Lovett v. Univ. Place Owner's Ass'n ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-594
    No. COA22-28
    Filed 6 September 2022
    Mecklenburg County, No. 21-CVS-5841
    MARY LOVETT, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF GREGORY DWAYNE
    LOVETT, Plaintiff,
    v.
    UNIVERSITY PLACE OWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC. F/K/A UNIVERSITY
    PLACE PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, TRICOR INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
    AND EBA CRYSTAL REAL ESTATE LLC, D/B/A SHOPPES AT UNIVERSITY
    PLACE, Defendants.
    Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 13 October 2021 by Judge Gregory
    Hayes in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9
    August 2022.
    Mauney PLLC, by Gary V. Mauney for plaintiff-appellant.
    McAngus, Goudelock & Courie, PLLC, by Zachary D. Walton and Heather G.
    Connor for defendants-appellees Tricor International, LLC and University
    Place Owner’s Association, Inc.
    Raynor Law Firm, PLLC, by Kenneth R. Raynor for defendant-appellee Crystal
    Real Estate, LLC.
    TYSON, Judge.
    ¶1         Mary Lovett (“Plaintiff”), in her representative capacity as Administrator of
    the Estate of Gregory Dwayne Lovett (“Decedent”), appeals from the trial court’s
    LOVETT V. UNIV. PLACE OWNER’S ASS’N
    2022-NCCOA-594
    Opinion of the Court
    order granting University Place Owner’s Association, Inc., Tricor International, LLC,
    and EBA Crystal Real Estate LLC’s (collectively “Defendants”) motions to dismiss
    with prejudice. We affirm.
    I.      Background
    ¶2         On the evening of 14 September 2020, Decedent joined friends at the Shoppes
    at University Place, a retail, dining, and recreational complex located in Charlotte.
    Decedent was intoxicated upon arrival at the Shoppes. Decedent met his friends at
    Boardwalk Billy’s Raw Bar & Ribs restaurant and bar and consumed more alcohol.
    Decedent allegedly suffered from alcoholism.
    ¶3         After leaving Boardwalk Billy’s, Decedent and his friends walked around the
    lake adjoining the Shoppes. No fence, warning signs, or “no swimming” signs were
    posted around the lake, nor was any security personnel present to prohibit Decedent
    from jumping in the lake. Decedent walked to the edge of the lake and jumped in.
    Several by-standers rendered aid and pulled Decedent from out of the lake.
    ¶4         Shortly after being pulled out of the lake, Decedent jumped into the lake a
    second time. Decedent’s friends became concerned when they could no longer see him
    above the surface of the water, but did not enter the lake and attempt to pull him
    again out of the water. Decedent’s friends called the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police
    Department for assistance. The police arrived and summoned divers to search for
    Decedent. Decedent could not be located. Police issued a “missing persons” report.
    LOVETT V. UNIV. PLACE OWNER’S ASS’N
    2022-NCCOA-594
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶5         On 15 September 2020, the police returned with divers. Divers found and
    retrieved Decedent’s body from under the surface of the water. The Mecklenburg
    County Medical Examiner’s Office conducted an autopsy and concluded Decedent had
    drowned. The toxicological profile revealed Decedent’s blood alcohol concentration
    (“BAC”) level at the time of death was 0.37 grams per milliliter (0.37 g/100 mL).
    ¶6         Plaintiff qualified as administrator of Decedent’s estate and filed a complaint
    alleging Decedent’s death was wrongful and directly and proximately caused by
    Defendants’ negligence and gross negligence. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
    complaint with prejudice. The trial court heard arguments on Defendants’ motions
    to dismiss on 14 September 2021 and entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s
    complaint with prejudice on 4 October 2021. Plaintiff appeals.
    II.      Jurisdiction
    ¶7         Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1)
    (2021).
    III.   Issues
    ¶8         Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by allowing Defendants’ motions to
    dismiss.
    IV.         Motion to Dismiss
    A. Standard of Review
    LOVETT V. UNIV. PLACE OWNER’S ASS’N
    2022-NCCOA-594
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶9          This Court’s standard of review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and ruling is well
    established. “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading.” Kemp
    v. Spivey, 
    166 N.C. App. 456
    , 461, 
    602 S.E.2d 686
    , 690 (2004) (citation and quotation
    marks omitted). “When considering a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court
    need only look to the face of the complaint to determine whether it reveals
    an insurmountable bar to plaintiff's recovery.” Carlisle v. Keith, 
    169 N.C. App. 674
    ,
    681, 
    614 S.E.2d 542
    , 547 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    ¶ 10        “On appeal from a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court reviews de
    novo whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint . . . are sufficient
    to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Christmas v. Cabarrus Cty., 
    192 N.C. App. 227
    , 231, 
    664 S.E.2d 649
    , 652 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted) (ellipses in original).
    ¶ 11          This Court “consider[s] the allegations in the complaint [as] true, construe[s]
    the complaint liberally, and only reverse[s] the trial court's denial of a motion to
    dismiss if [the] plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts which could be
    proven in support of the claim.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    B. Analysis
    ¶ 12          In North Carolina, “a plaintiff’s contributory negligence is a bar to recovery
    from a defendant who commits an act of ordinary negligence.” Sorrells v. M.Y.B.
    Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 
    332 N.C. 645
    , 648, 
    423 S.E.2d 72
    , 73-74 (1992)
    LOVETT V. UNIV. PLACE OWNER’S ASS’N
    2022-NCCOA-594
    Opinion of the Court
    (citation omitted). Plaintiff correctly asserts Decedent’s contributory negligence does
    not bar recovery from a defendant’s gross negligence.         “Only gross contributory
    negligence by a plaintiff precludes recovery by the plaintiff from a defendant who was
    grossly negligent.” McCauley v. Thomas, 
    242 N.C. App. 82
    , 89, 
    774 S.E.2d 421
    , 426
    (2015) (citations omitted). “Gross negligence is willful and wanton negligence.” 
    Id.
    ¶ 13         Our Court has held:
    An act is wanton when it is done of wicked purpose or when
    done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the
    rights of others. An act is wilful (sic) when there exists a
    deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty necessary to
    the safety of the person or property of another, a duty
    assumed by contract or imposed by law.
    Boyd v. L.G. DeWitt Trucking Co., 
    103 N.C. App. 396
    , 402, 
    405 S.E.2d 914
    , 918 (1991)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    ¶ 14         In Sorrells, our Supreme Court held the trial court properly granted
    defendant’s motion to dismiss where decedent was voluntarily intoxicated, lost
    control of his vehicle, and struck a bridge. Sorrells, 
    332 N.C. at 649
    , 
    423 S.E.2d at 74
    .
    The Court found the facts established a similar degree of contributory negligence on
    part of the decedent, and plaintiff could not prevail. 
    Id.
    ¶ 15         In Davis v. Hulsing Enters., LLC, 
    370 N.C. 455
    , 457, 
    810 S.E.2d 203
    , 205 (2018)
    our Supreme Court affirmed Sorrells’ analysis.            Our Supreme Court held the
    decedent’s voluntary intoxication established contributory negligence, barring
    LOVETT V. UNIV. PLACE OWNER’S ASS’N
    2022-NCCOA-594
    Opinion of the Court
    recovery from defendant’s ordinary negligence. 
    Id. at 458
    , 810 S.E.2d at 206. It held,
    regardless of defendant’s negligence in continuing to serve decedent alcohol after she
    was visibly intoxicated, the decedent’s contributory negligence prevented recovery.
    Id.
    ¶ 16         Here, Decedent was voluntarily intoxicated upon arrival and when he twice
    jumped into the lake. Decedent’s BAC was nearly five times the legal intoxication
    threshold of 0.08 grams per milliliter (0.08 g/100 mL). We conclude, as did our
    Supreme Court in Sorrells, Decedent’s voluntary intoxication level equaled, if not
    exceeded, any alleged negligence on Defendants’ part.        The trial court properly
    concluded these uncontested facts, reviewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
    established such a degree of Decedent’s contributory negligence to prevent Plaintiff
    from prevailing as a matter of law.
    ¶ 17         Plaintiff’s argument fails because Decedent was grossly contributorily
    negligent, and his actions bar any negligence claim against Defendants. Id. Plaintiff’s
    arguments are without merit.
    V.     Conclusion
    ¶ 18         Our case law demonstrates voluntary intoxication is a circumstance which
    establishes gross contributory negligence. Decedent was voluntarily intoxicated
    nearly five times the legal limit when he twice jumped into the lake. Decedent’s gross
    contributorily negligence bars any recovery for negligence from Defendants.
    LOVETT V. UNIV. PLACE OWNER’S ASS’N
    2022-NCCOA-594
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 19         Upon de novo review, taking Plaintiff’s allegation as true and in the light most
    favorable to her, the trial court properly granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss
    Plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint is
    affirmed. It is so ordered.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges INMAN and GORE concur.