State v. Ferrin , 305 Neb. 762 ( 2020 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/05/2020 08:08 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. FERRIN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 762
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Benjamin L. Ferrin, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed May 8, 2020.     No. S-19-594.
    1. Criminal Law: Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In an appeal
    of a criminal case from the county court, the district court acts as an
    intermediate court of appeals, and its review is limited to an examina-
    tion of the record for error or abuse of discretion. Both the district court
    and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county
    court for error appearing on the record. When reviewing a judgment for
    errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether
    the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence,
    and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    2. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
    3. Evidence: Records: Appeal and Error. A bill of exceptions is the
    only vehicle for bringing evidence before an appellate court, and evi-
    dence which is not made a part of the bill of exceptions may not be
    considered.
    4. Records: Appeal and Error. As a general proposition, it is incumbent
    upon the appellant to present a record supporting the errors assigned;
    absent such a record, an appellate court will affirm the lower court’s
    decision regarding those errors.
    5. Trial: Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings: Evidence: Juries: Appeal and
    Error. A motion in limine is a procedural step to prevent prejudicial
    evidence from reaching the jury. It is not the office of a motion in limine
    to obtain a final ruling upon the ultimate admissibility of the evidence.
    Therefore, when a court overrules a motion in limine to exclude evi-
    dence, the movant must object when the particular evidence is offered
    at trial in order to predicate error before an appellate court.
    6. Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. An appellant who
    has assigned only that the trial court erred in denying a motion in limine
    has not triggered appellate review of the evidentiary ruling at trial.
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    7. Motions to Dismiss: Directed Verdict: Waiver: Appeal and Error. A
    defendant who moves for dismissal or a directed verdict at the close of
    the evidence in the State’s case in chief in a criminal prosecution and
    who, when the court overrules the dismissal or directed verdict motion,
    proceeds with trial and introduces evidence, waives the appellate right
    to challenge correctness in the trial court’s overruling the motion for
    dismissal or a directed verdict but may still challenge the sufficiency of
    the evidence.
    8. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a crimi-
    nal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction,
    the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any ratio-
    nal trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court does not resolve con-
    flicts in the evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the
    evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact.
    9. Criminal Law: Statutes. To determine the elements of a crime, courts
    look to the text of the statute.
    10. ____: ____. Penal statutes are considered in the context of the object
    sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be rem-
    edied, and the purpose sought to be served.
    11. ____: ____. Effect must be given, if possible, to all parts of a penal
    statute; no sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless
    or superfluous if it can be avoided.
    12. Statutes. In the absence of anything indicating otherwise, statutory lan-
    guage is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
    13. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Judges: Proof: Intent.
    To show a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016),
    the State must prove that (1) the defendant intentionally obstructed,
    impaired, or hindered either a peace officer, a judge, or a police animal
    assisting a peace officer; (2) at the time the defendant did so, the peace
    officer or judge was acting under color of his or her official authority to
    enforce the penal law or preserve the peace; and (3) the defendant did
    so by using or threatening to use either violence, force, physical interfer-
    ence, or obstacle.
    14. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Intent. Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016) does not proscribe all conduct that intention-
    ally obstructs, impairs, or hinders officers who are acting under color
    of their authority to either enforce the penal law or preserve the peace.
    Instead, it proscribes only conduct that involves using or threatening to
    use “violence, force, physical interference, or obstacle.”
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    15. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Convictions: Evidence. Evidence show-
    ing a defendant resisted handcuffing, struggled with an officer, and
    continued to resist restraint is alone sufficient to sustain a conviction for
    obstructing a peace officer under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue
    2016).
    16. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs. The act of running away
    from police interposes a physical obstacle that can obstruct, impair, or
    hinder an officer’s efforts to preserve the peace under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016).
    17. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Judges: Intent. The
    proper inquiry under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016) is
    not whether a defendant has engaged in “some sort of physical act,”
    but, rather, whether a defendant’s conduct, however expressed, used or
    threatened to use either violence, force, physical interference, or obsta-
    cle to intentionally obstruct, impair, or hinder a peace officer or judge
    who was acting to either enforce the penal law or preserve the peace
    under color of his or her official authority.
    18. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles.
    Officers making a traffic stop may order the driver and passengers to get
    out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop.
    19. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles:
    Evidence. Evidence that a defendant repeatedly refused to comply with
    police orders to exit a vehicle during a traffic stop is sufficient to show
    the use of either “physical interference” or “obstacle” under Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016).
    Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County, George
    A. Thompson, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
    for Sarpy County, Robert C. Wester, Judge. Judgment of
    District Court affirmed.
    John H. Sohl for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Matthew Lewis
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    The district court for Sarpy County affirmed Benjamin L.
    Ferrin’s conviction and sentence for the misdemeanor offense
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    of obstructing a peace officer under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906
    (Reissue 2016), which provides in relevant part:
    A person commits the offense of obstructing a peace
    officer, when, by using or threatening to use violence,
    force, physical interference, or obstacle, he or she inten-
    tionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders (a) the enforce-
    ment of the penal law or the preservation of the peace
    by a peace officer or judge acting under color of his or
    her official authority or (b) a police animal assisting a
    peace officer acting pursuant to the peace officer’s offi-
    cial authority.
    The primary question on appeal is whether the evidence in
    this case was sufficient to support Ferrin’s conviction. Finding
    it was, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On February 11, 2018, at 1:54 p.m., two Bellevue, Nebraska,
    police officers were dispatched to a domestic disturbance call.
    When they arrived, they spoke with M.H., who had called
    police for assistance. M.H. told police she and her husband,
    Ferrin, were having marital difficulties, and she reported
    he had locked her out of their residence. M.H. spoke with
    police outside the residence, and the conversation was video
    recorded.
    M.H. told police she had spoken with Ferrin by telephone
    earlier that day and was concerned about his state of mind,
    explaining “he just appeared to have snapped.” M.H. reported
    that Ferrin had been verbally and physically abusive in the
    past, and she told the officers Ferrin had sexually assaulted her
    about 3 weeks earlier. M.H. told the officers that Ferrin owned
    several guns and that he had been suicidal months before. She
    warned officers that Ferrin may be uncooperative if they tried
    to talk with him.
    1. Traffic Stop
    While police were interviewing M.H. outside her residence,
    Ferrin drove past in his pickup truck. One of the officers got
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    STATE v. FERRIN
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    into his cruiser and followed Ferrin’s truck, activating his over-
    head lights. The officer testified that the purpose of the traffic
    stop was twofold: to investigate a possible crime against M.H.
    and to check on Ferrin’s well-being.
    Ferrin pulled his truck to the side of the road and stopped.
    The first officer parked his cruiser behind Ferrin’s truck and
    waited for the second officer to arrive and provide backup.
    According to the first officer, he did not want to contact Ferrin
    without backup, because he was concerned about Ferrin’s state
    of mind and the possibility there were guns in his truck.
    The second officer arrived at the traffic stop shortly there-
    after, and the officers positioned themselves near the first offi-
    cer’s cruiser and directed Ferrin to exit his pickup truck and
    walk back to them. Ferrin, whose window was rolled down,
    replied that he could not hear the officers. Using the public
    address system in one of the cruisers, the officers again asked
    Ferrin to open his pickup door, exit the pickup, and walk back
    to where the officers were positioned. Ferrin responded, “‘No,
    thank you.’”
    At that point, the officers considered it a “high-risk” traffic
    stop and drew their firearms. They again asked Ferrin to step
    out of his truck and walk back to them. Ferrin responded that
    he did not want to leave his truck, because he had a dog inside.
    The officers suggested Ferrin roll up the window so that the
    dog could not get out, and they again directed him to exit the
    truck and walk back to them. Again Ferrin refused to comply.
    The officers informed Ferrin that if he did not comply with
    their request to get out of his truck, he could be charged with a
    crime. Ferrin asked why he had been stopped, and the officers
    told him they were “investigating a domestic incident.” Ferrin
    replied that the officers had no reason to stop him, and he
    remained inside the truck. The officers again instructed Ferrin
    to get out of the truck and walk back to them so that they could
    talk with him. Ferrin remained in the truck. The video shows
    that the officers made approximately eight requests for Ferrin
    to step out of the truck and that he complied with none.
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    STATE v. FERRIN
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    After approximately 3 to 5 minutes of this back-and-forth
    communication, the officers advised Ferrin he was under arrest
    for obstructing a peace officer. Ferrin responded, “‘Fuck off.’”
    He remained in his truck for a few more seconds, then opened
    the door and got out. When the officers instructed Ferrin where
    to put his hands, he again responded, “‘Fuck off.’” The officers
    then instructed Ferrin to lift his shirt so that they could see his
    waistband and to walk toward them until he was told to stop.
    Ferrin complied with these requests. The officers then directed
    Ferrin to get down on his knees. Ferrin initially refused that
    request, but complied after further direction. At that point,
    Ferrin was handcuffed, searched, and placed in the cruiser. The
    entire stop and arrest was video recorded.
    2. Criminal Proceedings
    On March 7, 2018, the State filed a criminal complaint in
    Sarpy County Court charging Ferrin with obstructing a peace
    officer, in violation of § 28-906. Ferrin entered a plea of
    not guilty.
    (a) Motion to Suppress
    Ferrin filed a motion to suppress, contending the traffic stop
    and subsequent arrest were not supported by probable cause.
    A suppression hearing was held, but that hearing was not
    included in the record on appeal. In a written order, the county
    court overruled the suppression motion in all respects. The
    matter was set for a jury trial.
    (b) Motion in Limine
    Before trial, Ferrin filed a motion in limine seeking to
    preclude the State from referring to, or offering evidence of,
    M.H.’s statements to police before the traffic stop. Ferrin
    argued that M.H.’s statements had no relevance to the charged
    offense and would serve only to prejudice the jury. The State
    responded that M.H.’s statements, which included allegations
    of criminal conduct by Ferrin, formed the basis for the traffic
    stop and were inextricably intertwined with evidence of the
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    STATE v. FERRIN
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    obstruction crime with which Ferrin had been charged. The
    court denied Ferrin’s motion in limine, but indicated it would
    give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the proper use
    of M.H.’s statements.
    (c) Jury Trial
    At trial, both officers testified to the facts summarized
    above. A video recording of the traffic stop, including M.H.’s
    statements to the officers prior to the stop, was offered and
    received over Ferrin’s relevancy and hearsay objections. The
    court gave the jury a limiting instruction essentially admonish-
    ing them to consider M.H.’s statements only for the purpose of
    determining whether police were conducting a criminal inves-
    tigation or preserving the peace. Similar admonishments were
    repeated several times during the trial and were included in the
    written jury instructions.
    At the close of the State’s case in chief, Ferrin moved for
    directed verdict, arguing the State had failed to prove the
    material elements of the charged offense. Summarized, Ferrin
    argued the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
    prove a violation of § 28-906(1), because it showed merely
    that he refused to cooperate with police. The court overruled
    Ferrin’s motion, after which he testified in his own defense.
    At the close of all the evidence, Ferrin renewed his motion
    for a directed verdict without additional argument. The court
    summarily overruled the motion and submitted the case to the
    jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court sentenced
    Ferrin to 7 days in the county jail, 1 month of probation, and a
    $50 fine. Ferrin timely appealed his conviction and sentence to
    the district court, sitting as an appellate court.
    3. Appeal to District Court
    Ferrin assigned four errors before the district court: (1)
    There was insufficient evidence to convict him, (2) the county
    court erred by overruling his motion to suppress, (3) the county
    court erred by admitting evidence that had a prejudicial impact
    on the jury, and (4) the sentence imposed was excessive.
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    STATE v. FERRIN
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    The district court rejected all four assignments of error and
    affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Ferrin timely appealed, and
    we moved the case to our docket on our own motion.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    On appeal to this court, Ferrin assigns, restated and reor-
    dered, that the district court erred in affirming the judgment of
    the county court, because the county court erred in (1) overrul-
    ing his motion to suppress, (2) overruling his motion in limine,
    and (3) overruling his motions for directed verdict, because
    there was insufficient evidence to prove the material elements
    of the crime.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court,
    the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and
    its review is limited to an examination of the record for error
    or abuse of discretion. 1 Both the district court and a higher
    appellate court generally review appeals from the county court
    for error appearing on the record. 2 When reviewing a judgment
    for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry
    is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by
    competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor
    unreasonable. 3
    [2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. 4
    IV. ANALYSIS
    1. Motion to Suppress
    Ferrin’s first assignment of error challenges the overruling
    of his motion to suppress, but the bill of exceptions in this case
    does not contain the suppression hearing.
    1
    State v. Becker, 
    304 Neb. 693
    , 
    936 N.W.2d 505
    (2019).
    2
    Id. 3 Id.
    4
    State v. Brye, 
    304 Neb. 498
    , 
    935 N.W.2d 438
    (2019).
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    [3,4] A bill of exceptions is the only vehicle for bringing
    evidence before an appellate court, and evidence which is
    not made a part of the bill of exceptions may not be con-
    sidered. 5 As a general proposition, it is incumbent upon the
    appellant to present a record supporting the errors assigned;
    absent such a record, an appellate court will affirm the lower
    court’s decision regarding those errors. 6 Because our record
    does not include the suppression hearing, we do not consider
    Ferrin’s assignment of error regarding the ruling on his motion
    to suppress.
    2. Motion in Limine
    [5] Ferrin’s second assignment of error challenges the
    overruling of his motion in limine, which sought to preclude
    admission of M.H.’s video-recorded statements to police. We
    have repeatedly held that a motion in limine is a procedural
    step to prevent prejudicial evidence from reaching the jury. 7 It
    is not the office of a motion in limine to obtain a final ruling
    upon the ultimate admissibility of the evidence. 8 Therefore,
    when a court overrules a motion in limine to exclude evi-
    dence, the movant must object when the particular evidence
    is offered at trial in order to predicate error before an appel-
    late court. 9
    Ferrin’s brief notes that he objected at trial when the video
    recording of M.H.’s statements was offered, but he has not
    assigned error to the ruling during trial. To be considered by
    an appellate court, an alleged error must be both specifically
    5
    Bohling v. Bohling, 
    304 Neb. 968
    , 
    937 N.W.2d 855
    (2020).
    6
    D.I. v. Gibson, 
    295 Neb. 903
    , 
    890 N.W.2d 506
    (2017).
    7
    Pantano v. American Blue Ribbon Holdings, 
    303 Neb. 156
    , 
    927 N.W.2d 357
    (2019); Golnick v. Callender, 
    290 Neb. 395
    , 
    860 N.W.2d 180
    (2015);
    State v. Schreiner, 
    276 Neb. 393
    , 
    754 N.W.2d 742
    (2008).
    8
    Pantano, supra note 7.
    9
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    assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party assert-
    ing the error. 10
    [6] An appellant who has assigned only that the trial
    court erred in denying a motion in limine has not triggered
    appellate review of the evidentiary ruling at trial. 11 Because
    Ferrin’s second assignment of error challenges only the rul-
    ing on the motion in limine, it presents nothing for appellate
    review.
    3. Motions for Directed Verdict/
    Sufficiency of Evidence
    Ferrin’s third assignment of error challenges the overruling
    of his motions for directed verdict made at the close of the
    State’s case and renewed at the conclusion of all the evidence.
    Both motions asserted the evidence was insufficient to prove
    the material elements of the charged offense.
    [7] A defendant who moves for dismissal or a directed ver-
    dict at the close of the evidence in the State’s case in chief
    in a criminal prosecution and who, when the court overrules
    the dismissal or directed verdict motion, proceeds with trial
    and introduces evidence, waives the appellate right to chal-
    lenge correctness in the trial court’s overruling the motion for
    dismissal or a directed verdict but may still challenge the suf-
    ficiency of the evidence. 12 We therefore consider Ferrin’s third
    assignment of error as one challenging the sufficiency of the
    evidence to prove the offense of obstructing a peace officer.
    [8] When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of
    the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for
    an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
    10
    State v. Dady, 
    304 Neb. 649
    , 
    936 N.W.2d 486
    (2019).
    11
    See Pantano, supra note 7.
    12
    State v. Briggs, 
    303 Neb. 352
    , 
    929 N.W.2d 65
    (2019).
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    a reasonable doubt. 13 An appellate court does not resolve
    conflicts in the evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or
    reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. 14
    (a) Obstructing Peace Officer
    [9-12] We begin by identifying the material elements the
    State must prove to show a violation of § 28-906(1). To
    determine the elements of a crime, we look to the text of the
    statute. 15 And when analyzing the text of a criminal statute,
    we follow settled principles of statutory construction. Penal
    statutes are considered in the context of the object sought to be
    accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied,
    and the purpose sought to be served. 16 Effect must be given,
    if possible, to all parts of a penal statute; no sentence, clause,
    or word should be rejected as meaningless or superfluous if it
    can be avoided. 17 And in the absence of anything indicating
    otherwise, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordi-
    nary meaning. 18
    [13] Under the plain language of the statute, to show a
    violation of § 28-906(1), the State must prove that (1) the
    defendant intentionally obstructed, impaired, or hindered either
    a peace officer, a judge, or a police animal assisting a peace
    officer; (2) at the time the defendant did so, the peace officer
    or judge was acting under color of his or her official author-
    ity to enforce the penal law or preserve the peace; and (3) the
    defendant did so by using or threatening to use either violence,
    force, physical interference, or obstacle.
    On appeal, Ferrin does not argue there was insufficient
    evidence to establish the first two of these elements. Rather,
    13
    State v. Olbricht, 
    294 Neb. 974
    , 
    885 N.W.2d 699
    (2016).
    14
    Id. 15 State
    v. Mann, 
    302 Neb. 804
    , 
    925 N.W.2d 324
    (2019).
    16
    Id. 17 Id.
    18
    State v. Stanko, 
    304 Neb. 675
    , 
    936 N.W.2d 353
    (2019).
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    his insufficiency argument is focused on the third element,
    which addresses the proscribed conduct. We limit our analysis
    accordingly.
    (i) Proscribed Conduct
    [14] Section 28-906(1) does not proscribe all conduct that
    intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders officers who are
    acting under color of their authority to either enforce the
    penal law or preserve the peace. Instead, it proscribes only
    conduct that involves using or threatening to use “violence,
    force, physical interference, or obstacle.” We have rejected
    the suggestion that these statutory terms are unconstitutionally
    vague, finding instead that they are commonly used words
    and are understandable by those of ordinary intelligence. 19
    [15] We have consistently recognized that evidence show-
    ing a defendant resisted handcuffing, struggled with an officer,
    and continued to resist restraint is alone sufficient to sustain a
    conviction for obstructing a peace officer. 20 But here, the State
    generally concedes that Ferrin’s conduct during the traffic
    stop did not involve using or threatening to use either violence
    or force. We agree, and we confine our analysis to whether the
    record contains sufficient evidence that Ferrin used or threat-
    ened to use either “physical interference” or “obstacle” within
    the meaning of § 28-906(1). Nebraska’s appellate courts have
    considered these terms in several cases.
    This court first considered the meaning of the phrase
    “physical interference, or obstacle” as used in § 28-906(1)
    in the 1987 case In re Interest of Richter. 21 In that case,
    two uniformed officers responded to a domestic disturbance
    call requesting police assistance in removing a disruptive
    youth from a home. When officers arrived, the youth was
    19
    State v. Lynch, 
    223 Neb. 849
    , 
    394 N.W.2d 651
    (1986).
    20
    State v. Campbell, 
    260 Neb. 1021
    , 
    620 N.W.2d 750
    (2001); Lynch, supra
    note 19.
    21
    In re Interest of Richter, 
    226 Neb. 874
    , 
    415 N.W.2d 476
    (1987).
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    arguing, cursing, and yelling, and officers told him he would
    be taken to a youth shelter for the evening. While officers
    were escorting the youth for transport, he ran away. They
    pursued him on foot and eventually located him an hour later,
    at which point he tried to run from the officers a second time.
    Based on these events, the State alleged the youth was within
    the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he committed
    an act which would constitute a violation of § 28-906(1). 22
    In response, the youth argued that to prove a violation
    of § 28-906(1), the State had to show he used or threat-
    ened to use “some physical means to thwart the officers” 23
    that involved more than simply running away from police.
    We disagreed.
    [16] We gave § 28-906(1) its plain and ordinary meaning,
    and reasoned that even if the word “physical” modified both
    “interference” and “obstacle,” the act of running away from
    police interposed a physical obstacle that obstructed, impaired,
    or hindered the officers’ efforts to preserve the peace. 24
    Ten years later, we decided State v. Yeutter. 25 In that case,
    city police discovered Edwin Yeutter’s dog running at large in
    violation of a city ordinance, and an officer went to Yeutter’s
    home to issue a citation. Yeutter refused to provide his iden-
    tifying information, and the officer could not complete the
    citation. When Yeutter was told that if he did not cooperate,
    he would be arrested for obstructing an officer, he held out
    his arms and said, “‘[G]o ahead and take me.’” 26 The ­officer
    22
    See, generally, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2016).
    23
    In re Interest of Richter, supra note 
    21, 226 Neb. at 876
    , 415 N.W.2d at
    478.
    24
    In re Interest of Richter, supra note 21. Accord U.S. v. Sledge, 
    460 F.3d 963
    (8th Cir. 2006) (under Nebraska law, mere act of running away from
    law enforcement officers constitutes physical interference or obstacle
    within meaning of § 28-906(1)).
    25
    State v. Yeutter, 
    252 Neb. 857
    , 
    566 N.W.2d 387
    (1997).
    26
    Id. at 859,
    566 N.W.2d at 390.
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    instructed him to put his hands on a nearby car, Yeutter
    refused, and a physical struggle ensued. During the struggle,
    Yeutter grabbed the officer’s baton, grabbed the officer’s
    handcuffs, bit the officer’s finger, and generally resisted being
    taken into custody and placed in the police cruiser.
    Yeutter was convicted for assaulting an officer, resisting
    arrest, and obstructing a peace officer. The Nebraska Court
    of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion filed on December
    18, 1996, in case No. A-96-255, reversed the conviction for
    obstructing a peace officer and otherwise affirmed. We granted
    Yeutter’s petition for further review to determine just one
    question: whether he was entitled to a jury instruction on
    self-defense.
    But before we addressed that question, we described
    Yeutter’s arrest for obstructing a peace officer as “an illegal
    arrest,” 27 noting that at the time the officer attempted to place
    him under arrest for obstruction, Yeutter had not “used or
    threatened to use violence or force or physically interfered with
    the officer.” 28 We then went on to state that “the mere verbal
    refusal to provide information to an officer does not constitute
    an obstacle to the enforcement of the penal laws as contem-
    plated by § 28-906. There must be some sort of physical act in
    order for a violation of this statute to occur.” 29 These proposi-
    tions of law, while dicta, have been cited by both the Nebraska
    Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the District of
    Nebraska. 30 We therefore conclude it is necessary to revisit our
    statements in Yeutter to ensure they comport with the statutory
    language of § 28-906(1).
    27
    Id. at 861,
    566 N.W.2d at 391.
    28
    Id. 29 Id.
    at 
    862, 566 N.W.2d at 391
    .
    30
    See, Deezia v. City of Lincoln, 
    350 F. Supp. 3d 868
    (D. Neb. 2018); State
    v. Ellingson, 
    13 Neb. Ct. App. 931
    , 
    703 N.W.2d 273
    (2005); State v. Owen, 
    7 Neb. Ct. App. 153
    , 
    580 N.W.2d 566
    (1998).
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    The plain language of § 28-906(1) makes it a crime not just
    to use violence, force, physical interference, or obstacle, but
    also to threaten to do so. Consequently, while Yeutter correctly
    observed that “the mere verbal refusal to provide information
    to an officer does not constitute an obstacle to the enforce-
    ment of the penal laws as contemplated by § 28-906,” 31 our
    opinion was imprecise when it went on to state that “some sort
    of physical act” 32 is always required. Because threats can be
    expressed verbally as well as through gestures and physical
    acts, 33 our language in Yeutter was too restrictive, and it failed
    to give effect to all of the statutory language the Legislature
    included in § 28-906(1).
    [17] We now clarify that the proper inquiry under § 28-906(1)
    is not whether a defendant has engaged in “some sort of physi-
    cal act,” but, rather, whether a defendant’s conduct, however
    expressed, used or threatened to use either violence, force,
    physical interference, or obstacle to intentionally obstruct,
    impair, or hinder a peace officer or judge who was acting to
    either enforce the penal law or preserve the peace under color
    of his or her official authority.
    (ii) Sufficient Evidence of
    Proscribed Conduct
    Ferrin argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to
    show he used or threatened to use physical interference or
    obstruction. He describes his conduct as “merely refus[ing]
    to come back and talk to the officers” 34 when requested to
    do so, and he equates such conduct with “the mere verbal
    refusal to provide information to an officer,” which we stated
    31
    Yeutter, supra note 25, 252 Neb. at 
    862, 566 N.W.2d at 391
    .
    32
    Id. 33 See
    Owen, supra note 30 (holding no clear error in jury instruction stating
    “obstacle” under § 28-906(1) could be either verbal or physical).
    34
    Brief for appellant at 19.
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    in Yeutter was insufficient to constitute an “obstacle” under
    § 28-906.
    The State argues Yeutter is inapplicable because Ferrin’s
    conduct involved more than just a mere verbal refusal to
    provide information. The State generally describes Ferrin’s
    conduct as a series of defiant refusals to exit his vehicle
    that presented an obstacle to the officers’ investigation under
    § 28-906(1).
    [18,19] It is well settled that officers making a traffic stop
    may order the driver and passengers to get out of the vehicle
    pending completion of the stop. 35 Here, when officers ordered
    Ferrin to get out of the truck, he repeatedly refused to comply
    and instead defiantly remained inside the truck. This conduct
    did not involve using violence or force. However, a reason-
    able jury could find that evidence that a defendant repeatedly
    refused to comply with police orders to exit a vehicle during
    a traffic stop is sufficient to show the use of either “physical
    interference” or “obstacle” under § 28-906(1).
    The terms “interference” and “obstacle” have similar mean-
    ings. Used in its common and ordinary sense, the word “inter-
    ference” means “[t]he action or fact of interfering or inter-
    meddling (with a person, etc., or in some action).” 36 Similarly,
    “obstacle” means “[s]omething that stands in the way or
    that obstructs progress (literal and figurative); a hindrance,
    impediment, or obstruction.” 37 Given the commonly under-
    stood meaning of these terms, a reasonable fact finder could
    conclude that Ferrin’s conduct in repeatedly refusing to com-
    ply with police orders to exit his truck during a traffic stop
    35
    See Maryland v. Wilson, 
    519 U.S. 408
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 882
    , 
    137 L. Ed. 2d 41
         (1997).
    36
    “Interference,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/
    view/Entry/97762 (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
    37
    “Obstacle,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/view/
    Entry/129940 (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
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    amounted to using either “physical interference, or obstacle”
    under § 28-906(1). And although we are mindful that cases
    from other jurisdictions apply different statutory language,
    this holding is in accord with decisions from other state and
    federal courts which hold that refusal to comply with an offi-
    cer’s requests to exit the vehicle during a traffic stop can sup-
    port an arrest or conviction for obstruction. 38
    Here, the evidence showed the traffic stop was part of
    an active police investigation of a reported domestic dis-
    pute involving possible domestic violence and sexual assault
    crimes. As part of that investigation, Ferrin was repeatedly
    asked to step out of his truck so officers could question him,
    and he repeatedly refused to comply with those requests,
    even after being told the nature of the investigation and being
    advised that he could be charged with a crime if he did not
    comply. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
    tion, this evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
    find that Ferrin used “physical interference, or obstacle” to
    intentionally obstruct, impair, or hinder the officers in their
    investigation.
    38
    See, e.g., Skube v. Koester, 
    120 F. Supp. 3d 825
    (C.D. Ill. 2015) (prolonged
    refusal to comply with police orders to exit vehicle can constitute crime
    of obstruction); Taylor v. State, 
    326 Ga. App. 27
    , 
    755 S.E.2d 839
    (2014)
    (evidence sufficient to prove obstruction when, among other things,
    defendant refused police orders to exit truck during investigation and
    instead locked door); State v. Orr, 
    157 Idaho 206
    , 
    335 P.3d 51
    (Idaho
    App. 2014) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for obstruction
    where suspect refused police requests to exit vehicle); People v. Synnott,
    
    349 Ill. App. 3d 223
    , 
    811 N.E.2d 236
    , 
    284 Ill. Dec. 941
    (2004) (defendant
    knowingly obstructed police investigation by repeatedly refusing orders
    to exit vehicle); Wilson v. Village of Los Lunas, 572 F. Appx. 635 (10th
    Cir. 2014) (refusing officer’s requests to exit vehicle during traffic stop
    provided probable cause to arrest for obstructing officer); United States
    v. Thomas, No. 97-4827, 
    1998 WL 852951
    (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 1998)
    (unpublished disposition listed in table of “Decisions Without Published
    Opinions” at 
    166 F.3d 336
    (4th Cir. 1998)) (refusing orders to exit vehicle
    constituted resisting, delaying, or obstructing officer).
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    Finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we
    reject Ferrin’s third assignment of error.
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly
    affirmed the judgment of the county court, and we likewise
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
    Affirmed.