One and Two
    “‘Average weekly wages’ shall mean the earnings of the injured employee in
    the employment in which the employee was working at the time of the injury during
    the period of 52 weeks immediately preceding the date of the injury . . . divided by
    52[.]” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5).
    Method one only applies when an employee has worked for the employer at
    least 52 weeks prior to the injury, and “cannot be used when the injured employee
    has been working in that employment for fewer than 52 weeks in the year preceding
    the date of accident.” Conyers v. New Hanover Cty. Schools, 
    188 N.C. App. 253
    , 258,
    
    654 S.E.2d 745
    , 750 (2008). The parties stipulated Plaintiff was employed by the
    employer for only 36 weeks in the year preceding the date of her injury, and the
    Commission properly rejected method one to calculate Plaintiff’s average weekly
    wages. See 
    id.
    Method two applies where the injured employee “lost more than seven
    consecutive calendar days at one or more times” during the 52 week period
    immediately preceding the date of injury. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5) (emphasis
    supplied). In such event, “the earnings for the remainder of such 52 weeks shall be
    divided by the number of weeks remaining after the time so lost has been deducted.”
    -8-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    
    Id.
     Plaintiff asserts method two is the appropriate method to calculate her average
    weekly wages. We disagree.
    The Symphony’s rehearsal and performance season runs from September
    through May, and included an optional summer season. Plaintiff argues method two
    applies because, although she stipulated she worked only 36 weeks during the
    relevant time period, her contract period was for a full year. Plaintiff asserts the 16
    weeks when no services were performed for Defendant-employer should be considered
    “lost” under method two of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5). We disagree.
    Plaintiff relies upon this Court’s decision in Bond. The plaintiff in Bond was
    injured during the course of his employment as a brick mason. Bond, 139 N.C App.
    at 124, 
    532 S.E.2d at 584
    . The plaintiff was a full time employee, but only worked
    when contract jobs were available and the weather was suitable. Id. at 125-26, 
    532 S.E.2d at 584
    . He did not work for seven or more consecutive days on more than one
    occasion during the 52 weeks preceding the injury. Id. at 126, 
    532 S.E.2d at 584
    .
    In Bond, this Court explained the work available to the plaintiff was dependent
    upon demand and weather conditions, and the plaintiff was not required to work for
    days or weeks at a time. Id. at 129, 
    532 S.E.2d at 587
    . This Court further explained
    the plaintiff was not a “seasonal” employee, because “[a] seasonal employee or relief
    worker does not work full-time every week in the year.” 
    Id.
     The Court held the
    second, and not the fifth, method was appropriate for determining the plaintiff’s
    -9-
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    average weekly wages, because “as a brick mason, plaintiff could be required to work
    every week, full-time by his employer.” 
    Id.
    The facts of this case are distinguishable from those present in Bond. Unlike
    in Bond, Defendant-Employer in this case was unable to require Plaintiff to work for
    52 weeks.    Plaintiff performed services for Defendant-Employer pursuant to a
    contract, which contemplated 36 and not 52 weeks of work. Pursuant to contract, no
    rehearsals, concerts or “services” were scheduled for the “off season.” Also, unlike in
    Bond, Plaintiff’s contract clearly stated that no work was required from, or offered to,
    Plaintiff during that time.
    Our precedent in Conyers is more directly on point and controlling. In Conyers,
    this Court determined whether the average weekly wages of a public school bus driver
    should be calculated with or without regard to the ten-week summer vacation period.
    Conyers, 188 N.C. App. at 257, 
    654 S.E.2d at 749
    .
    In Conyers, the Court held that Plaintiff’s employment extended for a period of
    less than 52 weeks prior to the injury. Id. at 258-59, 
    654 S.E.2d at 749
    . The plaintiff
    drove a school bus for only ten months of the year, was paid for only ten months of
    work, and was not hired or obligated to work during the summer vacation period. Id.
    at 259, 
    654 S.E.2d at 750
    . The Court held the plaintiff was not employed for a 52-
    week period and rejected the first and second methods in the statute to calculate the
    plaintiff’s average weekly wages. 
    Id.
    - 10 -
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    Again, and unlike in Bond, the employment in Conyers and in this case was for
    a fixed and definite time period of less than 52 weeks. Because Plaintiff’s job was
    non-existent during a portion of the year, she did not “lose” time like the employee in
    Bond.
    The application of method two requires the employee to have been employed
    for a period of 52 weeks preceding the injury, which Plaintiff stipulated she was not.
    The Commission properly rejected method two as the appropriate method to calculate
    Plaintiff’s average weekly wages. We disagree.
    Method Three
    Method three applies “[w]here the employment prior to the injury extended
    over a period of fewer than 52 weeks.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5). In such event, the
    Commission follows “the method of dividing the earnings during that period by the
    number of weeks and parts thereof during the employee earned wages,” provided the
    results are “fair and just to both parties.” 
    Id.
     Where the employment prior to the
    injury extended over a period of less than 52 weeks, the average weekly wages are
    calculated in the same manner as method two, with the distinction that the results
    must be “fair and just to both parties.” 
    Id.
    Like in Conyers, Plaintiff’s employment prior to the injury extended over a
    period of fewer than 52 weeks. After rejecting the first two methods of calculating
    the plaintiff’s average weekly wages, the Court in Conyers analyzed the third method,
    - 11 -
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    but determined that the plaintiff’s yearly salary would be nearly $5,000.00 more than
    her actual pre-injury wages, if she were permitted to divide her annual gross wages
    by the number of weeks she was actually employed. 
    Id. at 259
    , 
    654 S.E.2d at 750
    .
    The Court rejected the third method, because “[t]he purpose of our Workers’
    Compensation Act is not to put the employee in a better position and the employer in
    a worse position than they occupied before the injury.” 
    Id.
    Here, Plaintiff earned $39,412.83 while working 36 weeks during the 52-week
    time period preceding the injury. Dividing this amount by 36 results in an average
    weekly wage calculation of $1,094.80. The Commission determined this weekly wage
    amount results in annualized wages of $56,929.60, over $17,000.00 more than
    Plaintiff’s actual pre-injury yearly wages. We are bound by Conyers to conclude the
    application of method three would “put the employee in a better position” than prior
    to the injury and is not a “fair and just” method to calculate Plaintiff’s average weekly
    wages. See 
    id.
    Plaintiff notes that the application of method three will always result in gross
    annualized wages which are higher than the result of method one. Plaintiff argues
    method three could never be regarded as “fair and just” to both parties and would
    never be used to calculate average weekly wages. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
    N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., 
    148 N.C. App. 610
    . 616, 
    560 S.E.2d 163
    , 168, disc.
    review denied, 
    355 N.C. 493
    , 
    564 S.E.2d 44
     (2002) (“[A] statute must be considered as
    - 12 -
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    a whole and construed, if possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered
    useless or redundant. It is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to be
    given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere surplusage.” (citation
    omitted)).
    Plaintiff proposes the Commission should have considered the “fairness”
    requirement of method three in light of her wage earning capacity. Plaintiff asserts
    the Commission should have taken into account her summer earnings from the
    Chautauqua Symphony in New York in order to determine whether the application
    of method three would result in a “windfall” to Plaintiff. The statute expressly
    excludes her earnings from outside employment and provides that average weekly
    wages “shall mean the earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which
    he was working at the time of the injury.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5) (emphasis
    supplied).
    We affirm the Commission’s determination that applying method three does
    not produce “fair and just” results where Plaintiff’s average weekly wages would be
    increase to over $17,000.00 more annually than Plaintiff’s actual pre-injury yearly
    wages. Plaintiff’s arguments are overruled.
    Method Five
    The parties agree method four is inapplicable to the circumstances at bar. The
    fifth, or final, method under the statute is to be used “for exceptional reasons” when
    - 13 -
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    the other methods “would be unfair to either the employer or employee.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5). In such event, the Commission is to “resort to” a method which “will
    most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning
    were it not for the injury.” 
    Id.
    The Commission properly determined that exceptional reasons exist, which
    require the application of method five. None of the other four methods set forth in
    the statute are appropriate for calculation of Plaintiff’s average weekly wages.
    Plaintiff asserts her pre-injury average weekly wages were $1,094.80, yet
    acknowledges she was not actually paid this amount on a weekly basis for the 52
    weeks prior to her injury and she specifically listed “$760.00+” as her average weekly
    wages on her Form 18 at the time of her injury.
    The Commission calculated Plaintiff’s average weekly wages by dividing
    Plaintiff’s annual gross earnings with Defendant-Employer by 52, “because this
    method produces a result which most nearly approximates the amount Plaintiff
    would be earning with Defendant-Employer were it not for the injury.”
    In Conyers, this Court affirmed the Commission’s application of the fifth
    method and explained: the “[p]laintiff [bus driver] earned $ 17,608.94 in the 52 weeks
    preceding the accident. Although she only worked approximately 40 of those weeks
    and was paid in 10 monthly paychecks, the compensation she collects for workers’
    compensation will be paid every week, including the weeks of her summer vacation.”
    - 14 -
    FRANK V. CHARLOTTE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
    Opinion of the Court
    Conyers, 188 N.C. App. at 261, 
    654 S.E.2d at 751
    . Based upon Conyers, we affirm the
    Commission’s use and application of the fifth method in the statute to calculate
    Plaintiff’s average weekly wages. Id.; 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5). Plaintiff’s arguments
    are overruled.
    VI. Conclusion
    The Commission properly concluded the application of the first four methods
    set forth in 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5) to determine Plaintiff’s average weekly wages
    were inappropriate or unjust.         The Commission properly determined that
    “exceptional reasons” existed to apply the fifth method, and applied the fifth method
    to “most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be
    earning were it not for the injury.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2
    (5).
    Plaintiff has failed to show any error in the Commission’s Opinion and Award.
    The Opinion and Award is affirmed. It is so ordered.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur.
    - 15 -