Topping v. Meyers ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA19-618
    Filed: 17 March 2020
    Mecklenburg County, No. 18 CVS 10730
    RICHARD TOPPING, Plaintiff,
    v.
    KURT MEYERS AND MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Defendants.
    Appeal by defendants from order entered 18 March 2019 by Judge Joseph N.
    Crosswhite in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5
    February 2020.
    Rudolf Widenhouse, by David S. Rudolf, Joseph P. Lattimore, and Sonya
    Pfeiffer, for plaintiff-appellee.
    Mullins Duncan Harrell & Russell PLLC, by Allison O. Mullins and Alan W.
    Duncan, for defendant-appellants.
    TYSON, Judge.
    Kurt Meyers and McGuireWoods, LLP (“Defendants”) appeal from an order
    entered 18 March 2019 denying their motion to dismiss Richard Topping’s
    (“Plaintiff”) claims against them. We dismiss Defendant’s interlocutory appeal and
    remand.
    I. Background
    Defendants’ client, Cardinal Innovations Healthcare Solutions (“Cardinal”) is
    a Local Management Entity/Managed Care Organization under the Mental Health,
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Act of 1985. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-
    1 (2019). Cardinal is an “area authority,” which is “a local political subdivision of the
    State.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 122C-3(1), 122C-116(a) (2019).
    Plaintiff became the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Cardinal 1 July 2015.
    Following receipt and review of a North Carolina State Auditor’s performance audit
    in May 2017, the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
    Services (“DHHS”) initiated an investigation into Cardinal’s activities.
    The subsequent investigatory report “sharply criticized” the severance
    provisions of Plaintiff’s employment contract and several other Cardinal executives,
    and also Plaintiff’s compensation and potential bonus opportunities under his
    contract. Plaintiff and three other executives resigned from Cardinal in November
    2017, after the audit and DHHS report. Plaintiff was paid two years’ severance,
    allegedly worth $1.7 million. DHHS officials took over Cardinal’s operations and fired
    its board members. The new board (“the Board”) hired Defendants in January 2018
    to conduct an independent internal investigation of Plaintiff’s conduct relating to the
    drafting and approval of the severance agreements, and the November 2017
    severance payments made to himself and three other former Cardinal executives, who
    had also resigned.
    Defendant Meyers presented the findings of the investigation to the Board on
    23 March 2018. The Board voted to file a lawsuit against Plaintiff, seeking the return
    -2-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    of the November 2017 two year’s severance payment based upon his alleged
    misconduct. The Board also authorized a press conference to be held after filing the
    suit, wherein Defendant Meyers would present the findings and allegations in the
    complaint to the media.
    Cardinal filed suit against Plaintiff at 9:00 a.m. on 26 March 2018. A press
    conference began at 10:30 a.m., during which Defendant Meyers gave his
    presentation to the assembled representatives of the media.
    Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on 30 May 2018, alleging libel per se,
    slander per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and punitive
    damages. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a
    claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
    12(b)(6) (2019). Defendants asserted, inter alia, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by
    absolute privilege and Plaintiff had improperly recast and re-asserted his defamation
    claims as negligence claims.
    The trial court struck four paragraphs of Plaintiff’s complaint for
    impermissible reliance upon the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct to
    allege a legal duty and standard of care for the negligence claims. The trial court
    otherwise denied Defendants’ motion. Defendants timely filed notice of appeal.
    II. Interlocutory Jurisdiction
    -3-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendants argue this Court possesses jurisdiction over this interlocutory
    appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27(b)(3) (2019).
    Ordinarily, an appeal from an interlocutory order will be
    dismissed as fragmentary and premature unless the order
    affects some substantial right and will work injury to
    appellant if not corrected before appeal from final
    judgment. . . . Essentially a two-part test has developed[:]
    the right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of
    that substantial right must potentially work injury to
    plaintiff if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.
    Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 
    326 N.C. 723
    , 726, 
    392 S.E.2d 735
    , 736 (1990)
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Admittedly the “substantial right” test for appealability of
    interlocutory orders is more easily stated than applied. It
    is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by
    considering the particular facts of that case and the
    procedural context in which the order from which appeal is
    sought was entered.
    Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 
    294 N.C. 200
    , 208, 
    240 S.E.2d 338
    , 343 (1978).
    On a purported appeal from an interlocutory order without the trial court’s
    Rule 54(b) certification, “the appellant has the burden of showing this Court that the
    order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent
    a review prior to a final determination on the merits.” Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint
    Venture, 
    115 N.C. App. 377
    , 380, 
    444 S.E.2d 252
    , 254 (1994) (citations omitted).
    Defendants assert the trial court’s order deprived them of substantial rights in
    two ways: (1) the trial court’s failure to dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claims for
    absolute privilege; and, (2) the trial court’s failure to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence
    -4-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    claims attacking speech as duplicative of his defamation claims. We address each in
    turn.   Alternatively, Defendants have concurrently filed a petition for a writ of
    certiorari with this Court.
    A. Absolute Privilege
    Defendants analogize their claim of absolute privilege to sovereign immunity
    or public official immunity to assert the trial court’s denials of their motion to dismiss
    are immediately appealable. See, e.g., Green v. Kearney, 
    203 N.C. App. 260
    , 266, 
    690 S.E.2d 755
    , 761 (2010) (citations omitted) (the “denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
    dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity affects a substantial right and is
    immediately appealable”); Summey v. Barker, 
    142 N.C. App. 688
    , 689, 
    544 S.E.2d 262
    , 264 (2001) (citation omitted) (“Orders denying dispositive motions based on
    public official’s immunity affect a substantial right and are immediately
    appealable.”).
    The rationale for the exception to the general rule [denying
    interlocutory appeals] stems from the nature of the
    immunity defense. A valid claim of immunity is more than
    a defense in a lawsuit; it is in essence immunity from suit.
    Were the case to be erroneously permitted to proceed to
    trial, immunity would be effectively lost.
    Clark v. Red Bird Cab Co., 
    114 N.C. App. 400
    , 403, 
    442 S.E.2d 75
    , 77 (1994) (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    If an absolute bar to suit extends and applies to Defendants’ actions, the trial
    court’s failure to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims deprives Defendants of immunity from
    -5-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    suit. If applicable, this denial of immunity from suit, as asserted in Defendants’
    motion, is a substantial right for Defendants, which would be lost, absent
    interlocutory review. See 
    Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 380
    , 444 S.E.2d at 254. In
    “considering the particular facts . . . and the procedural context” of this case, we
    conduct a full analysis of the issue of absolute immunity from suit below, to determine
    whether Defendants have asserted a “substantial right” in this interlocutory appeal.
    See 
    Waters, 294 N.C. at 208
    , 240 S.E.2d at 343.
    B. Negligence Claims
    Defendants also assert a substantial right exists for this Court to exercise
    interlocutory jurisdiction over their appeal of the trial court’s denial of their motion
    to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence-based claims regarding Defendants’ speech.
    Defendants argue the trial court’s failure to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence-based
    claims misapplies defamation standards including the actual malice standard, denies
    them applicable defenses including the truth, and also presents the danger of
    inconsistent verdicts.
    “An order implicating a party’s First Amendment rights affects a substantial
    right.” Sherrill v. Amerada Hess Corp., 
    130 N.C. App. 711
    , 719, 
    504 S.E.2d 802
    , 807
    (1998).   Our Courts have recognized, when considering a motion for summary
    judgment, a misapplication of the actual malice standard could have a chilling effect
    on a defendant’s right to free speech and implicates a substantial right. Boyce & Isley,
    -6-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    PLLC v. Cooper (Boyce II), 
    169 N.C. App. 572
    , 575-76, 
    611 S.E.2d 175
    , 177 (2005)
    (citing Priest v. Sobeck, 
    357 N.C. 159
    , 
    579 S.E.2d 250
    (2003)). In Boyce II, however,
    this Court held the denial of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss does not implicate a
    substantial right as could arise by the denial of a motion for summary judgment
    under Rule 56:
    misapplication of the actual malice standard on summary
    judgment could lead to some loss or infringement on a
    substantial right, whereas denial of the 12(c) motion here
    will not. On a motion for summary judgment the forecast
    of evidence is set. A court can more adequately determine
    whether the forecast evidence (affidavits, depositions,
    exhibits, and the like) presents a factual issue under the
    correctly applied legal standard for actual malice. In
    reviewing the allegations of the pleadings as in ruling on a
    12(c) motion, the court need only decide if the elements of
    the claim, perhaps including actual malice, have been
    alleged, not how to apply that standard. An incorrect
    application of the actual malice standard to deny summary
    judgment results in trial, whereas denial of a 12(c) motion
    results in further discovery and possibly summary
    judgment or other proceedings. Although we recognize
    that the First Amendment protects substantial rights,
    there is nothing here to suggest an immediate loss of these
    rights. . . . Any defenses or arguments that plaintiffs cannot
    actually prove their allegations in the complaint due to lack
    of evidence regarding malice will not be immediately lost if
    this case proceeds.
    
    Id. at 577-78,
    611 S.E.2d at 178.
    Although the ruling in Boyce II dealt with a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on
    the pleadings, a Rule “12(c) motion is more like a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion than one for
    summary judgment, because at the time of filing typically no discovery has occurred,
    -7-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    no evidence or affidavits are submitted, and a ruling is based on the pleadings
    themselves—along with any properly submitted exhibits.” 
    Id. at 576,
    611 S.E.2d at
    177-78. Where, as here, the interlocutory appeal is asserted on denial of a Rule
    12(b)(6) motion, and not under a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
    reasoning stated in Boyce II is stronger.
    Alternatively, Defendants argue the risk of inconsistent verdicts on the
    defamation and negligence claims represents a substantial right.          However, our
    Courts have only found a substantial right in the risk of inconsistent verdicts between
    multiple trials on the same issues, not between multiple claims in the same trial.
    “The avoidance of one trial is not ordinarily a substantial right. . . . [T]he right to
    avoid the possibility of two trials on the same issues can be a substantial right.” Green
    v. Duke Power Co., 
    305 N.C. 603
    , 608, 
    290 S.E.2d 593
    , 596 (1982) (citations and
    alterations omitted).
    Defendants’ second issue is properly dismissed as interlocutory. Defendants
    have not shown they possess a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent
    appellate review, at least upon denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. We
    express no opinion on the merits, if any, of Plaintiff’s claims or Defendants’
    arguments and defenses.
    III. Issue
    -8-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    In the remaining issue, Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their
    motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based on the assertion of absolute privilege.
    IV. Standard of Review
    “We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
    state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Watts-Robinson v. Shelton, 
    251 N.C. App. 507
    , 509,
    
    796 S.E.2d 51
    , 54 (2016).
    Generally, immunities from suit and assertions of privileges are strictly
    construed in North Carolina. See, e.g., Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
    257 N.C. 32
    , 37, 
    125 S.E.2d 326
    , 330 (1962) (physician-patient privilege); Scott v. Scott,
    
    106 N.C. App. 606
    , 612, 
    417 S.E.2d 818
    , 823 (1992) (attorney-client privilege), aff’d,
    
    336 N.C. 284
    , 
    442 S.E.2d 493
    (1994).
    “In deciding whether a statement is absolutely privileged, a court must
    determine (1) whether the statement was made in the course of a judicial proceeding;
    and (2) whether it was sufficiently relevant to that proceeding. These issues are
    questions of law to be decided by the court.” Harman v. Belk, 
    165 N.C. App. 819
    , 824,
    
    600 S.E.2d 43
    , 47 (2004) (citations omitted). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are
    reviewed de novo.” Shirey v. Shirey, __ N.C. App. __, __, 
    833 S.E.2d 820
    , 825 (2019).
    V. Analysis
    In North Carolina, absolute privilege or “complete immunity” from suit applies
    to communications which are:
    -9-
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    so much to the public interest that the defendant should
    speak out his mind fully and freely, that all actions in
    respect to the words used are absolutely forbidden, even
    though it be alleged that they were used falsely, knowingly,
    and with express malice. This complete immunity obtains
    only where the public service or the due administration of
    justice requires it, e.g., words used in debate in Congress
    and the State Legislatures, reports of military or other
    officers to their superiors in the line of their duty,
    everything said by a judge on the bench, by a witness in the
    box, and the like. In these cases the action is absolutely
    barred.
    Bouligny, Inc. v. Steelworkers, 
    270 N.C. 160
    , 170-71, 
    154 S.E.2d 344
    , 354 (1967)
    (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
    These communications represent the core of speech protected by absolute
    privilege. As a claimant of absolute privilege departs from this protected core, the
    claim to the immunity from suit diminishes.
    [T]he protection from liability to suit attaches by reason of
    the setting in which the defamatory statement is spoken or
    published. The privilege belongs to the occasion. It does
    not follow the speaker or publisher into other surroundings
    and circumstances. The judge, legislator or administrative
    official, when speaking or writing apart from and
    independent of the functions of his office, is liable for
    slanderous or libelous statements upon the same principles
    applicable to other individuals.
    
    Id. at 171,
    154 S.E.2d at 354.
    This Court has stated, “an attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish
    defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed
    judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a
    - 10 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the
    proceeding.” Jones v. Coward, 
    193 N.C. App. 231
    , 234, 
    666 S.E.2d 877
    , 879 (2008)
    (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977)).
    “Our courts have held that statements are ‘made in due course of a judicial
    proceeding’ if they are submitted to the court presiding over litigation or to the
    government agency presiding over an administrative hearing and are relevant or
    pertinent to the litigation or hearing.” Burton v. NCNB, 
    85 N.C. App. 702
    , 705, 
    355 S.E.2d 800
    , 802 (1987) (citations omitted).
    The trial court ruled Defendants’ assertion of absolute privilege over Meyers’
    statements departs and deviates from the core speech protected by the judicial-
    proceeding privilege in two significant ways: (1) Defendants were investigatory
    counsel, and not litigation counsel, for Cardinal in the newly-commenced judicial
    proceeding; and, (2) Defendants’ speech occurred during a press conference to the
    media and not while in the courtroom. Defendants also argue Cardinal’s status as a
    statutorily-created entity and being a local political subdivision cloaks their
    investigation and statements as a quasi-judicial or legislative proceeding.
    A. Investigatory Counsel
    The trial court determined: “Defendant Meyers’s statements are not entitled
    to an absolute privilege [because he] was not counsel for the Board in the judicial
    proceeding . . . .” The trial court did not provide any precedent or legal basis for
    - 11 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    distinguishing Meyers’ role as counsel retained by the Board to investigate Plaintiff
    from the status of “counsel for the Board in the judicial proceeding.”
    The trial court’s ruling implies that Cardinal’s litigation counsel would be
    entitled to a greater claim to absolute privilege than Defendants for making the same
    statements by virtue of their role in this judicial proceeding. We see no basis for the
    trial court’s distinctions between in-house, investigatory, and litigation counsel.
    Cardinal hired Defendants to conduct its investigation into Plaintiff’s conduct
    as its CEO and his interactions with other Cardinal senior officers based upon the
    audit and intervention from DHHS. Defendants’ investigation formed the basis for
    Cardinal’s allegations and claims in their civil suit filed against its former CEO.
    Cardinal had filed a civil proceeding against Plaintiff in the superior court earlier the
    same day as the press conference was held. The complaint and judicial proceeding
    were both predicated upon Defendants’ investigation and the findings and allegations
    made about Plaintiff in their report to the Board.
    Plaintiff’s complaint concedes Defendant Meyers’ statements were made in a
    press conference held at 10:30 a.m. on 26 March 2018, an hour and a half after
    Cardinal had filed its lawsuit against Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged Defendant Meyers
    “knew that [Cardinal’s] lawsuit . . . would be based on his investigation,” and “agreed
    to participate in a press conference about [Plaintiff’s] alleged misconduct in
    conjunction with the filing of the lawsuit.” Plaintiff further alleged and acknowledged
    - 12 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant Meyers’ statements “mirrored” the allegations asserted in Cardinal’s
    complaint, and his PowerPoint repeated “the same misconduct as was alleged in the
    lawsuit filed by Cardinal earlier that day.”
    “Where the relation of attorney and client exists, the law of principal and agent
    is generally applicable.” Bank v. McEwen, 
    160 N.C. 414
    , 420, 
    76 S.E. 222
    , 224 (1912).
    It is undisputed that Defendants’ statements at the press conference “mirrored”
    allegations asserted in Cardinal’s complaint. Defendants acted as Cardinal’s counsel
    and agents throughout the investigation and press conference, just as the litigation
    counsel did when it filed the complaint against Plaintiff on Cardinal’s behalf.
    Defendants’ claim to absolute privilege flows through their principal-agent
    relationship with Cardinal. The immunity from suit protects the principal. If the
    principal is immune, its agents are as well. See 
    id. We cannot
    distinguish Defendants’ statements based on whether they had
    been retained by Cardinal as counsel for investigation or litigation. Preparation for
    litigation is as much the practice of law as is litigating the claims. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 84-2.1(a) (2019).   The trial court erred by distinguishing Defendants’ role as
    investigatory versus litigation counsel as a factor in its analysis.
    B. Out-of-Court Press Conference
    We next analyze the venue or “occasion” where and when the statements were
    made. See Bouligny, Inc., 270 N.C. at 
    171, 154 S.E.2d at 354
    .            The trial court
    - 13 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    concluded Defendants were not entitled to immunity from suit because “the
    statements were made outside of the proceeding at a press conference attended by
    members of the media.” The trial court denied dismissal and reasoned this privilege
    “does not apply to statements made outside of the judicial proceeding, particularly
    when the statements are made to the media,” citing Andrews v. Elliot, 
    109 N.C. App. 271
    , 275, 
    426 S.E.2d 430
    , 432-33 (1993).
    The trial court’s order denying Defendants’ motion partially relied upon this
    Court’s decision in Andrews, wherein one attorney sued another for mailing a copy of
    a letter containing allegedly slanderous and libelous statements about him to a
    newspaper, where it was seen and read by at least three of their employees. 
    Id. at 272,
    426 S.E.2d at 431. The letter did not concern pending litigation, however; it
    merely threatened litigation after accusing the other attorney of various criminal and
    ethical misdeeds. 
    Id. at 273,
    426 S.E.2d at 431.
    Plaintiff cites this Court’s earlier decision in Boston v. Webb to support the trial
    court’s decision. Boston v. Webb, 
    73 N.C. App. 457
    , 460, 
    326 S.E.2d 104
    , 106 (1985),
    disc. rev. denied, 
    314 N.C. 114
    , 
    332 S.E.2d 479
    . In Boston, a detective sergeant was
    fired from the city police department. 
    Id. at 458,
    326 S.E.2d at 105. The detective
    sergeant appealed to the city manager, who upheld the termination. 
    Id. After conducting
    an investigation into the firing and briefing the city council, the city
    manager wrote and published a press release explaining the termination decision. 
    Id. - 14
    -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    The detective sergeant filed a defamation claim against the city manager. 
    Id. at 457,
    326 S.E.2d at 104.
    This Court held the city manager was not entitled to an absolute privilege for
    the statements made in his press release. 
    Id. at 460,
    326 S.E.2d at 106. Both Boston
    and the present case concern statements made to the press following an investigation.
    Unlike the present case, however, the city manager’s press release in Boston was
    independent of any filed or pending lawsuit. The city manager had investigated and
    ruled upon the detective sergeant’s appeal prior to publishing his release and
    statements to the media. 
    Id. at 458,
    326 S.E.2d at 105.
    Although neither Andrews nor Boston squarely addresses the denial of
    absolute privilege for statements made to the media while a judicial proceeding is
    ongoing, no case Defendants cite demonstrates why the privilege should be extended
    in this case to carry their burden to overcome the presumption of correctness and
    reverse the trial court’s order.
    Defendants cite a series of cases recognizing our courts have defined “the
    phrase ‘judicial proceeding’ . . . broadly, encompassing more than just trials in civil
    actions or criminal prosecutions.” Harris v. NCNB, 
    85 N.C. App. 669
    , 673, 
    355 S.E.2d 838
    , 842 (1987) (citation omitted). These cases represent small and incremental
    steps, extending the absolute privilege of complete immunity from suit beyond the
    protected core of in-court speech. See, e.g., Scott v. Statesville Plywood & Veneer Co.,
    - 15 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    
    240 N.C. 73
    , 76, 
    81 S.E.2d 146
    , 149 (1954) (privilege extended to statements made in
    pleadings and other papers filed in a judicial proceeding); 
    Jones, 193 N.C. App. at 234
    , 666 S.E.2d at 880 (privilege extended to counsel’s statements or questions to a
    potential witness in preparation of pending litigation); Rickenbacker v. Coffey, 
    103 N.C. App. 352
    , 357-58, 
    405 S.E.2d 585
    , 588 (1991) (privilege extended to potential
    witness’ statements to counsel at pre-deposition conference); 
    Burton, 85 N.C. App. at 707
    , 355 S.E.2d at 803 (privilege extended to out-of-court statements made between
    the parties or their attorneys during pending litigation); 
    Harris, 85 N.C. App. at 674
    ,
    355 S.E.2d at 842 (privilege extends to out-of-court communications between
    attorneys preliminary to proposed or anticipated litigation).
    These cases extend the absolute privilege beyond the core of protected speech
    in the courtroom during a trial. These extensions are logical and practical, and each
    protected communication and testimony furthers the purpose of the privilege. The
    “public policy underlying this privilege is grounded upon the proper and efficient
    administration of justice. Participants in the judicial process must be able to testify
    or otherwise take part without being hampered by fear of defamation suits.” 
    Jones, 193 N.C. App. at 234
    , 666 S.E.2d at 879 (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Defendants have not shown extension of absolute privilege to statements made
    by counsel during an out-of-court press conference would further this core protected
    - 16 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    purpose. Our immunity from suit precedents appropriately protect communications
    made between parties, their counsel, or the court itself, from the fear of defamation
    suits. A press conference to the media is not communication between the parties,
    their counsel, nor with or concerning the court.
    Absolute privilege appropriately protects statements asserted in a pleading
    filed with the trial court and invoking judicial process. 
    Scott, 240 N.C. at 76
    , 81 S.E.2d
    at 149.     Statements made outside the proceeding to the public or media
    representatives at a press conference, even those averments that “mirror” allegations
    made in a filed complaint, deviate from and stray too far beyond the core and
    “occasion” of speech to invoke immunity from suit. Such immunity cannot be justified
    by asserted public interest beyond encouraging frankness and protecting testimony,
    communications between counsel inter se or with the court, and participation within
    the judicial proceeding. See 
    id. A press
    conference is neither an inherent nor critical component of a judicial
    proceeding.   To hold otherwise would enable any litigant to file barratrous or
    sanctionable pleadings containing scurrilous, false, or defamatory language, then
    immediately convene a press conference outside the courthouse to further
    disseminate and re-publish those otherwise defamatory statements, while asserting
    immunity from challenge or to being answerable in court.
    - 17 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    This potential conduct ranges too far afield from the core of protected speech
    subject to absolute privilege. Our Supreme Court noted long ago: “The privilege
    belongs to the occasion.    It does not follow the speaker or publisher into other
    surroundings and circumstances.” Bouligny, Inc., 270 N.C. at 
    171, 154 S.E.2d at 354
    .
    Construing the immunity of absolute privilege narrowly, as we must, the
    inverse concern of chilling speech by the threat of defamation suits is not so great as
    to necessitate absolute immunity from suit for statements made at out-of-court press
    conferences during pending litigation. See 
    id. A litigant,
    or their counsel, who gives
    a press conference during a judicial proceeding is not deprived of defenses nor is
    necessarily liable for their statements. Neither are they absolutely immune from suit
    challenging and asserting defamatory conduct.
    The venue or “occasion” for Defendants’ statements weighs heavily against
    recognizing absolute privilege in this case, far more so than the distinction between
    litigation and investigatory counsel.       Defendants have not shown that absolute
    immunity should extend from the courtroom during a judicial proceeding to an
    extrajudicial press conference, whether the speaker is litigation or investigatory
    counsel. Defendants’ arguments claiming immunity from suit on the basis of the
    pending litigation are overruled.
    C. Quasi-Judicial Investigation
    - 18 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendants alternatively assert they are immune from suit for their
    statements resulting from their investigation of Plaintiff because that investigation
    was a quasi-judicial proceeding. The phrase “judicial proceeding” in the context of
    absolute privilege also encompasses quasi-judicial proceedings. 
    Harris, 85 N.C. App. at 673
    , 355 S.E.2d at 842 (citation omitted). “Quasi-judicial” is “a term applied to the
    action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers, who are required to
    investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, and draw conclusions from them,
    as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Angel
    v. Ward, 
    43 N.C. App. 288
    , 293, 
    258 S.E.2d 788
    , 792 (1979) (citation and alterations
    omitted).
    In Angel, a partner of a certified public accounting firm telephoned an Internal
    Revenue Service agent’s supervisor to complain about the agent’s treatment of his
    firm’s clients. 
    Id. at 289,
    258 S.E.2d at 789. The agent’s supervisor requested the
    partner file his complaints in a written letter, which he did. 
    Id. at 289,
    258 S.E.2d at
    789-90. The agent was subsequently fired. 
    Id. at 289,
    258 S.E.2d at 790. She sued
    the partner and his firm alleging libel per se for the remarks made in his letter to her
    supervisor. 
    Id. This Court
    held the partner’s written remarks were libelous per se, as they
    tended to impeach the agent in her trade or profession. 
    Id. at 291,
    258 S.E.2d at 791.
    However, this Court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling the CPA’s remarks were
    - 19 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    absolutely privileged in the due course of a quasi-judicial proceeding. 
    Id. at 293,
    258
    S.E.2d at 792.    This Court determined the letter was requested by the agent’s
    supervisor in the quasi-judicial process of evaluating the agent in connection with her
    employment. 
    Id. Had defendants
    merely mailed the letter to plaintiff’s
    superiors, the communication would have been entitled to
    a qualified privilege. However, in the instant case,
    defendants admittedly submitted their letter upon the
    request of plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, who was
    putting together an evidentiary file to support his
    superior’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment
    with the Internal Revenue Service.
    
    Id. at 293,
    258 S.E.2d at 791-92.
    Defendants liken their press conference to the letter sent in Angel, because it
    was held at the direction of Cardinal, a local political subdivision. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 122C-116(a). In this argument, the extension of absolute privilege flows not from
    judicial immunity, but rather from legislative immunity. Defendants do not cite any
    binding authority from our courts on this extension of legislative immunity to
    Cardinal, but do cite cases from other states where the absolute privilege has been
    extended to “lesser legislative bodies,” such as local political subdivisions. See, e.g.,
    Sanchez v. Coxon, 
    854 P.2d 126
    , 128 (Ariz. 1993) (privilege extended to town council
    meeting); Noble v. Ternyik, 
    539 P.2d 658
    , 660 (Or. 1975) (privilege extended to port
    commission meeting).
    - 20 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    No cases Defendants cite, however, extend the legislative immunity to
    statements made during a press conference to the media. The only cited case in which
    immunity from suit was extended beyond a lesser legislative body’s official meeting
    itself, involved statements made by one city council member to other city council
    members, and also statements potentially overheard by patrons of a deli restaurant
    “within listening distance.” Issa v. Benson, 
    420 S.W.3d 23
    , 28-29 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    2013).
    The court in Issa held the statements made to other city council members were
    protected by legislative immunity. 
    Id. at 28.
    The court also held the council member’s
    statements at the deli were in response to a threat of litigation against the city, were
    “preliminary to proposed litigation,” and were protected by judicial immunity. 
    Id. at 29.
    If legislative immunity applies to Cardinal and its Board, Defendants’
    argument would only appropriately cover statements made by the Board’s members
    in its meetings, and possibly Defendants’ statements to the Board at its behest.
    Defendants cite no authority, binding or persuasive, to extend the legislative
    immunity afforded to quasi-judicial, “lesser legislative bodies,” to statements made
    by agents, including counsel of such a body, to the public or media representatives in
    a press conference held at the body’s request or direction.
    - 21 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    This Court declined to hold that statements made by the city manager in the
    press release in Boston was “issued in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial
    proceeding.” 
    Boston, 73 N.C. App. at 461
    , 326 S.E.2d at 106 (emphasis supplied). As
    discussed above, a press conference ventures too far afield from the core of protected
    speech to be entitled to absolute immunity from suit under legislative immunity in a
    quasi-judicial proceeding. See 
    id. Defendants fail
    to show entitlement to absolute immunity from suit flowing
    from either Cardinal’s pending suit against Plaintiff as a judicial proceeding, or their
    investigation of Plaintiff as a quasi-judicial proceeding. Defendants’ appeal on this
    issue is properly dismissed as interlocutory.
    VI. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
    Defendants have also filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari as
    an alternative to their assertion of substantial rights to an interlocutory appeal.
    “Certiorari is a discretionary writ, to be issued only for good and sufficient cause
    shown.” State v. Grundler, 
    251 N.C. 177
    , 189, 
    111 S.E.2d 1
    , 9 (1959) (citation omitted).
    “A petition for the writ must show merit or that error was probably committed below.”
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    As discussed above, Defendants have not shown a substantive right in jeopardy
    to merit an interlocutory review at the Rule 12 stage in the proceedings. Similarly,
    we find Defendants have also not shown “good and sufficient cause” for us to allow
    - 22 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant’s petition and issue our writ of certiorari in this case. In the exercise of
    our discretion and pursuant to Appellate Rule 21, we decline to issue the writ of
    certiorari. See N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (“The writ of certiorari may be issued in
    appropriate circumstances . . . to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial
    tribunals when . . . no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists[.]”) (emphasis
    supplied).
    VII. Conclusion
    Defendants fail to show they possess “a substantial right which would be
    jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits.” 
    Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 380
    , 444 S.E.2d at 254. Although the trial court’s distinction
    between litigation and investigatory counsel is unpersuasive and without basis, the
    trial court did not err in declining to extend absolute immunity from suit to
    Defendants in this case.
    Defendants’ statements made at the out-of-court press conference during
    pending litigation are too far afield to be considered “made in due course of a judicial
    proceeding.” 
    Burton, 85 N.C. App. at 705
    , 355 S.E.2d at 802. Defendants’ statements
    made at the out-of-court press conference following their investigation into Plaintiff’s
    conduct on behalf of Cardinal do not fall within the immunity afforded to lesser
    legislative bodies. See 
    Boston, 73 N.C. App. at 461
    , 326 S.E.2d at 106. Defendants’
    appeal as to their assertion of absolute privilege is dismissed as interlocutory.
    - 23 -
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Opinion of the Court
    Asserted misapplication of the actual malice standard does not affect a
    substantial right at the Rule 12 motion to dismiss stage of litigation, as it could at a
    hearing under Rule 56 for summary judgment. Boyce II, 169 N.C. App. at 
    577-78, 611 S.E.2d at 178
    .
    Defendants have failed to show either a substantial right as a basis for
    interlocutory appeal or good and sufficient cause as a basis for our discretionary grant
    of a writ of certiorari. Defendants’ appeal on this issue is dismissed as interlocutory
    and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.
    We express no opinion on the validity, if any, of Plaintiff’s claims nor
    Defendant’s defenses thereto. It is so ordered.
    DISMISSED AS INTERLOCUTORY.
    Judge BERGER concurs.
    Judge BROOK concurs in part and concurs in the result in part with separate
    opinion.
    - 24 -
    No. COA19-618 – Topping v. Meyers
    BROOK, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the result in part.
    I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that we must dismiss this
    interlocutory appeal because it does not implicate a substantial right and in its denial
    of Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari. More specifically, I concur in the holding
    that we must reject the assertion of a substantial right to exercise interlocutory
    jurisdiction over the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
    negligence-based claims. I further concur in the majority’s holding that “Defendants
    have not shown that absolute immunity should extend from the courtroom during a
    judicial proceeding to an extrajudicial press conference, whether the speaker is
    litigation or investigatory counsel.” 
    Topping, supra
    at ___ (emphasis added).
    I do not join section V.A. of the majority’s opinion labelled “Investigatory
    Counsel.” First, this section is not necessary to arrive at the agreed upon dismissal.
    Further, I disagree with the majority’s contention that the trial court’s distinction
    between litigation and investigatory counsel is without basis.           In fact, Judge
    Crosswhite cites Andrews v. Elliot, 
    109 N.C. App. 271
    , 275, 
    426 S.E.2d 430
    , 432-33
    (1993), for the proposition that “judicial proceedings privilege . . . does not apply to
    statements made outside the judicial proceeding” and thus does not shield the
    statement of Defendant Meyers as he “was not counsel for the Board in [its] judicial
    proceeding[.]” While we need not decide the merits of this issue, I cannot agree that
    the trial court’s assertion here was baseless.
    TOPPING V. MEYERS
    Brook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part
    Accordingly, and with respect, I concur in part and concur in the result in part.
    2