United States v. Gerald Farmer ( 2019 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0355n.06
Case Nos. 17-6420/6422 FILED
Jul 12, 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
17-6420 )
)
GERALD EDWIN FARMER,
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Respondent-Appellant. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
17-6422 ) TENNESSEE
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
GERALD EDWIN FARMER, )
Defendant-Appellee. )
BEFORE: GILMAN, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. In 2013, Gerald Farmer pleaded guilty to being a felon in
possession of ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Based on three prior Tennessee
convictions, the parties stipulated in the plea agreement that Farmer had three prior violent felony
Case Nos. 17-6420/6422, Farmer v. United States, et al.
convictions and qualified as an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The district court
accepted the agreement and imposed a 210-month sentence.
In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed
Career Criminal Act violates due process. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). Relying on Johnson,
Farmer filed this § 2255 motion, arguing that two of his Tennessee convictions, conspiracy to
commit aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, no longer qualify as violent felonies under the
Act and that he should be resentenced. While his petition was pending, this court held that
Tennessee aggravated burglary, Farmer’s third prior conviction, did not qualify as a violent felony
because Tennessee’s statute covers more structures than the Act’s enumerated burglary offense
covers. United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Farmer filed a
supplemental brief asserting entitlement to relief on that additional basis. The government agreed
that Farmer did not qualify for the sentence enhancement but asked the district court to hold the
case in abeyance pending any appeal of Stitt. The district court decided not to hold the case in
abeyance, granted Farmer’s § 2255 motion based on Stitt, and amended his sentence to 120
months.
The government appealed and asked that we hold the case in abeyance while it sought the
Supreme Court’s review in Stitt. We agreed to do so. Late last year, the Supreme Court reversed
this court’s decision in Stitt, holding that the structures covered by Tennessee’s aggravated
burglary statute fit within the Act’s generic-burglary definition. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct.
399, 406–08 (2018).
The government now asks us to reverse and have the district court reinstate the original
sentence because the Supreme Court’s decision in Stitt undermines the basis for the district court’s
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Case Nos. 17-6420/6422, Farmer v. United States, et al.
grant of relief. Farmer does not (and cannot) dispute that he is no longer eligible for relief based
on the structures Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute covers.
Farmer nonetheless urges us to affirm for two reasons. First, he says that a conviction for
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery does not count as a violent felony under the elements
clause because the overt act necessary for a conspiracy need not involve the “use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
Second, he contends that his aggravated burglary conviction does not qualify as a burglary under
the Act for a reason distinct from the issue in Stitt. Generic burglary requires “an unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a
crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). If the only thing that enters a structure
is an instrument, Farmer says, then the act counts as generic burglary only if the defendant used
the instrument to try to commit the intended felony inside (e.g., sticking a coat hanger through a
window to snag an item). Meanwhile, he adds, Tennessee’s burglary statute requires only that an
instrument enter a structure. In Farmer’s view, that makes the Tennessee statute overbroad.
Because the district court had no occasion to consider either argument the first time around,
we vacate the district court’s decision granting Farmer’s § 2255 motion and remand for the district
court to consider these arguments.
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