State v. Turnage , 259 N.C. App. 719 ( 2018 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-803
    Filed: 15 May 2018
    Duplin County, No. 16 CRS 50583-84
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    TONI TURNAGE, Defendant.
    Appeal by State of North Carolina from an order entered 29 March 2017 by
    Judge Joshua W. Willey, Jr. in Duplin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
    Appeals 23 January 2018.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L.
    Hyde, for the State.
    Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Katy
    Dickinson-Shultz, for defendant-appellee.
    BERGER, Judge.
    On October 3, 2016, the Duplin County Grand Jury indicted Toni Turnage
    (“Defendant”) for fleeing to elude arrest, resisting a public officer, and two counts of
    child abuse. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress in Duplin County Superior Court
    alleging law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s
    vehicle, and the seizure of Defendant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. The
    trial court granted Defendant’s motion. We reverse.
    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Defendant’s Motion to Suppress was heard in Duplin County Superior Court
    on March 21, 2017. The State’s only witness at the suppression hearing was Detective
    Shane Miller of the Duplin County Sheriff’s Department. Defendant did not put on
    any evidence.
    The evidence tended to show that detectives with the Duplin County Sheriff’s
    Department received several complaints regarding apparent drug activity at 155
    John David Grady Road in Duplin County. On March 23, 2016, detectives conducted
    surveillance of the area. Lieutenant Chuck Weaver and Detective Allen Williams
    were in an unmarked Ford pickup truck with Detective Miller, while Detectives
    Michael Tyndall, Matthew Strickland, and Jay Lanier were in an unmarked
    Chevrolet pickup truck. The detectives were in plain clothes.
    As Detective Miller was arriving to the area, Detective Tyndall’s unit reported
    a burgundy van leaving 155 John David Grady Road. Detective Miller observed the
    burgundy van traveling west on John David Grady Road, approaching the
    intersection of Woodland Church Road. Detective Miller noticed the van was driven
    by a female and that there was a male passenger. Detective Miller followed the
    burgundy van for approximately one-half mile after the female driver turned onto
    Woodland Church Road.
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    Suddenly, and without warning, the burgundy van stopped in the middle of
    Woodland Church Road. Detective Miller waited approximately fifteen seconds, and
    activated the blue lights on the patrol unit because he “didn’t want anybody coming
    down the road . . . [to] hit the vehicle, [and] cause a[n] accident.” Detective Miller
    testified:
    Well, the van was obviously stopped in the roadway so we
    didn't know what was going on. We didn't know if the van
    had broken down or if there was a problem in the van or
    what was going on in the van. So at that point in time I
    activated my blue lights because there was a van in the
    roadway.
    Detective Miller further elaborated that “[i]f a vehicle is stopped in the roadway,
    [blocking] traffic, impeding traffic, broke down, whatever, I want to know what's
    going on with that vehicle. So I activate my emergency equipment to let people know,
    hey, something going on here, be careful.”
    The Ford pickup truck driven by Detective Miller was located approximately
    fifteen feet from the burgundy van in the middle of the roadway. As Detective Miller
    attempted to approach the driver’s side of the vehicle, he noticed a male subject exit
    the passenger side of the burgundy van. Detective Miller recognized the male subject
    to be Donnie Barton, an individual known to Detective Miller through prior law
    enforcement encounters. Detective Miller testified:
    I went to get out of the [patrol vehicle] and all of a sudden
    a male subject from the passenger side of the van gets out
    of the van, hands in pocket, and starts walking toward the
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    patrol vehicle. At that point in time I told Detective
    Williams who was in the passenger side of my patrol
    vehicle to get out of the vehicle because he was approaching
    us with his hands in his pockets.
    ....
    We didn't know if there was a weapon in his pocket, if there
    were drugs in his pocket or what he was up to.
    Mr. Barton then ran back to the van, yelling, “Go, go, go.” The burgundy van
    sped away, and Detective Miller returned to the Ford pickup truck, activated the
    siren, and began pursuing the burgundy van.
    During the mile and a half pursuit, Detective Miller observed the burgundy
    van run off the shoulder of the road, cross the center line, and travel in excess of
    eighty miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone.      Deputy Anthony Toler
    positioned his vehicle at an intersection and prevented the burgundy van from
    advancing. Defendant was removed from the driver’s seat. Detective Miller then
    heard two children, ages two and three, crying in the back of the burgundy van.
    No illegal drugs or contraband were located in the burgundy van. Defendant
    was arrested for fleeing to elude arrest, resisting a public officer, and two counts of
    child abuse. The Department of Social Services was contacted by law enforcement
    and Mr. Barton’s father assumed custody of the two children.
    In open court, the trial court made findings of fact, including:
    The burgundy vehicle came to a stop on Woodland
    Church Road. The officer drove up behind the vehicle and
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    activated his blue lights about 10 to 15 seconds after the
    vehicle had stopped.
    ....
    Immediately after stopping his vehicle, Detective
    Miller exited the driver's door and began approaching the
    driver's door of the burgundy van. Detective Williams
    exited from the passenger door of the law enforcement
    vehicle and began approaching the passenger door of the
    burgundy van.
    The male exited the passenger side of the burgundy
    van with his hands in his pockets. At some point after that,
    he turned, hollered to the driver of the van, "Go, go, go" and
    ran and jumped in the van. At this point, the van rapidly
    accelerated and sped off.
    The trial court concluded that “there was a seizure of the van and its occupants
    when Detective Miller came up behind the stopped van and activated his blue lights.”
    The trial court further concluded that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal
    activity and Defendant’s rights preserved under the Fourth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina
    Constitution had been violated.1
    1   The State did not argue during the pre-trial hearing or on appeal whether a defendant
    stopping a vehicle in the middle of a lane of travel on a public roadway, standing alone, constituted a
    moving violation justifying a stop. As such, this opinion does not address that issue, but rather
    whether a seizure occurs when a motorist inexplicably stops in the middle of a public roadway and an
    officer subsequently activates his blue lights.
    In addition, the trial court made conclusions of law regarding the community caretaker
    exception which we need not address as the issue is not argued by the State on appeal, and because of
    our holding that Defendant was not seized when Detective Miller initially activated his blue lights.
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    The State timely entered notice of appeal in open court immediately following
    the March 21, 2017 hearing on the motion to suppress. However, the trial court
    subsequently entered a written order on March 29, 2017, finding that “[s]topping the
    van was inconsistent with criminal activity inside the van[,]” and “[t]here was no
    objectively reasonable basis for Detective Miller to believe the van was disabled or
    that its occupants were in danger.”
    The trial court’s written order concluded that a seizure of Defendant had
    occurred when Detective Miller pulled “behind the stopped van and activated his blue
    lights.” The trial court further concluded “there was no reasonable suspicion of
    criminal activity to justify a stop or a seizure of the van or its occupants.”
    Standard of Review
    In determining whether the trial court properly granted a defendant’s motion
    to suppress, our review “is strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's
    underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they
    are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn
    support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cathcart, 
    227 N.C. App. 347
    , 349, 
    742 S.E.2d 321
    , 323 (2013) (citation omitted). “Conclusions of law are
    reviewed de novo.” State v. Gerard, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    790 S.E.2d 592
    , 594 (2016)
    (citation omitted).
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    The State does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact despite some
    difference with regards to Detective Miller’s testimony.       Thus, the trial court’s
    findings are binding on appeal. State v. McLeod, 
    197 N.C. App. 707
    , 711, 
    682 S.E.2d 396
    , 398 (2009) (“Unchallenged findings of fact, where no exceptions have been taken,
    are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and binding on appeal.”
    (citation, quotation marks, ellipses and brackets omitted)).
    Analysis
    The State argues the trial court erred in concluding a seizure of Defendant
    occurred when Detective Miller activated his blue lights approximately fifteen
    seconds after Defendant stopped the burgundy van in the middle of Woodland Church
    Road. We agree, and reverse the trial court.
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
    houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
    and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
    issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
    affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
    searched and the persons or things to be seized.
    U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of North Carolina
    likewise prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires that warrants be
    issued only on probable cause.” State v. Allman, 
    369 N.C. 292
    , 293, 
    794 S.E.2d 301
    ,
    303 (2016). A seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
    authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 19 n.16, 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 905 n.16 (1968). There must be “a physical
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    application of force or submission to a show of authority” for a seizure to be found.
    State v. Cuevas, 
    121 N.C. App. 553
    , 563, 
    468 S.E.2d 425
    , 431, disc. review denied, 
    343 N.C. 309
    , 
    471 S.E.2d 77
    (1996) (citation omitted).
    “The activation of blue lights on a police vehicle has been included among
    factors for consideration to determine when a seizure occurs.” State v. Baker, 
    208 N.C. App. 376
    , 386, 
    702 S.E.2d 825
    , 832 (2010). However, a simple show of authority
    by law enforcement does not rise to the level of a seizure unless the suspect submits
    to that show of authority. California v. Hodari D., 
    499 U.S. 621
    , 626, 
    113 L. Ed. 2d
    .
    690, 697 (1991) (“The narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of
    authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even though
    the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.”).
    This Court held that an individual is not seized for Fourth Amendment
    purposes by a mere show of authority by law enforcement, but rather when that
    individual is physically restrained. State v. Leach, 
    166 N.C. App. 711
    , 717, 
    603 S.E.2d 831
    , 835 (2004), appeal dismissed, 
    359 N.C. 640
    , 
    614 S.E.2d 538
    (2005). In State v.
    Leach, officers attempted to arrest the defendant on drug-related charges. 
    Id. at 713,
    603 S.E.2d at 833.     The officers identified themselves as law enforcement, and
    surrounded the defendant in his vehicle. 
    Id. The defendant
    fled and led officers on
    a high-speed chase that ended after he crashed the vehicle in a ditch and officers
    detained the defendant when he attempted to flee on foot. 
    Id. At different
    points
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    during the chase, the defendant threw away a firearm and a plastic bag containing
    cocaine.   
    Id. In upholding
    the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to
    suppress, this Court held that a seizure did not occur “until defendant was physically
    restrained.” 
    Id. at 717,
    603 S.E.2d at 835.
    In State v. Mewborn, officers drove alongside the defendant, who was walking
    in the roadway of a high-crime area. Neither defendant nor his companion were
    violating any laws at the time. State v. Mewborn, 
    200 N.C. App. 731
    , 732, 
    684 S.E.2d 535
    , 536 (2009). Officers asked the two if they would stop to talk for a few minutes.
    
    Id. at 733,
    684 S.E.2d at 536. When officers were exiting the vehicle, the defendant
    ran away from the officers, and they began pursuit. 
    Id. During the
    pursuit, the
    defendant threw a firearm on the ground. 
    Id. at 733,
    684 S.E.2d at 537. After he was
    apprehended, the defendant threw a plastic bag containing crack cocaine on the
    ground. 
    Id. The defendant
    was charged with possession with intent to sell and
    deliver a controlled substance, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a firearm
    by a felon, and resisting a public officer. 
    Id. at 733-34,
    684 S.E.2d at 537.
    The defendant argued that he was unconstitutionally seized by officers when
    they asked him to stop and talk without reasonable suspicion. 
    Id. at 734,
    684 S.E.2d
    at 537. This Court noted that “[t]he dispositive issue in the case before us is a
    determination of whether [d]efendant was seized before or after he ran from the
    officers.” 
    Id. at 735,
    684 S.E.2d at 537. This Court held that the defendant had not
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    been seized when he initially fled because he did not submit to a show of authority,
    stating, “[T]he officers were in various stages of exiting the vehicle and that
    [d]efendant began to run away before stopping and submitting to their authority.”
    
    Id. at 735-36,
    684 S.E.2d at 538.
    In State v. Mangum, officers received an anonymous tip concerning an
    impaired driver. State v. Mangum, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    795 S.E.2d 106
    , 109 (2016),
    writ denied, disc. review denied, appeal dismissed, 
    369 N.C. 536
    , 
    797 S.E.2d 283
    (2017). Officers located the vehicle, and observed that it was traveling fifteen miles
    per hour below the speed limit, and that it stopped in the roadway on two occasions,
    once at an intersection where there were no traffic control devices, and subsequently
    at a railroad crossing without active traffic signals. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 110. The
    officer following the defendant activated his blue lights, but the defendant did not
    pull over immediately. 
    Id. After approximately
    two minutes, the officer activated
    the siren on his patrol vehicle, and the defendant stopped in the roadway a short time
    later. 
    Id. The defendant
    was arrested for driving while impaired. 
    Id. This Court
    held the defendant was not seized when the officer activated his blue lights and siren,
    but rather when he stopped the vehicle, yielding to the officer’s show of authority. Id.
    at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 116.
    Here, no officer in the unmarked Ford pickup truck identified himself as a law
    enforcement officer before Defendant stopped her vehicle. While the trial court did
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    find that “[t]he detective noted the driver and passenger look[ed] at him and seem[ed]
    to stare at him before” turning onto Woodland Church Road, there was no evidence
    that Defendant knew or reasonably believed the three individuals in the Ford pickup
    truck were law enforcement officers. Detective Miller was following Defendant in an
    unmarked vehicle, and Defendant had not violated any laws. There was no action on
    the part of law enforcement that caused Defendant to stop her vehicle or otherwise
    impede her movement. Defendant’s motionless vehicle in the middle of a public
    roadway invited an encounter with any concerned motorist, including law
    enforcement officers.
    “Police are free to approach and question individuals in public places when
    circumstances indicate that citizens may need help or mischief might be afoot.” State
    v. Icard, 
    363 N.C. 303
    , 311, 
    677 S.E.2d 822
    , 828 (2009) (citations omitted). A vehicle
    inexplicably stopped in the middle of a public roadway is a circumstance sufficient,
    by itself, to indicate someone in the vehicle may need assistance, or that mischief is
    afoot. At the very least, it is a situation which warrants notice to other motorists and
    it is not the role of this, or any other court, to “indulg[e] in unrealistic second-guessing
    of [a] law enforcement [officer’s] judgment call[].” Mangum, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 795
    S.E.2d at 118 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    Here, Detective Miller waited behind Defendant’s vehicle for approximately
    fifteen seconds before activating his blue lights. By his testimony, he was unsure if
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    the vehicle had broken down, and was attempting to alert other possible motorists of
    a potential hazard in the roadway.
    Further, for reasons known only to her and perhaps Mr. Barton, Defendant
    inexplicably stopped the burgundy van in the middle of Woodland Church Road prior
    to any show of authority from law enforcement. Detectives were not identified as law
    enforcement until Detective Miller activated his blue lights approximately fifteen
    seconds after Defendant stopped the burgundy van. Thus, the earliest point at which
    detectives made a show of authority was activation of the blue lights on the Ford
    pickup truck. Consistent with Mangum, the mere activation of the vehicle’s blue
    lights did not constitute a seizure as Defendant did not yield to the show of authority.
    Mr. Barton exited Defendant’s vehicle as Detective Miller was attempting to
    approach. However, he instructed Defendant to flee. As in Leach and Mewborn,
    Defendant fled prior to submitting to a show of authority.
    Defendant then led officers on a lengthy, high-speed chase with two small
    children in the vehicle. She did not submit to the officers’ show of authority until she
    discontinued fleeing from officers and further movement was prevented by Deputy
    Toler’s vehicle. It was at this point that Defendant was seized pursuant to the Fourth
    Amendment. The criminal activity observed by Detective Miller during the mile and
    a half car chase, and subsequently his observations of the two minor children in the
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    STATE V. TURNAGE
    Opinion of the Court
    van, justified Defendant’s arrest for fleeing to elude arrest, resisting a public officer,
    and two counts of child abuse.
    Conclusion
    Defendant was not seized under the Fourth Amendment when Defendant
    stopped her burgundy van in the middle of Woodland Church Road. The trial court
    erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress.         Accordingly, we reverse and
    remand to the trial court.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    Judges BRYANT and MURPHY concur.
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