Gimple v. Student Transp. of America , 300 Neb. 708 ( 2018 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
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    GIMPLE v. STUDENT TRANSP. OF AMERICA
    Cite as 
    300 Neb. 708
    Shelley R. Gimple, appellee and cross-appellant,
    v. Student Transportation of A merica
    and National I nterstate I ns. Co.,
    appellants and cross-appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed August 3, 2018.    No. S-17-985.
    1.	 Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. Pursuant to Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 48-185 (Cum. Supp. 2016), an appellate court may modify,
    reverse, or set aside a Workers’ Compensation Court decision only when
    (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2)
    the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not
    sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the
    order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensa-
    tion court do not support the order or award.
    2.	 ____: ____. Determinations by a trial judge of the Workers’ Compensation
    Court will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are contrary to law
    or depend on findings of fact which are clearly wrong in light of the
    evidence.
    3.	 Workers’ Compensation: Subrogation. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-118
    (Reissue 2010) grants an employer who has paid workers’ compensation
    benefits to an employee injured as a result of the actions of a third party
    a subrogation interest against payments made by the third party.
    4.	 Workers’ Compensation: Statutes: Appeal and Error. In workers’
    compensation cases, appellate courts give statutory language its plain
    and ordinary meaning.
    5.	 Words and Phrases. The plain and ordinary meaning of “any” is “all”
    or “every.”
    6.	 Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. Findings of fact made by
    the Workers’ Compensation Court have the same force and effect as a
    jury verdict and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
    7.	 Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When testing
    the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of fact made by the
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    Workers’ Compensation Court trial judge, the evidence must be consid-
    ered in the light most favorable to the successful party and the success-
    ful party will have the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible
    from the evidence.
    Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Court: Daniel R.
    Fridrich, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and
    remanded with directions.
    Abigail A. Wenninghoff and Jocelyn J. Brasher, of Larson,
    Kuper & Wenninghoff, P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.
    Caroline M. Westerhold and Zachary W. Anderson, of
    Baylor, Evnen, Curtiss, Grimit & Witt, L.L.P., for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, and
    Papik, JJ., and Vaughan, District Judge.
    Papik, J.
    A vehicle driven by a drunk driver struck the school bus
    Shelly R. Gimple was driving and injured her. For a time,
    Gimple’s employer, Student Transportation of America (Student
    Transportation), paid workers’ compensation benefits to
    Gimple. When Gimple later asserted that she was permanently
    disabled as a result of her injuries and Student Transportation
    refused to pay benefits to which Gimple claimed she was
    entitled, Gimple brought suit in the Workers’ Compensation
    Court. The compensation court found that Gimple was entitled
    to additional benefits and that it did not have jurisdiction
    to grant relief requested by Student Transportation concern-
    ing a settlement Gimple entered into with the driver who
    caused her injuries. The compensation court denied Gimple’s
    request that she be awarded penalties, attorney fees, and inter-
    est because of Student Transportation’s failure to pay the ben-
    efits she requested.
    The parties have now appealed and cross-appealed. We
    affirm the compensation court’s findings that Gimple was enti-
    tled to benefits and that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve
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    issues regarding the third-party settlement, but we reverse its
    determination that Gimple was not entitled to penalties, attor-
    ney fees, and interest.
    BACKGROUND
    Gimple’s Claim for Benefits.
    On April 22, 2014, a vehicle driven by a drunk driver struck
    the school bus Gimple was driving for Student Transportation.
    After being taken by ambulance to a hospital, doctors diag-
    nosed her with a left distal radius intra-articular fracture dis-
    location. Gimple underwent multiple surgeries and treatments
    over the next few years as a result of her injury.
    While Student Transportation initially paid some work-
    ers’ compensation benefits to Gimple as she incurred medi-
    cal costs, a dispute eventually arose between the parties as to
    whether Gimple was entitled to additional benefits. Gimple
    claimed that she was permanently disabled as a result of her
    injuries and was entitled to permanent partial disability ben-
    efits (PPD benefits). After Student Transportation refused to
    pay such benefits, Gimple filed an action in the compensation
    court against Student Transportation and its workers’ compen-
    sation insurer.
    Student Transportation admitted that Gimple suffered an
    injury arising out of and in the scope of her employment, but
    denied the remainder of the allegations. Student Transportation
    also alleged that Gimple had failed to comply with the
    Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act by settling a claim
    against the third party who injured her for $25,000 without
    providing notice or reimbursement to Student Transportation.
    Student Transportation requested that the compensation court
    declare either that the settlement was void or that Student
    Transportation was entitled to a credit against past and future
    workers’ compensation benefits because of Gimple’s receipt of
    the settlement funds.
    The compensation court conducted a trial. Importantly for
    purposes of this appeal, the parties stipulated that Gimple
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    suffered an injury arising out of and in the course and scope
    of her employment, that the past medical treatment Gimple
    received was reasonable and necessary, and that Gimple suf-
    fered a single scheduled member injury to her left upper
    extremity. In addition, both parties presented evidence. Among
    the evidence introduced by Gimple was a letter containing an
    opinion as to Gimple’s permanent impairment from Dr. Ian
    Crabb, an orthopedic doctor who had treated Gimple. In his
    letter, Dr. Crabb opined on the extent of Gimple’s permanent
    impairment as a result of the injury.
    Initial Award.
    The compensation court issued its initial award on August
    23, 2017. In the initial award, the compensation court deter-
    mined that Gimple was entitled to some temporary total dis-
    ability benefits, but was not entitled to PPD benefits. The
    compensation court’s stated reason for not awarding PPD
    benefits was that Gimple failed to offer evidence of permanent
    impairment. Despite the parties’ stipulation that the injury was
    to her left arm, the compensation court found that the injury
    was actually to Gimple’s left wrist and that Gimple failed to
    offer evidence of permanent impairment to her wrist.
    The compensation court also found it was without juris-
    diction to grant the relief Student Transportation sought with
    respect to the third-party settlement. It relied on Miller v.
    M.F.S. York/Stormor, 
    257 Neb. 100
    , 
    595 N.W.2d 878
    (1999),
    in which this court held that the compensation court did not
    have jurisdiction to determine the amount of credit to which
    an employer was entitled on an employee’s workers’ compen-
    sation benefits as a result of the previous settlement of a suit
    against a third party.
    Modified Award.
    Gimple later filed a motion to modify the initial award. She
    asserted that the compensation court erred in rejecting the par-
    ties’ stipulation that her injury was to her left arm, because the
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    parties had relied upon that stipulation when presenting evi-
    dence and defining the issues for the court to decide. She sought
    modification of the compensation court’s award to accept the
    parties’ stipulation and award PPD benefits in accordance with
    Dr. Crabb’s medical opinion that she suffered a 13-percent
    permanent partial impairment to her left upper extremity. She
    further sought penalties, attorney fees, and interest for Student
    Transportation’s nonpayment of those benefits.
    Following a hearing on the motion to modify, the compen-
    sation court sustained Gimple’s motion and issued a modified
    award finding that Gimple was entitled to PPD benefits in
    the amount of $12,721.70. It found that it had erred in reject-
    ing the parties’ stipulation that Gimple injured her left arm. It
    noted that both parties tried the case based upon the stipula-
    tion that Gimple injured her left arm and that there was no
    good cause to reject that stipulation. In reliance on the report
    of Dr. Crabb, the compensation court found that Gimple’s left
    arm was permanently and partially disabled. Although the last
    sentence of Dr. Crabb’s report assigned the impairment rating
    to Gimple’s right arm, the compensation court found that to
    be a scrivener’s error. Finally, the compensation court denied
    Gimple’s request for penalties, attorney fees, and interest for
    Student Transportation’s nonpayment of PPD benefits. It found
    that there was a reasonable controversy in light of “the ‘hand
    vs. arm’ PPD [benefits] debate” and the scrivener’s error in Dr.
    Crabb’s report.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    On appeal, Student Transportation assigns that the compen-
    sation court erred (1) in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to
    determine the issues regarding the third-party settlement and
    (2) in finding that Gimple was entitled to PPD benefits for an
    impairment to her left upper extremity.
    On cross-appeal, Gimple assigns that the compensation court
    erred in failing to award penalties, attorney fees, and interest
    for Student Transportation’s nonpayment of PPD benefits.
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    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-185 (Cum. Supp.
    2016), an appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside
    a Workers’ Compensation Court decision only when (1) the
    compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers;
    (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3)
    there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to war-
    rant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the
    findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the
    order or award. Greenwood v. J.J. Hooligan’s, 
    297 Neb. 435
    ,
    
    899 N.W.2d 905
    (2017). Determinations by a trial judge of the
    Workers’ Compensation Court will not be disturbed on appeal
    unless they are contrary to law or depend on findings of fact
    which are clearly wrong in light of the evidence. 
    Id. ANALYSIS Jurisdiction
    to Resolve Dispute Regarding
    Third-Party Settlement.
    We begin with Student Transportation’s contention that the
    compensation court incorrectly concluded it lacked jurisdiction
    to resolve disputes related to Gimple’s settlement with the third
    party who caused her injuries. For reasons we will explain
    below, we conclude that the compensation court did not have
    jurisdiction to decide these issues and that, therefore, neither
    does this court.
    Student Transportation argues the compensation court should
    have found that the settlement was void because Gimple did
    not comply with statutory requirements governing third-party
    settlements or, alternatively, that Student Transportation was
    entitled to a credit with respect to its obligations to Gimple.
    Student Transportation contends that the compensation court
    has authority to resolve these issues by virtue of Neb. Rev. Stat.
    §§ 48-152 and 48-161 (Reissue 2010), two general jurisdic-
    tional statutes that authorize the Workers’ Compensation Court
    to administer the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act and to
    decide issues “ancillary to the resolution of an employee’s right
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    to workers’ compensation benefits.” But a different provision
    of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act speaks directly to
    the issues Student Transportation sought to raise, and so our
    analysis must start there.
    [3] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-118 (Reissue 2010) grants an
    employer who has paid workers’ compensation benefits to an
    employee injured as a result of the actions of a third party a
    subrogation interest against payments made by the third party.
    Kroemer v. Omaha Track Equip., 
    296 Neb. 972
    , 
    898 N.W.2d 661
    (2017). The next section, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-118.01
    (Reissue 2010), discusses claims or suits the injured employee
    or subrogated employer might pursue against third parties. That
    section requires that the employer and employee, before mak-
    ing such a claim or bringing such a suit, provide notice to the
    other of the opportunity to join in such claim or action. Section
    48-118.01 goes on to provide as follows:
    Each party shall have an equal voice in the claim and the
    prosecution of such suit, and any dispute arising shall be
    passed upon by the court before which the case is pend-
    ing and if no action is pending then by the district court
    in which such action could be brought.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    We have previously found the above-quoted language con-
    trolling when a party sought a credit against benefits it owed
    as a result of the employee’s receiving funds in settlement
    of a claim against a third party. In Miller v. M.F.S. York/
    Stormor, 
    257 Neb. 100
    , 
    595 N.W.2d 878
    (1999), an employee
    was injured when the safety equipment on machinery he was
    repairing failed. The corporation alleged to have installed
    the safety equipment agreed to settle a personal injury suit
    against it. The federal district court in which the suit was
    brought subsequently allocated the settlement between the
    injured employee and the subrogated employer. The federal
    court did not, however, address the amount of credit to which
    the employer would be entitled for any disability benefits
    accruing thereafter.
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    When the employee in Miller later sought additional work-
    ers’ compensation benefits, the compensation court found it
    lacked authority to determine the credit to which the employer
    was entitled. On appeal to this court, we agreed. We deter-
    mined that the language of what is now § 48-118.01 quoted
    above precluded the compensation court from determining the
    amount of any credit, because the compensation court was nei-
    ther, in the words of § 48-118.01, “the court before which the
    case [against the third party] is pending” nor “the district court
    in which such action could be brought.”
    Faced with our holding in Miller that the compensation court
    does not have jurisdiction to determine the amount of credit
    to which an employer is entitled when an employee receives
    settlement funds from a third party, Student Transportation
    attempts, in various ways, to distinguish the relief it is seeking
    from the relief sought in Miller. It contends that Miller held
    only that the compensation court cannot determine the amount
    of a credit, but that it asked the compensation court only to
    find an entitlement to a credit. It also contends that it asked the
    compensation court to find the settlement was void and that
    Miller did not determine whether the compensation court could
    reach that question.
    [4,5] We find Student Transportation’s attempts to distin-
    guish Miller unpersuasive. The specific issue we decided in
    Miller was whether the compensation court could determine
    the amount of a credit, but, in concluding that it could not, we
    relied upon statutory language that is not limited to disputes
    regarding the amount of a credit. Rather, § 48-118.01 provides
    that “any dispute” between employer and employee concern-
    ing a claim or suit against a third party must be brought in the
    district court in which an action against a third party is pending
    or the district court in which such action could be brought. We
    give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. See,
    e.g., Interiano-Lopez v. Tyson Fresh Meats, 
    294 Neb. 586
    , 
    883 N.W.2d 676
    (2016). The plain and ordinary meaning of “any”
    is “all” or “every.” See, e.g., In re Interest of Powers, 242 Neb.
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    19, 
    493 N.W.2d 166
    (1992). Section 48-118.01 thus applies to
    every possible dispute that might arise between a subrogated
    employer and an injured employee regarding a claim against a
    third party, including the issues Student Transportation attempts
    to raise in this case.
    Disputes governed by § 48-118.01 must be decided by the
    “court before which the case [against the third party] is pend-
    ing and if no action is pending then by the district court in
    which such action could be brought.” Because there is no
    action pending against the driver who injured Gimple, Student
    Transportation’s contentions regarding the third-party settle-
    ment must be presented to “the district court in which such
    action could be brought.” And since an action against the
    third party who injured Gimple could not have been brought
    in the compensation court, the compensation court correctly
    concluded it did not have authority to grant the relief Student
    Transportation requested regarding the third-party settlement.
    PPD Benefits.
    We now turn to the parties’ remaining assignments of error,
    which are related and which we will address together. Both par-
    ties argue that the compensation court erred in its disposition
    of Gimple’s claim for PPD benefits. Student Transportation
    contends that the compensation court erred by finding that
    Gimple was entitled to such benefits, and Gimple claims that
    the compensation court erred by not finding that she was
    entitled to penalties, attorney fees, and interest for Student
    Transportation’s failure to pay them. We conclude that the
    compensation court correctly found that Gimple was entitled
    to PPD benefits, but erred by denying her penalties, attorney
    fees, and interest.
    Student Transportation correctly points out that before PPD
    benefits can be awarded, the workers’ compensation claimant
    must prove not only that he or she suffered an injury arising
    out of and in the scope of his or employment, but also that
    his or her injury caused permanent impairment. See Gardner
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    v. International Paper Destr. & Recycl., 
    291 Neb. 415
    , 
    865 N.W.2d 371
    (2015). Student Transportation does not dispute
    that Gimple was injured: it acknowledges the parties’ stipula-
    tion that Gimple suffered an injury to her left upper extremity
    and disavows any argument that the stipulation should not be
    given effect. Rather, Student Transportation argues that Gimple
    introduced no evidence that she was permanently disabled as a
    result of the injury to which the parties stipulated.
    Gimple counters that the letter of Dr. Crabb mentioned
    above contains a medical opinion that Gimple was permanently
    impaired. Dr. Crabb’s letter states in relevant part:
    [Gimple’s] current diagnosis is status post left distal
    radius fracture with open reduction and internal fixation
    accompanied by carpal instability. This condition is cer-
    tainly related to her previous work accident dated April
    22, 2014. . . . Gimple has reached Maximum Medical
    Improvement as of November 3, 2015. She has been
    released to full duty and has no permanent restrictions.
    . . . Gimple has suffered a permanent partial impair-
    ment rating related to her injury. Based off her limitations
    in motion, she receives nine percent (9%) of the upper
    extremity and due to additional unpredicted mechanical
    symptoms she receives an additional four percent (4%)
    of the upper extremity. This results in a total of thirteen
    percent (13%) permanent partial impairment rating of the
    right upper extremity.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    Student Transportation cannot and does not dispute that Dr.
    Crabb’s letter expresses an opinion that Gimple suffered per-
    manent impairment. Instead, it claims that Dr. Crabb’s letter
    cannot support an award of PPD benefits, because he refers
    to Gimple’s right arm being impaired despite there being no
    evidence of an injury to her right arm. In other words, Student
    Transportation seems to argue that Gimple was incorrectly
    awarded PPD benefits because of a mismatch between the
    injury and the evidence of impairment—the parties stipulated
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    to a left arm injury, but Gimple presented evidence of right
    arm impairment.
    Student Transportation’s argument might present a problem
    for Gimple if we were obligated to look at bits and pieces of
    Dr. Crabb’s letter in isolation. It does, after all, refer to an
    impairment rating to Gimple’s right arm. But, as with any
    medical opinion, we must view that reference in the context
    of the expert’s entire statement. See Renne v. Moser, 
    241 Neb. 623
    , 
    490 N.W.2d 193
    (1992).
    Viewed in context, it is obvious to us that it was Dr.
    Crabb’s intention to assign a 13-percent impairment rating of
    the left arm and that his reference to the right arm was a scriv-
    ener’s error. Dr. Crabb initially refers to Gimple’s injury as an
    injury to her left arm. When he later discusses his impairment
    rating, he refers to “her injury,” an unmistakable reference to
    the injury to the left side mentioned earlier. Furthermore, all
    of the evidence in the record of Gimple’s injury depicts an
    injury on the left side of her body, and Student Transportation
    stipulated to an injury to the left upper extremity. Given these
    facts, it would seem that everyone involved understood that
    Dr. Crabb had merely made a mistake by referencing the
    right arm. At oral argument, Student Transportation’s counsel
    conceded as much, admitting that she knew at the time that
    Dr. Crabb’s reference to the right arm was nothing more than
    a mistake.
    [6,7] Because we find that Dr. Crabb’s letter, when viewed
    in context, expressed an opinion that Gimple’s left arm
    was permanently impaired as a result of her injury, Student
    Transportation’s challenge to the award of PPD benefits must
    fail. Findings of fact made by the Workers’ Compensation
    Court have the same force and effect as a jury verdict and will
    not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Hintz v. Farmers
    Co-op Assn., 
    297 Neb. 903
    , 
    902 N.W.2d 131
    (2017). When
    testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of
    fact made by the Workers’ Compensation Court trial judge,
    the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable
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    to the successful party and the successful party will have the
    benefit of every inference reasonably deducible from the evi-
    dence. 
    Id. Given the
    medical evidence supporting Gimple’s
    permanent impairment, we cannot say that the compensation
    court clearly erred by awarding PPD benefits.
    This leaves only the question of whether Gimple should
    have received penalties, attorney fees, and interest as a result
    of Student Transportation’s failure to pay PPD benefits. Under
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-125 (Cum. Supp. 2016), an employee is
    entitled to a 50-percent waiting-time penalty as well as attor-
    ney fees and interest if (1) the employer fails to pay compensa-
    tion within 30 days of the employee’s notice of disability and
    (2) no reasonable controversy existed regarding the employee’s
    claim for benefits. See Armstrong v. State, 
    290 Neb. 205
    , 
    859 N.W.2d 541
    (2015).
    Because Student Transportation did not pay Gimple PPD
    benefits within 30 days of Gimple’s providing notice of her
    disability, she is entitled to penalties, attorney fees, and interest
    if there was no reasonable controversy regarding her entitle-
    ment to benefits. We have said that a reasonable controversy
    exists if (1) there is a question of law previously unanswered
    by the Nebraska Supreme Court, which question must be
    answered to determine a right or liability for disposition of a
    claim, or (2) if the properly adduced evidence would support
    reasonable but opposite conclusions by the compensation court
    about an aspect of an employee’s claim and those conclusions
    would affect allowance or rejection of an employee’s claim, in
    whole or in part. See 
    id. In affirming
    the compensation court’s award of PPD ben-
    efits, we have already determined that there was sufficient
    medical evidence to justify awarding PPD benefits. In order to
    determine whether there was a reasonable controversy, we must
    now revisit that same issue, this time to determine whether the
    evidence was so one-sided that the only reasonable conclusion
    that could be drawn therefrom was that Gimple was entitled to
    such benefits.
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    It is here that we diverge from the compensation court for
    the first time. It stated that a reasonable controversy existed
    “in light of the ‘hand vs. arm’ PPD [benefits] debate and by
    virtue of Dr. Crabb’s report in which he ostensibly assigned
    permanent impairment to [Gimple’s] right arm rather than
    her left.” We do not believe either of the issues mentioned by
    the compensation court creates a reasonable controversy as to
    Gimple’s entitlement to PPD benefits.
    The compensation court’s reference to the “hand vs. arm”
    debate presumably refers to the compensation court’s hav-
    ing some question as to whether the injury was actually to
    Gimple’s arm and not her wrist. It was this issue that caused
    the compensation court to initially reject the parties’ stipula-
    tion and deny Gimple PPD benefits. This court has said, how-
    ever, that voluntary stipulations are to be enforced “‘unless
    some good cause is shown for declining to do so, especially
    where the stipulations have been acted upon so that the parties
    could not be placed in status quo.’” In re Estate of Mithofer,
    
    243 Neb. 722
    , 727, 
    502 N.W.2d 454
    , 457-58 (1993), quot-
    ing Martin v. Martin, 
    188 Neb. 393
    , 
    197 N.W.2d 388
    (1972).
    Student Transportation presents no argument that there was
    good cause for rejecting the parties’ stipulation, and we can-
    not discern any in the record. Because we do not see a basis
    to reject the stipulation of a left arm injury, we find that the
    issue did not amount to a reasonable controversy as to whether
    Gimple was entitled to PPD benefits.
    Neither do we believe that Dr. Crabb’s scrivener’s error cre-
    ated a reasonable controversy. For all the reasons explained
    above, we find that despite the mistaken reference to
    Gimple’s right arm, it was quite clear from the context that
    it was Dr. Crabb’s intention to assign an impairment rating to
    Gimple’s left arm. As evidenced by the concession of Student
    Transportation’s counsel at oral argument, this was not a case
    in which a scrivener’s error led to confusion as to the substance
    of the testimony. Everyone involved knew the reference to
    the right arm was just a mistake. Under those circumstances,
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    we do not believe the scrivener’s error created a reason-
    able controversy.
    Having set to the side the grounds upon which the com-
    pensation court found a reasonable controversy existed, we
    are left with a stipulation that Gimple injured her left arm and
    an undisputed medical opinion that she was permanently dis-
    abled as a result of that injury. In light of these facts, we do
    not believe there was a reasonable controversy as to whether
    Gimple was entitled to PPD benefits.
    We are aware that whether a reasonable controversy exists
    under § 48-125 is a question of fact and that we will reverse
    the factual findings of the Workers’ Compensation Court only
    if we find them to be clearly wrong. See Armstrong v. State,
    
    290 Neb. 205
    , 
    859 N.W.2d 541
    (2015). In this case, however,
    we find that the compensation court was clearly wrong. We
    therefore reverse the court’s finding that a reasonable contro-
    versy existed and remand this matter with directions to award
    Gimple relief in accordance with § 48-125 and consistent with
    this opinion.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of
    the compensation court in part, and in part reverse, and remand
    the matter with directions to award Gimple relief in accord­
    ance with § 48-125 and consistent with this opinion.
    A ffirmed in part, and in part reversed
    and remanded with directions.