State v. Thorsteinson , 924 N.W.2d 376 ( 2019 )


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  •                 Filed 3/13/19 by Clerk of Supreme Court
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2019 ND 65
    State of North Dakota,                                       Plaintiff and Appellee
    v.
    Austin Lee Thorsteinson,                                 Defendant and Appellant
    No. 20180233
    Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District,
    the Honorable Donovan J. Foughty, Judge.
    AFFIRMED.
    Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
    Kari M. Agotness, Ramsey County State’s Attorney, Devils Lake, ND, for
    plaintiff and appellee.
    Kyle R. Craig, Minot, ND, for defendant and appellant.
    State v. Thorsteinson
    No. 20180233
    Crothers, Justice.
    [¶1]   Austin Thorsteinson appeals from a criminal judgment after a jury convicted
    him of felony child abuse. Thorsteinson argues the district court erred by admitting
    evidence of alleged prior bad acts. Thorsteinson further argues the district court failed
    to give adequate jury instructions on the definition of reckless conduct. We affirm.
    I
    [¶2]   In November 2016 a two-year-old child in Thorsteinson’s care suffered injuries
    that caused bleeding on the brain. A subsequent surgery removed part of the child’s
    skull to relieve pressure. The child suffered a stroke during hospitalization and tests
    indicate a portion of the child’s brain will not recover from the injury.
    [¶3]   Thorsteinson was the last individual alone with the child before the injury.
    Thorsteinson and the child’s mother were in a romantic relationship and he often
    provided care for the child. Thorsteinson cooperated with police to reenact the
    incident and answered questions regarding his perception of the events leading up to
    the child’s injury. Thorsteinson said the injury was from an accidental fall while he
    was holding the child. He told police the injury resulted from the impact between the
    child’s head and a hard object in the path of the fall. Thorsteinson was arrested and
    charged with felony child abuse in violation of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22.
    [¶4]   The State filed a pretrial notice of intent to introduce evidence of three prior
    bad acts under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b). The prior acts included a July 2016 head injury to
    the child while in Thorsteinson’s care, a September 2016 domestic violence incident
    between Thorsteinson and the child’s mother and a September 2016 incident in which
    Thorsteinson caused bruising to the child’s buttocks. Thorsteinson objected and
    argued the State was not using the evidence for a permissible purpose, and instead
    was attempting to prove propensity of character in violation of N.D.R.Ev. 404(b)(2).
    1
    The district court allowed the State to use most of the evidence but excluded
    photographs of the July 2016 injury, which it found were unduly prejudicial.
    [¶5]   The original trial ended with a hung jury.          The State elected to retry
    Thorsteinson and again sought to use evidence of the prior events. Thorsteinson again
    objected, claiming the State was attempting to use the evidence in a manner not
    allowed under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b). The district court allowed the State to use the
    evidence at the second trial.
    [¶6]   The case was submitted to the jury after closing arguments.               During
    deliberation the jury asked about the definition of reckless conduct. The judge denied
    Thorsteinson’s request for an additional jury instruction, and directed the jury to use
    the legal definitions provided in the jury instructions and the plain, ordinary and
    commonly understood meaning of any words within the definitions. The jury
    delivered a guilty verdict and, on May 31, 2018, the district court sentenced
    Thorsteinson to twenty years imprisonment with ten years suspended. Thorsteinson
    filed this timely appeal.
    II
    [¶7]   Thorsteinson argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior
    bad acts.
    [¶8]   Rule 404(a), N.D.R.Ev., outlines the general rule that “[e]vidence of a person’s
    character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the
    person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” However, evidence of other
    crimes, wrongs, or acts “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving
    motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
    mistake, or lack of accident.” 
    Id. [¶9] This
    Court repeatedly has warned of the danger of allowing evidence of other
    acts to show propensity and of tempting the jury to convict a defendant for actions
    other than the charged misconduct.         State v. Aabrekke, 
    2011 ND 131
    , ¶ 8,
    
    800 N.W.2d 284
    ; State v. Schmeets, 
    2009 ND 163
    , ¶ 15, 
    772 N.W.2d 623
    ; State v.
    2
    Ramsey, 
    2005 ND 42
    , ¶ 19, 
    692 N.W.2d 498
    . This rule recognizes the inherent
    prejudice the evidence of prior bad acts may have on the trier of fact, and excludes
    such evidence unless it is substantially relevant for a purpose other than to show a
    person’s criminal character and that the person acted in conformity with that
    character. Schmeets, at ¶ 15.
    [¶10] The invocation of an exception does not end the inquiry of whether to allow
    the evidence of prior bad acts. Aabrekke, 
    2011 ND 131
    , ¶ 9, 
    800 N.W.2d 284
    . The
    district court must apply a three-step analysis to determine whether the evidence is
    admissible. Schmeets, 
    2009 ND 163
    , ¶ 15, 
    772 N.W.2d 623
    . First, the district court
    must examine the purpose for which the evidence is introduced. 
    Id. Second, the
    evidence must be substantially reliable or clear and convincing. 
    Id. Third, in
    a
    criminal case like here, independent proof of the crime charged must exist which
    permits the trier of fact to establish guilt without considering the prior bad acts. 
    Id. The final
    step of this three-step analysis usually is satisfied with a cautionary jury
    instruction regarding the admissibility of the prior bad act evidence for a limited
    purpose. Aabrekke, 
    2011 ND 131
    , ¶ 10, 
    800 N.W.2d 284
    . After the three-step
    analysis is satisfied, the district court must consider N.D.R.Ev. 403, and whether the
    probative value of the evidence outweighs any possible prejudicial effect. 
    Id. [¶11] The
    admission or exclusion of evidence will not be overturned unless an abuse
    of discretion occurred. State v. Peltier, 
    2016 ND 75
    , ¶ 3, 
    878 N.W.2d 68
    . “A trial
    court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unconscionably, or unreasonably,
    or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process.” 
    Id. [¶12] Regarding
    the July 2016 head injury, the district court performed the three-step
    analysis and found the evidence was probative of an absence of mistake or accident,
    and balanced the probative value against prejudice. After correctly applying the law,
    the court properly excluded photos of the injury as inflammatory under
    N.D.R.Ev. 403. The district court made a supplemental finding that the evidence was
    substantially reliable to show the injury occurred while the child was alone with the
    defendant and demonstrates an absence of mistake or accident. The district court also
    3
    found the incident surrounding the injury provides a “more complete story of the
    crime by putting it in context of happenings near in time and place.” State v.
    Alvarado, 
    2008 ND 203
    , ¶ 16, 
    757 N.W.2d 570
    . Further, the admissibility of other
    crimes, wrongs, or acts to establish an absence of mistake or accident is well
    established in child abuse cases. State v. Buckley, 
    2010 ND 248
    , ¶ 37, 
    792 N.W.2d 518
    .
    [¶13] Thorsteinson argues the State did not use the September 2016 video for the
    purpose for which it was admitted. The district court found the video of the domestic
    violence incident was probative of motive, intent, and lack of mistake or accident,
    because it tends to prove injury to the child occurred as a result of Thorsteinson’s
    anger or jealousy of the continued contact between the child’s mother and biological
    father. An intoxicated Thorsteinson can be heard yelling at the child and mother in
    the video, and remarking that the mother’s crying sounds like the child’s crying when
    Thorsteinson disciplines the child. The district court found this incident also provided
    a “more complete story of the crime by putting it in context of happenings near in
    time and place.” Alvarado, 
    2008 ND 203
    , ¶ 16, 
    757 N.W.2d 570
    . At trial the State
    introduced the video through the mother’s testimony, and she explained the
    circumstances surrounding the video and how Thorsteinson was jealous and angry
    about continued contact between the child’s biological parents.
    [¶14] The district court found the photograph of the bruised buttocks was probative
    of motive or intent and lack of mistake or accident because it demonstrates the
    defendant engaged in physical disciplining of the child. At trial law enforcement
    testified that Thorsteinson admitted to physically disciplining the child during the
    incident but did not intend to leave bruises. The district court found the evidence of
    bruises could prove a motive for injuring the child by physical discipline that went too
    far, and it lends itself to the probability Thorsteinson intended to strike the child rather
    than it being a mistake or accident.
    [¶15] Following analysis of each prior bad act under the three-step analysis, the
    district court concluded the evidence was admissible and the probative value
    4
    outweighed the prejudicial effect. The district court completed the third step by
    analyzing other evidence on which the jury could determine guilt, including
    testimony, medical records, photographs and police reports. The district court issued
    appropriate instructions to the jury to use the evidence for limited purposes. The
    district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prior bad acts into evidence.
    III
    [¶16] Thorsteinson argues the district court failed to adequately instruct the jury on
    the definition of reckless conduct.
    [¶17] Jury instructions are fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Wilson, 
    2004 ND 51
    ,
    ¶ 11, 
    676 N.W.2d 98
    . This Court reviews jury instructions as a whole and determines
    whether they correctly and adequately inform the jury of the applicable law, even
    though part of the instructions standing alone may be insufficient or erroneous. 
    Id. Reversal is
    appropriate only if the jury instructions, as a whole, are erroneous, relate
    to a central subject in the case, and affect a substantial right of the accused. State v.
    Huber, 555 NW.2d 791, 793 (N.D. 1996).
    [¶18] Here, the jury was informed the State had the burden to prove:
    “1. That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2016, in Ramsey
    County, North Dakota, the Defendant, Austin Thorsteinson;
    2. Was a parent, adult family or household member, guardian or other
    custodian of the child;
    3. Willfully inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child bodily
    injury, substantial bodily injury or serious bodily injury;
    4. The injury caused permanent loss or impairment of the function of
    a bodily member or organ of the child; and
    5. The child was under the age of six years at the time.”
    [¶19] The jury received instructions including how an individual acts “willfully.”
    The jury instructions also defined how an individual acts “recklessly” if “the actor
    engaged in the conduct in conscious and clearly unjustifiable disregard of a
    substantial likelihood of the relevant facts or risks. Such disregard must involve a
    gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” The instructions stated the
    purpose of using “willfully” is to ensure an individual is not convicted for an act
    5
    committed because of mistake, accident, or innocent reason. When the jury asked the
    court for clarification, Thorsteinson requested a supplemental instruction defining
    “recklessly” as “a high degree of risk of which the actor is aware and consciously
    disregards.” The judge denied Thorsteinson’s request, and instead directed the jury
    to use the legal definitions provided and treat the words within any definitions by their
    plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning.
    [¶20] Viewed as a whole, the jury instructions correctly and adequately informed the
    jury on the law and the parties’ burdens of proof. The instructions were not
    erroneous, and the district court did not err in declining to provide Thorsteinson’s
    definition of “reckless.”
    IV
    [¶21] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed evidence of
    Thorsteinson’s prior bad acts. The instructions adequately informed the jury of the
    applicable law and the parties’ burdens of proof. We affirm the criminal judgment.
    [¶22] Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jon J. Jensen
    Jerod E. Tufte
    Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
    6