State v. Joiner ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA19-1112
Filed: 6 October 2020
Forsyth County, No. 12 CRS 53205-6; 14 CRS 8
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RAYMOND DAKIM-HARRIS JOINER
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 20 March 2014 by Judge John O.
Craig III in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22
September 2020.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Forrest
Fallanca, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Emily
Holmes Davis, for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
Raymond Dakim-Harris Joiner (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered
after a jury’s verdict finding him guilty of two counts of felonious breaking and
entering, two counts of larceny after breaking and entering, larceny of goods over
$1,000, and non-felonious larceny. We find no error in the jury’s verdicts and
sentences imposed, but remand for the correction of a clerical error.
I. Background
STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
Two break-ins occurred at two separate student dormitory rooms at Wake
Forest University on 2 April 2012. The first break-in occurred at Bostick Hall around
1:00 p.m. While the student was asleep, Defendant stole her backpack, which
contained: a Lenovo ThinkPad laptop computer, graphic calculator, textbooks and
pencil case. A housekeeper and another student saw Defendant leaving the student’s
room.
The second break-in occurred around 1:40 p.m., on the opposite side of campus,
in Taylor Hall. The student was not present in the room. Defendant stole the
student’s MacBook Pro laptop, laptop charger, and five Xbox games.
At approximately 2:00 p.m., two Wake Forest University officers observed
Defendant. Defendant threw the backpack and ran. Inside the backpack, the officers
discovered the first student’s Lenovo laptop. They also found the second student’s
MacBook Pro laptop, computer charger, Xbox games, and earbuds. The items were
eventually returned to the respective students. Defendant was arrested later that
evening. He admitted he regularly sells stolen computers.
Defendant was indicted for two counts of felonious breaking and entering, two
counts of larceny after breaking and entering, two counts of larceny of goods over
$1,000, and habitual felony breaking and entering.
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STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Defendant’s counsel moved to
dismiss all charges “based on insufficiency of the evidence.” The trial court denied
the motion. Defendant did not present evidence and renewed his motion to dismiss.
On 20 March 2020, the jury convicted Defendant of: felony breaking and
entering, felony larceny after breaking and entering, and felony larceny of property
worth more than $1,000 for breaking into Bostick Hall.
Regarding the theft from the second student’s room in Taylor Hall, the jury
convicted Defendant of felony breaking and entering, felony larceny after breaking
and entering, and non-felonious larceny. Defendant was also convicted for habitual
breaking and entering. The trial court consolidated the felonies and sentenced
Defendant to an active sentence of two consecutive terms of 50 to 72 months.
Defendant timely filed his written notice of appeal on 21 March 2020. Four
days later, the State filed a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) seeking to arrest
judgment on the felony larceny of property worth more than $1,000 and the non-
felonious larceny conviction. On 14 April 2020, the trial court granted the State’s
MAR and amended the judgment. The amended judgment arrested judgment on
Defendant’s convictions of felony larceny of goods over $1,000 and for non-felonious
larceny.
II. Jurisdiction
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STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
This Court possesses jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and
15A-1444(a) (2019).
III. Issues
Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) amending the judgments when
notice of appeal had been entered; and, (2) entering a judgment for four counts of
larceny when the State only proved two felonies.
IV. Jurisdiction to Amend Judgment
A. Standard of Review
“Questions of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.” State v. Rogers,
256 N.C. App. 328, 337, 808 S.E.2d 156, 162 (2017) (citation omitted). “Under a de
novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 609
S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Analysis
Defendant argues the trial court erred by amending the judgment when notice
of appeal had already been entered.
A court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to
decide a case. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
indispensable foundation upon which valid judicial
decisions rest, and in its absence a court has no power to
act. As a result, subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, whether at trial or on appeal, ex mero motu.
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STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
State v. Sellers, 248 N.C. App. 293, 300, 789 S.E.2d 459, 465 (2016) (alterations,
citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Our general statutes provide: “The jurisdiction of the trial court with regard to
the case is divested, except as to actions authorized by G.S. 15A-1453, when notice of
appeal has been given and the period described in (1) and (2) has expired.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1448(a)(3) (2019). Our rules of appellate procedure allow a written notice
of appeal to be filed up to fourteen days after the entry of a judgment in a criminal
case. N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). The trial court retains jurisdiction until a notice of
appeal has been given and fourteen days have passed. State v. Lebeau, ___ N.C. App.
___, ___,843 S.E.2d 317, 319-20 (2020). The State may file a motion for appropriate
relief for any error which may be asserted on appeal within ten days of the judgment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1416 (2019).
Defendant asserts the trial court was divested of jurisdiction when he entered
the written notice of appeal. On 25 March 2014, the State filed a MAR to amend the
judgments within the statutory allowed ten-day period after the judgment. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1416(a)(2019). The trial court was not divested of jurisdiction until
fourteen days until after it had ruled on the State’s MAR. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1448(a)(2) (2019) (when a proper motion for appropriate relief is made, the case shall
remain open for the taking of an appeal until the court has ruled on the motion). We
hold the State timely filed the MAR within ten days of the judgment in accordance
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STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
with N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-1416. Further, we hold the trial court properly retained
jurisdiction to issue its 10 April 2014 order on the State’s MAR in accordance with
N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-1448(a)(2).
V. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
because the State only proved two individual takings. The State’s MAR and the trial
court’s order address the duplicity of the charges for the same acts. “A single larceny
offense is committed when, as part of one continuous act or transaction, a perpetrator
steals several items at the same time and place. In such instances the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy prohibits multiple convictions.” State v.
Froneberger, 81 N.C. App. 398, 401, 344 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1986) (internal citations
omitted).
Defendant correctly asserts the multiple larceny convictions from each
breaking and entering charge was improper. In the present case, the State correctly
responds this issue is moot. A case is moot when “a determination is sought on a
matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing
controversy.” Roberts v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass’n, Inc, 344 N.C. 394, 398-99, 474
S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996) (citations omitted).
The State’s MAR requested the court to arrest judgment on the two duplicate
larceny charges, leaving one remaining larceny charge for each felonious breaking
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STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
and entering charge. The trial court properly arrested judgment on the duplicate
larceny charges. Defendant’s motion for insufficient evidence to prove multiple
larceny charges is moot because the trial court’s order on the State’s MAR arrested
judgment of the duplicate larceny charges.
“Whenever during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has
been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are
no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain an action
merely to determine abstract propositions of law.” Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358,
370, 451 S.E.2d 858, 866 (1994) (citation omitted). “If the issues before the court
become moot at any time during the course of the proceedings, the usual response is
to dismiss the action.” Id. (citations omitted).
Defendant offers no argument regarding our mootness doctrine or any
exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The relief Defendant seeks on appeal is the same
relief previously granted to him in the trial courts order. Defendant’s argument is
dismissed as moot.
VI. Clerical Error
The jury found Defendant guilty of habitual breaking and entering. The AOC
judgment form provides a numerical list of the offenses with check boxes for each
item. The form states: “The Court: . . . 3. adjudges the defendant to be a habitual
felon to be sentenced[.]” The next line states “4. adjudges the defendant to be an
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STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
habitual breaking and entering status offender, to be sentenced as a Class E felon.”
Form AOC-CR-601. The judgment form should have been marked as “4” in
accordance with the jury finding and sentence, but instead it was marked as “3.” The
amended judgments have box “3” checked adjudicating Defendant to be a habitual
felon. Although Defendant was properly sentenced as a Class E felon and not under
the habitual felon provisions, the trial court should have checked box “4” to
correspond with Defendant being a habitual breaking and entering status offender.
“A clerical error is defined as an error resulting from a minor mistake or
inadvertence, especially in writing or copying something on the record, and not from
judicial reasoning or determination.” State v. Gillespie, 240 N.C. App. 238, 245, 771
S.E.2d 785, 790 (2015) (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
“When, on appeal, a clerical error is discovered in the trial court judgment or
order, it is appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction because of
the importance that the record speak the truth.” State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842,
845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
State concedes the judgment contained a clerical error. We remand for the correction
of the clerical error on the judgment forms. Id.
VII. Conclusion
The trial court possessed jurisdiction to rule on the State’s MAR under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1416. Defendant’s argument on the sufficiency of the evidence is
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STATE V. JOINER
Opinion of the Court
resolved and moot.
The trial court allowed the State’s MAR and arrested judgment on the
duplicate larceny charges. Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial errors
he preserved and argued.
We find no error in the jury’s verdicts and sentences imposed by the trial court.
We remand for the limited purpose of correcting the above described clerical error on
each AOC form for the habitual breaking and entering. It is so ordered.
NO ERROR; REMAND FOR THE CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERROR.
Judges DIETZ and MURPHY concur.
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