State v. Briggs , 257 N.C. App. 500 ( 2018 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-583
    Filed: 16 January 2018
    Union County, No. 13 CRS 052761
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
    v.
    ANTRAVIOUS QUANEALIOUS BRIGGS, Defendant.
    Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 July 2016 by Judge Christopher W.
    Bragg in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 November
    2017.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly N.
    Callahan, for the State.
    Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W.
    Andrews, for defendant-appellant.
    ZACHARY, Judge.
    The issue presented is whether the trial court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction to enter an order denying defendant’s motion for post-conviction DNA
    testing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269 while defendant’s appeal from the
    original judgment of conviction was pending. We conclude that the trial court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction, and vacate the court’s order.
    Background
    STATE V. BRIGGS
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant Antravious Quanealious Briggs was convicted of attempted second-
    degree sexual offense and sentenced to 73-100 months in prison on 10 November
    2014. Defendant gave notice of appeal the same day. On 6 April 2016, while his appeal
    was pending in this Court, defendant filed a pro se Motion to Locate and Preserve
    Evidence and Motion for Post-Conviction DNA Testing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    15A-269. The trial court denied defendant’s motion on 13 July 2016, while defendant’s
    appeal was still pending. Defendant timely filed notice of appeal from the denial of
    his motion for post-conviction DNA testing. On 16 August 2016, this Court issued an
    opinion in defendant’s original appeal, vacating his sentence and remanding the case
    to the trial court for re-sentencing. State v. Briggs, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
    790 S.E.2d 671
    (2016). The mandate issued on 6 September 2016.
    On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction to enter the order denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing
    because the trial court was divested of jurisdiction over the case from the date on
    which defendant gave his initial notice of appeal of the 10 November 2014 judgment
    until the date on which this Court’s mandate issued.
    Standard of Review
    “Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law,
    reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v. Herman, 
    221 N.C. App. 204
    , 209, 
    726 S.E.2d 863
    , 866 (2012) (citation omitted). Under de novo review, this Court considers the
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    STATE V. BRIGGS
    Opinion of the Court
    matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court. State
    v. Williams, 
    362 N.C. 628
    , 632-33, 
    669 S.E.2d 290
    , 294 (2008). Lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction may be raised by any party “at any time, even for the first time on
    appeal[.]” State v. Kostick, 
    233 N.C. App. 62
    , 72, 
    755 S.E.2d 411
    , 418 (2014).
    Discussion
    Subject matter jurisdiction is “the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of
    controversy presented by the action before it, and is conferred upon the courts by
    either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.” State v. Petty, 
    212 N.C. App. 368
    , 371, 
    711 S.E.2d 509
    , 512 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted)
    (alterations omitted). “A trial court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a case
    in order to act in that case.” State v. Satanek, 
    190 N.C. App. 653
    , 656, 
    660 S.E.2d 623
    , 625 (2008). Where a court enters an order without jurisdiction to do so, the order
    is void ab initio, State v. Sams, 
    317 N.C. 230
    , 235, 
    345 S.E.2d 179
    , 182 (1986), and
    “the appropriate action on the part of the appellate court is to arrest judgment or
    vacate [the] order entered without authority.” State v. Felmet, 
    302 N.C. 173
    , 176, 
    273 S.E.2d 708
    , 711 (1981).
    Generally, in criminal cases, “a particular judge’s jurisdiction over a particular
    case terminates at the end of the session at which a particular case is heard and
    decided.” 
    Petty, 212 N.C. App. at 374
    , 711 S.E.2d at 513. Even where a statute allows
    the trial court to act beyond the close of the original session, “[t]he jurisdiction of the
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    STATE V. BRIGGS
    Opinion of the Court
    trial court with regard to the case” will remain divested as of the filing of a notice of
    appeal. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1448(a)(3) (2016); State v. Williams, 
    177 N.C. App. 725
    , 731, 
    630 S.E.2d 216
    , 221 (2006), disc. review denied, 
    360 N.C. 581
    , 
    636 S.E.2d 198
    (2006); 
    Petty, 212 N.C. App. at 373
    , 711 S.E.2d at 513. Once a notice of appeal
    has been filed, the trial court retains jurisdiction only over matters that are “ancillary
    to the appeal[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1453 (2016); State v. Davis, 
    123 N.C. App. 240
    ,
    242, 
    472 S.E.2d 392
    , 393 (1996). A matter that is ancillary to the appeal typically
    involves the correction of a clerical error, as doing so does not implicate the trial court
    “exercis[ing] any judicial discretion or undertak[ing] any judicial reasoning[.]” State
    v. Everette, 
    237 N.C. App. 35
    , 43, 
    764 S.E.2d 634
    , 640 (2014); see e.g., Davis, 123 N.C.
    App. at 
    242-43, 472 S.E.2d at 393-94
    .         On the other hand, a “trial court lacks
    jurisdiction to correct judicial errors, or address issues never litigated, . . . following
    valid entry of notice of appeal.” State v. Price, 
    233 N.C. App. 386
    , 394, 
    757 S.E.2d 309
    , 314 (2014). Such non-ancillary matters may only be resolved once the pending
    appeal has been finalized. See State v. Dixon, 
    139 N.C. App. 332
    , 338, 
    533 S.E.2d 297
    , 302 (2000).
    Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269, a defendant “may make a motion before
    the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction against the defendant for
    performance of DNA testing[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269(a) (2016). The trial court
    must grant the motion for post-conviction DNA testing if it determines that
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    STATE V. BRIGGS
    Opinion of the Court
    (1) [the testing]
    [(a)] Is material to the defendant’s defense.
    [(b)] Is related to the investigation or
    prosecution that resulted in the judgment.
    [(c)] Meets either of the following conditions:
    [i.] It was not DNA tested previously.
    [ii.] It was tested previously, but the
    requested DNA test would provide
    results that are significantly more
    accurate and probative of the identity
    of the perpetrator or accomplice or have
    a reasonable probability of
    contradicting prior test results[;]
    (2)   If the DNA testing being requested had been
    conducted on the evidence, there exists a reasonable
    probability that the verdict would have been more
    favorable to the defendant; and
    (3)   The defendant has signed a sworn affidavit of
    innocence.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269(a)-(b) (2016).
    In the instant case, it is clear from the text of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269 that
    the trial court’s order entered pursuant thereto did not constitute a matter ancillary
    to the original judgment on appeal. The fact that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269
    authorized the trial court to act beyond the close of the original session did not render
    that matter ancillary, or otherwise vest the trial court with jurisdiction while the
    appeal was pending. See 
    Petty, 212 N.C. App. at 373
    , 711 S.E.2d at 513 (“Th[e] power
    of a court to hear and determine (subject matter jurisdiction) is not to be confused
    with the way in which that power may be exercised in order to comply with the terms
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    STATE V. BRIGGS
    Opinion of the Court
    of a statute (authority to act).”). Rather, the plain language of Section 15A-269
    directly implicates an exercise of the trial court’s judicial discretion and judicial
    reasoning, 
    Everette, 237 N.C. App. at 43
    , 764 S.E.2d at 640, and requires the trial
    court to make determinations on new issues never litigated. 
    Price, 233 N.C. App. at 394
    , 757 S.E.2d at 314. Accordingly, in this case, the trial court’s order entered
    pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269 was not “ancillary” to defendant’s initial
    pending appeal.
    The State, however, asserts that a motion for post-conviction DNA testing is
    not a “motion in the original cause,” and thus may be decided by the trial court while
    the case is pending appeal, because N.C. Gen. Stat. §§15A-269-15A-270.1 do not
    explicitly provide otherwise. To illustrate this point, the State directs our attention
    to the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1411(b), which provides that a motion for
    appropriate relief is “a motion in the original cause and not a new proceeding.” N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 15A-1411(b) (2016). Because a motion for appropriate relief is a motion
    in the original cause, it is the appellate court, rather than the trial court, that has
    jurisdiction to rule on such a motion while the case is pending on appeal. 
    Williams, 177 N.C. App. at 731
    , 630 S.E.2d at 221. According to the State, because a motion for
    post-conviction DNA testing is not a motion for appropriate relief, and because the
    statute governing post-conviction DNA testing does not explicitly state that the
    motion is part of the “original cause and not a new proceeding,” defendant’s motion
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    STATE V. BRIGGS
    Opinion of the Court
    constituted a new proceeding over which the trial court retained its jurisdiction. We
    do not find this argument persuasive.
    Upon review of the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§15A-269-15A-270.1,
    defendant’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing was, in fact, a motion in the
    original cause. If the trial court were to grant defendant’s motion for post-conviction
    DNA testing and the results were favorable to defendant, the appropriate relief would
    have been for the trial court to (1) vacate and set aside the judgment; (2) discharge
    defendant; (3) resentence defendant; or (4) grant defendant a new trial. N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 15A-270(c). Each of these provisions relates to the original case filed against
    defendant, and not to any ancillary matter over which the trial court retains
    jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal. Moreover, permitting the trial court to
    rule on a defendant’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing while an appeal from
    the case is pending would run the risk of the trial court granting relief pursuant to
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-270(c) that conflicts with the mandate issued by the appellate
    court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1448 (official commentary) (“Problems have arisen
    in the processing of appeals when post-trial motions are pending.”).
    In the instant case, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction when defendant
    filed notice of appeal from the judgment entered on his conviction for attempted
    second-degree sex offense on 10 November 2014. Because defendant’s motion for post-
    conviction DNA testing opened an inquiry into a case that this Court was already
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    STATE V. BRIGGS
    Opinion of the Court
    reviewing, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on it until after the case was
    returned to the trial court by way of mandate, which issued on 6 September 2016. We
    therefore must vacate the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for post-
    conviction DNA testing. 
    Felmet, 302 N.C. at 176
    , 273 S.E.2d at 711.
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not have
    jurisdiction to enter its 13 July 2016 order denying defendant’s motion for post-
    conviction DNA. Accordingly, the order is
    VACATED.
    Judges STROUD and ARROWOOD concur.
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