Galvanizers v. Kautzman , 2021 ND 169 ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    IN THE OFFICE OF THE
    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    SEPTEMBER 30, 2021
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2021 ND 169
    Galvanizers, Inc., a North Dakota
    corporation, and K and K Construction
    and Repair, Inc., a North Dakota
    Corporation,                                         Plaintiffs and Appellants
    v.
    Paul Kautzman,                                        Defendant and Appellee
    and
    the United States of America by and
    through the Department of Treasury
    and its Internal Revenue Service,                                  Defendant
    No. 20210042
    Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
    the Honorable Steven L. Marquart, Judge.
    AFFIRMED.
    Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.
    Ann E. Miller, Fargo, ND, for plaintiffs and appellants.
    Jonathan T. Garaas, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellee.
    Galvanizers v. Kautzman
    No. 20210042
    VandeWalle, Justice.
    [¶1] Galvanizers, Inc., and K and K Construction and Repair, Inc. (collectively
    “plaintiffs”), appealed from a judgment dismissing their action against Paul
    Kautzman seeking to quiet title to real property. The plaintiffs argue the
    district court erred in dismissing their quiet title action and failed to make
    sufficient findings to understand the evidentiary and theoretical basis for its
    decision. We affirm, concluding the court’s findings were sufficient to support
    its decision dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.
    I
    [¶2] In 1974, Paul Kautzman and his brother, John Kautzman, acquired
    certain real property in Cass County by warranty deed. Each party
    individually owned an undivided one-half interest in the property.
    [¶3] Paul Kautzman and John Kautzman also started various businesses
    together. They formed Galvanizers in 1980, K and K in 1993, and Kautzman
    Brothers Partnership (“Kautzman Brothers”). In 1981, Paul Kautzman and
    John Kautzman conveyed some of their property to Galvanizers. In 1997,
    Kautzman Brothers acquired property adjacent to the property Paul
    Kautzman and John Kautzman owned.
    [¶4] In 1997, individual parcels, including the property owned by Paul
    Kautzman, John Kautzman, Kautzman Brothers, and Galvanizers, were
    platted to form Lot 1 in Block 1 of Kautzman’s First Addition to the City of
    West Fargo.
    [¶5] In 2013, Paul Kautzman executed a redemption agreement with
    Kautzman Brothers for the partnership to redeem his interest in the
    partnership. Paul Kautzman also executed stock redemption agreements with
    Galvanizers and K and K to sell all of his shares of stock in each corporation to
    the corporation.
    1
    [¶6] In 2019, the plaintiffs brought an action against Paul Kautzman to quiet
    title. They alleged Paul Kautzman, John Kautzman, Galvanizers, and
    Kautzman Brothers owned parcels of land that were platted in 1997; they all
    intended that only Galvanizers and the partnership were the property owners
    after the 1997 plat; and the 1997 plat did not truly express the parties’ intent
    due to a mutual mistake. They also alleged Paul Kautzman believed the only
    interest he had in the property was through his ownership interest in
    Galvanizers and Kautzman Brothers, the parties intended that he was
    relinquishing all ownership interest in the property by executing the 2013
    redemption agreements, and the redemption agreements do not express the
    parties’ true intentions due to a mutual mistake. They requested that the
    district court reform the 1997 plat or, alternatively, reform the redemption
    agreements to express the parties’ true intentions, and that the court quiet
    title.
    [¶7] Paul Kautzman moved for summary judgment, arguing he remained the
    owner of the property he acquired individually, he is on the title and has been
    since 1974, there have not been any conveyances from him, there were no
    genuine issues of material fact, and he was entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law. The plaintiffs opposed the motion. The district court denied the motion.
    [¶8] After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.
    The court found Paul Kautzman individually acquired ownership of the
    disputed property, he never intended the property would be partnership
    property, and the plaintiffs never asked him to execute a deed to the property
    when they acquired his assets. The court concluded the plaintiffs failed to
    prove there was actual fraud, a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of
    one party which the other knew or suspected, to justify revising a contract for
    fraud or mistake under N.D.C.C. § 32-04-17, and the written agreement did
    what it intended to do. Judgment was entered dismissing the plaintiffs’
    complaint with prejudice.
    II
    [¶9] The plaintiffs argue the district court failed to make sufficient findings
    to understand the basis for its decision and to determine whether the court
    2
    properly applied the law. They contend the court’s findings are inadequate and
    are not supported by the evidence. They claim the evidence established Paul
    Kautzman always intended his property would be partnership property and he
    sold his interest in the property when he redeemed his ownership interest in
    the corporations and the partnership.
    [¶10] In an appeal from a bench trial, the district court’s findings of fact are
    reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review and its conclusions of
    law are fully reviewable. Kruger v. Goossen, 
    2021 ND 88
    , ¶ 5, 
    959 N.W.2d 847
    .
    A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the
    law, there is no evidence to support it, or if, after reviewing all of the evidence,
    this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.
    
    Id.
     The district court’s findings are presumptively correct. Id. at ¶ 6. We do not
    reweigh the evidence or reassess the witnesses’ credibility, nor do we
    reexamine findings of fact made on conflicting testimony. Id. A court’s choice
    between two permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Id.
    [¶11] “In an action tried on the facts without a jury . . . the court must find the
    facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” N.D.R.Civ.P.
    52(a)(1). The purpose of the rule “is to enable the appellate court to obtain a
    correct understanding of the factual issues determined by the trial court as a
    basis for its conclusions of law and judgment.” IRET Props. v. Lee, 
    2018 ND 116
    , ¶ 15, 
    910 N.W.2d 868
     (quoting Abelmann v. Smartlease USA, L.L.C., 
    2014 ND 227
    , ¶ 18, 
    856 N.W.2d 747
    ). Detailed findings are particularly important
    when there is conflicting or disputed evidence because we defer to the district
    court’s choice between two permissible views of the evidence. Lindstaedt v.
    George, 
    2020 ND 262
    , ¶ 5, 
    952 N.W.2d 102
    . “This Court cannot review a district
    court’s decision when the court does not provide any indication of the
    evidentiary and theoretical basis for its decision because we are left to
    speculate what evidence was considered and whether the law was properly
    applied.” IRET Props., at ¶ 15 (quoting Abelmann, at ¶ 18).
    [¶12] At trial, the plaintiffs argued Paul Kautzman intended the property
    would belong to the partnership at all times after he purchased the property
    in 1974 and his interest in the property was purchased by the partnership in
    3
    2013 as part of the redemption agreement. They claimed the property was a
    partnership asset, the property was included in the business valuations as an
    asset of Galvanizers and Kautzman Brothers, the business valuations were
    used to determine the redemption price of Paul Kautzman’s interest in the
    companies, and he was paid for his interest in the property in 2013 through
    the redemption agreements. They claimed there was evidence showing the
    partnership at all times paid the property taxes on the property, Paul
    Kautzman did not include any rental income from the property in his tax
    returns, and the property was not included as a personal asset on his financial
    statements or in his divorce. They asserted there was no mistake in the
    redemption agreements; rather, the mistake was that a deed was not executed
    at the time the agreements were signed. The plaintiffs requested the district
    court quiet title in the plaintiffs or, in the alternative, order Paul Kautzman to
    execute a warranty deed conveying any interest he has in the property to K
    and K.
    [¶13] The district court found Paul Kautzman never intended the property
    would be partnership property, the plaintiffs never asked him for a deed to the
    property when they executed the redemption agreements, and the written
    agreement did what it intended to do. The district court implicitly found Paul
    Kautzman individually owned the property in 2013 when the stock and
    partnership redemption agreements were executed, the property was not
    included in the redemption agreements, and Paul Kautzman never transferred
    ownership of the property to the plaintiffs. Although the court’s findings are
    sparse and the court could have provided a more detailed explanation for its
    decision, we are able to understand the rationale for its decision.
    [¶14] Property titled in the name of an individual partner may be partnership
    property, but “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the partners intended that the
    property in question be partnership property or individual property.” Nelson v.
    Mattson, 
    2018 ND 99
    , ¶ 9, 
    910 N.W.2d 171
    . Whether property held in the name
    of an individual belongs to the partnership is a question of fact. Eckert v.
    Eckert, 
    425 N.W.2d 914
    , 915 (N.D. 1988).
    4
    [¶15] The plaintiffs argue there was overwhelming evidence the property was
    always intended to be partnership property. They claim there was evidence
    Paul Kautzman never paid taxes on the property, K and K paid rent to
    Kautzman Brothers for use of the property, Paul Kautzman failed to list the
    property on his financial statements, and he failed to disclose the property as
    an asset during his divorce.
    [¶16] This Court has said, “[P]ayment of the property taxes and expenses with
    partnership funds generally indicates the partners’ intention to treat the
    property as partnership property, [but] it is not dispositive on the issue.”
    Nelson, 
    2018 ND 99
    , ¶ 11. Evidence established the K and K building is on the
    property Paul Kautzman and John Kautzman owned individually, and K and
    K paid rent for the property. Paul Kautzman testified the rental tenant was to
    pay the property taxes and Galvanizers and K and K always took care of the
    taxes for the property.
    [¶17] “Legal title is at least prima facie evidence of actual ownership so that
    where land is previously owned by a partner individually, the fact that he
    retains title after formation of the partnership is evidence that the land is not
    donated as a partnership asset.” Nelson, 
    2018 ND 99
    , ¶ 16 (quoting Bachand
    v. Walker, 
    455 N.W.2d 851
    , 855 (S.D. 1990)). This Court has also said,
    “[G]enerally, in order to constitute land partnership property its acquisition
    must have been with partnership funds or on partnership credit and for the
    uses of the partnership; these two factors must concur and the mere use of real
    estate for partnership purposes does not impress upon it the character of
    partnership property.” Nelson, at ¶ 16 (quoting McGowin v. Robinson, 
    39 So.2d 237
    , 239 (Ala. 1949)).
    [¶18] Evidence established Paul Kautzman, individually, acquired ownership
    of property in 1974, and he remains the record owner of the disputed property.
    Paul Kautzman testified he has personally owned the property since 1974, he
    has always held it personally, and he continues to own the property. The 1997
    plat recognized Paul Kautzman’s ownership of the property and was signed by
    John Kautzman as president of Galvanizers and as a partner in Kautzman
    Brothers. The plat is evidence that the parties recognized Paul Kautzman
    5
    individually owned property and the partnership owned separate property and
    that they did not intend the property Paul Kautzman owned individually was
    partnership property. The property was used in connection with the various
    businesses Paul Kautzman and John Kautzman owned, but there was no
    evidence it was purchased with partnership funds or credit.
    [¶19] The district court found, “Paul Kautzman and his wife divorced in 2013
    and in deposition testimony, Paul never made mention of his ownership
    property. The Court concludes that he simply forgot to do so.” Paul Kautzman
    testified that he did not have a good recollection of what he said during the
    deposition, but he did not testify that he forgot to include the property. The
    court’s finding is troubling; however, even the failure to include individual
    ownership of the property as an asset in the divorce is not conclusive evidence
    of ownership. Cf. In re Randall’s Estate, 
    40 N.W.2d 446
    , 449 (N.D. 1949)
    (explaining an inventory and appraisal of decedent’s estate is prima facie
    evidence of ownership of property, but the failure to list property is not
    conclusive and does not affect the true title).
    [¶20] Although there was evidence that may raise some question as to whether
    Paul Kautzman intended the property would be partnership property, this
    Court does not reweigh the evidence and we give due regard to the district
    court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility. See Nelson, 
    2018 ND 99
    ,
    ¶ 13. Evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding that Paul
    Kautzman did not intend the property to be partnership property.
    [¶21] An agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein is
    invalid unless it is in writing. N.D.C.C. § 9-06-04(3). The stock and partnership
    redemption agreements only refer to the sale of the stock and Paul Kautzman’s
    interest in the partnership. The disputed real property was not partnership
    property and it was not specifically included as part of the sale in the
    redemption agreements. There is no evidence there was a written agreement
    for Paul Kautzman to sell his individual interest in the property to the
    plaintiffs at the time the 2013 redemption agreements were executed.
    6
    [¶22] We conclude the district court’s findings were sufficient to understand
    the basis for its decision. Evidence in the record supports the court’s findings
    and they are not clearly erroneous. The district court did not err by failing to
    quiet title in favor of the plaintiffs.
    III
    [¶23] The plaintiffs argue the district court erred in applying N.D.C.C. § 32-
    04-17. They argue they were not seeking to reform or revise a contract, they
    were only seeking to quiet title based on Paul Kautzman selling his interest in
    the property when he redeemed his ownership interest in Kautzman Brothers,
    K and K, and Galvanizers.
    [¶24] The plaintiffs’ complaint requested the district court reform the 1997
    plat or, alternatively, reform the redemption agreements to truly express the
    parties’ intentions. At trial, the plaintiffs informed the court that they were not
    asking the court to reform a contract, they were not claiming the redemption
    agreements are invalid or incomplete, and they were only trying to determine
    what the partnership owned in 2013 when Paul Kautzman was bought out.
    The court concluded the plaintiffs failed to prove the redemption agreements
    should be revised under N.D.C.C. § 32-04-17 for fraud or mistake.
    [¶25] Any error in deciding the plaintiffs failed to prove a reformation claim
    that may have been included in the complaint and was later abandoned is
    harmless. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 61 (stating the court must disregard errors that do
    not affect a party’s substantial rights); see also Aldinger v. Aldinger, 
    2020 ND 5
    , ¶¶ 11-12, 
    937 N.W.2d 282
     (holding error was harmless when party did not
    explain how the alleged error prejudiced him or affected his substantial rights).
    IV
    [¶26] Paul Kautzman argues the appeal is frivolous and he is entitled to
    attorney’s fees and costs. Attorney’s fees may be awarded if an appeal is
    frivolous. N.D.R.App.P. 38. “[A]n appeal is frivolous if it is flagrantly
    groundless, devoid of merit, or demonstrates persistence in the course of
    litigation which could be seen as evidence of bad faith.” Frontier Fiscal Servs.,
    7
    LLC v. Pinky’s Aggregates, Inc., 
    2019 ND 147
    , ¶ 21, 
    928 N.W.2d 449
     (quoting
    Witzke v. City of Bismarck, 
    2006 ND 160
    , ¶ 19, 
    718 N.W.2d 586
    ). The plaintiffs’
    appeal is not frivolous, and we deny Paul Kautzman’s request for attorney’s
    fees.
    V
    [¶27] We affirm the judgment.
    [¶28] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Gerald W. VandeWalle
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    8