State v. Lail , 2020 ND 13 ( 2020 )


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  •               Filed 01/23/2020 by Clerk of Supreme Court
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2020 ND 13
    State of North Dakota,                                Plaintiff and Appellee
    v.
    Alexander Blake Lail,                              Defendant and Appellant
    No. 20190058
    Appeal from the District Court of Wells County, Southeast Judicial District,
    the Honorable Daniel D. Narum, Judge.
    AFFIRMED.
    Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.
    Kathleen K. Murray, State’s Attorney, Fessenden, ND, for plaintiff and
    appellee.
    Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
    State v. Lail
    No. 20190058
    VandeWalle, Justice.
    [¶1] Alexander Lail appealed from a criminal judgment entered upon a jury
    verdict finding him guilty of two counts of attempted murder. Lail argues there
    was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdicts. We affirm.
    I
    [¶2] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review
    the record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that could allow a
    jury to draw a reasonable inference in favor of the conviction.” State v. Rai,
    
    2019 ND 71
    , ¶ 13, 
    924 N.W.2d 410
    (citing State v. Truelove, 
    2017 ND 283
    , ¶ 7,
    
    904 N.W.2d 342
    ). “This Court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or judge
    the credibility of witnesses.” 
    Id. “[T]he defendant
    ‘bears the burden of showing
    the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light
    most favorable to the verdict.’” 
    Id. “A jury
    may find a defendant guilty even
    though evidence exists which, if believed, could lead to a verdict of not guilty.”
    State v. Christian, 
    2011 ND 56
    , ¶ 8, 
    795 N.W.2d 702
    (quoting State v. Wanner,
    
    2010 ND 121
    , ¶ 9, 
    784 N.W.2d 143
    ). “A ‘[r]eversal is warranted only if, after
    viewing the evidence and all reasonable evidentiary inferences in the light
    most favorable to the verdict, no rational factfinder could have found the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Keller, 
    2005 ND 86
    , ¶
    50, 
    695 N.W.2d 703
    (quoting City of Jamestown v. Neumiller, 
    2000 ND 11
    , ¶ 5,
    
    604 N.W.2d 441
    ).
    II
    [¶3] Lail’s convictions stem from his attempts at hiring two individuals to kill
    his wife, Donna Lail, and his former employee, Tyler Schnase. The following
    evidence was adduced at trial. Alex and Donna Lail were married in 2004 in
    California. They moved to New Rockford, North Dakota, in 2012 and started
    Central Plains Restoration, a home restoration business. Shortly after moving
    to North Dakota, their marriage began to deteriorate. Alex and Donna
    1
    separated, and Donna moved to Fessenden, North Dakota. In August 2016,
    Donna filed for divorce.
    [¶4] Lail continued to operate Central Plains Restoration after Donna Lail
    had filed for divorce. In July or August 2016, Lail hired Michael Kanwischer
    to perform miscellaneous work for Lail such as cleaning carpets and spraying
    ditches. Kanwischer had an extensive criminal history, including spending
    seven years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary, and was in and out of
    work. Kanwischer grew up in Fessenden and lived there most of his life. A
    short time after Kanwischer began working for Lail, Lail told Kanwischer he
    was getting a divorce and asked “how far [Kanwischer] was willing to go to
    make money.” Lail asked Kanwischer if he could “take out” his wife because,
    having lived there most of his life, Kanwischer was familiar with Fessenden
    and the surrounding area and knew where Donna lived in Fessenden. Lail
    never described the house that Donna lived in to Kanwischer, but Kanwischer
    testified Lail did not have to because he was familiar with the area and knew
    which house Donna lived in.
    [¶5] Lail also asked Kanwischer if he could kill Tyler Schnase. Lail wanted
    Schnase killed because he “knew too much.” Lail was indicated in other
    criminal activity that Lail believed would adversely affect the outcome of his
    divorce. Schnase had knowledge of and informed law enforcement officers
    about this criminal activity. Lail brought Kanwischer to Schnase’s home and
    told Kanwischer that was where Schnase lived. Lail told Kanwischer he
    wanted Donna Lail and Tyler Schnase killed by using the gas line to “blow up”
    their homes with them inside. Lail offered Kanwischer $35,000 to kill Donna
    and $20,000 to kill Schnase, but never paid Kanwischer any money.
    Kanwischer testified that he believed Lail would be able to pay him because
    Kanwischer was aware that Lail owned property in Florida and California. In
    total, Lail discussed killing Donna and Schnase with Kanwischer on four
    different occasions. Lail told Kanwischer he wanted them killed before his
    divorce was finalized so Donna would not be awarded Central Plains or any of
    Lail’s property through the divorce. Kanwischer accepted Lail’s offer, but told
    Lail it would take time to plan and execute Lail’s request. Kanwischer never
    took steps to kill either Donna or Schnase, but he never told Lail he would not
    2
    kill them. And Lail never told Kanwischer to not follow through on his
    requests.
    [¶6] Tyler Schnase was also a former employee of Lail’s. After Schnase had
    reported Lail’s criminal activity to law enforcement officers, Schnase and his
    girlfriend constantly observed Lail near Schnase’s residence and at all hours
    of the day and night. On one occasion, Lail had been cleaning the house across
    the street from Schnase’s throughout the afternoon and into the evening. After
    dark, Schnase left his residence in his vehicle. While driving away, Schnase
    witnessed Lail and another individual walk across the street towards
    Schnase’s home in his rearview mirror. Schnase drove around the block and
    shined his lights on his home, where he witnessed Lail and the other individual
    in his driveway. Lail and the other individual ran back to the house across the
    street. And on two occasions, Schnase witnessed Lail parked in Schnase’s
    driveway while Schnase was not home. Schnase’s girlfriend was also present
    during one of these encounters.
    [¶7] In the summer of 2016, Lail began dating Deanna Neurohr. Neurohr
    lived in Harvey, North Dakota, in the same apartment building as Michael
    Kanwischer. Lail would frequently stay at Neurohr’s apartment. While staying
    with Neurohr, Lail made several comments that he wanted Donna Lail and
    Tyler Schnase killed because of the pending divorce. Lail told Neurohr he
    wanted their homes burned down with them inside. Neurohr overheard
    multiple conversations between Lail and Kanwischer about killing Donna and
    Schnase, including one conversation in which Kanwischer told Lail he went
    and “staked out” Donna’s home in Fessenden. Lail also told Neurohr he had
    attached a GPS tracking device to Donna’s vehicle and showed Neurohr an app
    on his phone that displayed the device’s location. At one point, the device had
    fallen off Donna’s vehicle. Lail went and retrieved the device from the farmer
    who had found the device in the ditch outside his farmstead.
    [¶8] In December 2016, Jason Saxer began working for Central Plains. In
    addition to being an employee at Central Plains, Saxer would travel with Lail
    to Minot and assist him in picking up cars. During one of their trips to Minot,
    Saxer told Lail he knew people in the Mafia. Lail asked Saxer how much it
    3
    would cost to “take care of somebody.” Lail told Saxer he wanted to find a way
    to “get rid of” Donna Lail so he could have the business to himself. Lail told
    Saxer he was concerned Donna would be awarded the business in the divorce.
    Saxer understood Lail’s questioning to mean he wanted Donna killed. Saxer
    told Lail it would cost approximately $5,000. Lail and Saxer never further
    discussed hiring someone from the Mafia to kill Donna, and Saxer never
    contacted anyone about killing Donna. On a separate occasion, Lail traveled
    with Saxer to Donna’s house in Fessenden and mentioned to Saxer that he
    wanted Donna’s house burned down. Saxer understood Lail was implying
    whether Saxer could burn the house down or if he knew someone that would.
    [¶9] Law enforcement officers had been investigating Lail on other criminal
    matters during the summer of 2016. In July 2016, Donna Lail and her
    daughter found thumb drives and a notebook belonging to Lail that contained
    website passwords. On the thumb drives were tracking logs, and one of the
    websites in the notebook was a website used for tracking people. The thumb
    drives and notebook were turned over to law enforcement officers as part of
    their investigation. Lail was arrested on April 25, 2017, after officers learned
    of Lail’s attempts at hiring Kanwischer and Saxer to murder Donna and
    Schnase. While being detained, Lail attempted to send a note to Donna
    reading, “Dear Donna, I had no idea that some crazy bastard (Mike) had went
    to the police telling them some bizarre story.” The note was intercepted by jail
    security. In the documents relating to the investigation of Lail, Mike
    Kanwischer was referred to as a “source”; his name was never mentioned.
    [¶10] Lail was subsequently charged with and convicted by a jury of two counts
    of attempted murder.
    III
    [¶11] Lail contends there was insufficient evidence for a jury to infer Lail took
    a substantial step toward the commission of murder. Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-
    06-01(1):
    A person is guilty of criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of
    culpability otherwise required for commission of a crime, he
    4
    intentionally engages in conduct which, in fact, constitutes a
    substantial step toward commission of the crime. A “substantial
    step” is any conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness
    of the actor’s intent to complete the commission of the crime.
    Factual or legal impossibility of committing the crime is not a
    defense, if the crime could have been committed had the attendant
    circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
    The culpability required for murder is intentionally or knowingly causing the
    death of another human being. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(a). Therefore, “‘[t]he
    offense of attempted murder requires the defendant to take a substantial step
    toward committing the crime of attempting to intentionally or knowingly cause
    the death of another . . . .’” Keller, 
    2005 ND 86
    , ¶ 47, 
    695 N.W.2d 703
    (quoting
    State v. Ellis, 
    2001 ND 84
    , ¶ 15, 
    625 N.W.2d 544
    ). However, “a person can be
    convicted of attempted murder for having taken a substantial step toward
    commission of the crime of murder even if there never was, in fact, a
    substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death to another . . . .” Keller, 
    2005 ND 86
    , ¶ 46, 
    695 N.W.2d 703
    ; see also State v. Stensaker, 
    2007 ND 6
    , ¶ 12, 
    725 N.W.2d 883
    (“[T]he substantial-step requirement ‘is intended to prevent a
    conviction based on the accused’s mere declaration of his criminal intent.’”).
    “Whether the accused committed an act sufficient for an attempt is a question
    of fact.” Stensaker, at ¶ 22 (citing N.D.C.C. § 12.1-06-01).
    [¶12] Other jurisdictions with similar attempt statutes have stated a
    substantial step is more than just mere preparation, “‘yet may be less than the
    last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime . . . .’”
    United States v. Martinez, 
    775 F.2d 31
    , 35 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting United States
    v. Manley, 
    632 F.2d 978
    , 987-88 (2d Cir. 1980)); State v. Daniel B., 
    201 A.3d 989
    , 997-98 (Conn. 2019) (quoting State v. Sorabella, 
    891 A.2d 897
    , 914 (Conn.
    2006)); see State v. Molasky, 
    765 S.W.2d 597
    , 600 (Mo. 1989). To illustrate, in
    State v. Daniel B., the defendant wanted to hire a hit man to kill his wife whom
    he was 
    divorcing. 201 A.3d at 991-92
    . The defendant met with an undercover
    police officer who was posing as a hit man. 
    Id. at 992.
    The defendant agreed to
    pay $10,000 for the murder of his wife with $3,800 as a down payment,
    provided the undercover officer with a detailed description and photograph of
    his wife and personal information about her, and assisted in formulating a plan
    5
    on how the murder should be executed. 
    Id. at 992-93.
    The Connecticut
    Supreme Court held the above stated facts were more than ample evidence
    from which a jury could have determined the defendant took a substantial step
    in attempting to murder his wife. 
    Id. at 999-1003.
    [¶13] Similar events occurred in State v. Urcinoli, wherein Urcinoli was
    incarcerated and offered a fellow inmate, MacPhee, $5,000 to kill his aunt and
    uncle. 
    729 A.2d 507
    , 515 (N.J. 1999). Urcinoli showed MacPhee his bank
    statement to prove he had the money. 
    Id. Urcinoli gave
    MacPhee descriptions
    of his aunt and uncle, personal information including addresses and directions
    to their homes, and described their daily routines. 
    Id. Urcinoli also
    told
    MacPhee he wanted them killed by planting a bomb under their car or for them
    to be shot and suggested how the murder scheme could be carried out. 
    Id. The New
    Jersey Supreme Court concluded this was sufficient evidence for a jury to
    reasonably conclude Urcinoli took substantial steps in attempting to commit
    murder. 
    Id. at 517.
    [¶14] In State v. Molasky, Molasky was 
    incarcerated. 765 S.W.2d at 598
    .
    Molasky and another inmate had a conversation about killing two individuals
    when the inmate was released. 
    Id. at 599.
    The conversation included a price
    for the killings, a time when the killings could be done, that Molasky wanted
    the bodies disposed of, and that the killings were not to take place in front of
    Molasky’s son. 
    Id. Molasky did
    not provide a street address for the victims,
    where they worked, or pictures of them. 
    Id. Molasky and
    another inmate also
    discussed killing the same two individuals, in which a price had been agreed
    upon, an arrangement had been made for payment, it was agreed that a
    shotgun would be used, and that the killings were not to take place in front of
    Molasky’s son. 
    Id. The Missouri
    Supreme Court concluded these facts were not
    enough to constitute a substantial step. 
    Id. at 602.
    The court relied on the fact
    that no money had changed hands, there was no description of the intended
    victims and no information about them had been provided, no concrete
    arrangements for payment were made, and similar conversations occurred
    daily in prison. 
    Id. The court
    held solicitation not accompanied by any other
    corroborative acts does not constitute a substantial step. 
    Id. But the
    court was
    diligent in noting that their decision should not be interpreted as suggesting
    6
    that “solicitation can never be the substantial step necessary to support an
    attempt charge.” 
    Id. [¶15] Here,
    Lail recruited Michael Kanwischer and Jason Saxer to kill Donna
    Lail and Tyler Schnase and had multiple conversations with each of them
    about doing so. In these conversations, Lail said he wanted the murders to take
    place by using the gas line to “blow up” or burn down Donna’s and Schnase’s
    homes with them still inside. Lail offered Kanwischer $35,000 to kill Donna
    and $20,000 to kill Schnase, and Kanwischer believed Lail had the ability to
    pay that amount. Lail recruited Kanwischer because he had an extensive
    criminal history and was in and out of work. Lail never provided Kanwischer
    with a description of Donna or told Kanwischer where Donna lived, but Lail
    did not need to because Kanwischer lived in Fessenden for most of his life and
    knew the area well. Kanwischer already knew where Donna lived without Lail
    providing an address or location. Lail did, however, show Kanwischer where
    Schnase lived. Lail also recruited Jason Saxer because he had ties to the Mafia.
    Lail asked Saxer if he would kill Donna and Schnase or knew someone who
    would. Lail showed Saxer where Donna lived. Neither Kanwischer nor Saxer
    ever acted on Lail’s requests, but neither ever told Lail they would not, and
    Lail never asked them not to. Lail himself also took steps towards having
    Donna and Schnase killed. Lail affixed a GPS device to Donna’s vehicle so that
    he could track her location. Thumb drives containing tracking information
    were found, as well as a notebook with a password written in it for a website
    that also contained tracking information. Lail was also constantly seen near
    Schnase’s home and on three occasions on Schnase’s property. After he was
    arrested, Lail sent a note stating “Mike” had come up with a crazy story even
    though Mike Kanwischer’s name was never used in any of the investigation
    documents. This leads to an inference that Lail had knowledge of who was
    involved in law enforcement’s investigation.
    [¶16] Lail attempted to intentionally cause the deaths of Donna Lail and Tyler
    Schnase. Lail did more than just engage in conversations about having Donna
    and Schnase killed and took steps beyond that of mere preparation. In murder
    for hire cases, taking actions that could reasonably lead to the hired individual
    committing the solicited killing constitute a substantial step in attempting to
    7
    commit the underlying crime. Lail’s solicitation accompanied by his assistance
    in formulating a plan to commit murder were concrete steps towards the
    commission of the crime. Even though Lail’s actions may be a floor of what is
    required for a substantial step, when considered together, these acts constitute
    a substantial step towards the commission of murder.
    [¶17] Lail has failed to show the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of
    guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. After viewing the
    evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
    verdict, we conclude a rational factfinder could have found Lail guilty beyond
    a reasonable doubt. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Lail guilty of
    attempted murder.
    IV
    [¶18] We affirm the criminal judgment.
    [¶19] Gerald W. VandeWalle
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    8