Standridge v. Standridge , 259 N.C. App. 834 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-493
Filed: 5 June 2018
Richmond County, No. 15 CVD 437
CHARLENE PERHEALTH STANDRIDGE, Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES EDWARD STANDRIDGE, Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 31 January 2017 by Judge Regina M.
Joe in District Court, Richmond County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 October
2017.
Buckner Law Office, PPLC, by Richard G. Buckner, for plaintiff-appellant.
No brief filed on behalf of defendant-appellee.
STROUD, Judge.
Plaintiff Charlene Perhealth Standridge (“Wife”) appeals from the trial court’s
equitable distribution order. Wife argues that the trial court erroneously concluded
that it could not consider for equitable distribution funds defendant James Edward
Standridge (“Husband”) had deposited into his personal account and farm account
but later withdrew. Because no claim for equitable distribution was filed after the
parties’ date of separation, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
enter the equitable distribution order, so we do not reach this issue on appeal and
instead must vacate the order.
STANDRIDGE V. STANDRIDGE
Opinion of the Court
Background
Husband and Wife were married on 26 November 1992. On 15 April 2015,
Wife filed her complaint for divorce from bed and board and equitable distribution of
the marital property. On 15 June 2015, Husband filed a motion to dismiss, answer,
and counterclaims for divorce from bed and board and equitable distribution.
A pretrial order was entered on 14 April 2016 and the parties stipulated to
several facts, including their date of separation, 12 September 2015. On 21 January
2017, following a hearing, the trial court entered an equitable distribution order. In
the order, the trial court found as fact that “although this action was filed on April
15, 2015, the final date of separation of the parties for purposes of this trial and of
this Order is by stipulation of the parties September 12, 2015.” Wife timely appealed
to this Court.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Neither party raised a question of jurisdiction on appeal, but where the record
shows subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, this Court should address it ex mero
motu:
The question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, even in the Supreme Court. When the record
clearly shows that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking,
the Court will take notice and dismiss the action ex mero
motu. Every court necessarily has the inherent judicial
power to inquire into, hear and determine questions of its
own jurisdiction, whether of law or fact, the decision of
which is necessary to determine the questions of its
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STANDRIDGE V. STANDRIDGE
Opinion of the Court
jurisdiction.
Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 580, 350 S.E.2d 83, 85-86 (1986)
(citations omitted). See also Carpenter v. Carpenter, 245 N.C. App. 1, 8, 781 S.E.2d
828, 835 (2016) (“It is well settled that the issue of a court’s jurisdiction over a matter
may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal or by a court sua sponte.”
(Citation and quotation marks omitted)). In addition, if a court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over a claim, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court by
their agreement to have the court rule on their case. See State v. Fisher, 270 N.C.
315, 318, 154 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1967) (“It is well established law that the parties
cannot, by consent, give a court jurisdiction over subject matter of which it would
otherwise not have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in this sense cannot be obtained by
consent of the parties, waiver or estoppel.”).
Under the North Carolina General Statutes, a party may assert a claim for
equitable distribution only after the parties have separated:
(a) At any time after a husband and wife begin to live
separate and apart from each other, a claim for equitable
distribution may be filed and adjudicated, either as a
separate civil action, or together with any other action
brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes, or
as a motion in the cause as provided by G.S. 50-11(e) or (f).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(a) (2017) (emphasis added). Where a claim for equitable
distribution is filed prior to the date of separation, the trial court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 132 N.C. App.
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STANDRIDGE V. STANDRIDGE
Opinion of the Court
82, 510 S.E.2d 178 (J. Greene, dissenting), reversed for the reasons stated in the
dissent, 350 N.C. 590, 516 S.E.2d 381 (1999) (per curiam).1 The timing of the
pleadings created the same jurisdictional defect in Miller v. Miller, __ N.C. App. __,
__, 799 S.E.2d 890, 893 (2017), where the wife filed a complaint for divorce from bed
and board and equitable distribution while the parties were still living together, and
the husband filed an answer which also alleged “the parties were ‘not living separate
and apart.’ ” Id. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 893. The parties did not begin living separate
and apart until months after the filing of the complaint and answer. Id. at __, 799
S.E.2d at 893. While the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter an equitable
distribution order based upon the initial pleadings, the final outcome in Miller was
different because the jurisdictional defect was addressed at the trial court level and
ultimately the equitable distribution claim was preserved. Id. at __, 799 S.E.2d at
899.
This Court has found subject matter jurisdiction where an original request for
equitable distribution was filed prior to the parties’ actual date of separation, but a
1 Judge Greene’s dissent, which the Supreme Court adopted as its majority, stated: “I accept
the general premise that Judge Smith, who entered the order in dispute dismissing plaintiff’s claim
for equitable distribution (ED), could not overrule Judge Cobb’s earlier order denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ED claim. It appears the basis for both motions (i.e., that plaintiff and
defendant were not separated at the time the ED claim was filed and it therefore was premature) was
the same. . . . In addressing the merits of the motion to dismiss, Judge Smith concluded that plaintiff’s
ED claim was not asserted after the date of separation and before the entry of the divorce, thus making
it invalid. I agree. There are findings to support this conclusion and those findings are supported in
this record. Because plaintiff had no valid ED claim prior to the time she dismissed it, the refiling of
that same claim is also invalid.” Atkinson, 132 N.C. App. at 90, 510 S.E.2d at 182 (J. Greene,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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STANDRIDGE V. STANDRIDGE
Opinion of the Court
party later filed a counterclaim requesting equitable distribution after the date of
separation. See Gurganus v. Gurganus, __ N.C. App. __, __, 796 S.E.2d 811, 815
(“Concerning the required separation of the parties as a prerequisite for jurisdiction
to adjudicate an equitable distribution claim, there is no indication in the record that
the parties were separated at the time plaintiff filed her complaint. The record does
show, however, that the parties separated on or about 22 March 2001, before
defendant filed his answer and counterclaim. . . . Therefore, regardless of whether
the parties were separated at the time plaintiff filed the complaint, the record is clear
that the parties were separated by the time defendant asserted his claim for equitable
distribution. Therefore the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction to
equitably distribute the marital property.”), disc. rev. denied, 369 N.C. 753, 799
S.E.2d 621 (2017).
But the present case differs from Gurganus because both claims for equitable
distribution here occurred prior to the date of separation. Wife filed her complaint
on 15 April 2015 requesting a divorce from bed and board from Husband. In her
complaint, Wife noted that the parties
were married on November 26, 1992 in Richmond County,
North Carolina, and lived together as husband and wife
until sometime in 2004, and since that time, although they
have continued to live under the same roof, they have been
living in a constant state of separation from each other, and
have at no time since 2004 resumed the marital
relationship which formerly existed between them.
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STANDRIDGE V. STANDRIDGE
Opinion of the Court
Wife’s 15 April 2015 complaint requested an equitable distribution of the marital
property of the parties. Husband filed his motion, answer, and counterclaim --
including a claim for equitable distribution -- on 15 June 2015. Husband alleged that
the parties “are not separated and continue to reside with one another in the same
house as a married couple.” Wife filed her reply to the Husband’s counterclaim on or
about 14 July 2015 and admitted “that the parties continue to live in the same
house[.]” The parties stipulated in the pretrial order that their date of separation
was 12 September 2015 -- roughly five months after Wife’s complaint was filed and
three months after Husband’s counterclaim. Thus, while both parties raised a claim
for equitable distribution, both raised it prior to the date of separation.
No claim for equitable distribution was made after the date of separation, so
the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over equitable distribution of
the marital property. We must vacate the trial court’s order.
Conclusion
For reasons stated above, we vacate the trial court’s order on equitable
distribution.
VACATED.
Judges HUNTER and TYSON concur.
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