Hogan v. Hogan , 308 Neb. 397 ( 2021 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    05/07/2021 08:12 AM CDT
    - 397 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    Brooke B. Hogan, appellant, v.
    Nicholas T. Hogan, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 12, 2021.   No. S-20-254.
    1. Child Custody: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. The question whether
    jurisdiction should be exercised under the Uniform Child Custody
    Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act is entrusted to the discretion of the
    trial court and is reviewed by an appellate court de novo on the record
    for abuse of discretion.
    2. ____: ____: ____. In considering whether jurisdiction exists under the
    Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, a jurisdic-
    tional question that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by
    an appellate court as a matter of law, which requires an appellate court
    to reach a conclusion independent from the trial court.
    3. Divorce: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a divorce
    decree presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate
    court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination reached by
    the court below.
    4. Child Custody: Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over a child custody proceed-
    ing with interstate implications, including one seeking to modify a child
    custody decision, is governed exclusively by the Uniform Child Custody
    Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
    5. ____: ____. Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
    Enforcement Act, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1239
     (Reissue 2016), a state’s
    exclusive and continuing jurisdiction is relinquished when both parties
    and the children no longer reside in the state.
    6. Jurisdiction: Service of Process. A voluntary appearance of a party is
    equivalent to service of process for purposes of personal jurisdiction.
    7. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
    power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class or
    category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
    the general subject matter involved.
    - 398 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    8. Jurisdiction. Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a
    judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of
    the parties.
    9. Actions: Jurisdiction. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
    at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte.
    10. ____: ____. A court action taken without subject matter jurisdiction
    is void.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Gary
    B. Randall, Judge. Affirmed.
    Andrea L. McChesney, of McChesney Family Law Office,
    for appellant.
    Dennis G. Whelan, of Slowiaczek Albers, P.C., L.L.O.,
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    Brooke B. Hogan, appellant, and Nicholas T. Hogan, appel-
    lee, were divorced in February 2019, in Douglas County,
    Nebraska. Several months after the decree and parenting plan
    were entered, Brooke and Nicholas jointly sought permis-
    sion to move from Nebraska to Arizona, and the district court
    entered an order modifying the parties’ parenting plan accord-
    ingly. The parties and the children moved to Arizona. Later
    the same year, Brooke initiated the present matter when she
    filed a complaint in the Douglas County District Court to
    modify the decree and parenting plan, with the ultimate objec-
    tive of allowing her to move, with the parties’ children, back
    to Nebraska. Nicholas moved to dismiss Brooke’s complaint
    to modify the decree, claiming that under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1239
    (a)(2) (Reissue 2016), of Nebraska’s Uniform Child
    Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the
    district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
    - 399 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    parties and children no longer resided in Nebraska. The district
    court determined that the parties and children did not reside in
    Nebraska, that it lacked continuing exclusive jurisdiction over
    the child custody determination, and that proper jurisdiction of
    the current issue is with Arizona. The district court dismissed
    Brooke’s complaint to modify. Brooke appeals. We conclude
    that the district court’s jurisdictional ruling was proper and, in
    so doing, make no comment on the merits of Brooke’s com-
    plaint to modify. We affirm.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On February 4, 2019, the district court entered a decree of
    dissolution of marriage and a parenting plan, which awarded
    the parties joint legal and physical custody of their minor chil-
    dren, subject to parenting time set forth in the parenting plan.
    In April 2019, the parties filed a joint complaint to modify
    the decree and parenting plan to allow them to move with the
    children from Nebraska to Arizona. The district court entered
    the stipulated order. Each party subsequently purchased a home
    in the Phoenix area, and they moved to Arizona. By the time
    the children started the school year on August 15, Brooke,
    Nicholas, and the children were residing in Arizona.
    On October 22, 2019, Brooke filed a complaint to modify
    in the Douglas County District Court, seeking a modification
    of the parenting plan with the ultimate objective of gaining
    permission to return with the children to Nebraska. In support
    of her motion, Brooke stated that she and the children had
    encountered problems transitioning to living in Arizona. She
    asserted that she and the children have no friends or family
    in Arizona and struggled to find safe housing and appropri-
    ate schools.
    On October 25, 2019, Nicholas entered a voluntary appear-
    ance and, on October 30, filed a motion to dismiss the com-
    plaint to modify on the basis that the Nebraska court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction under § 43-1239(a)(2). Section
    43-1239 provides, in relevant part:
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    [A] court of this state which has made a child custody
    determination consistent with section 43-1238 or 43-1240
    has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determina-
    tion until . . . (2) a court of this state or a court of another
    state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and
    any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in
    this state.
    Brooke claimed that Nebraska retained continuing exclusive
    jurisdiction because it continued to be the residence, place of
    domicile, and home state of the children within 6 months before
    the commencement of the complaint to modify. In support of
    her claim, she asserted that during the 6 months prior to her
    complaint, the parties continued to own homes in Nebraska,
    they had driver’s licenses and registered vehicles in Nebraska,
    they maintained voter’s rights in Nebraska, and the children
    were seen by doctors and dentists in Nebraska. However, she
    admitted that by August 2019, the parties resided in Arizona.
    Nicholas noted that under § 43-1239(a)(2), because nei-
    ther the parties nor the children resided in Nebraska when
    Brooke filed her complaint to modify, jurisdiction was proper
    in Arizona.
    Following a hearing, the district court determined that
    because the parties and the children resided in Arizona when
    Brooke filed her complaint, Nebraska should relinquish exclu-
    sive continuing jurisdiction over modifications to the child cus-
    tody determination. The court specifically noted that Brooke
    had stipulated to an order approximately 5 months before,
    showing the parties’ intention to move to Arizona and remain
    there with the minor children, which order was not appealed.
    The district court noted that it had conferred with the Maricopa
    County Superior Court of Arizona to review factors of the
    UCCJEA and determined that jurisdiction was appropriate
    in Arizona. On January 9, 2020, the district court granted
    Nicholas’ motion to dismiss for lack of continuing exclusive
    jurisdiction under § 43-1239(a)(2) and dismissed Brooke’s
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    complaint to modify. Brooke unsuccessfully filed a motion
    to reconsider.
    Brooke appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Brooke assigns, summarized and restated, that the district
    court erred when it dismissed her complaint to modify the
    decree. She specifically claimed that Nebraska had exclusive
    continuing jurisdiction (1) under § 43-1239(a)(1) and, fur-
    ther, (2) because Nicholas conferred jurisdiction on the dis-
    trict court.
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1] The question whether jurisdiction should be exercised
    under the UCCJEA is entrusted to the discretion of the trial
    court and is reviewed by an appellate court de novo on the
    record for abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship of S.T., 
    300 Neb. 72
    , 
    912 N.W.2d 262
     (2018).
    [2] In considering whether jurisdiction exists under the
    UCCJEA, a jurisdictional question that does not involve a
    factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclu-
    sion independent from the trial court. In re Guardianship of
    S.T., 
    supra.
    [3] The meaning of a divorce decree presents a question
    of law, in connection with which an appellate court reaches
    a conclusion independent of the determination reached by
    the court below. Braun v. Braun, 
    306 Neb. 890
    , 
    947 N.W.2d 694
     (2020).
    ANALYSIS
    Brooke contends that the district court retained continu-
    ing exclusive jurisdiction to make child custody determina-
    tions and that it erred when it granted Nicholas’ motion to
    dismiss and dismissed her complaint to modify the parenting
    plan. She specifically claimed that (1) due to connections
    to Nebraska, § 43-1239(a)(1) vested the district court with
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    continuing exclusive jurisdiction, and (2) Nicholas conferred
    jurisdiction on the district court by making a voluntary appear-
    ance and by agreeing to application of Nebraska law. We reject
    these arguments.
    § 43-1239 Analysis.
    [4] Jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding with inter-
    state implications, including one seeking to modify a child cus-
    tody decision, is governed exclusively by the UCCJEA. See In
    re Guardianship of S.T., 
    supra.
     The purposes of the UCCJEA
    are to avoid interstate jurisdictional competition and conflict in
    child custody matters, to promote cooperation between courts
    of other states so that a custody determination can be rendered
    in a state best suited to decide the case in the interest of the
    child, to discourage the use of the interstate system for continu-
    ing custody controversies, to deter child abductions, to avoid
    relitigation of custody issues, and to facilitate enforcement of
    custody orders. Watson v. Watson, 
    272 Neb. 647
    , 
    724 N.W.2d 24
     (2006).
    A Nebraska court which made an initial custody determina-
    tion applies § 43-1239 to determine whether it has continuing
    exclusive jurisdiction to modify child custody. Section 43-1239
    provides as follows:
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in section 43-1241,
    a court of this state which has made a child custody
    determination consistent with section 43-1238 or 43-1240
    has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determina-
    tion until:
    (1) a court of this state determines that neither the
    child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a
    person acting as a parent have a significant connection
    with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer
    available in this state concerning the child’s care, protec-
    tion, training, and personal relationships; or
    (2) a court of this state or a court of another state deter-
    mines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person
    acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    (b) A court of this state which has made a child custody
    determination and does not have exclusive, continuing
    jurisdiction under this section may modify that determina-
    tion only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determi-
    nation under section 43-1238.
    [5] Here, because neither the parties nor the children resided
    in Nebraska at the time of Brooke’s filing, the district court
    did not err when it found that under § 43-1239(a)(2), Nebraska
    no longer possessed exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. This is
    because when the children and the parents have moved away
    from the issuing state, the issuing state no longer meets the juris-
    dictional prerequisites of § 43-1239(a). Such was the case here.
    Nebraska’s exclusive and continuing ­jurisdiction was relin-
    quished because both parties and the children no longer reside
    in the state. See, Watson v. Watson, 
    supra;
     § 43-1239(a)(2). The
    record was undisputed that Brooke, Nicholas, and the children
    resided in Arizona by August 2019.
    Brooke made several arguments that their move was so
    recent that the parties retained a “significant connection”
    to Nebraska and that, hence, Nebraska retained jurisdiction
    under § 43-1239(a)(1). In contrast, relying on § 43-1239(a)(2),
    Nicholas argued that because the parties and children had moved
    to Arizona, the Nebraska court was no longer the exclusive
    forum. We agree with Nicholas, as did the district court. The
    statute is constructed such that jurisdiction may be relinquished
    based on either § 43-1239(a)(1) or § 43-1239(a)(2). Even
    assuming that Nebraska could maintain continuing jurisdiction
    over the child custody determination under § 43-1239(a)(1),
    the court did not err when it determined it had lost exclusiv-
    ity under § 43-1239(a)(2). This assignment of error is with-
    out merit.
    Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
    Brooke next contends that Nicholas conferred subject matter
    jurisdiction on the district court by filing a voluntary appear-
    ance and, in addition, that he acquiesced to proceedings in
    Nebraska when he agreed to application of Nebraska law in
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    HOGAN v. HOGAN
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 397
    the parties’ modified stipulated decree and parenting plan. It
    is axiomatic that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdic-
    tion upon a judicial tribunal by consent, and we find no merit
    to this argument.
    [6-10] A voluntary appearance of a party is equivalent to
    service of process for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See
    Johnson v. Johnson, 
    282 Neb. 42
    , 
    803 N.W.2d 420
     (2011).
    Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to hear
    and determine a case in the general class or category to which
    the proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general
    subject matter involved. J.S. v. Grand Island Public Schools,
    
    297 Neb. 347
    , 
    899 N.W.2d 893
     (2017). Parties cannot confer
    subject matter jurisdiction upon a judicial tribunal by either
    acquiescence or consent, nor may subject matter jurisdiction be
    created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of the parties.
    
    Id.
     Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
    time by any party or by the court sua sponte. 
    Id.
     A court action
    taken without subject matter jurisdiction is void. 
    Id.
    As we understand Brooke’s argument, she asks this court to
    ignore the UCCJEA and instead conclude that Nicholas’ vol-
    untary appearance created exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
    in the district court for Douglas County. Based on the proposi-
    tions outlined above, this argument fails.
    Brooke also claims that Nebraska must retain continuing
    exclusive jurisdiction because of a provision in the parties’
    order of modification and attached parenting plan providing
    that a move to another state would not “in any way alter exist-
    ing Nebraska law.” This argument is also unpersuasive. By
    applying Nebraska’s UCCJEA, the Nebraska court did in fact
    employ “existing Nebraska law” as anticipated by previous
    orders. See § 43-1239(a)(2). This argument has no merit.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, Brooke’s assignments of
    error are without merit, and accordingly, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S-20-254

Citation Numbers: 308 Neb. 397

Filed Date: 2/12/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/7/2021