In re Application No. OP-0003 -- (TransCanada) , 303 Neb. 872 ( 2019 )


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    IN RE APPLICATION NO. OP-0003
    Cite as 
    303 Neb. 872
    In re A pplication No. OP-0003.
    TransCanada K eystone Pipeline, LP, et al., appellees and
    cross-appellees, v. Susan and William Dunavan et al.,
    appellants, Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota
    and Ponca Tribe of Nebraska, appellees and
    cross-appellants, and Sierra Club, Nebraska
    Chapter, et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed August 23, 2019.    No. S-17-1331.
    1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
    not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
    matter of law.
    2. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The meaning and
    interpretation of statutes and regulations are questions of law for which
    an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
    irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
    3. Constitutional Law: Due Process. The determination of whether the
    procedures afforded to an individual comport with constitutional require-
    ments for procedural due process presents a question of law.
    4. Public Service Commission: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 75-136(2) (Reissue 2018), an appellate court reviews an order of the
    Nebraska Public Service Commission de novo on the record.
    5. Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court
    reappraises the evidence as presented by the record and reaches its own
    independent conclusions concerning the matters at issue.
    6. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. Where the evidence is in con-
    flict, the Supreme Court will consider and may give weight to the fact
    that the agency hearing examiner observed the witnesses and accepted
    one version of the facts rather than another.
    7. Constitutional Law: Public Service Commission. The Nebraska Public
    Service Commission is an independent regulatory body created by the
    Nebraska Constitution in article IV, § 20.
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    8. Public Service Commission. The determination of what is consistent
    with the public interest, or public convenience and necessity, is one
    that is peculiarly for the determination of the Nebraska Public Service
    Commission.
    9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain
    and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
    pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
    direct, and unambiguous.
    10. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of
    statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
    should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the
    intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, har-
    monious, and sensible.
    11. Evidence. Unless an exception applies, only a preponderance of evi-
    dence is required in civil cases.
    12. Trial: Evidence: Proof. The burden of proof is satisfied by actual proof
    of the facts, of which proof is necessary, regardless of which party intro-
    duces the evidence.
    13. Administrative Law: Pleadings. The rules of pleading are not applied
    in administrative proceedings as strictly as they are in court proceedings.
    14. Administrative Law: Due Process: Notice. Due process requires notice
    and an opportunity for a full and fair hearing at some stage of the
    agency proceedings.
    15. Notice: Waiver. It is generally held that participation in the hearing
    waives any defect in the notice.
    16. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not
    consider an issue on appeal that was not presented to or passed upon by
    the administrative agency.
    17. Interventions: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. An order denying
    intervention is a final order for purposes of appeal.
    18. Administrative Law: Statutes. Agency regulations properly adopted
    and filed with the Secretary of State of Nebraska have the effect of
    statutory law.
    19. Rules of Evidence: Hearsay: Statutes. The Nebraska Evidence Rules
    provide that hearsay is admissible when authorized by the statutes of the
    State of Nebraska.
    20. Legislature: Courts: Evidence. The legislative branch has the right to
    prescribe the admissibility of certain categories of evidence, but it is
    solely a judicial function to determine the weight, if any, to be given
    such evidence.
    21. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a civil case, the admission or exclu-
    sion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a
    substantial right of the complaining party.
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    22. Interventions: Pleadings. Intervenors can raise only issues that sustain
    or oppose the respective contentions of the original parties.
    23. Interventions: Parties. An intervenor who is not an indispensable party
    cannot change the position of the original parties or change the nature
    and form of the action or the issues presented therein.
    24. Interventions. An intervenor cannot widen the scope of the issues,
    broaden the scope or function of the proceedings, or raise questions
    which might be the subject of litigation but which are extraneous to the
    controlling question to be decided in the case.
    Appeal from the Public Service Commission. Affirmed.
    David A. Domina and Brian E. Jorde, of Domina Law
    Group, P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, L. Jay Bartel, David
    A. Lopez, and Lynn A. Melson for appellee Nebraska Public
    Power Service Commission.
    James G. Powers and Patrick D. Pepper, of McGrath, North,
    Mullin & Kratz, P.C., L.L.O., for appellees TransCanada
    Keystone Pipeline, LP, et al.
    Jennifer S. Baker and Leonika R. Charging, of Fredericks,
    Peebles & Morgan, L.L.P., for appellee Yankton Sioux Tribe.
    Brad S. Jolly, of Brad S. Jolly & Associates, for appellee
    Ponca Tribe of Nebraska.
    Kenneth C. Winston for appellee Sierra Club, Nebraska
    Chapter.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Funke, J.
    The Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) granted
    the application filed by TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP
    (TransCanada), pursuant to the Major Oil Pipeline Siting Act
    (MOPSA), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 57-1401 to 57-1413 (Reissue
    2010 & Cum. Supp. 2018), for approval of a major oil pipeline
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    route and eminent domain authority. The PSC approved the
    “Mainline Alternative Route” (MAR), a 36-inch major oil pipe-
    line and related facilities to be constructed through Nebraska,
    from the South Dakota border in Keya Paha County, Nebraska,
    to Steele City, Nebraska. The landowners, two Indian tribes,
    and the Sierra Club, Nebraska Chapter (Sierra Club), all inter-
    vened in the proceedings. The landowners appealed, the Indian
    tribes cross-appealed, and the Sierra Club attempted to appeal
    from the PSC’s decision.
    The intervenors raise numerous arguments on appeal. Each
    of these arguments raises issues of public concern and rep-
    resents profound, deeply held beliefs. Upon de novo review
    of the PSC’s decision, we find the matters in controversy
    are resolved based on the determination of four overarching
    issues: The first, whether the PSC had jurisdiction to consider
    TransCanada’s application; the second, whether TransCanada
    met its burden of proof; the third, whether the PSC properly
    considered the MAR; and the fourth, whether the intervenors
    were afforded due process. We answer each of these questions
    in the affirmative.
    At the outset, we observe that this appeal comes to us in a
    completely different legal framework than we confronted in
    Thompson v. Heineman.1 While both cases involve the statu-
    tory process for obtaining route approval of an oil pipeline,
    the issues in this appeal are distinctly different from those in
    Thompson because here, route approval was sought from the
    PSC using the MOPSA procedure. In this opinion, we describe
    the procedures enacted by the Legislature to effectuate pro-
    ceedings under MOPSA. We discuss the record in detail and
    show that TransCanada carried its burden of proving that the
    MAR is in the public interest. We then determine that the errors
    assigned by the intervenors are without merit. Accordingly, we
    affirm the PSC’s determination that approval of the MAR is in
    the public interest.
    1
    Thompson v. Heineman, 
    289 Neb. 798
    , 
    857 N.W.2d 731
     (2015).
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    IN RE APPLICATION NO. OP-0003
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    I. BACKGROUND
    TransCanada is a limited partnership organized in Delaware
    with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. In 2008,
    TransCanada applied for a presidential permit to construct a
    pipeline across the Canadian border into the United States.
    The proposed route would have passed through the Nebraska
    Sandhills at a time when no legal standards existed in Nebraska
    to constrain an oil pipeline carrier’s right to exercise eminent
    domain authority.2 In 2011, Gov. Dave Heineman called a
    special session of the Legislature to enact siting legislation for
    pipeline routing.
    1. Siting Legislation
    The Legislature enacted MOPSA, 2011 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1,
    § 2, 1st Spec. Sess., which gave routing authority to the PSC,
    an independent regulatory body with duly elected officials.3
    MOPSA applies to a pipeline with an interior diameter larger
    than 6 inches that is built to transport petroleum products
    within, through, or across Nebraska.4 MOPSA requires a major
    oil pipeline carrier to apply for and obtain routing approval
    from the PSC before the carrier is authorized to exercise emi-
    nent domain power pursuant to § 57-1101.5
    MOPSA recognized that federal law preempts state regula-
    tion of safety issues related to oil pipelines and that Nebraska’s
    laws cannot interfere with the federal government’s uniform
    standards for pipeline safety, operation, and maintenance.6
    Consequently, the Legislature enacted MOPSA to address
    “choosing the location of the route aside and apart from safety
    considerations.”7 With MOPSA, the Legislature ­          harnessed
    2
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-1101 (Reissue 2010).
    3
    See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-509 (Reissue 2016); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-101(1)
    (Reissue 2016).
    4
    § 57-1404(2).
    5
    See §§ 57-1402(1)(c) and 57-1408(1).
    6
    § 57-1402(2).
    7
    See id.
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    Nebraska’s remaining sovereign powers with respect to oil
    pipeline construction, granted the PSC authority to conduct
    proceedings and decide applications, and determined that
    “[t]he construction of major oil pipelines in Nebraska is in the
    public interest of Nebraska . . . .”8
    In the same special session, the Legislature enacted 2011
    Neb. Laws, L.B. 4, 1st Spec. Sess., which created a sepa-
    rate procedural avenue for a pipeline carrier to obtain route
    approval. Independent from the MOPSA process, § 3 of L.B. 4
    authorized Nebraska’s Department of Environmental Quality
    (DEQ) to collaborate with any federal agency for the prep-
    aration of a supplemental environmental impact statement
    (SEIS) for oil pipelines within, through, or across Nebraska,
    in accordance with the review process under the National
    Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
    (2012).9 Once completed, the DEQ was to submit the SEIS to
    the Governor, who then would have 30 days to indicate his or
    her approval of a route in writing to the relevant federal agen-
    cies.10 Both L.B. 1 and L.B. 4 were passed with an emergency
    clause and became effective on the same date, November
    23, 2011.
    On January 18, 2012, the President of the United States
    denied TransCanada’s permit application. On April 17, 2012,
    the Legislature passed and the Governor approved 2012 Neb.
    Laws, L.B. 1161, which amended L.B. 1 and L.B. 4. In its orig-
    inal form, MOPSA did not apply to TransCanada, because the
    legislation contained an exemption for a pipeline carrier which
    had a pending application for a presidential permit.11 L.B. 1161
    eliminated that exemption, which led TransCanada to seek to
    obtain route approval from the PSC under MOPSA.12
    8
    § 57-1403(3).
    9
    L.B. 4, § 3(1).
    10
    L.B. 4, § 3(4).
    11
    L.B. 1, § 5(2).
    12
    L.B. 1161, § 4.
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    L.B. 1161 amended § 3 of L.B. 4 so that the DEQ could
    either prepare the SEIS through collaboration with federal
    agencies, as L.B. 4 originally had provided, or could indepen-
    dently evaluate a route submitted by a pipeline carrier “for the
    stated purpose of being included in a federal agency’s or agen-
    cies’ National Environmental Policy Act review process.”13
    This amendment allowed the DEQ to continue to review pos-
    sible routes for the Keystone XL pipeline project, which the
    DEQ had ceased reviewing following the President’s denial of
    TransCanada’s application for permit.
    In conducting an independent evaluation of a proposed
    route, L.B. 1161 required the DEQ to hold at least one public
    hearing, provide opportunities for public review and comment,
    and analyze “the environmental, economic, social, and other
    impacts associated with the proposed route and route alterna-
    tives in Nebraska.”14 The DEQ would then submit its evalu-
    ation of the pipeline route to the Governor, and the pipeline
    carrier could then seek the Governor’s approval of the route.15
    L.B. 1161 provided that a pipeline carrier’s authorization
    to exercise eminent domain power expires “[i]f condemna-
    tion procedures have not been commenced within two years
    after the date the Governor’s approval is granted or after the
    date of receipt of an order approving an application under
    [MOPSA].”16
    2. TransCanada Modifies Route
    In 2012, TransCanada modified the original route, which
    would have passed through the Nebraska Sandhills, based
    on recommendations provided by the DEQ. On September 5,
    2012, TransCanada filed a supplemental environmental report
    with the DEQ regarding the “reroute.” The “reroute” avoided
    13
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-1503(1)(a)(i) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
    14
    Id.
    15
    See, § 57-1503(4); § 57-1101 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
    16
    § 57-1101 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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    the Sandhills and other areas of fragile soils and shallow
    groundwater identified by the DEQ. On January 3, 2013, the
    DEQ submitted a final evaluation report to the Governor in
    accordance with L.B. 1161. On January 22, the Governor
    approved the “reroute” in a letter to the President and the U.S.
    Department of State (the Department), asking that the DEQ’s
    evaluation be included in the federal SEIS report. TransCanada
    filed condemnation actions, which were later dismissed follow-
    ing litigation challenging the constitutionality of L.B. 1161.
    More than 2 years passed after the Governor’s approval of the
    route, and TransCanada no longer proceeded on that approval.
    On January 24, 2017, the President invited TransCanada to
    resubmit its permit application, which TransCanada accom-
    plished 2 days later. On February 16, TransCanada filed an
    application with the PSC for approval of a major oil pipeline
    route. On March 23, the Department granted TransCanada a
    presidential permit.
    3. TransCanada’s A pplication to PSC
    TransCanada’s application to the PSC sought approval of
    a route designated as the “Preferred Route” (PR), which was
    “refined to reflect the recommendations made by the [DEQ]
    and the Governor’s approval.” The “reroute” submitted to
    the DEQ in 2012 “was used as the basis for developing the
    [PR].” The PR is 275.2 miles long and begins at the Nebraska-
    South Dakota border in Keya Paha County and passes through
    the Nebraska counties of Keya Paha, Boyd, Holt, Antelope,
    Boone, Nance, Merrick, Polk, York, Fillmore, and Saline
    before terminating in Steele City.
    The application referred to two alternative routes, the MAR
    and the “Sandhills Alternative Route” (SAR). TransCanada
    developed each of the three routes with the goal of utiliz-
    ing the “existing fixed starting point” at the Nebraska-South
    Dakota border in Keya Paha County, north of Mills, Nebraska,
    and the “existing fixed ending point” at the pump station in
    Steele City, which is the end point of the pipeline system
    already existing in Nebraska, known as Keystone I. Keystone I
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    runs north and south through the Nebraska counties of Cedar,
    Wayne, Stanton, Colfax, Butler, Seward, Saline, and Jefferson.
    The PR and the MAR run southeastward and were designed to
    avoid passing through the Sandhills, an ecological region as
    defined by the DEQ.
    The PR would run across the southwest corner of Boyd
    County and then cross the Keya Paha River; enter Holt County
    crossing the Niobrara River; cross the Elkhorn River in
    Antelope County, through Boone County; and cross the Loup
    River in Nance County. The route would then turn and cross
    the northeastern corner of Merrick County; cross the Platte
    River; enter Polk County and continue south through York,
    Fillmore, and Saline Counties; and end in Jefferson County.
    The PR would parallel Keystone I for 7.3 miles and would
    require five pump stations.
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    The SAR is the route TransCanada initially proposed in
    2008. TransCanada’s application stated: “Compared to the
    [SAR], the overall footprint of the [PR] represents less envi-
    ronmental impact by avoiding the Sandhills region and mini-
    mizing impacts to areas with characteristics similar to the
    Sandhills, including shallow groundwater and fragile soils.”
    The MAR would “follow the [PR] for 110 miles to just
    south of the Elkhorn River in Antelope County, then head in
    a southeasterly direction across Madison and Stanton coun-
    ties for approximately 43 miles to intercept [Keystone I],” and
    head south and parallel Keystone I for 97.6 miles, crossing
    Shell Creek and the Platte River in Colfax County. Based on
    the DEQ’s recommendation, TransCanada adjusted the route
    to divert from Keystone I for 29.8 miles to avoid the “Seward
    County Wellhead Protection Area.” The route then rejoins
    Keystone I and continues through Saline County to Jefferson
    County. The MAR would be 5 miles longer than the PR and
    would require a total of six pump stations.
    TransCanada stated in the application that it viewed the PR
    to be superior to the MAR, because the MAR would require
    a greater total number of acres; increase the crossing of the
    ranges of federally recognized threatened and endangered spe-
    cies; increase the crossing of highly erodible soils; increase the
    crossing of unusually sensitive ecological areas; and increase
    crossings of perennial streams, railroads, and roads. Despite
    the MAR’s advantages due to its co-location with Keystone I,
    TransCanada considered the PR to be more beneficial than the
    MAR, because the PR was shorter and required one fewer
    pump station.
    The application included a reclamation and revegetation plan
    to fully restore lands disturbed by construction along the route
    to their preconstruction capabilities. Under the Oil Pipeline
    Reclamation Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-3301 to 76-3308
    (Reissue 2018), TransCanada is responsible for all reclama-
    tion costs necessary as a result of constructing and operating
    the pipeline, except to the extent another party is determined
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    to be responsible.17 TransCanada intends to revegetate the
    pipeline right-of-way as near as practicable to preconstruc-
    tion conditions to ensure equivalent land capability following
    construction and the establishment of native plant communities
    along the pipeline. TransCanada represented that it will abide
    by § 76-3304(3) and keep its reclamation and maintenance
    obligations until the pipeline is permanently decommissioned
    or removed.
    The application specified that the pipeline would be 36 inches
    in diameter for the entire length of the route. Construction
    would occur in a linear segmented fashion within a 110-foot-
    wide construction right-of-way, consisting of a 60-foot tem-
    porary right-of-way and a 50-foot permanent easement. The
    width of the construction right-of-way may be decreased or
    increased to address natural resource or engineering concerns.
    Moreover, TransCanada stated it will adjust the route “to the
    extent practicable” to avoid culturally significant sites. In addi-
    tion to the installation of the pipeline, the PR required the con-
    struction and operation of permanent aboveground structures,
    including 5 pump stations and 19 intermediate mainline valves.
    The pump stations would be built on purchased land ranging
    from 7 to 17 acres. Each intermediate mainline valve would be
    constructed within a fenced site, approximately 50 feet by 50
    feet, located within the 50-foot-wide easement.
    TransCanada concluded its application by stating that the
    PR had been thoroughly evaluated by federal and state agen-
    cies, was designed to mitigate impacts to natural resources,
    and ensured minimal impacts to the orderly development and
    growth of the region. In its prayer for relief, TransCanada
    requested an order from the PSC that the PR is in the pub-
    lic interest.
    4. Prehearing M atters
    The PSC published notice of TransCanada’s application in
    The Daily Record, a legal newspaper in Omaha, Nebraska, on
    17
    § 76-3304(1).
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    February 20, 2017, and set the deadline for formal intervention
    for March 22. TransCanada filed proof of service of its appli-
    cation on the agencies listed in § 57-1407(3), as well as proof
    of notice to Antelope, Boone, Boyd, Fillmore, Holt, Jefferson,
    Keya Paha, Merrick, Nance, Polk, Saline, and York Counties.
    TransCanada later filed proof that notice of the application was
    filed in newspapers of general circulation in those counties.
    Numerous groups and individuals filed petitions to inter-
    vene in the proceedings based on property, economic, natural
    resource, social, cultural, and territorial interests. On March
    30, 2017, TransCanada filed objections to certain petitions for
    intervention, arguing that the asserted legal rights or interests
    would not be affected due to the narrow scope of the proceed-
    ings. TransCanada argued that MOPSA does not provide a
    forum to litigate whether or not a major oil pipeline should be
    constructed, but instead is limited to the issue of whether or not
    to approve a particular pipeline route.
    On March 31, 2017, the hearing officer for the PSC issued an
    “Order on Formal Intervention Petitions.” The order explained
    that, under § 57-1408(2), the applicable statutory deadline for
    the PSC’s decision was “eight months after the issuance of a
    presidential permit authorizing the construction of the major oil
    pipeline.” The presidential permit for the pipeline was issued
    on March 23, which meant that the PSC was required to issue
    its final decision on the application by November 23. The order
    stated that the decisions on the petitions for intervention were
    reached by balancing the strict deadline under MOPSA with
    the need to produce a complete record and afford all interested
    parties an opportunity to be heard.
    The order granted petitions for formal intervention filed by
    the landowners with no limitations or conditions. The order
    granted petitions for formal intervention filed by three dif-
    ferent unions: the Midwest Regional Office of the Laborers
    International Union of America (LiUNA); the International
    Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 265; and
    the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
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    Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and
    Canada, AFL-CIO (UA). The order imposed conditions on the
    unions’ participation by ordering them to jointly offer testi-
    mony from one witness at the public hearing, participate in
    limited discovery, collaborate on cross-examination of up to 1
    hour per witness, and submit one joint brief.
    The order granted petitions for formal intervention filed
    by the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska (Ponca) and the Yankton
    Sioux Tribe of South Dakota (Yankton Sioux). Ponca’s peti-
    tion stated it had a direct interest in the proceedings because
    the routes pass through its traditional, aboriginal, and federally
    recognized territory, which contains “historic, cultural, sacred
    and archaeological natural resources.” Yankton Sioux’s petition
    stated that the proposed pipeline would “traverse [its] ancestral
    territory” and that it had an interest in preserving “cultural,
    spiritual, and historic sites.” The hearing officer found that
    “neither petition cite[d] a legally cognizable current real prop-
    erty interest in land encompassing the route,” but noted that
    § 57-1407(4)(d) requires the PSC “to consider evidence of the
    social impacts of the project,” and found that evaluating social
    impacts could encompass cultural, anthropological, and histori-
    cal issues. The order imposed conditions on the tribes’ petitions
    similar to those imposed on the unions.
    The order granted petitions for formal intervention, subject
    to the same or similar conditions, filed by groups and indi-
    viduals asserting environmental and natural resource interests,
    including Bold Alliance and the Sierra Club. The order stated
    that under MOPSA, the PSC is prohibited from evaluating
    safety considerations such as “the risk or impact of spills
    or leaks from the major oil pipeline,” but found that the
    PSC could appropriately consider issues such as the proposed
    route’s “environmental impact, soil permeability, distance to
    groundwater, and impact on plant life and wildlife.”
    The order on the petitions for intervention concluded with
    a separate section devoted to addressing the MAR. The order
    stated that “[MOPSA] requires the [PSC] to consider whether
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    any other utility corridor exists that could feasibly and benefi-
    cially be used for the route of the major oil pipeline,” and that
    the MAR “partially parallels [Keystone I].” The order there-
    fore “encourage[d] all parties to provide evidence regarding
    the feasibility and potential benefits and/or drawbacks of the
    [MAR].” The order granted each intervenor group permission
    to call an additional witness and offer accompanying exhibits
    to provide evidence concerning the MAR. The order noted that
    the SAR “was previously rejected by Nebraska authorities” and
    therefore has “already effectively been determined to not be a
    viable option.”
    On April 5, 2017, the hearing officer entered a case man-
    agement order. The order set a prehearing conference for July
    31 and announced that a public hearing on TransCanada’s
    application would commence on August 7 in Lincoln,
    Nebraska. The order stated that the PSC may hold public
    meetings “for the purpose of receiving input from the public”
    and that “[a]ny comments received will be made a part of
    the permanent record of this proceeding.” All parties were
    required to submit written testimony in advance and make
    witnesses available for cross-examination at the public hear-
    ing. The order stated that “any/all Hearing Officer Orders . . .
    will apply to and bind all parties, will control the course of
    the proceedings, and may be modified only by order of the
    Hearing Officer.”
    The PSC published notice of the public hearing on
    TransCanada’s application in The Daily Record newspaper
    on April 11, 2017. The notice also announced that the PSC
    would hold a public meeting in Lincoln on April 18. The PSC
    published notice of its August 7 public hearing in newspapers
    in counties along the MAR and the PR, and sent letters to the
    governing bodies of the cities and counties along both routes
    notifying them that the pipeline route could pass through their
    jurisdiction and seeking their views on whether that would be
    in the public interest. The letters indicated that the application
    was available on the PSC’s website.
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    On May 3, 2017, the PSC held a public meeting in York,
    Nebraska. On May 10, “after careful and thoughtful delibera-
    tion and reflection of the variety of public comment received by
    the [PSC] at the [public meeting],” the hearing officer entered
    an order “[m]odifying [c]ase [m]anagement [p]lan and [i]nter-
    vention [o]rder.” The order allowed each intervenor group to
    present testimony from two witnesses, in addition to a “witness
    regarding the [MAR] as detailed in the [intervention order].”
    On June 7 and 28 and July 26, 2017, the PSC held addi-
    tional public meetings in York, O’Neill, Norfolk, and Ralston,
    Nebraska, respectively, and received over 450 oral and written
    comments from the public.
    5. Public Hearing
    The PSC held a public hearing on TransCanada’s application
    from August 7 to 10, 2017, in Lincoln. TransCanada submitted
    prefiled direct examination testimony from 10 witnesses, pre-
    sented each witness for cross-examination, and filed rebuttal
    testimony from 6 witnesses. The landowner intervenors pre-
    filed testimony from 61 witnesses and offered live testimony
    from 10 landowners and 1 expert witness. Ponca and Yankton
    Sioux each presented testimony from one witness. The natu-
    ral resource intervenors presented testimony from three wit-
    nesses, and the union groups presented testimony from two
    witnesses.
    We provide a summary of the presentation of evidence at the
    public hearing, along with context added from the thousands of
    pages of pleadings, exhibits, testimony, and briefs in the record
    before the PSC.
    (a) TransCanada Testimony
    (i) Tony Palmer
    Tony Palmer is the president of TransCanada Keystone
    Pipeline GP, LLC, and TransCanada Keystone, LLC, which
    together own 100 percent of TransCanada, a company orga-
    nized for the purposes of owning and constructing pipelines
    which transport crude oil from Canada to the United States.
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    Palmer is responsible for development and oversight of the
    pipeline project. He testified in support of the request for
    approval of the PR as set forth in the application. Palmer stated
    the PR was designed by drawing the “shortest footprint . . .
    from Hardisty, Alberta, to Steele City.”
    Palmer estimated the initial use of the pipeline would be
    20 years, which could be extended to 50 years if it was well
    maintained. Palmer confirmed that TransCanada is responsible
    for all reclamation costs associated with the project, unless
    another party is determined to be responsible. Palmer repre-
    sented that TransCanada and all affiliated parties will not claim
    any tax deductions, exemptions, credits, refunds, or rebates
    under the Nebraska Advantage Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-5701
    to 77-5735 (Reissue 2009), and testified that “we do not con-
    sider selling the route an option.” Palmer stated that based on
    TransCanada’s studies and the studies conducted by the DEQ
    and the Department, he considered the PR to be superior to
    the MAR.
    (ii) Paul Fuhrer
    Paul Fuhrer, the project manager for TransCanada USA
    Services Inc., testified regarding the construction process for
    the proposed pipeline and pump stations. Fuhrer stated the
    top of the pipeline will sit a minimum of 4 feet below the
    surface of land, and a minimum of 25 feet below the surface
    of a water stream. Each pump station will be placed an aver-
    age of 55 miles apart and utilize approximately 8 to 10 acres
    of land, but could utilize up to 17 acres. Shutoff valves will
    be placed at intervals along the pipeline, based on hydraulics
    and other factors, and located within a 50-foot-by-50-foot
    fenced enclosure.
    Fuhrer testified about the trenching operations designed
    to provide sufficient width and depth to support the pipeline.
    The construction and installation of a new pipeline would
    require segregating topsoil from subsoil 110 feet across, and
    digging trenches that are approximately 8 feet wide and 7
    feet deep.
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    (iii) Ernie Goss
    Dr. Ernie Goss, a professor of economics at Creighton
    University and the principal of the “Goss Institute,” testified
    regarding his “socioeconomic” impacts report. Goss concluded
    that the pipeline project would generate economic activity in
    Nebraska such as sales, wages, and jobs, and would contribute
    to the state and local tax bases. He estimated that construction
    of the pipeline would result in positive state and local tax rev-
    enue to exceed $264 million through the year 2034. Goss con-
    cluded that during the 2-year construction period, the project
    would generate a total of over $890 million in Nebraska, with a
    labor income of $326.6 million supporting an average of 3,397
    jobs per year. He estimated that, during the operations period
    from 2020 through 2034, there would be an economic impact
    in Nebraska of $1.2 billion in output/sales, with labor income
    of $415.5 million supporting an average of 371.7 jobs per year.
    For property tax purposes, Goss considered the pipeline to be a
    15-year asset which would depreciate out, except to the extent
    that facilities are added, replaced, or maintained.
    Goss employed an input-output method, a type of applied
    economics analysis that “tracks the interdependence among
    various producing and consuming sectors of an economy.”
    For example, Goss asserted that each $1 million TransCanada
    spends on construction would create a net economic gain of
    $286,522 in Nebraska and that each $1 million TransCanada
    spends on operation would create a net gain of $150,000. Goss
    used “IMPLAN” software in forecasting the economic impact
    of the pipeline. IMPLAN combines input-output analysis with
    regional-specific statistics. Goss stated that IMPLAN is a
    widely used and accepted multiplier system, but agreed that
    IMPLAN is limited in its ability to determine whether “jobs
    or output are new or already existing and are simply being
    reallocated from other uses.”
    Goss’ report did not disclose the scope of his engagement,
    but he stated that he was engaged to update his report, initially
    published in 2013, to reflect the most current data. He did not
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    recall how much he had been paid by TransCanada. He admit-
    ted the report was not peer reviewed and stated: “The goal was
    to do a study that made sense to the woman and man on the
    street . . . .”
    (iv) Sandra Barnett
    Sandra Barnett, an environmental specialist for TransCanada
    Corporation, testified regarding environmental issues. Her tes-
    timony reiterated TransCanada’s commitment to comply with
    the Oil Pipeline Reclamation Act and to minimize potential
    impacts on land areas and natural resources. Barnett admit-
    ted that for affected cropland, “[t]here would be temporary
    yield loss during construction and perhaps for a period of
    time afterward,” but stated that TransCanada will reclaim and
    revegetate the right-of-way and work with the affected land-
    owners to return it “as close as we can make it” to preconstruc-
    tion condition.
    Barnett stated that if a dispute occurs between TransCanada
    and a landowner about the postconstruction condition of land,
    the parties will reach a resolution by consulting the Natural
    Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), a division of the U.S.
    Department of Agriculture, or other agencies, and include them
    in the discussion in order to reach a resolution. Regarding sur-
    face water resources, Barnett admitted that during construction,
    there potentially will be temporary degradation to groundwater
    quality and aquatic habitat, as well as bank stability.
    (v) John Beaver
    John Beaver, a project manager, ecologist, and reclama-
    tion specialist with an environmental services company, has
    been the senior reclamation specialist and special-status
    species biologist for the project since 2009. He stated that
    TransCanada will monitor the condition of the right-of-way
    during the pipeline’s entire operational life. He admitted that
    TransCanada’s land surveys and “Construction Mitigation
    and Reclamation Plan” (CMRP) for Nebraska have not been
    updated since 2012.
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    (vi) Michael Portnoy
    Michael Portnoy, the president and chief executive officer
    of an environmental consulting and engineering firm, is the
    lead hydrologist and project manager for soil permeability and
    distance-to-groundwater surveys. He has academic degrees in
    geology, geochemistry, hydrology, and business administration.
    He testified that there is a wide diversification of soil along the
    PR; he did not separately study the soil along the MAR.
    (vii) Dr. Jon Schmidt
    Dr. Jon Schmidt, vice president of the management con-
    tractor for the pipeline project, helped prepare TransCanada’s
    application. He testified the application compared the different
    routes based on the number of acres disturbed, federally listed
    threatened and endangered species, amount of highly erodible
    soils, ecologically sensitive areas, and number of crossings of
    perennial streams, railroads, and roads. He did not analyze the
    route referred to as the “I-90 Route,” which would co-locate
    with the entire length of Keystone I.
    On cross-examination, Schmidt agreed that the MAR “ha[d]
    potential environmental benefits due to its co-location with
    [Keystone I].” He agreed that the PR crosses five Nebraska
    rivers and the MAR crosses only two rivers, but stated the
    MAR crosses more “perennial waterbodies.” He agreed that
    according to a map received in evidence, both the PR and the
    MAR cross the “Ponca Trail of Tears.”
    (viii) Meera Kothari
    Meera Kothari, a professional engineer and manager for
    TransCanada, helped prepare the section of the application
    which addressed the possible routes. She agreed that the MAR
    could “feasibly” and “beneficially” be used in Nebraska. She
    testified that the MAR’s deviation from Keystone I in Seward
    County was to “avoid the wellhead protection area based
    on the feedback from the DEQ” and confirmed that “there
    are no wellhead protection area issues on either” the PR or
    the MAR.
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    (b) Landowner Intervenors
    Testimony
    The PSC heard testimony from the landowners focusing on
    issues of soil compaction, topsoil loss, wind and water erosion,
    soil blowouts and slides, adverse impacts to crops based on
    increased soil temperature, and proximity of pipeline construc-
    tion to water sources. The landowners also provided expert
    testimony on the issue of economic impact.
    (i) Arthur Tanderup
    Arthur Tanderup owns farmland in Antelope County. He
    and his wife conduct no-till, irrigated farming and raise corn,
    native corn, soybeans, and rye. He described his land as highly
    erodible and testified that construction will interfere with the
    topsoil and the benefits of no-till farming.
    (ii) Frank Morrison
    Frank Morrison owns farmland in Antelope County, where
    he and his wife produce popcorn, edible beans, and peanuts.
    The land farmed by Morrison contains 65 irrigation wells.
    He testified the proposed route runs approximately 11⁄2 miles
    from his processing facilities and intersects his property almost
    in half.
    (iii) Robert Krutz
    Robert Krutz owns land in Antelope County. He and his
    wife raise “natural beef,” corn, and soybeans. Krutz testified
    that the construction could put his natural beef certification at
    risk, which would affect his market sales. He stated his con-
    cerns about the continued revegetation of his land which sup-
    ports his livestock.
    (iv) Jeanne Crumly
    Jeanne Crumly owns land in Holt County. She and her
    husband conduct no-till, irrigated farming and raise corn, soy-
    beans, hay, and potatoes. She testified that the pipeline will
    impact erodible and permeable soils.
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    (v) Bonny Kilmurry
    Bonny Kilmurry owns land in Holt County. She and her
    husband have a cow-calf operation, and they harvest hay
    from pastureland. Her land contains subirrigated meadows
    with water close to the surface, as well as highly erodible soils,
    which she described as being similar to Sandhills land.
    (vi) Diana Steskal
    Diana Steskal owns land in Holt County. Steskal owns
    no-till, irrigated farmland that produces wheat, corn, soybeans,
    edible beans, and popcorn, and she urged for the protection of
    the natural resources on her land.
    (vii) Andy Grier
    Andy Grier is a manager of a ranch in Holt County. He tes-
    tified about the pipeline’s crossing of the Niobrara River, the
    potential soil erosion from land clearing, and the proximity of
    the pipeline to his ranch’s water supplies.
    (viii) Robert Allpress
    Robert Allpress owns ranchland on the eastern border of
    Keya Paha County. He stated the proposed route will cross
    through fragile soil that is susceptible to blowouts and slides
    and that many plants and animals will be endangered. He testi-
    fied he has observed a bald eagle’s nest and whooping cranes
    in areas near his property. In addition, he testified that mem-
    bers of the Ponca and Yankton Sioux have surveyed his prop-
    erty and have identified “culturally significant sites.”
    (ix) Dr. Michael O’Hara
    Dr. Michael O’Hara, an economics professor at the
    University of Nebraska at Omaha, analyzed the economic
    impact of the proposed pipeline in Nebraska and reviewed
    Goss’ socioeconomic report. O’Hara opined that the pipeline
    would decrease the value of property on the route by approxi-
    mately 15 percent, and he concluded that the pipeline would
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    “reduce the emotional attitude of property owners towards
    their property.” On cross-examination, he admitted that he
    did not evaluate the Department’s conclusion that the proj-
    ect would not have a negative impact on property values and
    would have a positive economic impact through job creation
    and earnings. He opined that the project would create few
    permanent jobs. He disagreed with Goss’ conclusions about
    the increased property tax revenues generated by the pipeline,
    but acknowledged that TransCanada will be obligated to pay
    significant sales and use taxes.
    (c) Yankton Sioux Testimony
    Jason Cooke, a member of the Yankton Sioux’s business
    and claims committee, the executive body of Yankton Sioux,
    testified the pipeline would cross the tribe’s ancestral territory
    and would disturb cultural resources. Cooke said he expected
    that the pipeline would encounter burials, ceremonial areas,
    historic trails, and food and medicine gathering areas. In
    addition, he objected to a temporary camp that TransCanada
    may build for its pipeline workers approximately 40 miles
    from a Yankton Sioux reservation. Cooke stated that such
    camps are a source of violence and drugs and that the
    pipeline workers would be drawn to the tribe’s casino in
    South Dakota.
    (d) Ponca Testimony
    Shannon Wright, the Ponca’s tribal historic preservation
    officer, stated that the PR and the MAR cross the Ponca Trail
    of Tears and that construction of either route could damage
    or destroy historic sites. Wright stated that the MAR would
    cross near Ponca’s service areas in the Nebraska counties of
    Boyd, Holt, Madison, Stanton, and Platte. Wright agreed that
    impacts from construction would be alleviated if TransCanada
    conducted the cultural surveys identified in the “Programmatic
    Agreement” (PA) and that there will be time before construc-
    tion for TransCanada to complete these surveys.
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    (e) Natural Resources Intervenors Testimony
    (i) Dr. Paul Johnsgard
    Dr. Paul Johnsgard, a University of Nebraska-Lincoln profes-
    sor emeritus of biological sciences, has extensively researched
    the biology of whooping cranes. Johnsgard asserted that the
    pipeline would require placing additional electric transmission
    lines in the whooping cranes’ central migration path. He agreed
    that the risk posed by the project is “small.”
    (ii) Dr. Thomas David Hayes
    Dr. Thomas David Hayes, the lead scientist and executive
    director of a nonprofit corporation providing research and
    technical services on environmental matters, testified the pipe-
    line project would adversely impact natural resources “due to
    decreased soil permeability and increased soil compaction in
    both natural areas and croplands.” He further stated that con-
    struction would “seriously deplete native prairie.” Comparing
    the PR and the MAR, Hayes concluded that “the [MAR’s]
    impact upon federally listed species is significantly less than
    that of the [PR], primarily due to the [MAR’s] impacting
    84.6 fewer miles of whooping crane habitat.” He stated that
    the application
    downplays the measurable benefits of co-locating the
    [MAR]. With 88.3 and 102.2 more miles, respectively,
    of pipeline and total co-location, compared to the [PR],
    the [MAR] substantially decreases its overall impact
    by reworking far more industrially impacted areas and,
    consequently, reducing impacts to relatively undisturbed
    land. . . . [I]n this manner, irreparable damage to impor-
    tant natural resources, including native soils and grass-
    lands, is proportionally reduced.
    (iii) Joseph Trungale
    Joseph Trungale, a consultant specializing in hydrology
    and instream flows, testified about the physical, chemical,
    and biological impacts associated with the pipeline’s interac-
    tion with stream channels. He stated there was insufficient
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    information about mitigation of stream channel erosion and
    that shallow aquifers could be affected.
    (f) Economic Intervenors Testimony
    (i) David Barnett
    David Barnett, an international representative assigned to the
    pipeline and gas distribution department for UA, testified that
    UA has worked with TransCanada on several recent projects
    and that the pipeline project would have a positive economic
    impact on UA. He estimated that UA could expect 564 jobs for
    the construction phase of the project.
    (ii) Bill Gerhard
    Bill Gerhard, a special representative of LiUNA, testified
    that the pipeline project would have a positive economic
    impact on LiUNA and its members. He stated the project
    would create several different types of energy-related jobs,
    including pipeline construction and pump station jobs.
    6. Closing A rguments
    In their written closing remarks, the landowner intervenors
    argued that TransCanada’s application should be denied for
    failure of proof. The landowners argued in the alternative that
    the PSC had the power to approve an alternate route, so long
    as the route followed Keystone I.
    Bold Alliance and the Sierra Club asserted in their written
    closing argument that “[the] PSC has the authority to approve
    or disapprove of each route location by considering the ben-
    efits and feasibility of each of the proposed routes.” They
    argued that the PR should be denied, because it has more nega-
    tive impacts than the MAR, and that the PSC should approve
    the I-90 Route.
    Ponca opposed both the PR and the MAR. Yankton Sioux
    argued about the risks associated with the camps for pipeline
    workers. The unions urged the PSC’s approval of the applica-
    tion, because the project would bring jobs and other tangible
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    economic benefits to their members and the communities in
    which they reside and work.
    7. PSC’s Order Granting
    TransCanada’s A pplication
    On November 20, 2017, the PSC issued an order approving
    TransCanada’s application, by a 3-to-2 vote, and finding the
    MAR to be in the public interest. The PSC began its findings by
    stating that MOPSA limits the PSC’s authority to “a review of
    the proposed route only. The [PSC] is not to determine whether
    or not the pipeline project, or the pipeline itself, should be
    built.” (Emphasis in original.) The PSC further stated, “[T]he
    Legislature has given the [PSC] the limited responsibility of
    determining whether the route of the pipeline is in the public
    interest.” In making its public interest determination, the PSC
    discussed and analyzed each of the eight factors for consider-
    ation under § 57-1407(4), which provides:
    The pipeline carrier shall have the burden to establish that
    the proposed route of the major oil pipeline would serve
    the public interest. In determining whether the pipeline
    carrier has met its burden, the commission shall not eval-
    uate safety considerations, including the risk or impact of
    spills or leaks from the major oil pipeline, but the com-
    mission shall evaluate:
    (a) Whether the pipeline carrier has demonstrated com-
    pliance with all applicable state statutes, rules, and regu-
    lations and local ordinances;
    (b) Evidence of the impact due to intrusion upon
    natural resources and not due to safety of the proposed
    route of the major oil pipeline to the natural resources of
    Nebraska, including evidence regarding the irreversible
    and irretrievable commitments of land areas and con-
    nected natural resources and the depletion of beneficial
    uses of the natural resources;
    (c) Evidence of methods to minimize or mitigate the
    potential impacts of the major oil pipeline to natural
    resources;
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    (d) Evidence regarding the economic and social impacts
    of the major oil pipeline;
    (e) Whether any other utility corridor exists that could
    feasibly and beneficially be used for the route of the
    major oil pipeline;
    (f) The impact of the major oil pipeline on the orderly
    development of the area around the proposed route of the
    major oil pipeline;
    (g) The reports of the agencies filed pursuant to sub-
    section (3) of this section; and
    (h) The views of the governing bodies of the counties
    and municipalities in the area around the proposed route
    of the major oil pipeline.
    The PSC found that TransCanada had produced sufficient
    evidence to satisfy the relevant statutory considerations. The
    PSC gave significant weight to subsection (e), and ultimately
    approved the MAR rather than the PR based on that subsec-
    tion. The PSC found that the MAR utilized an existing utility
    corridor, Keystone I, for approximately 100 miles. The PSC
    declined to approve the I-90 Route, because TransCanada’s
    construction permit in South Dakota required crossing into
    Nebraska in Keya Paha County, and the entry point for the I-90
    Route is over 100 miles to the east.
    The PSC found that “the [PR] fails to take advantage of
    any opportunity to co-locate with the existing utility corridor
    represented by Keystone I, and therefore we are unable to con-
    clude that the [PR] is in the public interest.” The PSC relied
    on testimony provided by TransCanada’s engineer, Kothari,
    who stated that the MAR was viable and beneficial. The PSC
    stated, “We see many benefits to maximizing the co-location
    of the Keystone XL Pipeline with Keystone I. It is in the pub-
    lic interest for the pipelines to be in closer proximity to each
    other, so as to maximize monitoring resources and increase the
    efficiency of response times.” The PSC further agreed with the
    intervenors that the MAR impacts fewer miles of endangered
    species and has other comparative environmental benefits. The
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    PSC stated, “[TransCanada] cites the additional [5] miles in
    length and one . . . additional pumping station as negatives
    against the [MAR]. However, we feel the benefits of maximiz-
    ing co-location opportunities and utilizing the existing utility
    corridor that is . . . Keystone I . . . outweighs these concerns.”
    The PSC found that the MAR “is in the public interest and
    shall be approved,” and granted TransCanada’s application.
    8. Motions for R econsideration
    Several parties moved for reconsideration. TransCanada’s
    motion requested leave to file an amended application “to make
    the [MAR] [TransCanada’s] [PR].”18 Following oral argument,
    the PSC denied the motions. The landowner intervenors filed a
    notice of appeal. We moved the case to our docket on our own
    motion pursuant to our authority to regulate the caseloads of
    the appellate courts of this state.19
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The landowners assign, restated and consolidated, that (1)
    the PSC lacked jurisdiction to consider the application, (2) the
    PSC erred in finding that TransCanada sustained its burden of
    proof, (3) the PSC erred by approving the MAR, (4) the PSC
    erred in admitting hearsay evidence under § 57-1407(2) and
    (3), and (5) the PSC erred in denying the landowners proce-
    dural due process. The landowners also assert constitutional
    challenges to various statutes.
    On cross-appeal, Ponca assigns, restated, that (1) the PSC
    erred in limiting its participation to social and cultural issues
    and limiting its witnesses and cross-examination time; (2)
    the PSC erred in approving the MAR because TransCanada
    never applied for approval of the MAR, the notice require-
    ments related to the MAR were not met, and TransCanada
    did not meet its burden of proof with respect to the MAR;
    and (3) the PSC erred in limiting its consideration of historic
    18
    Brief for appellee TransCanada at 11.
    19
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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    and cultural resources to those covered by the National
    Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq. (Supp.
    III 2015).
    On cross-appeal, Yankton Sioux assigns, restated and con-
    solidated, that the PSC erred by (1) approving a route which
    does not serve the public interest, (2) violating Yankton Sioux’s
    procedural due process and equal protection rights, and (3)
    applying § 84-912.02 of the Administrative Procedure Act
    (APA)20 instead of the PSC’s intervention regulations to limit
    Yankton Sioux’s participation. Yankton Sioux also joins in the
    errors assigned by the landowner appellants.
    The Sierra Club filed a brief but did not include any assign-
    ments of error.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1-3] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a
    factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law.21 The meaning and interpretation of statutes and regula-
    tions are questions of law for which an appellate court has an
    obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of
    the decision made by the court below.22 The determination of
    whether the procedures afforded to an individual comport with
    constitutional requirements for procedural due process presents
    a question of law.23
    [4-6] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-136(2) (Reissue 2018),
    an appellate court reviews an order of the PSC de novo on
    the record.24 In a review de novo on the record, an appellate
    20
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-901 to 84-920 (Reissue 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
    21
    In re Grand Jury of Douglas Cty., 
    302 Neb. 128
    , 
    922 N.W.2d 226
     (2019).
    22
    In re Petition of Golden Plains Servs. Transp., 
    297 Neb. 105
    , 
    898 N.W.2d 670
     (2017).
    23
    Cain v. Custer Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    298 Neb. 834
    , 
    906 N.W.2d 285
     (2018).
    24
    In re Application No. B-1829, 293 Neb 485, 
    880 N.W.2d 51
     (2016);
    Telrite Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., 
    288 Neb. 866
    , 
    852 N.W.2d 910
     (2014). See In re Claims Against Pierce Elevator, 
    291 Neb. 798
    , 
    868 N.W.2d 781
     (2015).
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    court reappraises the evidence as presented by the record
    and reaches its own independent conclusions concerning the
    matters at issue.25 When an appellate court makes a de novo
    review, it does not mean that the court ignores the findings of
    fact made by the agency and the fact that the agency saw and
    heard the witnesses who appeared at its hearing.26 Where the
    evidence is in conflict, the Supreme Court will consider and
    may give weight to the fact that the agency hearing examiner
    observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts
    rather than another.27
    Lastly, Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(D)(1)(d), (e), and (f)
    (rev. 2014) requires that the brief of an appellant include a
    separate section for assignments of error, designated as such
    by a heading, and also requires that the section be located after
    a statement of the case and before a list of controlling propo-
    sitions of law.28 When a party fails to follow the rules of the
    Nebraska Supreme Court, an appellate court may proceed as
    though the party had failed to file a brief or, alternatively, may
    examine the proceedings for plain error.29
    The Sierra Club attempted to file an appeal in this case, but
    failed to set forth any assignment of error in its brief. In addi-
    tion to considering the assignments of error raised by the land-
    owners, Ponca, and Yankton Sioux, we will consider whether
    the PSC committed plain error. Plain error is error plainly
    evident from the record and of such a nature that to leave it
    25
    Id.
    26
    See, Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi v. Dolan, 
    251 Neb. 457
    , 
    558 N.W.2d 303
     (1997); Department of Health v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc., 
    227 Neb. 116
    , 
    416 N.W.2d 222
     (1987).
    27
    Dieter v. State, 
    228 Neb. 368
    , 
    422 N.W.2d 560
     (1988).
    28
    Steffy v. Steffy, 
    287 Neb. 529
    , 
    843 N.W.2d 655
     (2014); In re Interest of
    Jamyia M., 
    281 Neb. 964
    , 
    800 N.W.2d 259
     (2011).
    29
    Steffy v. Steffy, supra note 28. See In re Interest of Jamyia M., supra
    note 28.
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    uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation,
    or fairness of the judicial process.30
    IV. ANALYSIS
    [7] The PSC is an independent regulatory body created by
    the Nebraska Constitution in article IV, § 20.31 The powers
    and duties of the PSC include the “general control of common
    carriers as the Legislature may provide by law.”32 The constitu-
    tional provision creating the PSC must be liberally construed to
    effectuate the purpose for which the PSC was created, which is
    to serve the public interest.33 In the absence of specific legisla-
    tion, the powers and duties of the PSC, as enumerated in the
    constitution, are absolute and unqualified.34
    [8] We have repeatedly said that the determination of what
    is consistent with the public interest, or public convenience
    and necessity, is one that is peculiarly for the determination
    of the PSC.35 “‘[C]ourts must give substantial deference to
    [the PSC’s] judgment about how best to serve the public
    interest.’”36 We have made this statement in recognition of the
    PSC’s status as a constitutional entity, and we have gone as far
    as to state that the “Supreme Court does not act as an appellate
    30
    Id.
    31
    Amend v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., 
    298 Neb. 617
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 551
    (2018).
    32
    Neb. Const. art. IV, § 20.
    33
    See Myers v. Blair Tel. Co., 
    194 Neb. 55
    , 
    230 N.W.2d 190
     (1975).
    34
    See State ex rel. State Railway Commission v. Ramsey, 
    151 Neb. 333
    , 
    37 N.W.2d 502
     (1949).
    35
    Dahlsten v. Harris, 
    191 Neb. 714
    , 
    217 N.W.2d 813
     (1974). See, Andrews
    Van Lines, Inc. v. Smith, 
    187 Neb. 533
    , 
    192 N.W.2d 406
     (1971); Nebraska
    State Railway Commission v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 
    187 Neb. 369
    ,
    
    191 N.W.2d 438
     (1971); Ace Gas, Inc. v. Peake, Inc., 
    184 Neb. 448
    , 
    168 N.W.2d 373
     (1969).
    36
    In re Application No. C-1889, 
    264 Neb. 167
    , 178, 
    647 N.W.2d 45
    , 54
    (2002).
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    [PSC].”37 However, in 2013, the Legislature amended
    § 75-136(2) to change our standard of review from errors
    appearing on the record, as provided under the APA, to “de
    novo on the record.”
    We first addressed the “de novo on the record” standard of
    review for PSC cases in Telrite Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Serv.
    Comm.38 Prior to the amendment, a party appealed from the
    PSC under the APA, and the initial appeal was taken to district
    court, which conducted a de novo review on the record of the
    agency.39 Our inquiry in appeals from a district court’s decision
    under the APA is limited to whether the decision conformed to
    the law, was supported by competent evidence, and was neither
    arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.40 In Telrite Corp., we
    rejected the PSC’s argument that the previous, more deferential
    standard of review for an appellate court under the APA still
    applied after the amendment to § 75-136. In so finding, we
    stated that the PSC was not “due the same degree of deference
    it enjoyed” before the amendment.41
    However, the issue of what deference is owed to the PSC
    regarding its public interest determinations is more nuanced
    than stated in Telrite Corp. Under MOPSA, the PSC views the
    witnesses and evaluates the strength of their testimony, receives
    comments from the public, investigates the issues presented in
    coordination with state agencies and authorized consultants,
    evaluates the public interest, and makes the initial decision
    of whether to approve an application and authorize eminent
    domain power. Under the circumstances, it is appropriate, even
    under a de novo standard of review, to adhere to the common
    37
    In re Application of Crusader Coach Lines, 
    213 Neb. 53
    , 58, 
    327 N.W.2d 98
    , 101 (1982). Accord In re Application of McCarty, 
    218 Neb. 637
    , 
    358 N.W.2d 203
     (1984).
    38
    Telrite Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., supra note 24.
    39
    See § 84-917(5).
    40
    Telrite Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., supra note 24.
    41
    Id., 288 Neb. at 874-75, 852 N.W.2d at 916.
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    practice among appellate courts to afford appropriate deference
    to the findings of the agency before which the record was cre-
    ated.42 We articulate this standard in light of the PSC’s being
    constitutionally created to serve the public interest.
    1. PSC H ad Jurisdiction
    The landowners and Yankton Sioux assert that the PSC
    lacked jurisdiction to approve TransCanada’s application
    because, under the appellants’ reading of MOPSA, the PSC
    cannot consider a route application unless the Governor has
    already considered and denied the application. We determine
    that under the plain language of MOPSA, prior gubernatorial
    denial is not required to initiate application proceedings before
    the PSC. MOPSA is an independent statutory process under
    which pipeline carriers may obtain route approval and eminent
    domain authority. Route approval by the Governor is not at
    issue in this case.
    [9,10] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary
    meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation
    to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
    direct, and unambiguous.43 Components of a series or collec-
    tion of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari
    materia and should be conjunctively considered and construed
    to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different
    provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.44
    The appellants’ argument is based upon § 57-1405(1), which
    provides:
    If a pipeline carrier proposes to construct a major oil
    pipeline . . . and the pipeline carrier has submitted a route
    for an oil pipeline within, through, or across Nebraska
    42
    See, Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi v. Dolan, supra note 26; Dieter v.
    State, supra note 27; Department of Health v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes
    Soc., supra note 26.
    43
    Mays v. Midnite Dreams, 
    300 Neb. 485
    , 
    915 N.W.2d 71
     (2018).
    44
    Davio v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 
    280 Neb. 263
    , 
    786 N.W.2d 655
     (2010).
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    but the route is not approved by the Governor pursuant to
    section 57-1503, the pipeline carrier shall file an applica-
    tion with the [PSC] and receive approval pursuant to sec-
    tion 57-1408 prior to beginning construction . . . .
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    Under the appellants’ view, “the PSC may consider an appli-
    cation for a route if, but only if, the Governor of Nebraska
    first considered, and declined to grant, the proposed pipeline
    route within or across the State.”45 According to the appel-
    lants, “[d]isapproval is a prerequisite to PSC jurisdiction under
    § 57-1405(1)”46 and “[t]he Governor must say ‘No’ first; then
    comes the PSC.”47
    It is clear that the appellants’ interpretation is not strictly
    derived from the statutory text, but, rather, is an extrapola-
    tion thereof. The language of § 57-1405(1) is not phrased as a
    jurisdictional prerequisite, but, rather, describes a process for
    applying for a pipeline route that has “not [been] approved by
    the Governor.” The appellants read the phrase “not approved
    by” to mean “must have first considered and denied.” We do
    not agree. Logically, one can “not approve” something by tak-
    ing no action. The phrase “not approved by” does not require
    the Governor to be the first to consider the application or to
    consider the application at all. As we explained in the back-
    ground section of this opinion, the MOPSA application process
    is one of two options the Legislature has enacted to enable a
    pipeline carrier to pursue route approval. Though we conduct
    a textual analysis as to whether § 57-1405(1) or § 57-1101
    authorizes the PSC to consider TransCanada’s application,
    we offer no opinion as to the constitutionality of § 57-1101
    or other references to the power of the Governor to approve
    the route.
    Sections 57-1405(1) and 57-1101 relate to the same sub-
    ject matter; they address the procedures available for a
    45
    Brief for appellants at 14 (emphasis in original).
    46
    Id. at 17.
    47
    Id. at 15.
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    pipeline carrier to obtain route approval under Nebraska law.
    The current versions of these sections were adopted by the
    Legislature in the same bill, 2012 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1161, and
    MOPSA makes specific reference to § 57-1101.48 Therefore,
    §§ 57-1405(1) and 57-1101 are in pari materia and we must
    construe them together.
    Section 57-1101 provides in relevant part:
    [F]or any major oil pipeline . . . to be placed in opera-
    tion in the State of Nebraska . . . , any such person,
    company, corporation, or association shall comply with
    section 57-1503 and receive the approval of the Governor
    for the route of the pipeline under such section or shall
    apply for and receive an order approving the applica-
    tion under [MOPSA], prior to having the rights provided
    under this section.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    Section 57-1101 describes the two avenues for route
    approval, under § 57-1503 and MOPSA, and uses the word
    “or” to connect them. The word “or,” when used properly, is
    disjunctive.49 This indicates that a pipeline carrier can pursue
    either process individually. The processes are independent of
    each other and should not be understood as the same thing.
    There are several differences.
    As described above, under § 57-1503, a pipeline carrier
    may not seek the Governor’s approval of an application until
    after the DEQ has utilized State funds to prepare a SEIS and
    has submitted its evaluation to the Governor. In contrast,
    under MOPSA, a pipeline carrier initiates the proceedings, is
    required to prove that the route is in the public interest based
    on the PSC’s evaluation of multifaceted statutory criteria,
    and must pay for the application process.50 MOPSA does not
    require gubernatorial denial prior to initiating an application
    48
    § 57-1408.
    49
    See Nebraska Protective Servs. Unit v. State, 
    299 Neb. 797
    , 
    910 N.W.2d 767
     (2018).
    50
    See §§ 57-1405 and 57-1406.
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    proceeding. The appellants’ assignment of error that the PSC
    lacked jurisdiction over TransCanada’s application is with-
    out merit.
    2. Evidence Supports PSC’s Determination
    that TransCanada M et Burden of P roof
    In their next assignment of error, the appellants argue that
    the PSC erred in finding that TransCanada sustained its bur-
    den of proof. Upon our independent review of the record
    before the agency, we find that sufficient evidence supports
    the PSC’s decision that TransCanada met its burden of proving
    that the MAR is in the public interest. While the intervenors
    reduced the strength of TransCanada’s evidence in certain
    areas, the intervenors’ objections are not enough to overcome
    TransCanada’s comprehensive presentation with respect to the
    relevant public interest factors under MOPSA.
    Two possible misconceptions must be addressed. First, in
    evaluating a route, we are prohibited from considering safety
    issues. Nebraska cannot interfere with uniform safety standards
    utilized by the federal government. To do so would undermine
    MOPSA and jeopardize Nebraska’s ability to review and scru-
    tinize a pipeline route in this state under state law. Second,
    the MOPSA structure enacted by the Legislature concerns
    only the selection of a particular pipeline route. In this case,
    TransCanada, as well as some of the appellants, asked the PSC
    to approve construction of a particular pipeline route. The PSC
    considered the evidence and determined that the MAR is in the
    public interest.
    [11,12] An application under MOPSA shall be approved
    if the proposed route of the major oil pipeline is determined
    by the PSC to be in the public interest.51 MOPSA places the
    burden of proof on the applicant.52 Although MOPSA does
    not specify a standard of proof, unless an exception applies,
    51
    § 57-1407(4).
    52
    Id.
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    only a preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases.53
    The burden of proof is satisfied by actual proof of the facts, of
    which proof is necessary, regardless of which party introduces
    the evidence.54 In concluding that the MAR is in the public
    interest, the PSC properly relied on all record evidence and
    carefully weighed the eight factors under § 57-1407(4).
    (a) Compliance With Applicable Laws
    The first factor for the PSC’s consideration is “[w]hether the
    pipeline carrier has demonstrated compliance with all applica-
    ble state statutes, rules, and regulations and local ordinances.”55
    TransCanada stated that it would comply with all applicable
    state statutes, rules, regulations, and local ordinances, and
    that it either has obtained or will obtain all permits necessary
    to comply with state laws, regulations, local ordinances, and
    zoning requirements. Moreover, TransCanada is required to
    comply with all applicable laws as a condition of its presiden-
    tial permit. Palmer, the president of the companies that own
    TransCanada, reaffirmed these commitments under oath. These
    commitments apply to the construction, maintenance, and oper-
    ation of the MAR. The record concerning § 57-1407(4)(a)
    supports the PSC’s finding that TransCanada met its burden
    of proof.
    (b) Impact on Natural Resources
    The PSC shall evaluate evidence of
    the impact due to intrusion upon natural resources and
    not due to safety of the proposed route of the major oil
    pipeline to the natural resources of Nebraska, includ-
    ing evidence regarding the irreversible and irretrievable
    53
    Wetovick v. County of Nance, 
    279 Neb. 773
    , 
    782 N.W.2d 298
     (2010). See,
    Pallas v. Dailey, 
    169 Neb. 533
    , 
    100 N.W.2d 197
     (1960); Eggleston v.
    Quinn, 
    88 Neb. 775
    , 
    130 N.W. 428
     (1911).
    54
    Lincoln Fire Fighters Assn. v. City of Lincoln, 
    198 Neb. 174
    , 
    252 N.W.2d 607
     (1977).
    55
    § 57-1407(4)(a).
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    commitments of land areas and connected natural
    resources and the depletion of beneficial uses of the natu-
    ral resources.56
    The evidence demonstrated that a large percentage of the land
    crossed by the pipeline is agricultural in nature and that the
    impacts of construction will be temporary.
    The MAR avoids the Nebraska Sandhills, which provides
    several advantages as compared to the PR, when considering
    impacts on natural resources. As the PSC found, compared
    to the PR, the MAR will involve “one fewer river crossing,
    fewer wells within 500 feet of the pipeline, fewer acres of
    pivot irrigated . . . land crossed, fewer crossing of intermit-
    tent and perennial streams . . . , fewer miles of pipeline placed
    in areas with shallow groundwater, and fewer state highways
    and natural gas facilities to be crossed.” The MAR “would
    impact 84.6 fewer miles of whooping crane migratory path
    as compared to the [PR],” as well as impact “fewer miles of
    the ranges” of other “threatened and endangered species.” The
    natural resources intervenors’ witness Hayes noted this fact in
    his conclusion that “the [MAR’s] impact upon federally listed
    species is significantly less than that of the [PR].”
    Hayes testified that, compared to the PR, the MAR substan-
    tially decreases the overall impact of the pipeline and stated
    that “irreparable damage to important natural resources, includ-
    ing native soils and grasslands, is proportionally reduced.”
    TransCanada’s witness Schmidt agreed that the MAR “ha[d]
    potential environmental benefits due to its co-location with
    [Keystone I].” Beaver, the senior reclamation specialist on the
    project, testified that construction of the pipeline would not
    significantly increase the impermeability of the soil.
    The PSC requested the DEQ to analyze the environmental
    impact of the MAR. The DEQ responded that based on the
    mitigation commitments and reclamation procedures within
    the application, the MAR “would have minimal environmental
    56
    § 57-1407(4)(b).
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    impacts in Nebraska.” The DEQ then followed up with the
    PSC after further analyzing the relevant soils and sediment,
    groundwater, surface water, air, hazardous materials, and emis-
    sions, and again concluded that the MAR “would have minimal
    permanent environmental impacts in Nebraska.” The record
    concerning § 57-1407(4)(b) supports the PSC’s finding that
    TransCanada met its burden of proof.
    (c) Mitigation of Potential Impacts
    The PSC shall evaluate “[e]vidence of methods to minimize
    or mitigate the potential impacts of the major oil pipeline to
    natural resources.”57 TransCanada provided a CMRP containing
    “construction, operation, and maintenance measures that are
    designed to reduce the likelihood and severity of impacts along
    the pipeline construction corridor and during operations.” The
    CMRP outlines procedures for soil protection, water-crossing
    methods, vegetation reclamation, and aquatic resources protec-
    tion. The CMRP was developed in consultation with the NRCS
    and experts from the University of Nebraska. The CMRP pro-
    cedures will be used to minimize the environmental impact
    of the MAR and return the land disturbed by construction as
    close as possible to its preconstruction condition. The PSC
    concluded that TransCanada’s procedures “conform to industry
    standards and are reasonable.” Project manager Fuhrer testified
    that TransCanada will be accountable for production losses and
    other costs resulting from pipeline maintenance and damage to
    the land throughout the useful life of the pipeline.
    The landowners noted that the CMRP has not been updated
    since 2012. However, the DEQ advised the PSC that the geology
    has not changed. The landowners emphasized that the CMRP
    allows TransCanada to deviate from the plan at its discretion.
    The PSC found that in the event a dispute arises regarding
    reclamation and mitigation efforts, the parties will consult the
    NRCS as a resource and follow the NRCS’ advice. We agree
    57
    § 57-1407(4)(c).
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    this resolution process is adequate. Because the NRCS helped
    formulate the CMRP and is familiar with the best reclamation
    and mitigation practices, the NRCS shall be consulted in any
    instance in which a dispute arises and TransCanada has devi-
    ated from the CMRP. The record concerning § 57-1407(4)(c)
    supports the PSC’s finding that TransCanada met its burden
    of proof.
    (d) Social and Economic Impacts
    The PSC shall evaluate “[e]vidence regarding the economic
    and social impacts of the major oil pipeline.”58
    (i) Economic Impacts
    Goss’ report found that the pipeline project would consti-
    tute an economic benefit to Nebraska and would contribute to
    the state and local tax bases. He found that the pipeline proj-
    ect would result in positive tax revenue to exceed $264 mil-
    lion through the year 2034. His report assumed that only 10
    percent of pipeline work in Nebraska would be conducted by
    Nebraska residents and that 7.3 percent of related pipeline
    work in Montana and South Dakota would be conducted by
    Nebraska residents. The report indicated that Goss’ estimates
    were conservative. The analysis did not include taxes gener-
    ated from the cost and installation of replacement materials or
    TransCanada’s preconstruction spending. In addition, the dol-
    lar figures were not adjusted for inflation, but were discounted
    to the equivalent of “2015 dollars.”
    The unions also presented evidence of positive economic
    impacts. Barnett testified that UA has worked with TransCanada
    on recent projects and estimated that UA could expect 564
    jobs for its members. Gerhard of LiUNA stated the project
    presents significant opportunity for the creation of several dif-
    ferent types of energy-related jobs. O’Hara, the professor who
    analyzed the economic impact of the proposed pipeline, testi-
    fied that the project would not provide long-term tax benefits,
    58
    § 57-1407(4)(d).
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    would create few permanent jobs, and would adversely impact
    property values. However, O’Hara’s analysis predominantly
    focused on issues of safety. O’Hara admitted that TransCanada
    will pay significant sales and use taxes. In addition, O’Hara’s
    conclusions regarding tax benefits assume that, contrary to
    the evidence, TransCanada will seek exemptions under the
    Nebraska Advantage Act. The PSC found that TransCanada
    “shall comply with its commitment to not use the Nebraska
    Advantage Act in any form in connection with the Keystone
    XL Project.”
    Nebraska’s Department of Revenue found that during con-
    struction, TransCanada or its contractors would incur sig-
    nificant sales and use tax liabilities, and that Nebraska would
    experience an increase in individual income tax revenue. The
    DEQ and the Department found that the pipeline was not
    expected to have an impact on residential or agricultural prop-
    erty values and would generate a substantial amount of new
    economic activity, millions of dollars in annual property tax
    revenue, and hundreds of jobs for Nebraskans. O’Hara opined
    that property values would decrease by 15 percent and that
    property taxes would decrease over the life of the pipeline.
    The PSC found that “much of the economic testimony was
    conflicting,” but concluded that the pipeline would accrue an
    economic benefit in Nebraska, and that Nebraska will “benefit
    from the investment and activity that is associated with the
    pipeline construction and operation.”
    (ii) Social Impacts
    The evidence of social impacts primarily concerned impacts
    on cultural resources and impacts from a temporary camp for
    pipeline workers that may be built in Holt County. MOPSA
    does not specifically state that the PSC must evaluate impacts
    on cultural resources. As noted, § 57-1407(4)(d) states the PSC
    shall consider “[e]vidence regarding the economic and social
    impacts of the major oil pipeline.” The parties and the PSC
    understood the cultural resources issue to be a piece of the
    PSC’s obligation to consider evidence of social impacts. The
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    parties and the PSC generally understood “cultural resources”
    to mean “physical evidence of culturally and historically val-
    ued aspects of the human and natural environment on the land-
    scape,” as defined by the DEQ.
    The preservation of historic resources is a matter of federal
    law governed by the National Historic Preservation Act. The
    Department has been designated the federal agency respon-
    sible for the review of TransCanada’s permit, which has
    been determined to be a federal undertaking. Nebraska pro-
    vides resources in coordination with this effort. Pursuant to
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 82-118 (Reissue 2014), the Nebraska State
    Historical Society, under the direction of the Nebraska State
    Historic Preservation Officer, is the state agency responsible
    for carrying out the purposes and objectives of the National
    Historic Preservation Act.
    Pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L.
    No. 89-665, § 106, 80 Stat. 917, the Department, the Nebraska
    State Historic Preservation Officer, TransCanada, and vari-
    ous other state and federal agencies entered into an amended
    PA in December 2013. According to the Nebraska State
    Historical Society, a § 106 review identifies “arch[a]eologi-
    cal or historic resources . . . listed or eligible for listing in
    the National Register of Historic Places.” The PA requires
    TransCanada to complete cultural resources surveys on all
    areas that would potentially be impacted by the proposed
    undertaking and to provide adequate mitigation in consultation
    with the Department, state and federal agencies, and Indian
    tribes. The PA requires TransCanada to avoid, when possible,
    adverse effects on known cultural resources. When unantici-
    pated cultural resources are discovered, all construction within
    a 100-foot radius must cease and may only resume after the
    resources are evaluated and protected according to the require-
    ments under the PA. The PA includes a “Tribal Monitoring
    Plan” that allows “tribal monitors with experience in the iden-
    tification of cultural resources to monitor construction along
    the pipeline route.” The CMRP also contains a commitment to
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    comply with any PA in order to minimize the impact on cul-
    tural sites along the route.
    Ponca’s witness Wright stated that construction of the pipe-
    line could damage or destroy historic sites, but he acknowl-
    edged this concern would be addressed if TransCanada adhered
    to the PA. Ponca stated that the Ponca Trail of Tears would not
    be included within the PA’s protections, because the trail is not
    listed on the National Register of Historic Places. However, the
    PA applies to any historical site eligible for inclusion on the
    national register, and furthermore, the PA commits TransCanada
    to protecting known cultural sites. TransCanada presented evi-
    dence that it is prepared to address the issue. TransCanada’s
    application states that it intends to avoid culturally significant
    sites by rerouting the pipeline “to the extent practicable.”
    Testimony at the hearing reflected that TransCanada has suc-
    cessfully avoided every eligible cultural site it has encountered
    thus far. TransCanada will have the opportunity to complete
    further cultural surveys prior to construction and to implement
    the necessary procedures under the PA.
    Ponca assigns error to the PSC’s determination that the
    preservation of cultural issues is a matter of federal law and
    argues that MOPSA requires an analysis with greater focus
    on Nebraska’s cultural resources. We disagree with Ponca’s
    characterization that the PSC did not evaluate the impact
    on Nebraska’s cultural resources. In its analysis, the PSC
    articulated features of the federal scheme that are available to
    address the risks to local cultural resources. The PSC found
    that TransCanada’s record of compliance with the PA and
    the National Historic Preservation Act showed TransCanada’s
    compliance would likely continue and that the Department will
    require compliance with federal law. The PSC concluded that
    these safeguards “help to assure that the route of the pipeline
    will be in the public interest.”
    The Nebraska State Historical Society, the state agency
    responsible for preserving historic resources, informed the
    PSC that, according to the processes outlined in the PA,
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    TransCanada is required to “complete cultural resources sur-
    veys on all areas that would be potentially impacted,” “make
    recommendations on National Register of Historic Places eli-
    gibility,” and “provide adequate mitigation in consultation with
    the Department . . . , state and federal agencies, and Indian
    tribes.” The Nebraska State Historical Society advised that
    these processes protect cultural resources.
    Moreover, existing state laws protect cultural resources.
    Under Nebraska law, it is a crime to knowingly and will-
    fully appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy an archaeological
    resource on public land without written permission from the
    State Archaeology Office.59 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 12-1205 (Cum.
    Supp. 2018) makes it a crime to knowingly fail to report the
    encounter of an unmarked human burial, and it requires the
    cessation of any activity that may disturb the burial. Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 28-1301 (Reissue 2016) describes the offense of remov-
    ing, abandoning, or concealing human skeletal remains or
    burial goods. TransCanada must comply with these laws.
    The temporary camps for pipeline workers do not make
    approving the MAR contrary to the public interest. All such
    camps must be permitted, constructed, and operated consist­
    ent with applicable county, state, and federal regulations.
    TransCanada must require camp residents to comply with a
    written code of conduct and potentially expel those found in
    violation. The camps will be fenced and secured with video
    surveillance and a guardhouse, staffed at all times. Only autho-
    rized personnel will be granted access to the camps; no visi-
    tors will be permitted. The record concerning § 57-1407(4)(d)
    supports the PSC’s finding that TransCanada met its burden
    of proof.
    (e) Other Utility Corridors
    The PSC must evaluate “[w]hether any other utility cor-
    ridor exists that could feasibly and beneficially be used for
    59
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 82-507 (Reissue 2014).
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    the route of the major oil pipeline.”60 The PSC interpreted the
    phrase “utility corridor” to mean “a passageway for facilities
    providing public services.” The PSC gave significant weight to
    the fact that the MAR “was developed to maximize the length
    of co-location with [Keystone I]” and takes advantage of the
    fixed entry point in Keya Paha County. The PSC found the
    MAR to be the most beneficial route, because the PR failed
    to take advantage of an existing utility corridor. The appel-
    lants urged approval of the I-90 Route, but the PSC rejected
    that proposal based on the lack of a feasible entry point. Upon
    de novo review, we are persuaded that the MAR’s co-location
    with Keystone I maximizes efficiency and reduces impacts to
    undeveloped land and natural resources.
    The PSC evaluated the eight public interest factors under
    § 57-1407(4) and was persuaded by the evidence in favor
    of the MAR under § 57-1407(4)(e). The PSC’s reasoning is
    compelling, because the record shows that by satisfying the
    considerations under § 57-1407(4)(e), the MAR’s co-­location
    with Keystone I enhances the overall strength of the route
    application and serves other public interest factors under
    § 57-1407(4). There is evidence to support the PSC’s reason-
    ing in giving great weight to TransCanada’s evidence under
    § 57-1407(4)(e) in deciding that the MAR, rather than the PR
    or I-90 Route, is in the public interest. The record concerning
    § 57-1407(4)(e) supports the PSC’s finding that TransCanada
    met its burden of proof.
    (f) Impact on Orderly Development of Area
    The PSC must evaluate “[t]he impact of the major oil
    pipeline on the orderly development of the area around the
    proposed route of the major oil pipeline.”61 There was a lack
    of evidence that significant restrictions on development would
    occur. The PSC observed that while future developments
    60
    § 57-1407(4)(e).
    61
    § 57-1407(4)(f).
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    would need to avoid the pipeline, “similar restrictions on
    development occur in areas near other infrastructure, i.e.,
    roads, bridges, dams, power lines, etc.” The MAR mitigates
    interference with orderly development by co-locating with
    Keystone I. In addition, the CMRP’s mitigation procedures
    address possible impacts of construction. The PSC’s consult­
    ants concluded that the pipeline would “play an ‘insignificant
    role in residential value, crop production, invasive species,
    and land development.’” We agree with the PSC that the
    impact on development of the area seems minimal. The record
    concerning § 57-1407(4)(f) supports the PSC’s finding that
    TransCanada met its burden of proof.
    (g) State Agency Reports
    The PSC must evaluate “[t]he reports of the agencies filed
    pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.”62 The PSC consulted
    all nine agencies listed within § 57-1407(3) on both the PR and
    the MAR. The agencies were familiar with the project based
    on prior efforts and did not express any concerns about the
    approval, denial, or relocation of either route.
    As already noted, Nebraska’s Department of Revenue found
    that the pipeline will generate revenue from sales taxes, use
    taxes, property taxes, and income taxes. The Nebraska State
    Historical Society stated that the necessary measures for pro-
    tecting cultural resources are in place. The Nebraska Game
    and Parks Commission explained that it would help “avoid
    and minimize impacts on species and their habitats.” And we
    ­reiterate the DEQ’s finding that the MAR “would have minimal
    environmental impacts in Nebraska.” The record concerning
    § 57-1407(4)(g) supports the PSC’s finding that TransCanada
    met its burden of proof.
    (h) Views of Counties and Municipalities
    The PSC must evaluate “[t]he views of the governing bod-
    ies of the counties and municipalities in the area around the
    62
    § 57-1407(4)(g).
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    proposed route of the major oil pipeline.”63 The PSC sent let-
    ters soliciting input to 18 counties and 32 cities along both
    the PR and the MAR. Boone, Nance, Saline, and Seward
    Counties expressed their approval; Boyd and Holt Counties
    expressed their opposition. The PSC received no input from
    Butler, Colfax, Madison, Platte, or Stanton Counties. Seward,
    Nebraska, and Steele City submitted favorable responses. The
    record concerning § 57-1407(4)(h) supports the PSC’s finding
    that TransCanada met its burden of proof.
    We find that the PSC—after months of investigation review-
    ing extensive pleadings, exhibits, and reports from consultants;
    holding public meetings and a public hearing; considering
    written and oral arguments; deliberating; and issuing its opin-
    ion and findings—did not err in concluding that TransCanada
    proved by a preponderance of the evidence that approval of the
    MAR is in the public interest.
    3. PSC Properly Considered MAR
    [13] In the appellants’ next assignment of error, they argue
    that the PSC was not authorized to approve the MAR, because
    TransCanada applied for approval of only the PR, and that the
    notice requirements for the MAR were not met. While it is true
    that TransCanada requested in its application “an order from
    the PSC that the [PR] is in the public interest,” we nevertheless
    find it indisputable that TransCanada included the MAR in its
    application and that the parties were on notice that the MAR
    was at issue. The rules of pleading are not applied in admin-
    istrative proceedings as strictly as they are in court proceed-
    ings.64 Administrative pleading rules require simply that the
    parties be sufficiently apprised of the nature of the proceedings
    so that there is no unfair surprise.65
    The hearing officer for the PSC devoted a separate sec-
    tion of its intervention order to the MAR and made clear
    63
    § 57-1407(4)(h).
    64
    See In re Appeal of Bonnett, 
    216 Neb. 587
    , 
    344 N.W.2d 657
     (1984).
    65
    Id.
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    that the merits of the MAR would be considered. The order
    stated that the SAR would not be considered and informed
    the parties that they should be prepared to address the MAR
    by granting them leave to designate an additional witness
    and offer exhibits pertaining to the MAR. There was no
    objection to the MAR section of the order. The case manage-
    ment order stated that “any/all Hearing Officer Orders . . .
    will apply to and bind all parties, will control the course of
    the proceedings, and may be modified only by order of the
    Hearing Officer.”
    Following a prehearing conference, the hearing officer mod-
    ified the intervention order by allowing each intervenor group
    to present testimony from two witnesses, “in addition to the
    ability to bring an additional witness regarding the [MAR]
    as detailed in the [intervention order].” The PSC’s Rules of
    Commission Procedure provide that once an order is entered
    “a reasonable time will be allowed for the parties to present
    objections . . . . Thereafter, the terms of the order . . . determine
    the subsequent course of the proceedings . . . .”66 Generally,
    the failure to object to the specifications in the pretrial order
    waives any right to claim error in that regard.67 The pretrial
    order is binding upon the parties. The issues set out in a pre-
    trial order supplant those raised in the pleadings.68
    [14] The appellants also contend that the PSC denied them
    procedural due process. Due process requires notice and an
    opportunity for a full and fair hearing at some stage of the
    agency proceedings.69 Contrary to the intervenors’ assertions,
    66
    291 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 020.04 (1992).
    67
    See Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 
    236 Neb. 233
    , 
    461 N.W.2d 55
     (1990).
    68
    See, Hall v. County of Lancaster, 
    287 Neb. 969
    , 
    846 N.W.2d 107
     (2014),
    overruled on other grounds, Davis v. State, 
    297 Neb. 955
    , 
    902 N.W.2d 165
     (2017); Cotton v. Ostroski, 
    250 Neb. 911
    , 
    554 N.W.2d 130
     (1996).
    See, Kustom Kreations v. Duxbury, 
    216 Neb. 99
    , 
    342 N.W.2d 656
     (1983);
    Jonas v. Willman, 
    27 Neb. Ct. App. 251
    , 
    930 N.W.2d 60
     (2019).
    69
    Stoneman v. United Neb. Bank, 
    254 Neb. 477
    , 
    577 N.W.2d 271
     (1998).
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    the PSC’s decision to approve the MAR is a reflection of
    the evidence and arguments presented. As already discussed,
    MOPSA “is intended to deal solely with the issue of sit-
    ing or choosing the location of the route.”70 MOPSA allows
    Nebraska to exercise its sovereign authority “to protect its
    land and natural resources . . . by regulation through approval
    or disapproval of major oil pipeline siting and the location of
    routes.”71 MOPSA grants the PSC the authority to consult state
    agencies “regarding the advisability of approving, denying,
    or modifying the location of the proposed route of the major
    oil pipeline.”72 As explained, among the factors the PSC must
    evaluate is “[w]hether any other utility corridor exists that
    could feasibly and beneficially be used for the route of the
    major oil pipeline.”73
    The record contained extensive evidence concerning the
    MAR. There was significant overlap in the evidence concern-
    ing the routes; much of the evidence concerning the PR and
    Keystone I equally applied to the MAR. The PR and the MAR
    are the same route for the first 110 miles and approximately 97
    of the MAR’s remaining 170 miles co-locate with Keystone I.
    Several witnesses addressed these routes and the differences
    between them in their testimony.
    Hayes testified that compared to the PR, the MAR substan-
    tially decreases the overall negative impacts of the pipeline.
    Kothari testified that the MAR was beneficial and feasible.
    Schmidt was questioned at length and in detail about the
    MAR to draw out comparisons between the MAR, the PR,
    and the I-90 Route. Wright provided testimony concerning
    the MAR. The consultants advised the PSC that there is
    little difference in soil characteristics between the PR and
    the MAR.
    70
    §   57-1402(2).
    71
    §   57-1403(1).
    72
    §   57-1407(3).
    73
    §   57-1407(4)(e).
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    The DEQ evaluated the MAR and informed the PSC that the
    MAR would have minimal permanent environmental impacts
    in Nebraska. The PSC heard evidence that TransCanada modi-
    fied the MAR to avoid wellhead protection areas based on the
    DEQ’s recommendations. Seward’s city council recognized
    this and approved the MAR on that basis. Thus, the suggestion
    that the appellants were not afforded notice and an opportunity
    to be heard on the MAR disregards considerable portions of
    the record. Fundamental issues before the PSC were whether
    or not to approve the PR or the MAR.
    Ponca argued that “the PSC could decide it preferred the
    [MAR] based on the evidence, but it was required to deny
    the [a]pplication for the [PR] and invite TransCanada to
    file a new application for the [MAR].”74 Ponca’s argument
    referred to § 57-1408(4), which provides in part that “[i]f the
    commission denies the application, the pipeline carrier may
    amend the denied application in accordance with the find-
    ings of the commission and submit the amended application
    within sixty days after the issuance of the order denying the
    application.” (Emphasis supplied.) The record makes clear
    that the PSC granted the application, approved the MAR,
    and determined that amendment pursuant to § 57-1408(4)
    was unnecessary when it overruled TransCanada’s motion
    for reconsideration. The PSC’s decision was consistent with
    the policy under MOPSA to “[e]nsure that a coordinated and
    efficient method for the authorization of such construction
    is provided.”75 There was no need to amend the application,
    because the application was supplanted by the hearing offi-
    cer’s orders concerning the MAR when no party objected
    to the orders. The parties effectively tried the matter as
    one seeking approval of the MAR. Moreover, there was no
    need for the PSC to grant the motion to amend, because in
    the civil context courts have the power to constructively
    74
    Reply brief for appellee Ponca on cross-appeal at 7 (emphasis supplied).
    75
    § 57-1402(1)(e).
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    amend pleadings in order to render a decision consistent with
    the trial.76
    Neither do we find a basis to reverse the PSC’s decision
    due to a failure to satisfy MOPSA’s notice requirements. The
    PSC published notice of the public hearing on TransCanada’s
    application in newspapers in general circulation along both
    the PR and the MAR. The PSC sent letters to the governing
    bodies along both routes and advised them that a copy of the
    application is available online at the PSC’s website. The PSC
    released additional press releases at the time the application
    was filed and provided notice of several public meetings and
    the public hearing.
    [15,16] Furthermore, these intervenors waived the right to
    object based on lack of notice. It is generally held that par-
    ticipation in the hearing waives any defect in the notice.77 If
    notice is materially lacking, then a timely objection will permit
    the public body to promptly remedy the defect and defer for-
    mal action until the required public notice can be given.78 The
    intervenors failed to raise the issue of notice in response to the
    prehearing orders, at the public hearing, or in their motions
    for reconsideration. An appellate court will not consider an
    issue on appeal that was not presented to or passed upon by
    the administrative agency.79 This assignment of error is with-
    out merit.
    4. Participation Claim Without Merit
    Ponca and Yankton Sioux argue that the PSC improperly
    limited their participation to social and cultural issues. They
    76
    See, Denali Real Estate v. Denali Custom Builders, 
    302 Neb. 984
    , 
    926 N.W.2d 610
     (2019); Zelenka v. Pratte, 
    300 Neb. 100
    , 
    912 N.W.2d 723
    (2018); Blinn v. Beatrice Community Hosp. & Health Ctr., 
    270 Neb. 809
    ,
    
    708 N.W.2d 235
     (2006).
    77
    See, Hansen v. City of Norfolk, 
    201 Neb. 352
    , 
    267 N.W.2d 537
     (1978);
    Alexander v. School Dist. No. 17, 
    197 Neb. 251
    , 
    248 N.W.2d 335
     (1976).
    78
    See Witt v. School District No. 70, 
    202 Neb. 63
    , 
    273 N.W.2d 669
     (1979).
    79
    Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 
    273 Neb. 178
    , 
    728 N.W.2d 570
     (2007).
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    argue that their petitions alleged governmental and territorial
    interests and that the PSC’s regulations allow the intervenors
    to present evidence on any express interest stated in a petition
    for intervention. They argue that the PSC improperly ordered
    them to combine their witnesses and cross-examination time.
    Yankton Sioux argues that the conditions imposed by the PSC
    violated its equal protection rights. TransCanada argues that
    this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the interve-
    nors’ arguments, because the intervenors did not appeal from
    the PSC’s order on petitions for intervention. The intervenors
    argue the intervention order was not a final order, because the
    order did not deny intervention.
    (a) Final Order
    Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it
    is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it.80 The jurisdictional issue
    before us is whether the intervenors’ objections to the scope
    of their participation may be reviewed after their appeal from
    the PSC’s judgment on the merits or whether the intervenors
    were required to appeal from the PSC’s order on petitions
    for intervention.
    [17] We have consistently held that an order denying inter-
    vention is a final order for purposes of appeal.81 Here, the
    PSC’s intervention order did not deny intervention, but, rather,
    granted petitions for intervention and imposed conditions on
    the scope of intervention. Such an order is not final in the
    traditional sense in that the order is not a final determination
    of the parties’ rights. Moreover, agency orders granting peti-
    tions for intervention subject to conditions are interlocutory in
    80
    In re Grand Jury of Douglas Cty., supra note 21.
    81
    Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family, 
    297 Neb. 773
    , 
    901 N.W.2d 284
     (2017); Basin
    Elec. Power Co-op v. Little Blue N.R.D., 
    219 Neb. 372
    , 
    363 N.W.2d 500
    (1985). See, Wayne L. Ryan Revocable Trust v. Ryan, 
    297 Neb. 761
    , 
    901 N.W.2d 671
     (2017); Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 
    271 Neb. 578
    , 
    713 N.W.2d 489
     (2006); Shold v. Van Treeck, 
    82 Neb. 99
    , 
    117 N.W. 113
     (1908).
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    nature. Under the APA and Nebraska’s Model Rules of Agency
    Procedure, an agency may modify an order imposing condi-
    tions on intervention at any time.82
    The U.S. Supreme Court held in Stringfellow v. Concerned
    Neighbors in Action 83 that an order granting permissive inter-
    vention, subject to conditions, and denying intervention as of
    right was not an appealable order. The Court explained that
    an order denying intervention is subject to appellate review
    by necessity, because the petitioner has no right to appeal
    from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding.84
    Conversely, the imposition of conditions on intervention can
    be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. Here, the PSC’s
    intervention order did not deny the petitions for intervention
    and therefore was not a final order. The intervenors properly
    appealed from the PSC’s judgment on the merits, and we have
    jurisdiction in such an appeal to consider their objections to the
    order which placed conditions on their participation.
    (b) Merits
    [18] Agency regulations properly adopted and filed with
    the Secretary of State of Nebraska have the effect of statutory
    law.85 Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary
    meaning, and we will not resort to interpretation to ascertain
    the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and
    unambiguous.86
    Pursuant to its authority under § 57-1410, the PSC adopted
    rules and regulations to carry out MOPSA. Under 291 Neb.
    Admin. Code, ch. 9, § 023.06 (2013), “The filing of petitions
    for intervention . . . and the conduct of the hearing shall be
    82
    § 84-912.02(4); 53 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, § 003.04 (1994).
    83
    Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 
    480 U.S. 370
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 1177
    , 
    94 L. Ed. 2d 389
     (1987).
    84
    Id.
    85
    Tran v. State, ante p. 1, 
    926 N.W.2d 641
     (2019).
    86
    Id.
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    governed by the Rules of Commission Procedure.” Under the
    PSC’s Rules of Commission Procedure, any person who has an
    interest in a proceeding before the PSC, who does not desire to
    file a formal protest, may file a petition of formal intervention
    and shall become a party to the proceeding.87 Generally, one
    who intervenes becomes a party to the litigation and has all the
    rights of a party.88 An intervenor can engage in discovery, file
    motions, introduce evidence, and examine witnesses, and file
    an appeal.89
    The PSC’s regulations further provide:
    A formal intervenor shall be entitled to participate in
    the proceeding to the extent of his/her express interest
    in the matter. Such participation shall include, without
    limitation, presentation of evidence and argument, cross-
    examination of witnesses and submission of rebuttal evi-
    dence. As a party, a formal intervenor shall have the right
    of appeal.90
    The PSC is also an “agency” within the meaning of the APA,
    and the APA’s provisions apply to the PSC.91 The PSC has
    authority to take actions affecting parties subject to its juris-
    diction if such action is taken pursuant to a statute.92 The APA
    grants the PSC the power to impose conditions upon an inter-
    venor’s participation, and this action is distinct from granting
    or denying a petition for intervention.93 Section 84-912.02(3)
    of the APA states in pertinent part:
    87
    291 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 015.01 (1992).
    88
    See Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co., 
    297 Neb. 541
    , 
    900 N.W.2d 765
    (2017).
    89
    Id.
    90
    291 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 015.01C (1992).
    91
    Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 
    256 Neb. 479
    ,
    
    590 N.W.2d 840
     (1999). See Yellow Cab Co. v. Nebraska State Railway
    Commission, 
    175 Neb. 150
    , 
    120 N.W.2d 922
     (1963).
    92
    See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-110(1) (Reissue 2018); In re Application No.
    C-1889, supra note 36.
    93
    See, § 75-110(2); § 84-912.02.
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    If a petitioner qualifies for intervention, the hearing offi-
    cer or designee may impose conditions upon the interve-
    nor’s participation in the proceedings, either at the time
    that intervention is granted or at any subsequent time.
    Conditions may include:
    ....
    (b) Limiting the intervenor’s use of discovery, cross-
    examination, and other procedures so as to promote the
    orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings; and
    (c) Requiring two or more intervenors to combine their
    presentation of evidence and argument, cross-­examination,
    discovery, and other participation in the proceedings.
    The PSC granted the petitions for formal intervention filed
    by Ponca and Yankton Sioux in recognition of their interests
    in the case, then limited the scope of their participation to
    the issues of impacts on social and cultural resources, as rel-
    evant under § 57-1407(4)(d) of MOPSA. The PSC stated it
    imposed these conditions “in order to balance the statutorily
    truncated timeframe [and] the need to consider certain statu-
    torily required issues, with the parties’ due process interests
    in being heard, and in the interest of maintaining an orderly
    proceeding.”
    The intervenors argue the conditions imposed by the PSC
    violated the PSC’s own regulations. Ponca asserts that “the
    language [of the regulation] is clear — the evidence, argu-
    ment, and cross-examination ‘shall’ be ‘without limitation.’”94
    However, Ponca’s argument departs from the plain mean-
    ing and organization of the language used in the regula-
    tion. The language provides that an intervenor’s “participation
    shall include, without limitation, presentation of evidence and
    argument, cross-examination of witnesses and submission of
    rebuttal evidence.”95 We interpret this language according to
    its plain and ordinary meaning. Here, the phrase “without
    94
    Brief for appellee Ponca on cross-appeal at 16.
    95
    291 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 015.01C.
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    limitation” indicates that an intervenor is entitled to engage
    in each form of participation listed in that sentence, i.e., the
    intervenor will participate in the “presentation of evidence and
    argument, cross-examination of witnesses and submission of
    rebuttal evidence.” In this context, “without limitation” does
    not mean, as Ponca argues, that an intervenor’s participation
    shall be unlimited. Taken to its logical conclusion, the inter-
    venors’ position would eliminate basic procedural norms. For
    example, the intervenors’ reading would eliminate a hearing
    officer’s ability to “exclude evidence which is cumulative
    or repetitious.”96 The intervenors’ interpretation of “without
    limitation” is unreasonable, would yield absurd results, and is
    contrary to MOPSA.
    The PSC advised the parties in numerous orders of its
    obligation to bring the proceedings to a timely resolution.
    Working under strict time restraints, the PSC had a managerial
    responsibility to oversee approximately 100 petitions for inter-
    vention; organize a representative presentation of evidence;
    acquire input from the public, agencies, local governments, and
    consultants; and issue a written order disposing of the case.
    The PSC would be unable to carry out these duties if it were
    required to afford unbounded participation to every intervenor.
    “[I]ntervention is a useful tool, but [one] which must be used
    carefully[,] lest the manageable lawsuit become an unmanage-
    able cowlick.”97 Upon de novo review, we find no error in the
    PSC’s interpretation of its own regulations or its actions taken
    pursuant to the APA.
    The intervenors failed to show that the hearing officer’s
    decisions violated their due process or equal protection rights.
    The intervenors presented evidence and argument, cross-­
    examination, and redirect; had the opportunity for rebuttal;
    and filed briefs. The hearing officer gave the intervenors
    96
    291 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 016.05 (1992).
    97
    Wilderness Society v. Morton, 
    463 F.2d 1261
    , 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
    (Tamm, Circuit Judge, concurring).
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    opportunities to bring out the differences in their positions
    regarding the pipeline, but they failed to form questions that
    were not redundant. The hearing officer explained to the inter-
    venors that they had “asked the same questions of virtually
    every witness.” The hearing officer received no substantive
    offer of proof to justify modifying the conditions and there-
    fore adhered to the prehearing order. The intervenors’ cross-­
    examination time was not restricted. The parties never reached
    their 1-hour time limit for cross-examination. Additionally,
    they failed to call a witness allotted to address the MAR. The
    PSC did not act contrary to its own regulations or impose
    procedural conditions beyond its authority under the APA and
    Nebraska’s Model Rules of Agency Procedure, and its deci-
    sions did not injure the intervenors’ substantive rights. This
    assignment of error is without merit.
    5. MOPSA Evidence Not Hearsay
    [19,20] The intervenors next argue that the PSC erred in
    receiving into evidence public comments, transcripts of public
    meetings, and the consultants’ reports. The intervenors argue
    that by including these materials in the record, the PSC vio-
    lated their due process rights, because the evidence was inad-
    missible hearsay. It is undisputed that the Nebraska Evidence
    Rules applied to the proceedings. The Nebraska Evidence
    Rules provide that hearsay is admissible when authorized by
    the statutes of the State of Nebraska.98 The legislative branch
    has the right to prescribe the admissibility of certain categories
    of evidence, but it is solely a judicial function to determine the
    weight, if any, to be given such evidence.99
    Section 57-1407(2) permits the PSC to hold public meet-
    ings for the purpose of receiving public input at locations near
    the route and requires the PSC to “make the public input part
    of the record.” Section 57-1407(3) allows the PSC to request
    98
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-802 (Reissue 2016).
    99
    See State ex rel. Veskrna v. Steel, 
    296 Neb. 581
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 788
     (2017).
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    state agencies to file a report “regarding information within the
    respective agencies’ area of expertise relating to the impact of
    the major oil pipeline.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-1412 (Cum. Supp.
    2018) enables the PSC to retain consultants “to assist with
    reviewing applications under [MOPSA].”
    [21] The PSC included in the record evidence from public
    meetings held in York, O’Neill, Norfolk, and Ralston; reports
    from agencies listed under § 57-1407(3); and reports from
    consultants. The landowners objected on hearsay grounds and
    moved for a “mistrial,” which the hearing officer overruled.
    The hearing officer’s decision was correct because, assuming
    that the evidence in question was hearsay, the evidence was
    admissible by operation of MOPSA and § 27-802. Even if the
    PSC erred by admitting this evidence, the intervenors made no
    showing that they were unfairly prejudiced by the admission
    of the evidence. In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of
    evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a
    substantial right of the complaining party.100 This assignment of
    error lacks merit.
    6. R emaining A rguments Not Properly
    R aised in MOPSA Proceeding
    Lastly, the intervenors raise constitutional challenges to vari-
    ous statutes. We conclude that these arguments are improperly
    raised in a MOPSA proceeding before the PSC, because the
    intervenors’ arguments do not relate to whether or not the PSC
    should grant an application for a major oil pipeline route.
    [22-24] As stated above, the intervenors have the full rights
    of original parties in a case. However, our jurisprudence rec-
    ognizes some practical limitations on the right to intervene.
    The intervenors can raise only issues that sustain or oppose the
    respective contentions of the original parties.101 An intervenor
    100
    Reiber v. County of Gage, ante p. 325, 
    928 N.W.2d 916
     (2019).
    101
    Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family, supra note 81; Wayne L. Ryan Revocable Trust
    v. Ryan, supra note 81.
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    who is not an indispensable party cannot change the position of
    the original parties or change the nature and form of the action
    or the issues presented therein.102 “‘[I]t is fundamental that an
    intervenor takes the action as he finds it and cannot secure relief
    that is foreign or extraneous to the action.’”103 In other words,
    an intervenor cannot widen the scope of the issues, broaden the
    scope or function of the proceedings, or raise questions which
    might be the subject of litigation but which are extraneous to
    the controlling question to be decided in the case.104 Here, the
    intervenors improperly sought to alter the scope and nature of
    a MOPSA proceeding by raising challenges to the constitu-
    tionality of various statutes, in particular §§ 57-1101, 57-1401,
    57-1403, 57-1407(2) and (3), and 57-1408.
    The original parties in a MOPSA proceeding are the appli-
    cant and the PSC. The PSC is a party in a MOPSA proceeding,
    because the PSC acts as more than a neutral factfinding body;
    the PSC is in charge of serving the public interest105 and has
    investigative responsibilities.106 The original parties did not
    challenge the constitutionality of MOPSA’s provisions, but
    instead conducted the proceedings in recognition of their statu-
    tory obligations.
    The intervenors’ challenge to § 57-1101 miscomprehends
    condemnation proceedings. A condemnation proceeding is an
    102
    Gilbert v. First National Bank, 
    154 Neb. 404
    , 
    48 N.W.2d 401
     (1951);
    State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, 
    145 Neb. 638
    , 
    17 N.W.2d 683
     (1945). See,
    Chandler Co. v. Brandtjen, Inc., 
    296 U.S. 53
    , 
    56 S. Ct. 6
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 39
    (1935); John P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure § 16:9 (2019).
    103
    Harleysville Ins. Group v. Omaha Gas Appliance Co., 
    278 Neb. 547
    , 552,
    
    772 N.W.2d 88
    , 93 (2009), quoting Arnold v. Arnold, 
    214 Neb. 39
    , 
    332 N.W.2d 672
     (1983).
    104
    Id. See, State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, supra note 102; First Nat. Bank of
    Neligh v. Lancaster, 
    54 Neb. 467
    , 
    74 N.W. 858
     (1898).
    105
    See, § 84-917(2)(a)(i); Shaffer v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human
    Servs., 
    289 Neb. 740
    , 
    857 N.W.2d 313
     (2014).
    106
    See In re Application of Metropolitan Util. Dist., 
    270 Neb. 494
    , 
    704 N.W.2d 237
     (2005). See, also, e.g., §§ 57-1407(2) and (3) and 57-1412.
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    action brought by a condemning authority in the exercise of its
    power of eminent domain.107 In other words, eminent domain
    is the right or power to take private property for a public use
    and condemnation is the procedure whereby this power is exer-
    cised.108 In a condemnation action, some right in property must
    be taken or damaged to afford a basis for relief.109 The deter-
    mination of compensation to the owner of property condemned
    for public use, by ascertaining the value of property taken or
    damaged, is a judicial function.110 MOPSA proceedings merely
    concern what route, if any, should be approved, and as such,
    concern antecedent issues. The intervenors’ concerns regarding
    § 57-1101 are premature and would be more properly raised
    in subsequent condemnation proceedings. After reviewing the
    record, we find no plain error and no merit to any assignment
    of error.
    V. CONCLUSION
    In summary, the PSC is an elected body created by the
    Nebraska Constitution to serve the public interest. In § 57-1403
    of MOPSA, the Legislature determined that “[t]he construction
    of major oil pipelines in Nebraska is in the public interest . . . .”
    The Legislature designated the PSC as the agency responsible
    for determining which pipeline route is in the public interest.
    After months of careful consideration, the PSC determined that
    the evidence showed that the MAR is in the public interest.
    Upon de novo review, we find there is sufficient evidence to
    support the PSC’s determination that the MAR is in the public
    interest. The assignments of error are without merit.
    A ffirmed.
    107
    See Henderson v. City of Columbus, 
    285 Neb. 482
    , 
    827 N.W.2d 486
    (2013).
    108
    Van Patten v. City of Omaha, 
    167 Neb. 741
    , 
    94 N.W.2d 664
     (1959).
    109
    Lockard v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 
    249 Neb. 971
    , 
    546 N.W.2d 824
    (1996).
    110
    See Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 
    155 Neb. 48
    , 
    50 N.W.2d 533
     (1951).