Erin Broussard v. Roy Arnel ( 2019 )

Opinion issued December 31, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-18-00687-CV
———————————
ERIN BROUSSARD, Appellant
V.
ROY ARNEL, Appellee
On Appeal from the 328th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 16-DCV-233665
OPINION
In this suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), Erin Broussard
appeals the trial court’s modification order designating Roy Arnel sole managing
conservator of their child, I.A. In four issues,1 Broussard challenges the trial
court’s order denying her plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to render its modification order due to I.A.’s
emancipation by marriage during the pendency of the modification suit.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Broussard’s plea to
the jurisdiction, and, accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s modification order.
Background
Broussard and Arnel were divorced after fourteen years of marriage on July
20, 2010. The divorce decree named the parties joint managing conservators of
their two minor children, I.A. and K.A., and gave Broussard the exclusive right to
designate the children’s primary residence.
On July 5, 2016, Arnel filed a petition to modify. The petition, as amended,
sought the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence. Trial
began in June 2017, but was continued several times.
On October 22, 2017, while trial was in recess, Broussard reported to her
counsel that I.A. had run away. Then on November 6, 2017, Broussard filed a plea
to the jurisdiction, informing the court and Arnel that I.A.—who was 15 years old
at the time—had traveled to Missouri three days earlier and married a 26-year-old
woman. Broussard contended that, as a result of the marriage, I.A. was now
1
Although Broussard’s brief lists five issues, the first and fourth are the same. We
have renumbered her issues accordingly.
2
emancipated and thus was no longer subject to her control or the trial court’s
SAPCR jurisdiction. She acknowledged that the marriage is void under Texas law,
but argued she that the trial court should recognize it nonetheless because it is legal
and valid under Missouri law, which, at the time, permitted the marriage of a 15-
year-old with parental consent. Broussard argued that Missouri law applies to
determine the validity of I.A.’s marriage, and, in the alternative, that the trial court
should recognize the Missouri marriage under the principles of comity and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV
§ 1.
Arnel filed a response, stating that, at the time of the marriage, the parties
were under temporary orders requiring Broussard to consult with him before
making significant decisions affecting I.A. He argued that Texas law applies to
determine the validity of I.A.’s marriage and asked the trial court to declare the
marriage void under Family Code section 6.205, which states that a marriage to
which either party is under the age of 18 is void “unless a court order removing the
disabilities of minority of the party for general purposes has been obtained in this
state or in another state.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.205. Arnel argued that
because I.A. had not obtained a court order—in Texas or Missouri—removing the
disabilities of his minority, he was not legally married under Texas law. See id.;
see also id. § 2.003 (“A person under 18 years of age may not marry unless the
3
person has been granted by this state or another state a court order removing the
disabilities of minority of the person for general purposes.”). He also argued that
neither comity nor full faith and credit requires recognition of a marriage that is
void as against Texas public policy.
On November 30, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Broussard’s plea to
the jurisdiction. After hearing argument, the trial court orally denied Broussard’s
plea and found that the marriage was void. The court issued emergency temporary
orders giving Arnel exclusive decision-making authority regarding I.A. and
requiring Broussard to cooperate with police in the investigation of I.A.’s
whereabouts.
On December 15, 2017, Broussard filed a “motion for reconsideration and
new trial” on her plea to the jurisdiction. In it, she stated that she consented to
I.A.’s marriage after he contacted her and told her that if she did not consent she
would never see him again.
On December 18, 2017, the trial court signed an order denying Broussard’s
plea to the jurisdiction, declaring I.A.’s marriage void under Texas law and against
“good morals and natural justice,” and declining to extend the marriage full faith
and credit, “as such recognition would be in violation of established Texas public
policy.”
4
On January 5, 2018, Broussard filed a mandamus petition with this Court.
She argued that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to recognize I.A.’s
Missouri marriage in violation of the principles of comity and by denying her
parental right to consent to her son’s marriage in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This Court denied the mandamus petition
without substantive opinion on October 16, 2018.
Trial of Arnel’s modification suit resumed on April 30, 2018 and concluded
on July 2, 2018. On July 3, 2018, the trial court rendered judgment appointing
Arnel sole managing conservator and Broussard possessory conservator of I.A.
On July 31, 2018, Broussard filed a motion for new trial, attaching as an
exhibit a Missouri circuit court judgment, rendered on February 15, 2018, in a
declaratory judgment action brought by I.A.’s wife. The Missouri judgment states
that the marriage “entered into on November 3, 2017 was, and continues to remain,
valid pursuant to the laws of the State of Missouri, including, but not limited to any
and all statutory requirements set forth in Section 451 [Revised Statutes of
Missouri] governing the validity of a Missouri marriage.” This was the first time
Broussard had brought this judgment to the trial court’s attention.2 Broussard
argued that the trial court’s declaration that the marriage was void violated the Full
2
On March 15, 2018, Arnel filed a post-judgment motion to intervene in the
Missouri declaratory judgment action seeking to have the judgment set aside. The
Missouri court denied his motion.
5
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, she argued
that she was “attempting to have the Court recognize the marriage—not enforce
it—and by recognizing the valid marriage the Court would be required to dismiss
the case due to lack of jurisdiction (i.e. it did not have jurisdiction over the
Missouri citizen [whom I.A. married]).”
Arnel filed a response, arguing, among other things, that the trial court
should not consider the Missouri judgment because it was not authenticated. On
August 9, 2018, after a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court orally denied
Broussard’s motion for new trial.
Broussard appeals the trial court’s denial of her plea to the jurisdiction.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Broussard argues that the trial court erred in denying her plea to the
jurisdiction because I.A.’s Missouri marriage divested the trial court of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Specifically, she argues that (1) I.A. was emancipated by his
Missouri marriage; (2) Texas law does not apply to determine the validity of I.A.’s
Missouri marriage; (3) I.A. was married in accordance with Texas law; and
(4) Texas must recognize I.A.’s marriage as valid under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution.
6
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
court. If the trial court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the court does not
have their authority to consider the matter. Shahin v. Mem’l Hermann Health Sys.,
527 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). The trial
court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is a legal question and is reviewed under
a de novo standard of review. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Shahin, 527 S.W.3d at 487. It is the plaintiff’s
burden to allege facts that affirmatively establish the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.
1993); Shahin, 527 S.W.3d at 487. In determining whether the plaintiff has met
this burden, we look to the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings, accept them as
true, and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226;
Shahin, 527 S.W.3d at 487. We review the actions of the trial court based upon the
materials before it at the time it acted. Shahin, 527 S.W.3d at 487.
B. Emancipation by Marriage
In her first issue, Broussard argues that I.A.’s emancipation by his Missouri
marriage rendered Arnel’s modification petition moot. Because as designated,
Broussard’s issues overlap, we will address as her first issue whether I.A.’s
Missouri marriage emancipated him.
7
As a preliminary matter, we note that Broussard assumes that I.A.’s alleged
emancipation would dispossess the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction by
rendering Arnel’s modification suit moot. The mootness doctrine implicates
subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether a claim is moot depends on whether a
justiciable controversy remains between the parties. City of Hous. v. Kallinen, 516
S.W.3d 617, 622 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). If a controversy
ceases to exist or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, a
case is moot. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. 2005). The
same is true when a judgment would not have any practical effect upon a then-
existing controversy. Kallinen, 516 S.W.3d at 622 (citing Zipp v. Wuemling, 218
S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. 2007)).
For purposes of this opinion, we will assume without deciding that, under
the mootness doctrine, a trial court loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
a petition to modify conservatorship or possession and access when the subject
minor is emancipated by marriage, even when, as here, the petition was filed
before the minor became emancipated.3 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.003
3
The trial court in a SAPCR has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over matters
concerning conservatorship, possession, and access to a “child,” which the Family
Code defines as “a person under 18 years of age who is not and has not been
married or who has not had the disabilities of minority removed for general
purposes.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.003(a). Courts have generally held
that the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify its conservatorship decisions ends upon
the occurrence of one of these circumstances—the child turns 18, is married, or is
8
(court in SAPCR may exercise its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its
prior orders regarding conservatorship, possession, and access to a “child”). The
question thus becomes whether I.A.’s Missouri marriage emancipated him.
The answer to this question is found in Family Code section 1.104, which
governs emancipation by marriage. Under section 1.104, I.A. could only have been
emancipated by his Missouri marriage if that marriage were legal in Texas. See id.
emancipated. See In re D.S.H., No. 09-16-00109-CV, 2017 WL 1429198, at *5
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[B]ecause D.S.H. is
now over eighteen years of age, the issue of conservatorship of D.S.H. is moot.”);
D.C. v. Te.s Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00453-CV, 2012 WL
1403333, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 19, 2012, no pet.) (dismissing appeal as
moot because there was no longer live controversy once subject of child custody
order became adult); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 691–92 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that ordinarily, conservatorship becomes moot once
child reaches age of eighteen); In re Rimes, No. 05-00-01081-CV, 2000 WL
1477212, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 6, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Since the
filing of the petition for writ of mandamus, the child has reached the age of 18
years and has become emancipated. Thus, the family court with continuing
jurisdiction no longer has jurisdiction.”); Husband v. Pierce, 800 S.W.2d 661, 663
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, no writ) (“A parents’ rights and obligations in relation to
their child end upon the child’s emancipation by marriage.”). But some courts
have held that if the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a petition to
modify conservatorship when it is filed, it does not lose jurisdiction to render
judgment on the petition if the child subsequently turns 18 (or, by extension, is
married or emancipated). See In re S.L.M., 97 S.W.3d 224, 231–32 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (“To the extent that the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction as to conservatorship and possession of S.L.M. prior to her 18th
birthday, it retained jurisdiction after her birthday to enter orders as to
conservatorship and possession for periods prior to S.L.M.’s 18th birthday . . . .”);
McLendon v. Allen, 752 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no
writ) (“In the case before us, the appellant filed the motions setting out grounds for
relief prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday in the court of original jurisdiction.
This was sufficient to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the motions even
though the hearing would have occurred subsequent to the child’s eighteenth
birthday.”).
9
§ 1.104 (stating that, except as provided by statute or constitution, “a person,
regardless of age, who has been married in accordance with the laws of this state
has the capacity and power of any adult, including the capacity to contract.”)
(emphasis added); see also Kingery v. Hintz, 124 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“Importantly, the Family Code
emancipates a minor only after she has been married in accordance with the laws
of Texas.”).
In Texas, a marriage by a person under 18 years of age who has not obtained
“a court order” emancipating him is void. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.205; see
also id. § 2.101 (“A county clerk may not issue a marriage license if either
applicant is under 18 years of age, unless each underage applicant shows that the
applicant has been granted by this state or another state a court order removing the
disabilities of minority of the applicant for general purposes.”); id. § 2.003(a) (“A
person under 18 years of age may not marry unless the person has been granted by
this state or another state a court order removing the disabilities of minority of the
person for general purposes.”); id. § 2.009(a)(3)(A) (stating that county clerk may
not issue marriage license if either applicant is under 18 years of age and has not
presented “a court order granted by this state under [Family Code] Chapter 31
removing the disabilities of minority of the applicant for general purposes”).
Indeed, because he was only fifteen years old, I.A. would not even have been
10
eligible for an emancipation order in Texas. See id. § 31.001(a)(2) (minor seeking
to remove disabilities of minority must be either 17 years of age or at least 16 years
of age and living apart from parents, managing conservator, or guardian).
There is no evidence or argument that, before his marriage, I.A. had
obtained—in either Texas or Missouri—a court order removing the disabilities of
his minority. I.A. was, therefore, not married in accordance with the laws of Texas
and, therefore, was not emancipated. See id. § 1.104 (stating that, except as
provided by statute or constitution, marriage emancipates person who has been
married “in accordance with the laws of this state”); id. § 6.205 (marriage by
person under 18 years of age who has not obtained “a court order” of emancipation
is void).
We overrule Broussard’s first issue.
C. Emancipation by Application of Missouri Law
In her second issue, Broussard argues that the trial court erred in applying
Texas law to determine “the validity of I.A.’s marriage” because Missouri law
applies, and I.A.’s marriage, valid under Missouri law, emancipated him.4
4
The Missouri statute that governed at the time of I.A.’s marriage permitted a
person 15 years of age with parental consent to obtain a marriage license; that
statute has since been amended, raising the permissible age with parental consent
from 15 to 16. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.090, amended by Act of Aug. 28, 2018,
2018 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 655, § A, 99th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2018).
11
In effect, Broussard argues that Family Code section 1.104, which compels
the conclusion that I.A. was not emancipated by his marriage because it was not
valid under Texas law, is inapplicable under a choice-of-law analysis. See id.
§ 1.104.
The problem with this argument is that the issue before us, as Broussard has
consistently framed it, is whether I.A. was emancipated by his Missouri marriage.
Thus, the validity of the marriage is but a peripheral, or secondary, consideration.
Although a conflicts analysis is not necessary here, we briefly address why it
would be unavailing to Broussard.
According to Broussard, under the “place of celebration rule,” Missouri law
applies to determine the validity of I.A.’s marriage because it was undertaken in
Missouri. We disagree that the place of celebration rule applies here to compel
Texas to recognize a marriage that is void under Texas law. First, the rule has been
all but abrogated in favor of the “most significant relationship” test of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 420–21 (Tex. 1984) (holding that “most significant relationship” test
of section 6 of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws applies in Texas in most
choice-of-law cases); see also Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 848
(Tex. 2000) (“Texas uses the Restatement’s ‘most significant relationship’ test to
decide choice-of-law issues.”) (citing Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421); In re Estate of
12
Loveless, 64 S.W.3d 564, 575 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (noting that
courts that had traditionally followed place of celebration rule have since applied
most significant relationship factors to determine validity of foreign marriage).5
In any event, the result is the same regardless of which test is used—we will
not apply a Missouri law that sanctions conduct that the Texas legislature has
declared to be void because “[t]he basic rule is that a court need not enforce a
foreign law if enforcement would be contrary to Texas public policy.” See
Larchmont Farms, Inc. v. Parra, 941 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam);
accord Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Posey, 146 S.W.3d 302, 316 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (“Texas will not enforce a foreign law which is
contrary to Texas public policy.”); Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462–64 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ) (declining to apply law of Kuwait or India,
where marriage and divorce ceremonies occurred, because “harshness” of Islamic
5
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that, subject to
constitutional restrictions and in the absence of statutory directive, a state will
consider the following factors in determining which state’s law to apply:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
13
law to non-Muslim divorced wife “runs . . . counter to our notions of good morals
and natural justice”).
Broussard next argues that Texas law does not apply to determine the
validity of I.A.’s Missouri marriage because Family Code section 1.103 dictates
that Texas law applies “to persons married elsewhere who are domiciled in this
state.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.103. According to Broussard, “there is no
evidence that [I.A.] was domiciled in Texas after the marriage” and “there is
evidence that he is currently domiciled in Louisiana.” Setting aside the evidentiary
issues implicit in this statement,6 we note that every Texas case that has cited to
section 1.103 has done so in the context of determining which state’s law to apply
to the litigant’s marriage or divorce. We do not consider section 1.103 to be
applicable beyond determining which state’s law governs the rights and duties
flowing from a litigant’s marriage or divorce; it does not govern the determination
whether an out-of-state marriage or divorce affects a Texas court’s jurisdiction.
Finally, we note that regardless of which choice-of-law rule or test courts
have applied, we have not found a single case holding that the law of another
jurisdiction applies to compel a Texas court to recognize a marriage that is void
under our laws. Cf. Braddock v. Taylor, 592 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
6
For example, Broussard supports her contention that I.A. is currently domiciled in
Louisiana by reliance on exhibits offered in support of Arnel’s motion to dismiss
this appeal that were not offered or admitted in the trial court.
14
1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (applying California law to hold that relationship carried on
in California was not valid marriage because California does not recognize
common law marriage); Nevarez v. Bailon, 287 S.W.2d 521, 522–23 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1956, writ ref’d) (applying Mexican law to hold that concubinage
relationship carried on in Mexico was not valid marriage).
We overrule Broussard’s second issue.
D. Emancipation by Recognition of Missouri Declaratory Judgment
In her third issue, Broussard argues (despite having consistently taken the
opposite position in the trial court) that I.A.’s marriage is not void under Texas
law. More specifically, she asserts that, despite I.A.’s age, his marriage is not void
because the subsequent Missouri judgment declaring the marriage valid operated to
emancipate him. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.205 (stating that marriage of
person under 18 years of age is void unless he has obtained “a court order
removing the disabilities of minority . . . for general purposes . . . in this state or in
another state”). Accordingly, Broussard argues, I.A.’s marriage is entitled to the
presumption of validity afforded to all marriages that are not void or voidable,
regardless of where they occurred. See id. § 1.101 (“[E]very marriage entered into
in this state is presumed to be valid unless expressly made void by [Family Code]
Chapter 6 or unless expressly made voidable by Chapter 6 and annulled as
provided by that chapter.”); Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 141, 153 (Tex.
15
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (applying presumption to out-of-state
marriages).
We begin by addressing Arnel’s assertion that Broussard failed to register
the Missouri declaratory judgment as a foreign judgment under Texas’s Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), which governs registration and
enforcement of out-of-state judgments. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 35.001–.008. Broussard attached the Missouri declaratory judgment as
evidentiary support for her motion for new trial on her plea to the jurisdiction. As
such, the prerequisites to a UEFJA filing are inapplicable.
Turning to the merits, we begin by observing that we fail to understand how
a valid marriage could have sprung from a subsequent declaratory judgment.
Issued after the marriage, the Missouri declaratory judgment can have no bearing
on the question whether the marriage was valid when it was transacted.
Additionally, the Missouri judgment goes no further than to declare that
I.A.’s marriage “was, and continues to remain, valid pursuant to the laws of the
State of Missouri.” It does not purport to remove the disabilities of I.A.’s minority.
Merely confirming that the marriage complied with Missouri law, the declaratory
judgment is superfluous, as it evidences little, if anything, beyond what the
marriage certificate already shows. Accordingly, we conclude that the Missouri
declaratory judgment did not operate to emancipate I.A. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
16
§ 1.104 (stating that, except as provided by statute or constitution, marriage
emancipates a person who has been married “in accordance with the laws of this
state”).7
We overrule Broussard’s third issue.
E. Emancipation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
In her fourth issue, Broussard argues that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution mandates that we recognize I.A.’s Missouri
marriage, as evidenced by the marriage certificate and the Missouri judgment
declaring it valid.
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, each state must give a final
judgment of a sister state the same force and effect the judgment would be entitled
to in the state in which it was rendered. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1 (“Full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state.”); Enviropower, L.L.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,
265 S.W.3d 16, 19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“Under the Full
7
Having concluded that it did not emancipate I.A., we note, but do not address,
Arnel’s argument that the Missouri declaratory judgment “has never been
authenticated, offered or admitted as evidence before the Texas trial court.” See
TEX. R. EVID. 901(b) (governing authentication requirement); TEX. R. EVID. 902
(identifying certain evidence as self-authenticating); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (dictating
manner of proving records of judicial proceedings of other states and providing
that copies of such proceedings, when properly authenticated, “shall have . . . full
faith and credit in every court within the United States”).
17
Faith and Credit Clause, a state must give the same force and effect to a judgment
of a sister state that it would give to its own judgments.”).
With regard to the marriage itself, evidenced by the marriage certificate,
Broussard has not provided authority supporting her argument that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires states to recognize and enforce out-of-state marriages;
the cases she cites concern divorce decrees and annulment orders, which, unlike
marriage certificates, represent matters that have been adjudicated by a court.8 See,
e.g., Trammell v. Trammell, 290 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. App.—Waco 1956, writ
ref’d n.r.e.) (“The decree of the California court annulling the plaintiff’s marriage
with Mosier is res judicata between the parties and is unassailable collaterally, and
must be accorded full faith and credit in Texas.”); Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211,
211 (Tex. 1985) (holding that New Hampshire divorce decree was entitled to full
8
Broussard references two additional cases that do not advance her argument: she
cites Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) for its statement that
“[m]arriages not polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by [the
foreign state’s] statute, will, if valid by the law of the state where entered into, be
recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction,” but this only serves to undercut
her argument because, as discussed supra, Texas law voids underage marriages,
see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.205 (stating that marriage of person under 18 years
of age is void unless he has obtained “a court order removing the disabilities of
minority . . . for general purposes . . . in this state or in another state”); and she
cites Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 674 (1842) for the
proposition that “[t]he marriage of a minor in Delaware, good by the law of that
state, would be good everywhere else,” but Prigg, which held that a federal law
requiring the return of fugitive slaves (the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793) invalidated
Pennsylvania’s scheme for recovery of fugitive slaves, is wholly inapplicable to
the facts and issues presented in this case.
18
faith and credit where laws of state of New Hampshire were properly before court
pursuant to wife’s motion to take judicial notice).
Finally, with regard to the Missouri declaratory judgment, we reiterate our
holding above—even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels us to recognize
it, the judgment merely declares that I.A.’s marriage complied with Missouri law;
it does not purport to emancipate him and thus fails to validate his marriage under
Texas law. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.205 (providing that marriage by person
under 18 years of age who has not obtained “court order” of emancipation is void).
We overrule Broussard’s fourth issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Hightower.
19