State v. Cruz ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA19-495
Filed: 7 July 2020
Cleveland County, Nos. 15 CRS 55334, 55249
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
CANDACE JANE CRUZ
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 June 2018 by Judge Lisa C.
Bell in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March
2020.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Milind K.
Dongre, for the State.
Van Camp & Van O’Linda, PLLC, by James R. Van Camp, for defendant-
appellant.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Defendant Candace Jane Cruz appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury’s verdicts finding her guilty of accessory after the fact and felony common-
law obstruction of justice. After careful review, we conclude that Defendant received
a fair trial, free from error.
Background
On the night of 24 November 2015, Quavios Clyde shot and killed Shawn
Borders in Shelby, North Carolina. Subsequently, Clyde contacted Defendant, and
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Opinion of the Court
she picked Clyde up and drove him from Shelby to Forest City, North Carolina, to the
home of his brother, Johntae Littlejohn. Defendant drove Clyde back to Shelby later
that night.
Meanwhile, Detective Cameron Stroup with the Cleveland County Sheriff’s
Office investigated the crime scene, and concluded that Clyde was the perpetrator.
While law enforcement personnel searched for Clyde, a crime analyst with the
Cleveland County Sheriff’s Office began “pinging” the locations of Clyde’s cell phone.
After the analyst tracked Clyde’s phone to Littlejohn’s residence, Detective Stroup
and several other deputies traveled to the Forest City home. Upon their arrival,
Littlejohn reported that Clyde was not there, but had been earlier that night,
accompanied by “a white female in an SUV.” Littlejohn consented to a search of his
home. When the detectives did not find Clyde at Littlejohn’s residence, Detective
Stroup visited Defendant’s home in Shelby.
Detective Stroup spoke with Defendant at her residence after midnight on 25
November 2015. Defendant permitted law enforcement officers to search her home
for Clyde. Detective Stroup asked Defendant if she had seen Clyde, and Defendant
replied that earlier that night, she had driven Clyde from Shelby to Forest City and
back. Detective Stroup then informed Defendant that Clyde “was wanted for the
homicide of [Borders] that occurred earlier that evening” and that a warrant had been
issued for his arrest. When asked whether she knew about Clyde’s involvement in
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the fatal shooting, Defendant told Detective Stroup that she had no knowledge of the
incident.
At around 8:00 a.m. later that morning, Defendant drove Clyde from Shelby to
Lincolnton, North Carolina. Meanwhile, Detective Jordan Bowen with the Cleveland
County Sheriff’s Office tracked Clyde’s cell phone to a location in Shelby, and a group
of officers traveled there to investigate.
At approximately 10:00 a.m., Detective Bowen received information that a
woman driving a gold Cadillac SUV had allegedly transported Clyde to Forest City
and back following the shooting. While the other officers “knock[ed] on doors,”
Detectives Bowen and Jason Suludak drove around the area until they spotted a car
matching the description from the tip. Defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat.
At 11:41 a.m., Detectives Stroup, Bowen, and Suludak approached Defendant
in her vehicle. Defendant told the detectives that she had not seen Clyde that
morning, nor had she called, texted, or spoken to him since the night before. Detective
Bowen requested Defendant’s permission to view her cell phone’s call and text
message histories in order to verify her story. But Defendant was “very hesitant” to
relinquish her phone, and she told Detective Bowen that she could not comply with
his request because her phone “was off and it was dead.” However, Detective Bowen
observed Defendant “deleting things” from her phone during their conversation.
After Detective Bowen’s conversation with Defendant, Detective Stroup requested,
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and the State obtained, a magistrate’s order charging Defendant with felony common-
law obstruction of justice for “withholding information from law enforcement in
reference to a hom[i]cide investigation.”
After obtaining the magistrate’s order, Detective Stroup returned to the area
where Clyde’s cell phone last “pinged.” Detective Stroup and other deputies were
handing out Crime Stoppers “business cards” with information for individuals with
knowledge of Clyde’s whereabouts. When they saw Defendant drive by, Detectives
Stroup and Suludak got into their patrol vehicles and prepared to initiate a stop of
Defendant’s vehicle. Detective Suludak stopped Defendant’s vehicle at 3:35 p.m.
After Detective Suludak pulled Defendant over, Detective Stroup arrested Defendant
pursuant to the magistrate’s order, and transported her to the Law Enforcement
Center to interview her.
During the interview, Defendant waived her Miranda rights. Defendant told
Detective Bowen that she had deleted some phone calls from her call history during
their conversation earlier that morning. She further admitted that she had not been
truthful when she told the detectives that she had not seen Clyde that day.
Defendant told Detective Bowen that in reality, she had driven Clyde from Shelby to
Forest City and back the previous evening, and again that morning from Shelby to
Lincolnton. Defendant also consented to a “forensic download” of her cell phone,
thereby providing law enforcement personnel full access to the device’s contents.
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Following the interview, Defendant was processed and released on an unsecured
bond.
On 28 November 2015, Clyde turned himself in to the sheriff’s office, where he
was charged with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. Clyde
was subsequently tried by a jury in a separate proceeding and was convicted of
second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon.
On 11 April 2016, Defendant was indicted for (i) accessory after the fact to a
felony, and (ii) felony common-law obstruction of justice. On 25 June 2018,
Defendant’s case came on for trial before the Honorable Lisa C. Bell in Cleveland
County Superior Court. On 27 June 2018, a jury found Defendant guilty of both
charges. On 29 June 2018, the trial court consolidated the offenses for judgment, and
imposed a mitigated sentence of 50 to 72 months in the custody of the North Carolina
Division of Adult Correction.1
Defendant timely filed written notice of appeal.
Discussion
On appeal, Defendant makes three distinct arguments challenging the trial
court’s instructions to the jury. We address each in turn.
1At sentencing, the trial court found two mitigating factors: Defendant supports her family
and has a support system in the community. The trial court found no aggravating factors, and thus,
concluded that a sentence within the mitigated range was appropriate.
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Opinion of the Court
Defendant initially contends that the trial court committed plain error by
instructing the jury on both the offense of accessory after the fact and the offense of
obstruction of justice. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.
I. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a challenge to a trial court’s decision regarding jury
instructions de novo, and we review “the jury instructions in their entirety when
determining if there was error.” State v. Wirt, __ N.C. App. __, __, 822 S.E.2d 668,
673 (2018) (citation omitted).
The charge will be held to be sufficient if it presents the
law of the case in such manner as to leave no reasonable
cause to believe the jury was misled or misinformed.
Under such a standard of review, it is not enough for the
appealing party to show that error occurred in the jury
instructions; rather, it must be demonstrated that such
error was likely, in light of the entire charge, to mislead the
jury.
Id. (citation omitted).
Here, however, Defendant failed to advance her arguments regarding the jury
charge before the trial court although she had several opportunities to do so.
Accordingly, she “specifically and distinctly” requests that we review for plain error.
N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (“In criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by
objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any
such action nevertheless may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when
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the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to
plain error.”).
Unpreserved issues may be reviewed for plain error “when they involve either
(1) errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury, or (2) rulings on the admissibility of
evidence.” State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 584, 467 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1996).
The plain error rule is always to be applied cautiously and
only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the
entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a
fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so
lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,
or where the error is grave error which amounts to a denial
of a fundamental right of the accused, or the error has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to
appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings or where it can be fairly said the
instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury’s
finding that the defendant was guilty.
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516-17, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[u]nder the plain error rule, [the]
defendant must convince this Court not only that there was error, but that absent
the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.” State v. Jordan,
333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993).
II. Analysis
Defendant first argues that the trial court committed plain error by instructing
the jury on both obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact because the
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enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7, codifying the offense of accessory after the fact,
partially abrogated the common-law offense of obstruction of justice with regard to
the conduct at issue in this case—specifically, “withholding information from law
enforcement and assisting a defendant to leave the scene of an offense.” Our Supreme
Court has previously addressed—and rejected—this very argument.
As our Supreme Court has explained, “[o]bstruction of justice is a common law
offense in North Carolina[,]” and “Article 30 of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes
does not abrogate this offense.” In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 670, 309 S.E.2d 442, 462
(1983) (emphasis added). “Article 30 sets forth specific crimes under the heading of
Obstructing Justice. There is no indication that the legislature intended Article 30
to encompass all aspects of obstruction of justice.” State v. Taylor, 212 N.C. App. 238,
245, 713 S.E.2d 82, 87-88 (emphasis added) (citation omitted), disc. review denied,
365 N.C. 342, 717 S.E.2d 558 (2011). Accordingly, Defendant’s first argument lacks
merit.
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed plain error by instructing
the jury that obstruction of justice and accessory after the fact are separate offenses,
rather than greater- and lesser-included offenses, because they constitute the same
offense for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy.
As with her first argument, Defendant’s second argument is foreclosed by our existing
jurisprudence.
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This Court has expressly held that accessory after the fact and obstruction of
justice do not constitute the same offense, and that neither is a lesser-included offense
of the other. See State v. Cousin, 233 N.C. App. 523, 537, 757 S.E.2d 332, 343, disc.
review denied, 367 N.C. 521, 762 S.E.2d 446 (2014). Indeed, as Defendant explicitly
acknowledges, these two offenses have different elements. For example, unlike
accessory after the fact, the offense of obstruction of justice “requires deceit and intent
to defraud.” Id. On the other hand, the offense of accessory after the fact “requires
that the defendant personally assisted the principal who committed the crime in
escaping detection, arrest, or punishment.” Id. Therefore, “[t]he two offenses are
distinct, and neither is a lesser[-]included offense of the other.” Id. (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the State presented substantial evidence to support each
essential element of both of the charged offenses. At trial, the State elicited testimony
from Detectives Stroup and Bowen that ultimately supported the instruction on the
charge of obstruction of justice. Detectives Stroup and Bowen explained that when
they approached Defendant in her vehicle, she told them that she had not seen Clyde
that morning, nor had she called, texted, or spoken to him since the night before.
Detective Bowen noted that during the same conversation, he requested Defendant’s
permission to view her cell phone’s call and text message histories in order to verify
her story, but Defendant told him that she could not comply with his request because
her phone “was off and it was dead.” However, Detective Bowen testified that he had
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observed Defendant “deleting things” from her phone during their conversation,
which Defendant confirmed during her interview with detectives later that day, after
waiving her Miranda rights. Defendant’s actions support the element of deceit and
intent to defraud, as required for an obstruction of justice conviction. As such, the
trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the offense of obstruction of justice.
The State also presented evidence to support the instruction on the charge of
accessory after the fact: that Defendant knew that Clyde shot and killed Borders, and
that Defendant personally rendered assistance to Clyde. See State v. Cole, 209 N.C.
App. 84, 91, 703 S.E.2d 842, 847 (setting forth the three elements of the charge of
accessory after the fact), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 197, 709 S.E.2d 922 (2011).
Detective Stroup testified that when he initially spoke with Defendant after
midnight on 25 November 2015, he told her that Clyde “was wanted for the homicide
of [Borders] that occurred earlier that evening” and that a warrant had been issued
for his arrest. The State’s evidence therefore demonstrated that when Defendant
drove Clyde from Shelby to Lincolnton in the morning of 25 November 2015, she knew
that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Indeed, during her interview
at the Law Enforcement Center, Defendant admitted that she had not been truthful
when she told Detectives Bowen and Suludak that she had not seen Clyde that day.
Moreover, Defendant told detectives that she did not know where Clyde was, despite
having been in contact with him and having driven him multiple times. She also
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admitted that she had deleted evidence from her phone that would have alerted
detectives to communications from Clyde. Taken together, this evidence supports the
State’s contention that although Defendant was aware that Clyde was wanted for
murder in the shooting death of Borders, she nevertheless personally assisted Clyde
in escaping detection, arrest, or punishment, as required for an accessory after the
fact conviction. As such, a jury instruction on the charge of accessory after the fact
was proper.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by instructing
the jury on both the offenses of accessory after the fact and obstruction of justice.
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing
to instruct the jury that, if it found that Defendant “reasonably believed that [Clyde]
killed [Borders] in self-defense, at the time she transported Clyde,” then “the verdict
on the accessory after the fact charge must be ‘not guilty.’ ” Specifically, Defendant
maintains that the trial court should have instructed the jury that “the fact that . . .
Defendant knew [Clyde] shot and killed [Borders] on the night of the incident does
not necessarily mean that, at the time [she] drove [Clyde] to Lincolnton and Forest
City, she knew [Clyde] had committed murder.” We disagree.
Clyde was convicted of second-degree murder in a separate proceeding. Yet,
through her argument, Defendant implicitly asks this Court to reassess Clyde’s self-
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defense claim, which was already litigated and rejected by the jury during his trial,
and thus has no bearing upon our decision in the instant case.
The elements of accessory after the fact are as follows: “(1) a felony was
committed; (2) the accused knew that the person he received, relieved or assisted was
the person who committed the felony; and (3) the accused rendered assistance to the
felon personally.” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]f the totality of the evidence is such to
give rise to a reasonable inference that [the] defendant knew precisely what had taken
place, then there is sufficient evidence of the knowledge element[.]” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, even assuming arguendo, that Defendant believed that Clyde killed
Borders in self-defense at the time that she drove him from Shelby to Forest City and
back on the night of the shooting, Defendant fails to explain her actions the following
day, when she was indisputably on notice that Defendant was wanted for murder.
Indeed, Detective Stroup testified that when he first arrived at Defendant’s home
after midnight on 25 November 2015, he asked Defendant if she was aware that Clyde
“had recently shot and killed someone[,]” and he told her that there was an
outstanding warrant for Clyde’s arrest. Notwithstanding this information, later that
morning, Defendant drove Clyde from Shelby to Lincolnton. Shortly thereafter,
however, Defendant told detectives that she did not know where Clyde was, she had
not been in contact with him since the night before, and she deleted evidence to the
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contrary from her phone. This evidence “give[s] rise to a reasonable inference that
[D]efendant knew precisely what had taken place,” id. (citation and italics omitted),
and that she personally assisted Clyde “in escaping detection, arrest, or
punishment[,]” Cousin, 233 N.C. App. at 537, 757 S.E.2d at 343.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the trial court did not err—let alone plainly
err—in its jury instructions on the offenses of felony common-law obstruction of
justice and accessory after the fact to a felony. Accordingly, we conclude that
Defendant received a fair trial, free from error.
NO ERROR.
Judges DILLON and HAMPSON concur.
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