State v. Porter ( 2022 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-166
    No. COA21-275
    Filed 15 March 2022
    Cumberland County, No. 20 CRS 052425
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    DARIUS DEANDRE PORTER, Defendant.
    Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 28 January 2021 by Judge Gale
    M. Adams in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30
    November 2021.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Carolyn
    McLain, for the State.
    Richard Croutharmel for defendant-appellant.
    MURPHY, Judge.
    ¶1         Defendant Darius Deandre Porter appeals from a judgment entered upon his
    Alford plea to communicating threats and assault on a female. Defendant argues,
    and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by sentencing Defendant to 24
    months of supervised probation without making a specific finding that a probationary
    period longer than 18 months was necessary. We agree and remand for resentencing.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2         On 28 January 2021, Defendant was charged with habitual misdemeanor
    STATE V. PORTER
    2022-NCCOA-166
    Opinion of the Court
    assault, communicating threats, resisting a public officer, two counts of assault
    inflicting serious injury in the presence of a minor, contributing to the delinquency of
    a minor, and assault on a female.            Defendant entered an Alford plea on the
    misdemeanor charges of communicating threats and assault on a female in exchange
    for the State’s dismissal of the remaining charges.
    ¶3          Pursuant to Defendant’s Alford plea, the trial court gave Defendant a
    suspended sentence of 150 days and placed him on 24 months of supervised probation.
    The trial court, however, made no specific findings regarding the probationary period
    exceeding 18 months. On 8 February 2021, Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶4          Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error by sentencing him
    to 24 months of supervised probation without making a specific finding that a
    probationary period of longer than 18 months was necessary in violation of N.C.G.S.
    § 15A-1343.2(d)(1).1 The State concedes that “the trial court erred when it failed to
    correctly mark the check box on the sentencing form” to indicate that the trial court
    1 Although Defendant did not object to the sentence at trial, we nonetheless have
    appellate jurisdiction as this issue is preserved for appeal as a matter of law. N.C.G.S. § 15A-
    1446(d)(18) (2021) (permitting appellate review of whether a “sentence imposed was
    unauthorized at the time imposed, exceeded the maximum authorized by law, was illegally
    imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law” regardless of whether the defendant
    objected to the sentence at trial); see also State v. Love, 
    156 N.C. App. 309
    , 318, 
    576 S.E.2d 709
    , 714 (2003) (quoting State v. Hucks, 
    323 N.C. 574
    , 579, 
    374 S.E.2d 240
    , 244 (1988))
    (“When a trial court acts contrary to a statutory mandate, the error ordinarily is not waived
    by the defendant’s failure to object at trial.”).
    STATE V. PORTER
    2022-NCCOA-166
    Opinion of the Court
    found a longer period of probation than that specified in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343.2(d)(1)
    was necessary. We agree and remand for resentencing.
    ¶5         “Alleged statutory errors are questions of law” reviewed de novo on appeal.
    State v. Mackey, 
    209 N.C. App. 116
    , 120, 
    708 S.E.2d 719
    , 721, disc. rev. denied, 
    365 N.C. 193
    , 
    707 S.E.2d 246
     (2011). The statutory provision at issue here, N.C.G.S. §
    15A-1343.2(d)(1), provides that,
    [u]nless the [trial] court makes specific findings that longer
    or shorter periods of probation are necessary, the length of
    the original period of probation for offenders sentenced
    under Article 81B shall be as follows: (1) [f]or
    misdemeanants sentenced to community punishment,[2]
    not less than six nor more than 18 months.
    N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343.2(d)(1) (2021).        Stated another way, “[N.C.G.S.] § 15A-
    1343.2(d)(1) . . . provides that a defendant who is sentenced to community
    punishment for a misdemeanor shall be placed on probation for no less than 6 months
    and no more than 18 months, unless the trial court enters specific findings that longer
    or shorter periods of probation are necessary.” State v. Sale, 
    232 N.C. App. 662
    , 664,
    
    754 S.E.2d 474
    , 476 (2014).
    ¶6         The Record reveals the trial court did not make specific findings that a
    probationary period longer than 18 months was necessary as required by N.C.G.S. §
    2 When Defendant was sentenced to 24 months of supervised probation, Defendant
    was sentenced to community punishment. See generally N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.11(2) (2021).
    STATE V. PORTER
    2022-NCCOA-166
    Opinion of the Court
    15A-1343.2(d)(1). This omission constitutes error. See id. at 664, 754 S.E.2d at 476
    (remanding for the trial court to reduce the defendant’s probationary period to a term
    within the statutorily mandated range or enter specific findings as to why a longer
    period of probation was necessary); accord State v. Branch, 
    194 N.C. App. 173
    , 179,
    
    669 S.E.2d 18
    , 22 (2008); State v. Mucci, 
    163 N.C. App. 615
    , 625, 
    594 S.E.2d 411
    , 418
    (2004); Love, 
    156 N.C. App. at 318
    , 
    576 S.E.2d at 714
    . We vacate the judgment below
    and remand for the reduction of Defendant’s probation to a length of time authorized
    by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343.2(d)(1) or entry of specific findings as to why a longer period
    of probation was necessary.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶7         The trial court erred by sentencing Defendant to a probationary period longer
    than that prescribed by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343.2(d)(1) without making specific findings
    that the length of the probationary period was necessary. Accordingly, we vacate the
    judgment below and remand for resentencing.
    VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
    Judges DIETZ and WOOD concur.