Kastet v. NDDOT , 2020 ND 91 ( 2020 )


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  •                  Filed 5/7/20 by Clerk of Supreme Court
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2020 ND 91
    Holden Thomas Kastet,                                                Appellee
    v.
    Ronald Henke, Interim Director,
    Department of Transportation,                                      Appellant
    No. 20200003
    Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Southeast Judicial
    District, the Honorable Cherie L. Clark, Judge.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
    Michael T. Pitcher, Attorney General’s Office, Bismarck, ND, for appellant.
    Luke T. Heck (argued) and Drew J. Hushka (appeared), Fargo, ND, for
    appellee.
    Kastet v. NDDOT
    No. 20200003
    Crothers, Justice.
    [¶1] The North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) appeals
    the district court judgment reversing the hearing officer’s decision suspending
    Holden Thomas Kastet’s driving privileges for 365 days. The Department
    argues the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in admitting the
    chemical breath test, and State Highway Patrol Trooper King scrupulously
    complied with the approved method for testing Kastet’s breath on the
    Intoxilyzer 8000. We reverse the district court judgment and remand with
    instructions to reinstate the hearing officer’s decision.
    I
    [¶2] On July 6, 2019, Trooper King stopped a vehicle driven by Kastet. King
    arrested Kastet for driving under the influence of alcohol, and read him the
    North Dakota implied consent advisory. Kastet agreed to submit to a chemical
    test and was transported to Stutsman County Correctional Center.
    [¶3] At 8:10 a.m. King started the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine. Kastet
    requested to speak with an attorney. King provided Kastet an opportunity to
    attempt to contact his attorney by telephone and accommodated Kastet’s
    request for a glass of water at 8:23 a.m. The Intoxilyzer machine continued
    running the first test sequence while Kastet made telephone calls. Another law
    enforcement officer entered the room and began using his computer next to the
    Intoxilyzer. At 8:26 and 8:27 a.m. the Intoxilyzer detected radio frequency
    interference (RFI). Kastet’s attempts to contact an attorney were unsuccessful
    and King advised Kastet the two hour testing time limit was near. At 8:54 a.m.
    a second test sequence was started and Kastet was tested at 8:57 and 9:03 a.m.
    [¶4] Kastet argued the approved method was not followed after RFI was
    detected. The hearing officer concluded the appropriate method was used to
    terminate the test because it was abandoned so Kastet could call an attorney,
    and not due to RFI. The hearing officer concluded, “the test was fairly
    administered in accordance with Chapter 39-20 and the approved method.”
    1
    The hearing officer explained, “In Kastet’s case, the first test was abandoned,
    not because of an RFI error, but because he needed time to call an attorney. At
    that point, King had the option of manually aborting the test, or simply letting
    it run its course and ‘time out’ without a breath sample being collected.” The
    hearing officer suspended Kastet’s driving privileges for 365 days. The district
    court reversed.
    [¶5] On appeal the Department argues the hearing officer did not abuse his
    discretion in admitting the chemical breath test, and King scrupulously
    complied with the approved method for testing Kastet’s breath on the
    Intoxilyzer.
    II
    [¶6] “The Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, governs
    the review of a decision to revoke driving privileges.” Haynes v. Dir., Dep’t of
    Transp., 
    2014 ND 161
    , ¶ 6, 
    851 N.W.2d 172
    . We review the Department’s
    original decision. DeForest v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 
    2018 ND 224
    , ¶ 5, 
    918 N.W.2d 43
    . “This Court gives deference to the agency’s findings and will not
    substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.” Ebach v. N.D. Dep’t of
    Transp., 
    2019 ND 80
    , ¶ 8, 
    924 N.W.2d 105
     (citing Lee v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp.,
    
    2004 ND 7
    , ¶ 9, 
    673 N.W.2d 245
     (internal citations omitted)). “The
    administrative hearing officer resolves the underlying factual disputes.” 
    Id.
    “We will only determine whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have
    concluded the findings were supported by the weight of the evidence from the
    entire record.” Ebach, at ¶ 8. “Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal.”
    
    Id.
     (citing Mees v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 
    2013 ND 36
    , ¶ 9, 
    827 N.W.2d 345
    (internal citations omitted)). We must affirm the Department’s decision unless:
    “1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
    2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the
    appellant.
    3. The provisions of [chapter 28-32] have not been complied with
    in the proceedings before the agency.
    4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the
    appellant a fair hearing.
    2
    5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a
    preponderance of the evidence.
    6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported
    by its findings of fact.
    7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently
    address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
    8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently
    explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary
    recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law
    judge.”
    N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46. The admissibility of evidence at an administrative
    adjudicative proceeding generally is governed by the North Dakota Rules of
    Evidence. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-24; see also Jangula v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 
    2016 ND 116
    , ¶ 8, 
    881 N.W.2d 639
    . A hearing officer has “broad discretion” when
    making evidentiary determinations. We review a hearing officer’s evidentiary
    determinations for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
    III
    [¶7] The State argues the hearing officer properly admitted the results of
    Kastet’s Intoxilyzer test, and Trooper King scrupulously complied with the
    approved method for testing Kastet’s breath.
    [¶8] Kastet argues the district court correctly determined the hearing officer’s
    decision was not in accordance with the law because the hearing officer
    improperly admitted the chemical test results. Kastet further argues King
    failed to scrupulously comply with the approved method when RFI is detected
    and no expert testimony was provided regarding the effect of the failure to
    comply with the approved method.
    [¶9] “The administrative hearing officer resolves the underlying factual
    disputes.” Ebach, 
    2019 ND 80
    , ¶ 8, 
    924 N.W.2d 105
     (citing Lee, 
    2004 ND 7
    , ¶ 9,
    
    673 N.W.2d 245
    ). Here, the parties disagree as to why the test was terminated.
    The hearing officer concluded the test was terminated “not because of an RFI
    error, but because he needed time to call an attorney.” This finding of fact is
    supported by a preponderance of the evidence. King testified that once they
    arrived at the correctional center they began the chemical test. King stated,
    3
    “As the test was started prior to the first subject sample . . . breath sample, Mr.
    Kastet advised that he wished to speak with an attorney, specifically, I believe
    he mentioned Luke Heck.” King testified he allowed Kastet the opportunity to
    contact an attorney, and the test continued running while Kastet made those
    calls. King testified that while Kastet was attempting to reach an attorney a
    coworker at the Jamestown Police Department placed his laptop on the counter
    space near the Intoxilyzer machine. At that point, the Intoxilyzer detected RFI.
    [¶10] The Intoxilyzer records also support the finding that the test was
    abandoned because Kastet needed time to call an attorney. The first sequence
    recorded the first and second subject tests as 0.000*. “Subject samples” were
    taken at 8:17 and 8:26 a.m. The 0.000 subject tests indicate deficient samples
    were collected. The room air was measured at 8:14, 8:20, and 8:22 a.m. with a
    reading of 0.000, and RFI was detected at 8:26 and 8:27 a.m. Therefore, the
    record supports by a preponderance of the evidence that the first test sequence
    terminated because Kastet requested to speak to an attorney and not due to
    RFI.
    [¶11] Kastet argues King failed to scrupulously comply with the approved
    method when RFI was detected. The Office of Attorney General Crime
    Laboratory Division issues the “Approved Method to Conduct Breath Tests
    with the Intoxilyzer 8000” manual. The manual outlines the testing procedure
    and how to interpret the test. Step five states:
    “‘20 Minute Wait?’ appears on display. Before proceeding, the
    operator shall ascertain that the subject has had nothing to eat,
    drink, or smoke within twenty minutes prior to the collection of the
    breath sample. Answer the question with either ‘N’ (No) or ‘Y’ (Yes)
    and press Enter. If ‘N’ is entered the instrument will not proceed.”
    Under “Interpretation of the Test (B)” the manual states:
    “If any breath sample is determined to be deficient, meaning the
    subject did not provide a breath sample or did not provide an
    adequate breath sample, the instrument will print ‘*Subject Test’
    followed by ‘#.###*’ with the highest alcohol concentration
    4
    obtained during the test. The asterisk (*) cross-references a
    message printed below on the test record.”
    Manual section (B)(2) states, “If both breath samples rendered by the subject
    are deficient, the test is still valid, but with deficient breath samples. The
    subject either refused or could not provide a sample. This is not an acceptable
    breath alcohol result.”
    [¶12] Here, the first record has an asterisk beside both subject tests which
    indicate the samples were deficient. The message beside the subject test
    asterisk states, “Deficient Sample–Value Printed was Highest Obtained.” The
    two subject tests were taken prior to RFI being detected. Therefore, the breath
    samples were deficient prior to the RFI invalidity. The manual states the test
    is valid, but with deficient breath samples. The manual only provides two
    reasons why the samples are deficient, stating “the subject either refused or
    could not provide a sample.” There is no evidence Kastet was unable to provide
    a sample. Therefore, instead of citing Kastet for refusal, King allowed Kastet
    to attempt a second test.
    [¶13] The second record states the first subject test was 0.103, and the second
    subject test was 0.097. It also states, “Difference OK” and “No RFI Detected.”
    Further, while Kastet was attempting to call an attorney he had a glass of
    water. King testified at 8:23 a.m. he provided Kastet with a glass of water and
    noted the time because he knew he had to wait 20 minutes to maintain the
    integrity of a chemical test. Under the approved method, “the operator shall
    ascertain that the subject has had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke within
    twenty minutes prior to the collection of the breath sample.” That means that
    the operator was required to wait until after 8:43 a.m. to perform the test. The
    test sequence began at 8:54 a.m. and concluded at 9:03 a.m. Therefore, this test
    was run without error or difficulty.
    [¶14] The hearing officer concluded the Intoxilyzer result was admissible
    because King followed the approved method. We agree. Therefore, the hearing
    officer did not abuse his discretion in admitting the Intoxilyzer test results and
    ultimately suspending Kastet’s driving privileges.
    5
    IV
    [¶15] We reverse the district court judgment, and remand with instructions
    to reinstate the hearing officer’s decision suspending Kastet’s driving
    privileges for 365 days.
    [¶16] Daniel J. Crothers
    Gerald W. VandeWalle
    Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Jerod E. Tufte
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    6