Gyger v. Clement , 263 N.C. App. 118 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA18-244
Filed: 18 December 2018
Guilford County, No. 16-CVD-5358
EVE GYGER, Plaintiff,
v.
QUINTIN CLEMENT, Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 30 November 2017 and 2 January 2018
by Judge Lora C. Cubbage in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 3 October 2018.
George Daly for plaintiff-appellant.
Coltrane & Overfield, PLLC, by Wendy M. Enochs, for defendant-appellee.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Plaintiff-Mother Eve Gyger appeals from the trial court’s order denying her
Rule 60 motions for relief from an order vacating the registration of her foreign
support order. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Factual and Procedural History
Between 1997 and 1999, Plaintiff-Mother and Defendant-Father were involved
in a romantic relationship while living in North Carolina. The parties had two
children born in May 2000 in Geneva, Switzerland. On 24 October 2007, Plaintiff-
Mother, through the children’s guardian, initiated an action in the Court of First
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
Instance, Third Chamber, Republic and Canton of Geneva against Defendant-Father
to establish paternity and child support. Defendant-Father did not appear in person
or through counsel. On 14 December 2009, the Swiss court entered judgment against
Defendant-Father on both counts.
In May 2014, the Swiss Central Authority for International Maintenance
Matters, on behalf of Plaintiff-Mother and the minor children, applied to register and
enforce the Swiss support order with the North Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement. The application and
supporting documentation sent from Switzerland included a limited power of
attorney authorizing the North Carolina Child Support Enforcement Agency, as the
central authority of the debtor’s country of residence,
to represent the [Plaintiff-Mother] in dealings with all
authorities and before all courts, to accept payments, to
bring or respond to civil and criminal proceedings, to make
use of any legal remedies, to reach settlements, and to
waive or acknowledge claims. [The North Carolina Child
Support Enforcement] Agency is authorised to grant
substitute powers of attorney to other authorities or
persons.
The application also included copies of court documents written in French, the official
language of the Swiss court, as well as English translations certified by a Swiss court
translator.
The Guilford County Clerk of Court registered the Swiss support order for
enforcement on 13 June 2016. Defendant-Father was served with a Notice of
-2-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
Registration of Foreign Support Order on 20 June 2016, and on 1 July 2016,
Defendant-Father timely filed a Request for Hearing to “vacate the registration, to
contest the remedies being sought or the amount of the alleged arrears pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-6-607.” The IV-D Attorney1 for the Guilford County Child
Support Enforcement Agency notified Plaintiff-Mother of the hearing with a notice
for “Hearing to Register Foreign Support Order” mailed on 14 July 2016, care of the
Swiss Central Authority for Maintenance Matters Section for Private International
Law at its address in Bern, Switzerland.
On 2 September 2016, a hearing was conducted in Guilford County District
Court before the Honorable Lawrence McSwain. The trial court vacated the
registration of the foreign support order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 52C-6-
607(a)(1) and 52C-7-706(b)(3) and dismissed the action, finding that the court file
lacked any evidence that Defendant-Father had been provided with proper notice of
the proceedings in Switzerland and an opportunity to be heard, and further, that
Defendant did not submit to the jurisdiction of Switzerland.
On 26 July 2017, Plaintiff-Mother filed a Motion for Relief from the trial court’s
order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 60(b)(1), (2), (4), and (6), and
1 The IV-D attorney represents the interests of the people of the State of North Carolina in
court proceedings regarding, inter alia, the establishment of paternity as well as the establishment
and enforcement of child support obligations, and provides service under Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-69b (2016).
-3-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
thereafter filed two amended motions.2 The trial court conducted a hearing on
Plaintiff-Mother’s 60(b) motions on 6 October 2017. Plaintiff-Mother did not appear
at the hearing, but attempted through counsel to introduce two affidavits and the
transcript of a deposition of Defendant-Father. The trial court admitted the
deposition and transcript into evidence, but excluded the affidavits. The trial court
excluded the first affidavit, an “Affidavit of Eve Gyger” purportedly signed by
Plaintiff-Mother, because it was not notarized, and Plaintiff-Mother was not present
to be examined. The second affidavit, an “Affidavit of Translation” containing
English translations by a French translator professing to demonstrate that certain
translations of the Swiss court’s file were erroneous, was not admitted because the
translator was not present in court and a third-party translation may not be
substituted for the original translation provided by the Swiss court. In addition,
Leilani Morange, Plaintiff-Mother’s caseworker with the Guilford County Child
Support Enforcement Agency, testified that it was her office’s procedure to send all
correspondence to plaintiffs in interstate and international child support enforcement
cases to the agency that initiated the action on behalf of the plaintiff.
2 The Second Amended Motion for Relief from Final Order, the only motion for relief contained
in the record on appeal, listed in its caption bases for relief under Rules 60(b)(2), (4), and (6). However,
in the body of the motion, Appellant argued Rule 60(b)(1) but not Rule 60(b)(2). The trial court
addressed Rules 60(b)(1) and (2) in its order. Appellant’s brie to this Court addressed only Rules
60(b)(1),(4), and (6). As a result, Appellant abandoned any appeal based on Rule 60(b)(2). See N.C.R.
App. P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed abandoned.”).
-4-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
By orders entered 30 November 2017 and 2 January 2018, the trial court
denied Plaintiff-Mother’s motions for relief from judgment under Rules 60(b)(1), (2),
(4), and (6). Plaintiff-Mother timely appealed.
Background
In order to simplify and streamline the procedures by which, inter alia, a child
support order rendered in another jurisdiction could be enforced, the General
Assembly adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(2017); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 52C-1-100 to 52C-9-902 (2017). A support order is:
a judgment, decree, order, decision, or directive, whether
temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued in a
state or a foreign country for the benefit of a child, a spouse,
or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support,
health care, arrearages, retroactive support, or
reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an
individual obligee in place of child support.
Id. § 52C-1-101(21). “A support order . . . issued in another state or a foreign support
order may be registered in this State for enforcement.” Id. § 52C-6-601. A foreign
support order is a support order of a foreign tribunal authorized to issue such orders.
See id. § 52C-1-101(3b), (3c). A foreign country “means a country, including a political
subdivision thereof, other than the United States, that authorizes the issuance of
support orders and . . . has been declared under the law of the United States to be a
foreign reciprocating country.” Id. § 52C-1-101(3a)(a). Federal law allows the United
States Secretaries of State and Health and Human Services to declare any foreign
-5-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
country to be a foreign reciprocating country “if the foreign country has established,
or undertakes to establish, procedures for the establishment and enforcement of
duties of support owed to obligees who are residents of the United States,” provided
that such procedures conform with standards prescribed by law. 42 U.S.C. §
659a(a)(1) (2017).
On 31 August 2004, a child support reciprocity agreement between
Switzerland and the United States was entered into and Switzerland was declared a
foreign reciprocating country. See Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Swiss Confederation for the
Enforcement of Maintenance (Support) Obligations, Switz.-U.S, Aug. 31, 2004,
T.I.A.S. No. 04-930.1, [https://perma.cc/C8TX-K8SU]. Regarding recognition and
enforcement of maintenance decisions, the agreement states:
1. Maintenance decisions, including maintenance decisions
arising from a determination of parentage, from the
Requesting Party [here, Switzerland] shall be recognized
and enforced in the Requested Party [here, North Carolina]
to the extent that the facts in the case support recognition
and enforcement under the applicable laws and procedures
of the Requested Party.
2. Maintenance decisions made after the failure of the
respondent to appear shall be considered as decisions
under paragraph 1 if it is demonstrated that notice had
been given and the opportunity to be heard had been
satisfied in a way to satisfy the standards of [North
Carolina].
-6-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
Id. art. 7. The agreement requires that the “Requesting Party,” in this case
Switzerland, transmit the application for enforcement with the requisite supporting
documentation, including the decision of the local tribunal, to the North Carolina
Child Support Enforcement Agency as the responsible public body of the Department
of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement. See id. art. 4,
cl. 3. However, for a foreign decision or order to be recognized and enforced, the
application shall include “evidence that the respondent has appeared in the
proceedings or has been given notice and an opportunity to appear.” Id. art. 4, cl.
5(b).
Once a requesting party registers a foreign support order for enforcement
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-6-602, the non-registering party, the individual
from whom support is being sought, must be notified of the registration of the support
order and informed of the opportunity to contest the validity or enforcement of the
order within twenty days after receiving notice. Id. § 52C-6-605. “A party contesting
the validity or enforcement of a registered support order or seeking to vacate the
registration has the burden of proving” at least one of several enumerated defenses,
including that “[t]he issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting
party.” Id. § 52C-6-607(a)(1).
Rule 60(b) Motions for Relief from Judgment
-7-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
Described as “a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular
case,” Sloan v. Sloan, 151 N.C. App. 399, 404, 566 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2002), Rule 60(b)
provides that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party . . . from a final . . . order . . . for the following reasons: (1) [m]istake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (4) [t]he judgment is void; [or] (6)
[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 60(b)(1), (4), (6) (2017). “The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to strike a
proper balance between the conflicting principles of finality and relief from unjust
judgments. Generally, the rule is liberally construed.” Harris v. Harris, 162 N.C.
App. 511, 513, 591 S.E.2d 560, 561 (2004).
A Rule 60(b) motion “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. The
trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is any competent
evidence in the record to support them.” Brown v. Cavit Sci., Inc., 230 N.C. App. 460,
463, 749 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2013) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.” Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C. App. 101,
109, 493 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
motions pursuant to Rule 60(b) may not be used as a substitute for appeal to correct
errors of law. Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006). In
-8-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
addition, our Supreme Court has directed that the discretionary ruling of a lower
court should not be disturbed on appeal unless it “probably amounted to a substantial
miscarriage of justice.” Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 487, 290 S.E.2d 599,
605 (1982).
“Although the decision to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is a matter
within the trial court’s discretion, what constitutes excusable neglect is a question of
law which is fully reviewable on appeal.” In re Hall, 89 N.C. App. 685, 687, 366 S.E.2d
882, 884 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 322
N.C. 835, 371 S.E.2d 277 (1988). “A Rule 60(b)(1) motion must be made within a
reasonable time, and the movant must show both the existence of one of the stated
grounds for relief, and a meritorious defense.” Id. at 686, 366 S.E.2d at 884 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Discussion
I. Rule 60(b)(1)
Plaintiff-Mother argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for
relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) because the trial court: 1) refused to
admit the “Affidavit of Eve Gyger,” 2) refused to admit the “Affidavit of Translation,”
and 3) proceeded with the hearing despite the lack of proper notice to Plaintiff-
Mother. These arguments are without merit, and we address each in turn.
1. Affidavit of Eve Gyger
-9-
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
Although Plaintiff-Mother failed to attend the Rule 60(b) hearing, she
attempted through counsel to introduce an affidavit that was not notarized, but
purportedly bore her signature. Attached to the affidavit were other documents,
including third-party statements and documents that Plaintiff-Mother allegedly
obtained from the Swiss court. Plaintiff-Mother contended that these documents
were excluded from the record submitted by the Swiss authorities, which constituted
mistake and excusable neglect. The trial court refused to admit the affidavit and
attached documents into evidence because the “Plaintiff’s signature was not notarized
and she was not present in Court to be examined.”
On appeal, Plaintiff-Mother argues that the affidavit should have been
admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-3-315(b) (2017), which states that “[a]n
affidavit . . . which would not be excluded under the hearsay rule if given in person,
is admissible in evidence if given under penalty of perjury by a party or witness
residing outside this State.” Plaintiff-Mother’s argument is unavailing.
An affidavit is “[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by
the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” Affidavit, Black’s
Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). More than a century ago, our Supreme Court declared:
The essential requisites [of an affidavit] are, apart from the
title in some cases, that there shall be an oath administered
by an officer authorized by law to administer it, and that
what the affiant states under such oath shall be reduced to
writing before such officer. The signing or subscribing of
the name of the affiant to the writing is not generally
- 10 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
essential to its validity; it is not, unless some statutory
regulation requires it, as is sometimes the case. It must be
certified by the officer before whom the oath was taken
before it can be used for legal purposes; indeed, it is not
complete or operative until this is done. The certificate,
usually called the jurat, is essential, not as part of the
affidavit, but as official evidence that the oath was taken
before a proper officer. The object of such an instrument is
to obtain the sworn statement of facts in writing of the
affiant in such official and authoritative shape, as that it
may be used for any lawful purpose, either in or out of
courts of justice. The signature of the affiant can in no
sense add to or give force to what is sworn, and what is
sworn is made to appear authoritatively by the certificate
of the officer.
Alford v. McCormac, 90 N.C. 151, 152-53 (1884) (some emphases added).
Because Plaintiff-Mother’s purported affidavit was not notarized, it lacked
proper certification and could not be used for legal purposes. Therefore, the trial
court was correct to exclude it from evidence.
2. Affidavit of Translation
At the Rule 60(b) hearing, Plaintiff-Mother’s counsel also attempted to
introduce into evidence the affidavit of a private-party translator, who was not
present to testify, to show alleged errors and discrepancies in the official English
translation of the Swiss court documents. The trial court found that “Plaintiff cannot
substitute a third party translation for the original translation provided by the Swiss
authorities.” The trial court further found that “the original translation supports the
Order [denying registration of the foreign support order].”
- 11 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff-Mother alleges error to the trial court’s ruling in a one-paragraph
argument in her brief, and cites no case law or other authorities to support her
assertions. It is not the job of this Court to create an argument for an appellant. Viar
v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361, reh’g denied, 359
N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005); N.C.R. App. P 28(b)(6). Therefore, we will not
address this argument.
3. Notice of Hearing
Plaintiff-Mother argues that the notice of hearing informing her of Defendant-
Father’s intention to contest the registration of the support order contained
materially misleading information and violated Rule 5 of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, in that it was not sent to her last known address.
Regarding materially misleading information, Plaintiff-Mother argues that the
notice stated that a “hearing to register foreign support order” was scheduled for 2
September 2016. The support order had already been registered and the hearing was
actually to “contest the validity or enforcement of a registered support order” as
provided under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-6-606. However, Plaintiff-Mother never raised
this issue below and we will not address it for the first time on appeal. See State v.
Haselden, 357 N.C. 1, 10, 577 S.E.2d 594, 600 (2003) (“This Court will not consider
arguments based upon matters not presented to or adjudicated by the trial court.”).
- 12 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
Concerning Plaintiff-Mother’s contention that the notice of hearing was sent
to the wrong location, the trial court found:
Plaintiff contends the September 27, 2016 Order is void
because she did not receive proper notice prior to the
September 2, 2016 hearing. No credible evidence supports
this contention. Defendant’s evidence shows and the Court
finds that the policy and procedures of the North Carolina
Guilford County Child Support Enforcement agency in an
interstate case are to send correspondence to a plaintiff to
the same agency that initiated the action on behalf of the
plaintiff. The Court further finds that Plaintiff signed a
power of attorney to give the agency authority to work on
Plaintiff’s behalf to obtain child support for the minor
children. A Notice of Hearing was sent to Plaintiff on July
12, 2016 to Eve Gyger c/o SZ Section for Private Int Law,
Central Authority for Maintenance Matter, Bundesrain 20,
Bern Switzerland. SZ Section for Private Int Law is the
agency that initiated the action on behalf of the Plaintiff.
....
Plaintiff received proper notice of the hearing scheduled for
September 2, 2016. The September 27, 2016 Order of the
Honorable Judge Lawrence McSwain is not void.
(Emphasis added).
Our statutes provide that “[i]f the party has no attorney of record, service shall
be made upon the party . . . [b]y mailing a copy to the party at the party’s last known
address or, if no address is known, by filing it with the clerk of court.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1A-1, Rule 5(b)(2)b (2016). However, Plaintiff-Mother was not an unrepresented
party. This action, as the trial court correctly noted, was initiated by the Swiss
Central Authority, and Plaintiff-Mother executed a limited power of attorney
- 13 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
granting the North Carolina Child Support Enforcement Agency the authority “to
represent [her] in dealings with all authorities and before all courts[.]”3
A IV-D agent of the Guilford County Child Support Enforcement Agency
testified that it was her office’s policy in international child support cases to send all
communications and correspondence directly to the agency initiating the support
request. The IV-D attorney informed Plaintiff-Mother, in accordance with federal
and state agency policy, of the scheduled hearing to contest the registration of the
foreign support order by mailing the notice of hearing to the Swiss Central Authority
in Bern, Switzerland. See A Caseworker’s Guide to Processing Cases with
Switzerland, Office of Child Support Enforcement, 8 (2009), [https://perma.cc/VK97-
4XBC] (“All correspondence to Switzerland must be sent to the Swiss Central
Authority in Bern[ ] . . . .”); Child Support Services Manual: Intergovernmental, N.C.
Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 41, [https://perma.cc/W96L-8L3N] (“When a
hearing [contesting the registration of a foreign support order] is scheduled, notice of
the date, time, and location of the hearing must be provided to the initiating state
immediately.”).
“Correspondence” is the “[i]nterchange of written communications.”
Correspondence, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Plaintiff’s counsel argues
3 While Plaintiff-Mother was not an unrepresented party, we note, “[n]o attorney/client
relationship shall be considered to have been created between the attorney who represents the child
support enforcement agency and any person by virtue of the action of the attorney in providing the
services required.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-130.1(c) (2016).
- 14 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
that this “correspondence” should have been served directly on the party in
accordance with Rule 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for service
upon an unrepresented party by delivering or mailing a copy to the party. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 5(b)(2). In this case, we are bound to follow federal law.
The governments of the United States and Switzerland entered into a treaty
concerning the registration and enforcement of foreign support orders between our
two countries. A treaty is federal law and “equivalent to an act of [Congress].” Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314, 7 L. Ed. 415, 436 (1829), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 8 L. Ed. 604 (1833). Federal law is “the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Whenever state and federal law conflict, “state law is
naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute.” Crosby v.
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 147 L. Ed. 2d 352, 361 (2000).
North Carolina is bound to follow the Agreement between the United States
and Switzerland. The Agreement provides that documents should be sent to the
“Central Authority or other designated public body” of each party. See Agreement,
art. 4, cl. 3. Both the U.S. Office of Child Support Enforcement and the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services provide that correspondence in
international foreign support cases should be sent to the respective country or state
- 15 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
agency, not sent directly to the individual parties. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in making the determination that the notice of hearing was sent
to the correct location, and that Plaintiff received proper notice, and thus we affirm
that finding.
II. Rule 60(b)(4)
Next, Plaintiff-Mother argues that her Rule 60(b)(4) motion was erroneously
denied because the order vacating the registration of the foreign support order was
void for failure to comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-6-606(c)
(2017). Plaintiff-Mother argues this error divested jurisdiction from the trial court
that granted the order vacating the registration of the foreign support order.
However, Plaintiff-Mother never raised this argument before the trial court, a fact
she concedes in her reply brief to this Court. Nevertheless, given that questions
concerning subject matter jurisdiction may properly be raised for the first time on
appeal, Federated Fin. Corp. of Am. v. Jenkins, 215 N.C. App. 330, 334, 719 S.E.2d
48, 51 (2011), we will address Plaintiff-Mother’s argument.
A trial court may only grant a Rule 60(b)(4) motion where the underlying
judgment is void. Burton v. Blanton, 107 N.C. App. 615, 616, 421 S.E.2d 381, 382
(1992). “A judgment will not be deemed void merely for an error in law, fact, or
procedure. A judgment is void only when the issuing court has no jurisdiction over
the parties or subject matter in question or has no authority to render the judgment
- 16 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
entered.” Id. The district courts of North Carolina are granted jurisdiction over
matters proceeding under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 52C-1-102 (2017).
Here, it is evident that the trial court possessed jurisdiction by statute.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff-Mother’s Rule 60(b)(4)
motion.
III. Rule 60(b)(6)
Finally, Plaintiff-Mother argues that her Rule 60(b)(6) motion was erroneously
denied because Plaintiff-Mother never received notice of the hearing to contest the
registration order, rendering the trial court’s order vacating the registration of her
foreign support order inequitable. We disagree.
A trial court cannot set aside a judgment or order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)
without a showing: (1) that extraordinary circumstances exist, and (2) that justice
demands relief. Howell v. Howell, 321 N.C. 87, 91, 361 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1987). The
determination of whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is equitable in nature
and within the trial court’s discretion. Kennedy v. Starr, 62 N.C. App. 182, 186, 302
S.E.2d 497, 499-500, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 321, 307 S.E.2d 164 (1983).
As discussed above, Plaintiff-Mother executed a limited power of attorney
granting the North Carolina Child Support Enforcement Agency the authority “to
represent [her] in dealings with all authorities and before all courts.” The Guilford
- 17 -
GYGER V. CLEMENT
Opinion of the Court
County Child Support Enforcement Agency followed established federal and state
agency procedure in sending notice to parties in an interstate case. Thus, competent
evidence exists in the record to support the trial court’s discretionary ruling denying
Plaintiff-Mother’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Further, Plaintiff-Mother failed to show that
extraordinary circumstances exist or that justice demands relief, and Plaintiff-
Mother lacks a meritorious defense in that neither of the affidavits were admissible
into evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Plaintiff-Mother’s
Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Conclusion
The trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff-Mother’s Rule 60(b) motions for
relief from the order vacating the registration of her foreign support order. Therefore,
we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
AFFIRMED.
Judge STROUD concurs.
Judge MURPHY concurs in result only.
- 18 -