Mosiello v. Mosiello ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-626
    No. COA21-734
    Filed 20 September 2022
    Union County, No. 18 CVD115
    MELISSA MOSIELLO, Plaintiff,
    v.
    ANTHONY MOSIELLO, Defendant.
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 June 2021 by Judge William
    F. Helms in Union County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 August
    2022.
    Leitner, Bragg & Griffin, PLLC, by Jordan M. Griffin, for plaintiff appellee.
    Plumides, Romano & Johnson, PC, by Richard B. Johnson, for defendant-
    appellant.
    TYSON, Judge.
    ¶1           Anthony Mosiello (“Anthony”) appeals from an order granting an unequitable
    distribution of marital property to his ex-wife, Melissa Mosiello (“Melissa”). We
    affirm.
    I.     Background
    ¶2           Anthony and Melissa married on 4 September 1992. Both parties remained
    uncertain about the official date of separation during the equitable distribution
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    hearing. When the divorce hearing was held over one year later, the trial court found
    the parties had separated on 9 March 2009. The trial court entered a Judgment of
    Divorce on the same day as the divorce hearing, 5 April 2021. Melissa’s claim for
    equitable distribution was heard on 10 March 2020. The trial court took the matter
    under advisement and entered a written order on 28 June 2021. The trial court
    concluded an unequal division would be equitable. Anthony filed a timely appeal.
    II.      Jurisdiction
    ¶3         This Court possesses appellate jurisdiction over equitable distribution orders
    “if the order or judgement would otherwise be a final order or judgment.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-19.1
     (2021); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2) (2021).
    III.   Issues
    ¶4         Anthony argues the trial court: (1) abused its discretion when determining
    whether an equal distribution of the marital estate was not equitable; (2) failed to
    rely on sufficient evidence to support its finding of facts; and, (3) prejudiced him by
    delaying entry of the order.
    IV.    Unequal Distribution of Marital Property
    ¶5         The trial court found an unequal distribution of marital property was equitable
    in this case. Anthony argues the trial court abused its discretion by distributing the
    most substantial marital asset, the marital home valued at $153,000, to Melissa.
    A. Standard of Review
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    ¶6         Trial courts are accorded discretion when distributing marital property, and
    “the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse.”
    McNeely v. McNeely, 
    195 N.C. App. 705
    , 709, 
    673 S.E.2d 778
    , 781 (2009) (citation and
    quotations omitted). “A ruling committed to a trial court’s discretion is to be accorded
    great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it
    could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” White v. White, 
    312 N.C. 770
    ,
    777, 
    324 S.E.2d 829
    , 833 (1985). “Once the trial court decides that an unequal
    division of the marital property would be equitable, its decision will only be reversed
    for an abuse of discretion.” Albritton v. Albritton, 
    109 N.C. App. 36
    , 42, 
    426 S.E.2d 80
    , 84 (1993) (citing White, 
    312 N.C. at 777
    , 
    324 S.E.2d at 833
    ).
    B. Analysis
    ¶7         
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
     (2021) governs the distribution of marital and divisible
    property. “[E]quitable distribution is a three-step process requiring the trial court to
    (1) determine what is marital [and divisible] property; (2) find the net value of the
    property; and, (3) make an equitable distribution of that property.” Petty v. Petty, 
    199 N.C. App. 192
    , 197, 
    680 S.E.2d 894
    , 898 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
    ¶8         Trial courts are mandated by statute to divide marital property equally “unless
    the court determines that an equal division is not equitable.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50
    -
    20(c). If the trial court determines “an equal division is not equitable, the court shall
    divide the marital property and divisible property equitably” and “consider all of the
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    following factors under [
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c)(1)-(12)].” Id.; see also White, 
    312 N.C. at 776-77
    , 
    324 S.E.2d at 832-33
     (explaining that “if no evidence is admitted
    tending to show that an equal division would be inequitable, the trial court must
    divide the marital property equally”).
    ¶9           When determining whether an unequal distribution is equitable, the trial court
    must make written findings of fact demonstrating and adjudicating which relevant
    and admitted evidence supports the 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c) distributional factors
    the court considered. Daetwyler v. Daetwyler, 
    130 N.C. App. 246
    , 249, 
    502 S.E.2d 662
    ,
    665 (1998) (citation omitted). “The trial court need not make ‘exhaustive’ findings of
    the evidentiary facts, but must include the ‘ultimate’ facts considered.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Armstrong v. Armstrong, 
    322 N.C. 396
    , 405–06, 
    368 S.E.2d 595
    , 600 (1988)).
    ¶ 10         If a party presents evidence that an unequal distribution is not equitable under
    one or more of the 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c) factors, the trial court must exercise its
    discretion when assessing and adjudicating how much weight to give each factor.
    White, 
    312 N.C. at 776-77
    , 
    324 S.E.2d at 832-33
     (explaining that when “evidence
    tending to show that an equal division of marital property would not be equitable is
    admitted, . . . the trial court must exercise its discretion in assigning the weight
    [accorded to] each factor”). “[T]he trial court is not required to show how it balanced
    the factors; the weight given to each factor is in the trial court’s discretion; and there
    is no need to show exactly how the trial court arrived at its decision regarding unequal
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    division,” but an appellate court must be able to review and conclude the statutory
    factors were followed. Montague v. Montague, 
    238 N.C. App. 61
    , 70-71, 
    767 S.E.2d 71
    ,
    78 (2014) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 11         “A single distributional factor may support an unequal division.” Mugno v.
    Mugno, 
    205 N.C. App. 273
    , 278, 
    695 S.E.2d 495
    , 499 (2010) (citation omitted); see also
    Leighow v. Leighow, 
    120 N.C. App. 619
    , 
    463 S.E.2d 290
     (1995) (finding three
    distributional factors in favor of one spouse supported an unequitable distribution
    order). Our Supreme Court has held “a party’s misconduct during the marriage
    which dissipates or reduces the value of the marital assets for non-marital purposes
    can be considered under [factor (12) of] 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50
    –20(c)(12) in determining
    whether equal would be equitable.” Coleman v. Coleman, 
    89 N.C. App. 107
    , 109-110,
    
    365 S.E.2d 178
    , 180 (1988) (citing Smith v. Smith, 
    314 N.C. 80
    , 81, 
    331 S.E.2d 682
    ,
    683 (1985)).
    ¶ 12         The trial court in Albritton relied on four of the twelve 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50
    -
    20(c) factors when deciding an equal distribution was not equitable. 
    109 N.C. App. at 42
    , 
    426 S.E.2d at 84
    . The trial court gave “particular weight” to evidence indicating
    the “plaintiff had secreted funds, attempted to devalue the marital estate and was
    less than truthful in much of her testimony,” and also considered the “defendant's
    declining health and inability to work” important. 
    Id.
     This Court held the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion because the decision was well reasoned and not arbitrary.
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    Id.
    ¶ 13         Here, the trial court reached a well-reasoned decision that was not arbitrary.
    The trial court considered the statutory facts and concluded an unequal distribution
    was equitable. The order reveals which 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c) factors the trial
    court weighed, although the court did not specifically label each factor.
    ¶ 14         The trial court considered factor (3), the duration of the marriage and the
    physical health of Melissa. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c)(3). The trial court also appeared
    to heavily weigh Anthony’s destructive acts, finding Anthony had “intentionally” set
    the marital home on fire and rendered the home “uninhabitable for at least six (6)
    months.” Melissa paid for all subsequent repairs to the home and the increased
    insurance premiums resulting from the fire. These findings clearly align with factor
    (11a), which allows courts to consider the “[a]cts of either party to maintain, preserve,
    develop, or expand; or to waste, neglect, devalue or convert the marital property or
    divisible property, or both, during the period after separation of the parties and before
    the time of distribution.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c)(11a) (emphasis supplied).
    ¶ 15         Those findings of fact also fall within factor (12) because trial courts may
    consider any action that “dissipates or reduces the value of the marital assets.”
    Smith, 
    314 N.C. at 81
    , 
    331 S.E.2d at 683
    . Although Anthony may not agree with how
    the trial court weighed each factor, the trial court was not required to show how it
    balanced the factors or the exact weight given to each factor, as a prior panel of this
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    Court explained in Montague, 238 N.C. App. at 70-71, 767 S.E.2d at 78.
    ¶ 16         The trial court, vested with the discretion to determine how much weight to
    give each of the 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c) factors, concluded factors (3), (11a), and
    (12) favored an unequal distribution.         A singular 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c)
    distributional factor may support an unequal division, as explained in Mugno.
    Because the trial court’s decision is not shown to be arbitrary, the trial court’s
    decision should not be set aside and must be given deference.
    V.    The Sufficiency of the Evidence
    ¶ 17         Anthony next argues several of the trial court’s findings of fact are not
    supported by relevant admitted evidence. Anthony asserts four of the trial court’s
    findings of fact do not comply with the statutory obligations governing the
    classification and valuation of marital property for equitable distribution orders.
    A. Standard of Review
    ¶ 18         Trial courts possess great discretion when distributing marital property, and
    this Court will only reverse an equitable distribution order if the trial court abused
    its discretion. Albritton, 
    109 N.C. App. at 42
    , 
    426 S.E.2d at 84
     (citation omitted).
    “Accordingly, this Court will not reverse [a] trial court’s findings of fact on appeal as
    long as they are supported by competent evidence.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted); see also
    Troutman v. Troutman, 
    193 N.C. App. 395
    , 400-01, 
    667 S.E.2d 506
    , 510 (2008)
    (explaining a trial court’s decision will not be overturned unless, “upon consideration
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    of the cold record . . . the division ordered by the trial court [ ] has resulted in an
    obvious miscarriage of justice”) (citations and quotations omitted).
    B. Analysis
    ¶ 19         Trial courts must publish written findings of fact to support their conclusions
    of law to enable appellate courts to assess the record and determine whether the
    evidence admitted supports the findings of fact and the legal conclusions represent a
    correct application of the law. Mrozek v. Mrozek, 
    129 N.C. App. 43
    , 49-50, 
    496 S.E.2d 836
    , 841 (1998) (citation omitted). “This [obligation to provide written orders] only
    requires that the court make findings as to the ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.
    The trial court is not required to recite in detail the evidence it considered in
    determining what division is equitable.” Id. at 50, 
    496 S.E.2d at 841
     (citation and
    quotation omitted).
    ¶ 20         “[F]indings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by any competent
    evidence from the record.” Robinson v. Robinson, 
    210 N.C. App. 319
    , 322, 
    707 S.E.2d 785
    , 789 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted). “[D]etermining the credibility of
    the evidence [is] the court’s province as finder of the facts.” Nye v. Nye, 
    100 N.C. App. 326
    , 327, 
    396 S.E.2d 91
    , 92 (1990) (explaining the trial court did not err when it
    determined defendant’s stock had no value and would not appreciate—
    notwithstanding contrary evidence presented by the plaintiff—because the court
    “simply did not believe” the plaintiff’s evidence). “This Court is not here to second-
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    guess values of marital and separate property where there is evidence to support the
    trial court’s figures.” Mishler v. Mishler, 
    90 N.C. App. 72
    , 74, 
    367 S.E.2d 385
    , 386
    (1988).
    ¶ 21         As noted above, the distribution of martial property encompasses a three-step
    process: (1) the classification of property as marital or separate, (2) the assignment of
    value to the property, and (3) the distribution of the marital property. Petty, 
    199 N.C. App. at 197
    , 
    680 S.E.2d at 898
     (citation omitted).
    ¶ 22         Marital property refers to “all real and personal property acquired by either
    spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the
    separation of the parties.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (b)(1) (2021). Divisible property
    encompasses the “appreciation and diminution in value of marital property and
    divisible property of the parties occurring after the date of separation and prior to the
    date of distribution, except that appreciation or diminution in value which is the result
    of postseparation actions or activities of a spouse shall not be treated as divisible
    property.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (b)(4)(a) (emphasis supplied).
    ¶ 23         Once the trial court classifies property, 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21
    (b) specifies that
    marital property should “be valued as of the date of the separation,” while divisible
    property is “valued as of the date of distribution.” Courts should then use the “net
    value” of both marital and divisible property when distributing it amongst the
    parties. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c). This Court has given “net value” its ordinary
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    meaning when applying 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
    (c) and defined it as the “market
    value, if any, less the amount of any encumbrance serving to offset or reduce market
    value.” Alexander v. Alexander, 
    68 N.C. App. 548
    , 550-51, 
    315 S.E.2d 772
    , 775 (1984).
    ¶ 24          While trial courts should make explicit findings regarding the net fair market
    value of property on the date of separation, a spouse is not necessarily prejudiced by
    the trial court’s failure to state the net value of the property if it is easily ascertained
    by the trial court’s findings, as explained in Wall v. Wall. 
    140 N.C. App. 303
    , 307, 
    536 S.E.2d 647
    , 649-50 (2000).
    Defendant does not question the accuracy of the trial
    court's findings, but argues that the trial court did not
    make an explicit finding about the net value of the marital
    home on 5 May 1988, the date of separation. However, the
    trial court found a gross fair market value on the date of
    separation of $186,000.00, subject to encumbrances of
    $132,136.71 and $17,753.20.                Subtracting the
    encumbrances from the gross value of the home leaves a
    net fair market value on the date of separation of
    $36,110.09. While it would have been better practice for
    the trial court to make a specific finding as to the net fair
    market value of the dwelling house on the date of
    separation, such value can be easily calculated from its
    findings. . . . Though the net fair market value of the Walls’
    residence was not explicitly set out, it can be made certain
    from the facts found by the trial court.
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied).
    ¶ 25          Trial courts may rely on a variety of relevant evidence, including the lay
    opinions of testifying spouses, when assessing the value of property.
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    Lay opinions as to the value of the property are admissible
    if the witness can show that he has knowledge of the
    property and some basis for his opinion. Unless it
    affirmatively appears that the owner does not know the
    market value of his property, it is generally held that he is
    competent to testify as to its value. . . . Rather, an owner is
    deemed to have sufficient knowledge of the price paid for
    his land, the rents or other income received, and the
    possibilities of the land for use, and to have a reasonably
    good idea of what the land is worth.
    Hill v. Hill, 
    244 N.C. App. 219
    , 229, 
    781 S.E.2d 29
    , 37 (2015) (citations and quotations
    omitted).
    ¶ 26         On appeal, this Court may consider whether the trial court’s valuation of
    martial property fell “within the range of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s valuations.”
    Smith, 104 N.C. App. at 792, 411 S.E.2d at 200. This Court has also held one party’s
    valuation of property in an equitable distribution affidavit may support a finding of
    value. See Lawing v. Lawing, 
    81 N.C. App. 159
    , 163-64, 
    344 S.E.2d 100
    , 104 (1986)
    (finding the plaintiff’s affidavit valuing the ring constituted competent value
    evidence, even though no other evidence was entered at trial and the defendant’s
    affidavit included a conflicting value).
    ¶ 27         Claims regarding post-separation changes in the value of real property often
    center around how the misclassification of marital property affects each spouse’s
    award when the property is divided equally. See McLean v. McLean, 
    88 N.C. App. 285
    , 293, 
    363 S.E.2d 95
    , 100 (1987) (stating this Court is required “to credit a former
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    spouse ‘with at least the amount by which he decreased the principal owed’ on marital
    debt by using his separate funds”) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 28         If property is divided equally between spouses, but one spouse made post-
    separation payments towards marital property, the court must consider whether the
    spouse making the payments used marital funds and determine the value of those
    payments. Smith, 104 N.C. App. at 790-92, 411 S.E.2d at 199 (explaining the court
    committed error by failing to credit plaintiff for the “various taxes, insurance and
    reduction of principal as to marital property” plaintiff paid because, as a result,
    plaintiff received an unequal share despite the court’s determination that an equal
    share was equitable).
    ¶ 29         Assessing the type of funds used to make the payment is important because, if
    a spouse used separate funds to benefit the marital estate, those payments may be
    credited to the payor when distributing the marital estate. Loving v. Loving, 
    118 N.C. App. 501
    , 505-06, 
    455 S.E.2d 885
    , 888 (1995) (explaining a spouse “who makes some
    payment on the marital debt after the date of separation and before the equitable
    distribution trial” should be awarded “either (1) a reimbursement from the other
    spouse for the amount of the payment, (2) a credit to his share of the equitable
    distribution award in an amount equal to the payment, or (3) an upward adjustment
    in his percentage of the distribution of the marital properties”). Although a spouse
    may sometimes be credited for the other spouse’s exclusive post-separation use of the
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    marital residence, the trial court may also balance such use and adjust if the spouse
    residing in the home is separately “forced to expend considerable sums to repair and
    maintain [it].” Leighow, 
    120 N.C. App. at 622
    , 
    463 S.E.2d at 292
    .
    ¶ 30         Anthony argues four of the trial court’s findings of fact do not properly comply
    with the trial court’s obligations under 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-20
    , 50-21. We address
    each of the contested findings of fact in turn.
    1. Value of the Home
    ¶ 31         Anthony contends the trial court committed three errors when valuating the
    marital home at $153,000. First, Anthony argues the $153,000 evaluation of the
    house was not supported by competent evidence because several conflicting values of
    the marital residence were offered at trial. Next, Anthony asserts the trial court did
    not consider whether post-separation changes in the value of the marital property
    constituted divisible property. Lastly, Anthony argues the trial court did not value
    the property as of the date of separation. Anthony’s arguments are without merit.
    ¶ 32         At trial, Melissa offered evidence regarding the value of the home. Melissa
    testified to the tax value of the property per the Union County tax records, which
    listed two tax evaluations for 2019 ($143,000 and $157,000). Melissa also testified
    regarding the current mortgage balance in 2019 (approximately $7,000) and the
    mortgage balance when Anthony initially left the marital residence ($17,000).
    Melissa’s equitable distribution affidavit included the value of the land ($140,000),
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    the value of the attached home ($30,000), and the encumbrances on the land
    ($17,000).
    ¶ 33         The trial court’s valuing the land and improvements at $153,000 is supported
    by relevant admitted evidence. Like in Wall, subtracting the $17,000 encumbrances
    from the $170,000 gross value of the marital residence nets fair market value on the
    date of separation of $153,000. The fair net market value can be made certain by the
    findings of fact. This value rests within the range of the evidence entered at trial, as
    explained in Smith, and is supported by more evidence than the sole affidavit as in
    Lawing. 
    81 N.C. App. at 165
    , 
    344 S.E.2d at 105
     (“One of our roles in reviewing
    findings of fact is to reconcile apparently inconsistent findings and uphold the
    judgment when practicable.”).
    ¶ 34         Next, the trial did not err by failing to consider the post-separation changes of
    value in the property as divisible because any appreciation or diminution was “the
    result of postseparation actions or activities” of Melissa. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50
    -
    20(b)(4)(a). Anthony does not contend Melissa used marital funds to pay off the
    encumbrances, nor does Anthony dispute the findings of fact listing all the
    postseparation actions and activities of Melissa. Unlike in Smith, the trial court
    found an unequal distribution of the marital residence was equitable, so any failure
    to quantify post-separation improvements to the marital residence did not harm
    Anthony. 
    Id.
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    ¶ 35         Lastly, the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the date of separation is
    supported by competent evidence. Both parties presented conflicting evidence about
    the date of separation, offering three different years of separation (9 March 2009, 10
    March 2010, and 1 January 2012). While the Judgment of Divorce, entered 5 April
    2021, ultimately concluded the parties separated on 9 March 2009, Melissa explained
    she used 1 January 2012 on the Equitable Distribution Affidavit because Anthony
    had left North Carolina and moved to New York, and had stopped coming by the
    home. The finding was supported by competent evidence in the record. Anthony
    cannot show an abuse of the court’s discretion.
    2. Value of the Cars
    ¶ 36         Plaintiff testified to the Kelley Blue Book values of two cars in Anthony’s
    possession: “At the time [Anthony left the home] the Cougar was valued at $4000 in
    the Blue Kelley Book, and the Lincoln was valued at $2000.” Anthony offered no
    evidence regarding the value of the cars and did not submit an Equitable Distribution
    Affidavit. The trial court’s finding of facts regarding the value of the cars was
    supported by competent evidence, the lay opinion of Melissa, who is allowed to testify
    the value of property under Hill. 244 N.C. App. at 229, 781 S.E.2d at 37.
    3. Actions of the Defendant
    ¶ 37         Anthony contends the trial court’s finding of fact that Anthony “intentionally”
    set the house on fire is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Melissa testified
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    how her daughter witnessed Anthony “go into the home with a gasoline jug and rag,
    take all [her] belongings, put them [into] the bedroom . . . and light the house on fire.”
    Melissa also stated their daughter told police Anthony held the daughter down when
    she was “trying to put the fire out with a pot of water.” Melissa faced increased
    insurance premiums because the fire was set intentionally. Anthony denied setting
    the house on fire, asserting the pictures entered into evidence at trial depicted him
    “outside doing fire on red ants.”
    ¶ 38          After hearing the evidence and assessing the witnesses’ credibility, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by finding Anthony set the fire intentionally. The
    trial court may properly consider evidence regarding marital conduct that “dissipates
    or reduces the value of the marital assets,” per Smith. 
    314 N.C. at 81
    , 
    331 S.E.2d at 683
    .
    4. The Length of the Marriage
    ¶ 39          Anthony’s argument regarding the trial court’s finding of fact detailing the
    length of the marriage mirrors Anthony’s argument regarding the date of separation.
    For the same reasons detailed above, we disagree. This argument is without merit.
    VI.     Prejudicial Delay
    ¶ 40          Anthony contends the trial court prejudiced Anthony by entering the order
    fifteen months after the equitable distribution hearing. We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
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    ¶ 41         As Anthony correctly notes, this Court in Wall established a “case-by-case
    inquiry as opposed to a bright line rule [must] determin[e] whether the length of a
    delay is prejudicial.” Britt v. Britt, 
    168 N.C. App. 198
    , 202, 
    606 S.E.2d 910
    , 912 (2005)
    (citing Wall, 
    140 N.C. App. at 314
    , 
    536 S.E.2d at 654
    ); see also Nicks v. Nicks, 
    241 N.C. App. 487
    , 510, 
    774 S.E.2d 365
    , 381 (2015).
    B. Analysis
    ¶ 42         This Court has declined to reverse late-entered equitable distribution orders
    when the complaining party is not prejudiced by the delay. Britt, 
    168 N.C. App. at 202
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 912
    .     In Britt, a sixteen-month delay between an equitable-
    distribution hearing and the equitable-distribution order did not warrant reversing
    the trial court’s order and entry of a new one. 
    Id.
     The court found no “potential
    changes in the value of marital or divisible property between the hearing and entry
    of the equitable distribution order [to] warrant[ ] additional consideration by the trial
    court.” 
    Id.
     The marital home, which was sold before the hearing, “was the most
    significant item of property distributed” and its value would “not change for the
    purposes of equitably distributing the parties’ marital property.” Id. at 202, 
    606 S.E.2d at 912-13
    .
    ¶ 43         Anthony’s argument fails to assert how he was harmed by the delay. Like in
    Britt, Anthony and Melissa’s most significant marital asset was the marital
    residence. Any changes in the value of the residence between the hearing and the
    MOSIELLO V. MOSIELLO
    2022-NCCOA-626
    Opinion of the Court
    entry of the order did not harm Anthony because the trial court distributed the
    entirety of the marital residence to Melissa. Finally, the delay in this case was
    slightly shorter than the sixteen-month delay in Britt. Any delay did not prejudice
    Anthony.
    VII.     Conclusion
    ¶ 44         The trial court’s findings of fact are supported by admitted and competent
    evidence in the record. Those findings support the conclusions of law that an unequal
    distribution of the parties’ martial assets is equitable. Anthony has failed to show
    any abuse of discretion or prejudice in the trial court’s equitable distribution order.
    The order appealed from in affirmed. It is so ordered.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges ARROWOOD and GRIFFIN CONCUR.