State v. Faucette ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-629
No. COA21-749
Filed 20 September 2022
New Hanover County, Nos. 18 CRS 058548, 058553
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ERIC JAMES FAUCETTE, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 19 February 2021 by Judge
Richard Kent Harrell in the New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals on 25 May 2022.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Asher P.
Spiller, for the State.
William D. Spence for defendant-appellant.
MURPHY, Judge.
¶1 Defendant Eric James Faucette appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss a charge of identity theft based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
Defendant has several theories as to why there was insufficient evidence presented
at trial to support his conviction under N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20, but we need not reach
the merits of those arguments as the State concedes that “there was insufficient
evidence presented at trial showing that Defendant knowingly used identifying
information of another person living or dead within the meaning of the identity theft
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2022-NCCOA-629
Opinion of the Court
statute.” As we agree with both parties that there was insufficient evidence showing
that Defendant intended to fraudulently represent that he was any actual person
living or dead, the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. We
therefore vacate Defendant’s conviction.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On 7 November 2018, Curtis Frashure received a phone call regarding a
disturbance at a trailer he owned. Frashure was told that Defendant, a former tenant
of Frashure, was destroying the trailer, tearing holes in the wall, and tearing doors
down. Frashure had previously told Defendant that he was no longer permitted to
live in the trailer. Upon receiving the phone call, Frashure contacted his friend James
Hinson, who lived across the street, and asked Hinson to find out what was going on
at his trailer. Frashure then called 911 to report the disturbance.
¶3 After speaking with Frashure, Hinson and Mary Baisden, Hinson’s fiancé,
walked over to Frashure’s home, where they observed Defendant picking through a
trashcan. Hinson told Defendant that he was not supposed to be there, that Frashure
had told Defendant to leave, and that Defendant would need to go. Without giving
any verbal response, Defendant stepped away from the trashcan and struck Hinson
in the head with a machete. Hinson then sought to disarm Defendant by punching
him but was not successful.
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Opinion of the Court
¶4 During their encounter, Hinson was hit with the machete multiple times.
Baisden eventually led Hinson back to their trailer, where they called 911. Hinson
was then taken to New Hanover Regional Medical Center where he received stitches
and staples on the lacerations on his head. In addition to scarring, the assault left
Hinson with recurring headaches, which still recurred at the time of trial.
¶5 After the assault, Defendant fled and eventually checked himself into New
Hanover Regional Medical Center. Defendant told hospital personnel that his name
was David Bostic and that his date of birth was 24 September 1972. Defendant
eventually left the hospital, apparently without receiving medical services or
treatment, wearing a bracelet identifying his name as David Bostic and his date of
birth as 24 September 1972.
¶6 Later that evening, Defendant was arrested by Sergeant Joshua Bryant. At
trial, Sgt. Bryant testified that he stopped Defendant after observing him riding a
bicycle without the required safety equipment. Sgt. Bryant observed what appeared
to be blood on Defendant’s clothes. He also recognized Defendant from a picture that
had been texted to him by another officer. Defendant began talking about the incident
and, while speaking to Sgt. Bryant, stated that he “went into the hospital under
another person’s name.”
¶7 On 18 February 2019, Defendant was indicted on charges of assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and identity theft. At trial, with respect to the
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2022-NCCOA-629
Opinion of the Court
identity theft charge, the State argued that Defendant gave the hospital false
information because he had an outstanding charge for failing to appear in court. The
State introduced and published a video recording of an interview of Defendant
conducted by John Carpenter, a former detective of the New Hanover County Sherriff’s
Office. During Defendant’s interview, Defendant stated that he gave the false name
to the hospital because he had a failure to appear. He further stated, in reference to
giving the false information to the hospital, “[t]his is just me protecting myself from
not [sic] having to go to jail.” Defendant further indicated that the information he
provided to the hospital did not belong to a real person. Defendant stated that he
thought he could just be “John Doe” at the hospital, and “that’s all it was.” He also
stated, in reference to the false name and birthdate, “that person doesn’t even exist.”
¶8 At trial, the wristband that Defendant obtained upon being admitted at the
hospital was also introduced into evidence. The name on the wristband was “David
Bostic,” and the birthdate on the wristband was 24 September 1972. Carpenter
testified that he contacted a man named David Bostic who verified that he did not visit
the hospital on 7 November 2018. The State then called David Bostic himself, who
testified he lived in Pender County,1 did not visit New Hanover Regional Medical
1We take judicial notice that Pender and New Hanover are adjoining counties. See
Lineberger v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 189 N.C. App. 1, 6, 657 S.E.2d 673, 677 (quoting West v.
G.D. Reddick, Inc., 302 N.C. 201, 203, 274 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1981)) (“Appellate courts may
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Opinion of the Court
Center on 7 November 2018, did not know Defendant, and had never given Defendant
permission to use his identity. He also testified that his date of birth was 28 May 1975.
¶9 At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss the
charge of identity theft based on the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant’s motion
was denied. Subsequently, Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all
evidence, which was again denied. Defendant timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
¶ 10 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss
the charge of identity theft at the close of all evidence on the ground that the evidence
was insufficient to establish every element of the crime pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1227. See generally N.C.G.S. § 15A-1227 (2021). Defendant argues that the evidence
presented was not sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact to find each element
of this charge beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, the trial court should not
have allowed this charge to go to the jury. The State concedes that this argument is
correct, and we agree.
take judicial notice ex mero motu on ‘any occasion where the existence of a particular fact is
important . . . .’ [Facts subject to judicial notice are those] which are either so notoriously
true as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute or ‘capable of demonstration by readily
accessible sources of indisputable accuracy’ . . . .”), aff’d per curiam in part, disc. rev.
improvidently allowed in part, 362 N.C. 675, 669 S.E. 2d 320 (2008).
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2022-NCCOA-629
Opinion of the Court
¶ 11 “We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v.
Sanders, 208 N.C. App. 142, 144, 701 S.E.2d 380, 382 (2010). “This Court, under a
de novo standard of review, considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. (citing State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-
33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)).
A defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied if there
is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the
offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and
(2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State, making all reasonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of the State. The trial court in
considering such motions is concerned only with the
sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury and
not with its weight. Contradictions and discrepancies are
for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal.
Id. at 144-45, 701 S.E.2d at 382-83 (marks and citations omitted).
¶ 12 N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20 provides, in pertinent part, that identity theft exists
when “[a] person . . . knowingly obtains, possesses, or uses identifying information of
another person, living or dead, with the intent to fraudulently represent that the
person is the other person . . . for the purpose of avoiding legal consequences[.]”
N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) (2021) (emphasis added). N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(b) further
provides a non-exclusive list of information that constitutes “identifying information”
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2022-NCCOA-629
Opinion of the Court
within the meaning of the statute. See N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(b) (2021); State v. Miles,
267 N.C. App. 78, 89, 833 S.E.2d 27, 34 (2019), disc. rev. denied, 373 N.C. 588, 837
S.E.2d 891 (2020).
¶ 13 This Court has determined that another person’s actual name, date of birth,
and address may constitute forms of identifying information under N.C.G.S. § 14-
113.20(b). See Miles, 267 N.C. App. at 89, 833 S.E.2d at 34. In State v. Miles, the
defendant went to Duke Regional Hospital to receive treatment for gunshot wounds
after fleeing from an assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 80-81, 833 S.E.2d at 29-
30. Upon arrival, the defendant gave the hospital the actual name, date of birth, and
address of another person, Jerel Thompson. Id. On these facts, we found that a
name, date of birth, and address of another person are “possible forms of identifying
information where a defendant, like [the] defendant in the instant case, uses the
information for the purposes of escaping arrest or other legal consequences and
possibly to receive hospital services for his injuries.” Id. at 89, 833 S.E.2d at 34.
¶ 14 Here, however, there was no evidence presented that an actual person matched
the identifying information on Defendant’s hospital wristband: David Bostic, born on
24 September 1972. And Defendant did not give the hospital an address. While the
State’s evidence, taken in the light most favorable to it, indicated that Defendant
gave the false name of David Bostic and a false birthdate to hospital personnel and
further showed that he did so for the purpose of avoiding arrest for a failure to appear,
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Opinion of the Court
there was no evidence presented at trial to connect Defendant’s use of this
information with an actual person, living or dead. The individual named David Bostic
who testified at trial did not have the same birthdate the State’s evidence suggested
Defendant provided the hospital, and the remaining evidence presented at trial does
not indicate that anyone could have used the information given by Defendant to
identify any real person.
¶ 15 Therefore, under the facts of this case and a plain reading of the statute, there
was insufficient evidence at trial to show that Defendant “knowingly . . . use[d]
identifying information of another person, living or dead, with the intent to
fraudulently represent that [Defendant was] the other person” within the meaning of
N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a). N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) (2021).
CONCLUSION
¶ 16 There was insufficient evidence at trial to show that Defendant intended to
fraudulently represent he was the David Bostic who testified at trial or that
Defendant used the identifying information of any other actual person, living or dead.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and his
conviction for identity theft under N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) is vacated.2
2 We note that, because Defendant’s sentence for the identify theft conviction was to
be served concurrently with an equivalent term of imprisonment for the assault conviction,
which Defendant did not challenge on appeal, vacatur of the identify theft conviction does
not necessitate a new sentencing hearing.
STATE V. FAUCETTE
2022-NCCOA-629
Opinion of the Court
VACATED.
Judges ARROWOOD and CARPENTER concur.