USA Trouser ( 2018 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-918
    Filed: 20 February 2018
    Guilford County, No. 14 CVS 790
    USA TROUSER, S.A. de C.V., Plaintiff,
    v.
    JAMES A. WILLIAMS; NAVIGATORS INSURANCE COMPANY;                                 and
    NAVIGATORS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., Defendants.
    Appeal by plaintiff from order and opinion entered 25 July 2016 by Chief Judge
    James L. Gale in the North Carolina Business Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
    22 January 2018.
    Law Offices of Matthew K. Rogers, PLLC, by Matthew K. Rogers, for plaintiff-
    appellant.
    Cozen O’Connor, by Tracy L. Eggleston and Patrick M. Aul, and Angelo G.
    Savino, pro hac vice, for defendant-appellees.
    TYSON, Judge.
    USA Trouser, S.A. de C.V. (“Plaintiff” or “USAT”) appeals an order of the North
    Carolina Business Court, granting Navigators Insurance Company’s and Navigators
    Management Company, Inc.’s motions to dismiss. We affirm the trial court’s order.
    I. Background
    The record on appeal tends to show the following:
    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    USAT is a Mexican company, which manufactures socks and hosiery products.
    USAT sold socks on credit to International Legwear Group, Inc. (“ILG”), a company
    conducting business within North Carolina.
    Navigators Insurance Company (“Navigators Insurance”) had issued a
    directors and officers liability insurance policy (the “Policy”) to ILG for the period
    from 31 December 2010 through 31 December 2017.
    In September 2011, USAT filed suit (the “Underlying Action”) against ILG and
    a number of its directors and officers. USAT alleged ILG had failed to disclose its
    worsening financial condition, while continuing to obtain products from USAT upon
    credit.     USAT asserted claims for breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty;
    fraudulent concealment; negligent misrepresentation; unfair and deceptive trade
    practices; breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing; fraudulent
    and/or negligent failure to perform statutory duties; conversion; and fraudulent
    conveyance.      A default judgment (the “Judgment”) was entered against ILG for
    $1,993,856.48 in the United States District Court. The plain language of the Policy
    indicates Navigators Insurance had no duty to defend ILG for the claims brought in
    the Underlying Action.
    On 2 June 2014, USAT filed suit in Guilford County Superior Court against
    James A. Williams (“Williams”), the CEO and President of ILG, to enforce the
    Judgment. Williams asserted counterclaims against USAT.
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
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    On 20 June 2014, USAT sent Navigators Insurance a copy of the Judgment
    and a letter demanding payment of the Judgment. After Navigators Insurance failed
    to respond to the demand letter, USAT filed an amended complaint purporting to add
    Navigators Insurance Company and Navigators Management Company, Inc.
    (“Navigators Management”) (collectively “Defendants”) as defendants to the suit
    against Williams. The case was designated a mandatory complex business case by
    order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina pursuant to N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 7A-45.4(a). The case was assigned to Chief Judge James L. Gale of the
    North Carolina Business Court.
    USAT asserted claims against Navigators Insurance and Navigators
    Management for: (1) conspiracy to defraud; (2) bad faith claims settlement practices;
    and (3) “unfair trade practices” pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1
    . On 17 October
    2014, Navigators Insurance and Navigators Management filed motions to dismiss
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Navigators
    Management premised its motion to dismiss on arguments that: (1) it was not a party
    to the Policy between ILG and Navigators Insurance; (2) USAT did not plead its
    conspiracy to defraud claims with specificity; and (3) it did not issue the Policy.
    In its motion to dismiss, Navigators Insurance argued (1) the Policy did not
    provide coverage for the Judgment; (2) USAT’s lack of coverage under the Policy
    precluded it from acting in “bad faith” by not paying the judgment; (3) the lack of
    coverage precluded USAT’s unfair trade practices claims; (4) USAT did not plead its
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    conspiracy to defraud claim with specificity; and (5) USAT’s lack of coverage under
    the Policy precluded the fraudulent concealment claim.
    On 21 July 2016, the trial court issued an order and opinion dismissing all of
    USAT’s claims against Navigators Insurance and Navigators Management. On 2
    March 2017, the remaining claims by and between USAT and Williams were
    voluntarily dismissed. USAT filed timely notice of appeal of the trial court’s order.
    II. Jurisdiction
    Appeal lies of right in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) (2013)
    and 1-277 (2017). In 2014, our General Assembly enacted Chapter 102 of the 2014
    North Carolina Session Laws, which, among other things, amended N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 7A-27 so as to provide a direct right of appeal to the Supreme Court from a final
    judgment of the Business Court. See 
    2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 621
    , 621, ch. 102, § 1.
    The effective date of the 2014 amendments to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(a)(2) was
    1 October 2014. See 
    2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 621
    , 629, ch. 102, § 9 (“Section 1 of this act
    becomes effective October 1, 2014, and applies to actions designated as mandatory
    complex business cases on or after that date.”).
    The present case was designated as a mandatory complex business case on 7
    July 2014, prior to the effective date of the 2014 amendments to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-
    27(a)(2). This case is properly before this Court.
    III. Standard of Review
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    The standard of review of an order granting a [motion to
    dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6)]
    is whether the complaint states a claim for which relief can
    be granted under some legal theory when the complaint is
    liberally construed and all the allegations included therein
    are taken as true. On a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s
    material factual allegations are taken as true.
    Bissette v. Harrod, 
    226 N.C. App. 1
    , 7, 
    738 S.E.2d 792
    , 797 (2013) (citations
    omitted).
    A motion to dismiss should be granted when: “(1) the complaint on its face
    reveals that no law supports the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals
    the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses
    some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim.” Wood v. Guilford Cty., 
    355 N.C. 161
    , 166, 
    558 S.E.2d 490
    , 494 (2002).
    “[W]hen ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may properly consider
    documents which are the subject of a plaintiff’s complaint and to which the complaint
    specifically refers even though they are presented by the defendant.” Oberlin Capital,
    L.P. v. Slavin, 
    147 N.C. App. 52
    , 60, 
    554 S.E.2d 840
    , 847 (2001). We review the trial
    court’s dismissal of an action de novo. Grich v. Mantelco, LLC, 
    228 N.C. App. 587
    ,
    589, 
    746 S.E.2d 316
    , 318 (2013).
    IV. Analysis
    A. Introduction
    USAT argues the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
    USAT asserts it became a third-party beneficiary to the Policy upon entry of the
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    default judgment against ILG, obtained the right to payment on the Judgment from
    Defendants, and to sue Defendants directly for their failure to pay.
    B. Third-Party Beneficiary
    USAT argues the trial court erred when it dismissed its claims against
    Defendants for unfair trade practices and bad faith claims settlement practices
    because USAT is a third-party beneficiary of the Policy. We disagree.
    USAT brings its unfair or deceptive trade practices claim pursuant to N.C.
    Gen. Stat § 75-1.1 and its bad faith claims settlement claim pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15
    (11).
    It is well-established in North Carolina that:
    [while] a plaintiff generally cannot sue the insurance
    company of an adverse party under G.S. § 75-1.1, if the
    plaintiff achieves the status of an intended third-party
    beneficiary arising from the contractual relationship
    between the adverse party and the adverse party’s
    insurance company, the plaintiff may then bring a claim
    against the insurance company for violating the unfair and
    deceptive practices statute.
    Prince v. Wright, 
    141 N.C. App. 262
    , 270, 
    541 S.E.2d 191
    , 197 (2000) (emphasis
    supplied). “[A] private right of action under N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15 and N.C.G.S. § 75-
    1.1 may not be asserted by a third-party claimant against the insurer of an adverse
    party.” Lee v. Mut. Community Sav. Bank, 
    136 N.C. App. 808
    , 810, 
    525 S.E.2d 854
    ,
    856 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    The controlling case regarding direct actions by a third-party plaintiff against
    an insured’s insurer is Wilson v. Wilson, 
    121 N.C. App. 662
    , 
    468 S.E.2d 495
     (1996).
    In Wilson, this Court held “North Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for
    third-party claimants against the insurance company of an adverse party based on
    unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” Id. at 665, 
    468 S.E.2d at 497
    . Shortly after Wilson was decided, this Court created an exception to the
    Wilson rule, and held, “[t]he injured party in an automobile accident is an intended
    third-party beneficiary to the insurance contract between insurer and the
    tortfeasor/insured party.” Murray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
    123 N.C. App. 1
    , 15,
    
    472 S.E.2d 358
    , 366 (1996) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted), rev. denied, 
    345 N.C. 344
    , 
    483 S.E.2d 173
     (1997).
    Following Murray, this Court has required the third-party plaintiff, in an
    automobile accident context, to have obtained a judgment against the liability
    insurance company’s insured before it may have standing to sue the insurance
    company directly. See Craven v. Demidovich, 
    172 N.C. App. 340
    , 342, 
    615 S.E.2d 722
    ,
    724 (2005) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against insurer when insured’s
    liability had not been judicially determined).
    USAT argues Murray holds that a third-party claimant’s obtainment of a
    judgment against the insurance company’s insured ipso facto raises the claimant to
    a retroactive intended third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract, and thereby
    places the third-party claimant in privity of contract with the insurer. We disagree.
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
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    USAT’s argument ignores the fact that the third-party claimant’s privity with
    the insurer is based upon the third-party claimant being an injured party in an
    automobile accident. See Murray, 123 N.C. App. at 15, 
    472 S.E.2d at 366
    . The Court’s
    ruling in Murray was premised upon its recognition that an “injured party in an
    automobile accident is an intended third-party beneficiary to the insurance contract
    between insurer and the tortfeasor/insured party . . . and for this reason alone, [the
    plaintiff is] not bound by the third-party restrictions set forth in Wilson.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis
    supplied).
    In the automobile accident context, an injured party is recognized as a third-
    party beneficiary to the liability insurance policy, because, under the statute, “[t]he
    primary purpose of th[e] compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is to
    compensate innocent victims who have been injured by financially irresponsible
    motorists.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 
    293 N.C. 431
    , 440, 
    238 S.E.2d 597
    ,
    604 (1977).
    Contrary to USAT’s assertions, Murray did not recognize nor implement a
    general rule that judgments against insureds provide claimants with rights to recover
    from insurers directly. Murray recognizes (1) that if a third-party claimant is a party
    to an insurance contract and (2) obtains a judgment against an insurance company’s
    insured, then the third-party claimant would have standing to sue the insurer
    directly. See Murray, 123 N.C. App. at 15, 
    472 S.E.2d at 366
    .
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
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    Murray does not establish that a third-party claimant’s obtainment of a
    judgment against an insured establishes privity with the insurer as a matter of law,
    as USAT asserts we should hold. USAT’s argument also misconstrues language in
    Taylor v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
    181 N.C. App. 343
    , 
    638 S.E.2d 636
     (2006),
    disc. review denied, 
    361 N.C. 369
    , 
    646 S.E.2d 773
     (2007), summarizing the holding of
    Murray, to argue the obtainment of a judgment by a third-party against an insured
    establishes privity with the insured’s insurer.
    As quoted by USAT, this Court stated in Taylor, “In [Murray] we found privity
    between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor’s insurer and allowed an excess policy
    coverage claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices based on the insured’s post
    judgment behavior towards the plaintiff.” Taylor, 
    181 N.C. App. 345
    -46, 638 S.E.2d
    at 637-38. Taylor does not recognize or summarize Murray as holding that a third-
    party obtains privity with an insurer by obtaining a judgment against its insured.
    See id.
    USAT asserts it can bring direct claims against Defendants for unfair or
    deceptive trade practices and bad faith settlement practices, based upon this Court’s
    reversal of a trial court’s dismissal of a negligence claim against an insurer in Prince
    v. Wright. In Prince, the personal representative of the estate of a minor child killed
    by a fire in a rental house caused by an electrical problem brought claims against the
    landlord for negligence, breach of statutory duties, and wrongful death. Prince, 141
    N.C. App. at 264-65, 
    541 S.E.2d at 194-95
    . The personal representative also brought
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
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    claims against the landlord’s insurance company for negligence and unfair and
    deceptive trade practices. 
    Id.
    The insurance company had undertaken to conduct an inspection of the rental
    house “for the purpose of detecting and detailing the suitability of the house for
    residential purposes, including but not limited to, damage or potential damage to the
    electrical system[.]” 
    Id. at 267
    , 
    541 S.E.2d at 196
    .     The personal representative
    alleged in her negligence claim against the insurer that the insurer had failed to warn
    the residents of the potential fire hazard created by water damage to the electrical
    system. 
    Id.
     In reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the negligence claim against
    the insurance company, this Court determined, that even though the plaintiff was
    not in privity with the landlord’s insurer, the plaintiff could maintain the negligence
    action against the insurer because “[the insurer] may have created for itself a duty to
    plaintiff which it breached by first expressly undertaking to conduct an inspection of
    the suitability of the house for residential purposes and then by failing to warn
    tenants of the dangerous conditions it discovered during that inspection.” 
    Id.
    On the personal representative’s claims for unfair or deceptive trade practices,
    this Court cited Wilson and Murray and held the personal representative did not have
    standing to bring the unfair or deceptive trade practices claim. 
    Id. at 269-70
    , 
    541 S.E.2d at 197
    .
    The Court determined the personal representative was not an intended third-
    party beneficiary of the landlord’s insurance contract with the insurer, because the
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
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    insurer insured the house against loss or damage for the benefit of the landlord, and
    the landlord did not enter into the insurance policy for the benefit of potential
    residents living in the house, “but rather paid for the coverage to reduce or eliminate
    loss caused by circumstances such as a house fire.” 
    Id. at 270
    , 
    541 S.E.2d at 198
    . The
    Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the unfair or deceptive trade practices
    claim because the personal representative was not in privity with the insurer to bring
    a direct action under the policy. 
    Id.
    Unlike the plaintiff in Prince, USAT has not asserted a claim against
    Defendant-insurers for negligence. See 
    id.
     The Court’s holding in Prince with regards
    to the negligence claim does not support USAT’s argument that it has standing to
    bring an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim and bad faith settlement practices
    claim directly against Defendants.      This Court’s review and disposition of the
    negligence claim in Prince is irrelevant to USAT’s claims, especially in light of the
    Court’s ruling in Prince that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring an unfair or
    deceptive trade practices claim against the insurer, because she was not an intended
    third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between the insurer and insured
    defendants. 
    Id.
    USAT also argues the recent case of Nash Hosps., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
    Ins. Co., __ N.C. App. __, 
    803 S.E.2d 256
     (2017), supports its contention “that the rule
    in Wilson is not applicable when privity is established by judgment or settlement.”
    In Nash., a not-at-fault motorist injured in an automobile accident incurred
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    treatment costs with several medical providers, including the plaintiff, Nash
    Hospitals. Nash, __ N.C. App. at __, 803 S.E.2d at 259. State Farm, the insurer for
    the at-fault driver, received notice of Nash Hospitals’ medical liens under 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 44-49
     and -50 from Nash Hospitals’ counsel. 
    Id.
     State Farm entered into a
    settlement agreement with the not-at-fault driver and provided her with a check
    payable to herself, Nash Hospitals and another medical provider. 
    Id.
     Nash Hospitals
    was not notified of the settlement nor presented with the check for endorsement or
    payment. 
    Id.
     Nash Hospitals eventually sued State Farm, asserting that 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44-50
     “specifically requires the liability insurer to retain out of any recovery,
    before any disbursements, a sufficient sum to pay lien holders,” and State Farm’s
    failure to comply with §§ 44-49 and -50 constituted an unfair trade practice. Id.
    State Farm argued Nash Hospitals did not have standing to bring an unfair or
    deceptive trade practices claim, because its suit did not involve a dispute over an
    insurance contract. Id. at __, 803 S.E.2d at 262. This Court determined that State
    Farm and the not-at-fault driver, who was not State Farm’s insured, were in privity
    upon them entering into the settlement agreement, and that Nash Hospitals was in
    privity with State Farm, reasoning:
    Once a claimant and an insurance company enter into a
    settlement agreement, they are therefore in privity. And by
    enacting 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 44-49
     et seq., the General
    Assembly expanded the scope of privity to hospitals and
    medical service providers. As discussed supra, the purpose
    of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 44-49
     et seq. is to protect hospitals and
    other health care providers that provide medical services
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    to injured persons who may be unable to pay at the time
    the services are rendered, but who may later receive
    compensation for their injuries. Smith, 157 N.C. App. at
    602, 580 S.E.2d at 50. As a result, Nash Hospitals’ privity
    became effective the moment Defendant received notice
    from Nash Hospitals of its assertion of a valid lien
    pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44-49
     and reached a
    settlement agreement with [the injured driver].
    
    Id.
     at __, 803 S.E.2d at 263 (emphasis in original).
    This Court held, in part, that Nash Hospitals had standing to sue State Farm
    for unfair or deceptive trade practices because of the statutory privity provided to
    hospitals and medical service providers by 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44-49
    . 
    Id.
    Contrary to USAT’s contention, this Court in Nash did not make a general
    determination “that the rule in Wilson is not applicable when privity is established
    by judgment or settlement[,]” but that 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44-49
     operates to grant a
    medical service provider privity with regard to a settlement agreement between an
    injured person “who may be unable to pay at the time the services are rendered[]”
    and an insurance company. 
    Id.
    USAT attempts to assert an alternative argument for the first time on appeal
    that certain provisions of the Policy should be interpreted as making it an intended
    third-party beneficiary. USAT failed to raise or make this alternative argument
    within its responsive briefing to Defendants’ motions to dismiss before the trial court,
    at the hearing on Defendants’ motions before the trial court, or allege it in its
    complaint. USAT cannot assert a new theory for the first time on appeal. Weil v.
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    Herring, 
    207 N.C. 6
    , 10, 
    175 S.E. 836
    , 838 (1934) (“An examination of the record
    discloses that the cause was not tried upon that theory, and the law does not permit
    parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount [on appeal].”);
    see State v. Sharpe, 
    344 N.C. 190
    ,195, 
    473 S.E.2d 3
    , 6 (1996), cert. denied, 
    350 N.C. 848
    , 
    539 S.E.2d 647
     (1999) (“[I]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that [a party]
    cannot argue for the first time on appeal [a] new ground . . . that he did not present
    to the trial court.”). This alternative argument is dismissed.
    USAT has not cited any authority, binding upon this Court, which tends to
    establish a trade creditor is in privity with its debtor and the debtor’s insurer with
    respect to a directors and officers liability insurance policy, merely by virtue of the
    trade creditor’s obtainment of a judgment against the insured debtor.             It is
    undisputed and admitted that USAT is not specifically and expressly named in the
    Policy.
    Treating the allegations in USAT’s complaint as true, USAT has failed to
    establish the privity required by Murray for it to have standing to assert claims for
    unfair or deceptive trade practices and bad faith claims settlement. Without privity,
    the general rule that “a private right of action under N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15 and N.C.G.S.
    § 75-1.1 may not be asserted by a third-party claimant against the insurer of an
    adverse party[,]” prevails. Lee, 136 N.C. App. at 810, 
    525 S.E.2d at 856
     (citation and
    quotation marks omitted). USAT does not have standing to assert its unfair or
    deceptive trade practices claim and bad faith settlement claim. See 
    id.
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    USAT has failed to state an unfair trade practices claim or a bad faith
    settlement claim upon which relief can be granted. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
    12(b)(6) (2017). USAT’s unfair trade practices claim and bad faith settlement claim
    were properly dismissed. USAT’s arguments are overruled.
    C. Conspiracy to Defraud
    USAT also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect
    to its conspiracy to defraud claim. North Carolina does not recognize an independent
    cause of action for civil conspiracy. Dove v. Harvey, 
    168 N.C. App. 687
    , 690, 
    608 S.E.2d 798
    , 800 (2005) (citation omitted). A civil conspiracy claim must be based on an
    adequately pled underlying claim. 
    Id.
     The claim underlying USAT’s civil conspiracy
    allegations is fraud.
    Rule 9(b) of our Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[i]n all averments of
    fraud . . . the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
    particularity.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(b) (2017). “[I]n pleading actual fraud,
    the particularity requirement is met by alleging time, place and content of the
    fraudulent representation, identity of the person making the representation and
    what was obtained as a result of the fraudulent acts or representations.” Terry v.
    Terry, 
    302 N.C. 77
    , 85, 
    273 S.E.2d 674
    , 678 (1981).
    “Dismissal of a claim for failure to plead with particularity is proper where
    there are no facts whatsoever setting forth the time, place, or specific individuals who
    purportedly made the misrepresentations.” Bob Timberlake Collection, Inc. v.
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    Edwards, 
    176 N.C. App. 33
    , 39, 
    626 S.E.2d 315
    , 321 (2006) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    Here, the Business Court properly concluded that USAT had failed to plead
    fraud with particularity. In its conspiracy to defraud claim, USAT alleges with
    respect to Defendants, the following:
    228. Navigators conspired with ILG’s officers and directors
    to commit fraud on the court by intending to cause default
    be entered against ILG purportedly for non-payment of
    legal fees, when Navigators intended to pay for the defense
    of co-defendants and when the ILG Policy covered ILG with
    regard to the acts and omissions of ILG’s officers including
    Williams, and Navigators conspired to dissolve ILG
    without disposing of contingent or known liabilities of
    which Navigators was aware or reasonably should’ve been
    aware.
    ...
    230. Navigators are conspiring with Williams to avoid
    paying the Judgment despite facts that already establish
    liability of both be established and Trouser is entitled to
    attorney fees as damages relating thereto.
    231. Navigators Insurance is conspiring with Navigators
    Management to avoid paying the Judgment in violation of
    North Carolina law.
    The complaint does not: (1) allege the identity of any specific person associated
    with    Navigators     Insurance     or    Navigators    Management         who   made
    misrepresentations or omissions; or (2) provide either the specific, or even the
    approximate, “time or place” at which either of the Defendants, together or
    separately, conspired with ILG’s directors. 
    Id.
     The Complaint contains none of this
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    specific information, but instead asserts only conclusory allegations that Defendants
    are liable for paying the Judgment against ILG, and are engaging in fraudulent acts
    to avoid paying the Judgment.
    Because USAT failed to plead the underlying claim of fraud with particularity,
    the conspiracy to defraud claim was properly dismissed by the Business Court. N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(b); see Edwards, 176 N.C. App. at 39, 
    626 S.E.2d at 321
     (“A
    trial court properly dismisses a claim for failure to plead fraud with particularity
    where there are no facts whatsoever setting forth the time, place, or specific
    individuals who purportedly made the misrepresentations.”). USAT’s arguments are
    overruled.
    V. Conclusion
    USAT did not become a third-party beneficiary to the Policy upon entry of the
    default judgment against ILG, nor did USAT obtain the right to payment on the
    Judgment directly from Defendants, or to sue Defendants directly for unfair trade
    practices or bad faith claims settlement practices. USAT also failed to plead the
    underlying claim of fraud with particularity and the conspiracy to defraud claim was
    properly dismissed by the Business Court.
    Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    The order and opinion of the North Carolina Business Court granting Defendants’
    motions to dismiss is affirmed. It is so ordered.
    AFFIRMED.
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    USA TROUSER, S.A. DE C.V. V. NAVIGATORS INS. CO.
    Opinion of the Court
    Chief Judge McGEE and Judge DAVIS concur.
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