Imes v. City of Asheville , 163 N.C. App. 668 ( 2004 )

WYNN, Judge.

By this appeal, Plaintiff James Edward Imes contends the trial court erred in granting motions to dismiss his compaint for wrongful discharge against Defendants City of Asheville, CCL Management, Inc., and Asheville City Coach Lines, Inc. Plaintiff argues the termination of his employment with Defendants violated public policy of this State. We conclude Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and we therefore affirm the order of the trial court.

The pertinent facts of the instant appeal are as follows: On 22 July 2002, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint in Buncombe County Superior Court alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The complaint alleged Plaintiff was an employee-at-will with Asheville City Coach Lines, Inc. from 1974 until his termination on 17 August 2001. Plaintiff alleged “Defendants CCL Management, Inc. and/or Asheville City Coach Lines, Inc. acted and served as agents to the City of Asheville.” According to the complaint, Plaintiff was terminated after he was hospitalized for serious injuries he sustained when his wife shot him on or about 12 July 2001. Plaintiff alleged his supervisor informed him “he was being terminated due to the Plaintiff being a victim of domestic violence.” As a victim of domestic violence, Plaintiff alleged he was a “member of a class of persons sought to be protected by the laws of the state of North Carolina” and therefore his termination violated public policy “in that, termination of any employment based on the employee’s status as a victim of domestic violence tends to be injurious to the public and against the public good.” On 30 October 2002, the trial court entered an order granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, from which Plaintiff appealed.

The issue on appeal is whether Plaintiff’s complaint states a valid claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be based, and we affirm the order of the trial court.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Considine v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 145 N.C. App. 314, 316-17, 551 S.E.2d 179, 181, affirmed per curiam, 354 N.C. 568, 557 S.E.2d 528 (2001). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must determine whether, taking all allegations in the complaint as true, relief may be granted under any recognized legal theory. Taylor v. Taylor, 143 N.C. App. 664, 668, 547 S.E.2d 161, 164 (2001). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if no law supports the claim, if sufficient facts to make out a good claim are absent, or if a fact is asserted that defeats the claim. Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 225, 517 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1999).

In the instant case, Plaintiff was employed at will. Although at-will employment may be terminated “ ‘for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent.’ ” Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989) (quoting Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985), overruled in part on other grounds, Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997)). “The narrow exceptions to [the employment-at-will doctrine] have been grounded in considerations of public policy designed either to prohibit status-based discrimination or to insure the integrity of the judicial process or the enforcement of the law.” Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333-34, 493 S.E.2d at 423.

To state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, an employee has the burden of pleading that his “dismissal occurred for a reason that violates public policy.” Considine, 145 N.C. App. at 317, 551 S.E.2d at 181; see also Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 422; Salter v. E & J Healthcare, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 685, 693, 575 S.E.2d 46, 51 (2003). “Public policy has been defined as the principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” Coman, 325 N.C. at 175 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2. Although this definition of public policy “does not include a laundry list of what is or is not ‘injurious to the public or against the public good,’ at the very least public policy is violated when an employee is fired in contravention of express policy declarations contained in the North Carolina General Statutes.” Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 353, 416 S.E.2d 166, 169 (1992) (footnote omitted).

Wrongful discharge claims have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1) for refusing to violate the law at the employer’s request, see, e.g., Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (holding the complaint stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee was discharged for refusing to comply with his employer’s demand that he continue to operate a commercial vehicle for periods of time that violated federal regulations); Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27 (holding that the plaintiffs complaint stated an enforceable claim for wrongful discharge where the employee was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for refusing to testify falsely in a medical malpractice case), (2) for engaging in a legally protected activity, see Vereen v. Holden, 121 N.C. App. 779, 784, 468 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1996) (holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 410, 494 S.E.2d 600 (1997), or (3) based on activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy. See Amos, 331 N.C. at 350, 416 S.E.2d at 167 (holding that firing an employee for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage violated North Carolina public policy); Simmons v. Chemol Corp., 137 N.C. App. 319, 322, 528 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2000) (recognizing claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee alleged he was handicapped and that his employer discharged him because of his handicap in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2).

The complaint filed in the instant case does not allege that Defendants’ conduct violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision, nor does it allege Defendants encouraged Plaintiff to violate any law that might result in potential harm to the public. Instead, the complaint alleged that “domestic violence is a serious social problem in North Carolina” and that “termination of any employment based on the employee’s status as a victim of domestic violence tends to be injurious to the public and against the public good.” Plaintiff acknowledges that “there are no North Carolina cases which specifically carve out a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine based on domestic violence.” Nor does Plaintiff cite North Carolina statutory law in support of his position.

While Chapter 50B of our General Statutes contains various protections for victims of domestic violence, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 et seq., it does not establish victims of domestic violence as a protected class of persons or extend employment security status to such persons. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 (2003) (stating that “[i]t is the public policy of this State to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex or handicap by employers which regularly employ 15 or more employees.”).

We do not dispute Plaintiff’s allegation, nor the dissent’s position, that domestic violence is a serious social problem for our State and is recognized as such by our General Assembly and the Governor. It is, however, but one of many social problems addressed by our General Statutes. Poverty, child abuse, juvenile delinquency, substance abuse — all are examples of social ills our General Statutes seek to alleviate. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-24 et seq. (creating public assistance programs); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-313 et seq. (protection of minors); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-540 (providing for comprehensive juvenile delinquency and substance abuse prevention plan). All such statutes may be read to express a general public policy in favor of protection of victims of poverty, child abuse, substance abuse, etc. We do not interpret such statutes, however, as creating specialized and protected classes of persons entitled to employment and other status protection. If the General Assembly desires to exempt victims of domestic violence from the at-will employment doctrine, it is free to do so. This Court, however, may not create public policy exemptions where none exist.

Plaintiff has failed to identify any specified North Carolina public policy that was violated by Defendants in terminating his employment. The complaint does not allege that Defendants’ conduct violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision, nor does it allege Defendants encouraged Plaintiff to violate any law that might result in potential harm to the public. Considine, 145 N.C. App. at 321-22, 551 S.E.2d at 184. The complaint does not allege any of “the narrow exceptions to [the employment-at-will doctrine] . . . grounded in considerations of public policy designed either to prohibit status-based discrimination or to insure the integrity of the judicial process or the enforcement of the law.” Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333-34, 493 S.E.2d at 423. Any exception to the at-will employment doctrine “should be adopted only with substantial justification grounded in compelling considerations of public policy.” Id. at 334, 493 S.E.2d at 423. Because Plaintiff’s complaint failed to articulate such compelling grounds to justify an exception to Defendants’ right to terminate his employment, we must hold the trial court properly granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

The order of the trial court is hereby,

Affirmed.

Judge ELMORE concurs. Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON dissents.