In re Interest of Kamille C. & Kamiya C. , 302 Neb. 226 ( 2019 )


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    IN RE INTEREST OF KAMILLE C. & KAMIYA C.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 226
    In   re I nterest of K amille C. and K amiya C.,
    children under 18 years of age.
    Nateesha B., appellant, v.
    Samuel C., appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 8, 2019.   No. S-18-651.
    1.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional question does
    not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which
    requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the
    decision made by the lower court.
    2.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Statutes. As a statutorily created court
    of limited and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such author-
    ity as has been conferred on it by statute.
    3.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Child Custody: Parental Rights.
    During proceedings under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue
    2016), the juvenile court has broad jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 43-284 (Reissue 2016) regarding placement, but its discretion is gov-
    erned by the parental preference doctrine that holds that in a child cus-
    tody controversy between a biological parent and one who is neither a
    biological nor adoptive parent, the biological parent has a superior right
    to the custody of the child.
    4.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. The juvenile court loses jurisdiction to
    order compliance with dispositional plans once it has terminated juris-
    diction over the juvenile and the parties.
    5.	 Juvenile Courts: Statutes: Legislature: Child Custody. In enacting
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.02 (Supp. 2017), authorizing bridge orders, the
    Legislature crafted a solution for temporary continuity when the child is
    no longer in need of the juvenile court’s protection; the juvenile court
    has made, through a dispositional order, a custody determination in the
    child’s best interests; and the juvenile court does not wish to enter a
    domestic relations custody decree under the power granted by Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 25-2740(3) (Reissue 2016).
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    6.	 Juvenile Courts: Courts: Jurisdiction: Child Custody. A juvenile
    court can ensure through a bridge order that during the transfer of juris-
    diction to the district court for entry of a custody decree, the custody
    arrangement that the juvenile court has found to be in the child’s best
    interests remains in place.
    7.	 Juvenile Courts: Courts: Legislature: Jurisdiction: Child Custody:
    Time. The Legislature, through enacting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.02
    (Supp. 2017), bridged the gap that would otherwise occur between the
    time that the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and the district
    court picked up the case, by avoiding a reversion, before district court
    proceedings can be commenced, back to whatever custody arrangement
    controlled before adjudication.
    8.	 Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Parental Rights. Juvenile court pro-
    ceedings are special proceedings, and an order in a juvenile special pro-
    ceeding is final and appealable if it affects a parent’s substantial right to
    raise his or her child.
    9.	 Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential
    legal right, not a mere technical right.
    10.	 Final Orders. It is not enough that the right itself be substantial; the
    effect of the order on that right must also be substantial.
    11.	 Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Most fundamentally, an order affects
    a substantial right when the right would be significantly undermined or
    irrevocably lost by postponing appellate review.
    12.	 ____: ____. If the right affected would not be significantly undermined
    by delaying appellate review, then the order falls under the general
    prohibition of immediate appeals from interlocutory orders. This gen-
    eral prohibition operates to avoid piecemeal appeals arising out of the
    same set of operative facts, chaos in trial procedure, and a succession
    of appeals in the same case to secure advisory opinion to govern further
    actions of the trial court.
    13.	 Constitutional Law: Child Custody: Parental Rights: Time. Custody
    is generally considered an essential legal right implicating a parent’s
    fundamental, constitutional right to raise his or her child, but the dura-
    tion of a court’s order is also relevant to whether an order affects a
    substantial right.
    14.	 Child Custody: Jurisdiction: Intent. A bridge order is designed to pre-
    serve the status quo by continuing the placement with the noncustodial
    parent until the matter can be heard in district court, if either of the par-
    ties are dissatisfied with the custody decree that the district court enters
    in accordance with the bridge order.
    15.	 Final Orders. An order merely preserving the status quo pending a
    further order is not final.
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    16.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Immediate appellate review of a
    bridge order would undermine the rights affected more than it would
    vindicate them.
    17.	 Jurisdiction: Final Orders. A bridge order is not final for purposes of
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016).
    Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster
    County: Linda S. Porter, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
    Joy Shiffermiller, of Shiffermiller Law Office, P.C., L.L.O.,
    for appellant.
    Megan M. Zobel, of Anderson, Creager & Wittstruck, P.C.,
    L.L.O., for appellee.
    Miller-Lerman,             Cassel,     Stacy,    Funke,    Papik,    and
    Freudenberg, JJ.
    Freudenberg, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    This appeal involves a “bridge order,” which was cre-
    ated by L.B. 180 in 2017,1 and is codified in Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 43-246.02 (Supp. 2017). Under § 43-246.02(1), a “juvenile
    court may terminate its jurisdiction under subdivision (3)(a)
    of section 43-247 by transferring jurisdiction over the juve-
    nile’s custody, physical care, and visitation to the district court
    through a bridge order,” if certain criteria are met. A bridge
    order solely addresses matters of legal and physical custody
    and parenting time when a juvenile has been placed by the
    juvenile court with a legal parent.2 The bridge order in this
    case was entered after the adjudication of five children under
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016), who had been
    in the mother’s sole legal and physical custody. Two of those
    children had the same father, with whom they were placed dur-
    ing the ongoing juvenile proceedings. The bridge order gave
    1
    2017 Neb. Laws, L.B. 180, § 1 (eff. Aug. 24, 2017).
    2
    See § 43-246.02(1)(c) and (4).
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    the father legal and physical custody, with substantial visitation
    by the mother. The mother contests the bridge order, arguing
    that it was inappropriate under the circumstances, because
    by the time the bridge order was entered, the Department of
    Health and Human Services (DHHS) had conceded that the
    children could safely be placed back in her care and custody.
    Because we determine that bridge orders are not final for pur-
    poses of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016), we dismiss
    the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    On July 11, 2017, a petition was filed under § 43-247(3)(a)
    to adjudicate Kamille C. and Kamiya C., as well as three
    siblings who are not the subject of this appeal. The children
    resided with their mother, Nateesha B. In a prior proceeding,
    Samuel C. had been determined to be the biological father of
    Kamille and Kamiya and had been ordered to pay child sup-
    port. The petition alleged that Nateesha had been found in
    possession of controlled substances after a traffic stop. Kamille
    and Kamiya were 5 years old at the time.
    On July 13, 2017, the juvenile court issued an ex parte
    order of temporary emergency custody of all five children with
    DHHS, which, after a hearing on July 19, the court ordered to
    be continuing.
    Nateesha admitted the allegations in the petition, and the
    children were adjudicated on October 6, 2017. The court
    ordered that Kamille and Kamiya be physically placed in
    Samuel’s home and that Nateesha be allowed to exercise rea-
    sonable rights of supervised parenting time. Samuel’s child
    support payments were suspended during this time.
    The dispositional order was issued on November 21, 2017.
    The court ordered that Kamille and Kamiya, as well as the
    other adjudicated children, remain in the temporary legal cus-
    tody of DHHS, while Nateesha worked on a permanency plan
    for reunification. Kamille and Kamiya’s placement was to con-
    tinue with Samuel.
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    At a dispositional review hearing on January 10, 2018, the
    court ruled that the children should remain in the temporary
    legal custody of DHHS and that Kamille and Kamiya should
    remain in their placement with Samuel.
    On April 24, 2018, pursuant to a motion by DHHS, the
    court ordered the placement change of one of Kamille and
    Kamiya’s siblings from foster care back into Nateesha’s home,
    subject to further hearing at the request of any party. In the
    affidavit in support of the motion, DHHS noted that it had also
    requested that another sibling be placed back with Nateesha,
    but that a hearing on the request had not yet been held. A
    DHHS specialist averred that Nateesha had regularly complied
    with the permanency plan by submitting to drug testing and
    being negative for any and all substances during the prior 2
    months. Additionally, Nateesha had been following the guide-
    lines of her outpatient treatment and was doing well. The
    DHHS specialist described Nateesha as providing a “safe and
    stable home.”
    There are no further orders regarding Kamille and Kamiya’s
    siblings in the appellate record.
    Samuel moved for a bridge order under § 43-246.02, which
    would close the juvenile case as to Kamille and Kamiya and
    transfer jurisdiction over their physical care, custody, and par-
    enting time to the district court. The motion alleged that the
    children were safely placed with Samuel, that there was not
    a district court order for custody in place, that there were no
    other related pending cases before the juvenile court, and that
    the juvenile court could safely close the juvenile case as to
    Kamille and Kamiya once orders for custody, physical care,
    and parenting time were in place.
    The court held a hearing on May 24, 2018, on Samuel’s
    motion for a bridge order. According to testimony at the
    hearing, approximately 1 month prior, Nateesha had begun
    having unsupervised visitation with Kamille and Kamiya,
    with periodic drop-ins, on two week nights a week. She had
    begun having unsupervised visitation on the weekends, with
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    periodic drop-ins, approximately 2 weeks prior to the hearing.
    Transportation for visitation was provided by DHHS.
    Evidence submitted at the hearing demonstrated that by
    March 2018, Nateesha’s home was considered to be safe and
    drug free. However, a child and family services specialist with
    DHHS who was assigned to Kamille and Kamiya’s case testi-
    fied that she believed it was in the children’s best interests for
    Samuel to have the legal and physical custody of the children,
    with visitation rights for Nateesha. The specialist testified that
    the children had been living with Samuel full time for approxi-
    mately 1 year and had adjusted well and formed a strong bond
    with Samuel.
    On May 29, 2018, the court issued, as to Kamille and
    Kamiya, a bridge order and an attached parenting plan. The
    court found that it was in Kamille and Kamiya’s best interests
    to have their legal and physical custody with Samuel and that
    the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Kamille and Kamiya be
    transferred to the district court. The parenting plan provided
    that Samuel have primacy in the choices regarding Kamille and
    Kamiya’s education, religious upbringing, and medical needs.
    Nateesha was to have visitation with Kamille and Kamiya
    every Tuesday commencing at 4:30 p.m. and concluding at
    7:30 p.m., every Wednesday commencing at 4 p.m. and con-
    cluding at 7:30 p.m., and every Friday commencing at 4:30
    p.m. and concluding Sunday at 10 a.m.
    The court scheduled the next dispositional review hearing
    for the other three adjudicated children on August 6, 2018.
    Nateesha appeals from the bridge order.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Nateesha assigns, summarized, that the juvenile court erred
    by (1) denying her due process right to an impartial decision-
    maker by adducing evidence and thereby acting as an advocate
    for one of the parties, (2) receiving into evidence a report of
    the Foster Care Review Board over her hearsay objection, (3)
    finding that the bridge order was necessary, and (4) finding
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    that the best interests of the children would be served by plac-
    ing legal and physical custody with Samuel.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual
    dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which requires an
    appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the deci-
    sion made by the lower court.3
    ANALYSIS
    This appeal involves a “bridge order” entered pursuant to
    § 43-246.02, which was enacted through L.B. 180 in 2017.
    Specifically, Nateesha challenges the domestic relations cus-
    tody determination made in the bridge order in this appeal.
    Before L.B. 180, there was no provision in the law for
    bridge orders. This is the first time we have addressed a bridge
    order under the newly enacted statute. A bridge order is part
    of the juvenile code governing the juvenile court, but was
    designed as a “bridge” between juvenile courts and district
    courts.4 The unique nature of a bridge order raises the question
    of whether it is final under § 25-1902. In a juvenile case, as
    in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented
    for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.5 For an
    appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must
    be a judgment or final order entered by the court from which
    the appeal is taken.6
    To understand whether a bridge order is final, we must
    understand what, precisely, it does. We must, therefore, exam-
    ine the respective roles of juvenile and district courts and the
    newly enacted statutory scheme.
    3
    Tilson v. Tilson, 
    299 Neb. 64
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 31
    (2018).
    4
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-245 to 43-2,129 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
    2018).
    5
    In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., 
    290 Neb. 589
    , 
    861 N.W.2d 415
    (2015).
    6
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016).
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    [2] Pursuant to Neb. Const. art. V, § 27, the juvenile court
    is a statutorily created tribunal established by the Legislature
    “with such . . . powers as the Legislature may provide.” Each
    county, depending on its population, has either a separate juve-
    nile court or a county court with authority to sit as a juvenile
    court.7 As a statutorily created court of limited and special
    jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has
    been conferred on it by statute.8
    [3] Section 43-247 gives the juvenile court jurisdiction as
    to any juvenile defined in subdivision (3) of that section. The
    dual purpose of proceedings brought under § 43-247(3)(a),
    which alleges that the juvenile is homeless, destitute, or with-
    out proper support through no fault of the parent, guardian,
    or custodian, is to protect the welfare of the child and to
    safeguard the parent’s right to properly raise his or her own
    child.9 During proceedings under § 43-247(3)(a), the juvenile
    court has broad jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-284
    (Reissue 2016) regarding placement, but its discretion is gov-
    erned by the parental preference doctrine that holds that
    in a child custody controversy between a biological parent
    and one who is neither a biological nor adoptive parent, the
    biological parent has a superior right to the custody of the
    child.10 The juvenile court’s authority and duty thus includes
    “to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family
    if required under section 43-283.01,”11 as well as “[t]o pro-
    mote adoption, guardianship, or other permanent arrangements
    7
    See § 43-2,111 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517(10) (Reissue 2016).
    8
    In re Interest of Jaden H., 
    263 Neb. 129
    , 
    638 N.W.2d 867
    (2002).
    9
    In re Interest of Constance G., 
    247 Neb. 629
    , 
    529 N.W.2d 534
    (1995).
    10
    See, In re Interest of Amber G. et. al., 
    250 Neb. 973
    , 
    554 N.W.2d 142
          (1996), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent
    S., 
    298 Neb. 306
    , 
    903 N.W.2d 651
    (2017); In re Interest of Stephanie H. et
    al., 
    10 Neb. Ct. App. 908
    , 
    639 N.W.2d 668
    (2002).
    11
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246(5) (Reissue 2016).
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    for children in the custody of [DHHS] who are unable to
    return home.”12
    The district court traditionally determines custody matters
    as between unmarried parents when juvenile services are not
    required.13 In such cases, the parental preference doctrine is
    not implicated, because there is no controversy between a
    biological parent and one who is neither a biological nor adop-
    tive parent.
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(12) (Reissue 2016) provides in part:
    “Nothing in the Nebraska Juvenile Code shall be construed to
    deprive the district courts of their habeas corpus, common-law,
    or chancery jurisdiction or the county courts and district courts
    of jurisdiction of domestic relations matters as defined in sec-
    tion 25-2740.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2740(1)(a) (Reissue 2016)
    includes “custody” within the definition of the term “[d]omes-
    tic relations matters.” Thus, up until amendments passed by the
    Legislature in 2008, domestic relations custody determinations
    between two parents were not within the scope of the juvenile
    court’s jurisdiction under § 43-247(3)(a). They were matters
    exclusively under the jurisdiction of the district court.
    At the same time, district courts were discouraged from
    making custody or visitation determinations while a juvenile
    court was exercising its jurisdiction over a child.14 For exam-
    ple, in Ponseigo v. Mary W.,15 we affirmed the district court’s
    refusal to consider a petition for grandparent visitation while
    a case involving the juvenile’s adjudication under § 43-247(3)
    continued in juvenile court. We noted the relative specificity of
    the relevant statutes as well as the need to avoid the possibility
    of conflicting orders from different courts.16
    12
    § 43-246(6).
    13
    See In re Interest of Ethan M., 
    18 Neb. Ct. App. 63
    , 
    774 N.W.2d 766
    (2009).
    14
    Compare Ponseigo v. Mary W., 
    267 Neb. 72
    , 
    672 N.W.2d 36
    (2003), with
    Schleuter v. McCuiston, 
    203 Neb. 101
    , 
    277 N.W.2d 667
    (1979).
    15
    Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14.
    16
    See 
    id. - 235
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    As explained by the Nebraska Court of Appeals in In re
    Interest of Ethan M.,17 through amendments to § 25-2740(3)
    in 2008, the Legislature expanded the juvenile court’s sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction so that it could enter domestic rela-
    tions custody orders for children over whom the juvenile
    court already had jurisdiction for another purpose. Section
    25-2740(3) refers to subsection (2), which describes domestic
    relations matters that shall be filed with the district court,
    and states that “a county court or separate juvenile court
    which already has jurisdiction over the child whose paternity
    or custody is to be determined has jurisdiction over such
    paternity or custody determination.” Before the 2008 amend-
    ments, this language referred only to paternity determinations.
    The express intent of the amendments was to remedy the
    problem that arose because the juvenile court lacked juris-
    diction over domestic relations custody determinations and
    the district court would not make domestic relations custody
    determinations over a child while under the juvenile court’s
    jurisdiction.18
    However, the procedures for making domestic relations cus-
    tody determinations were not changed by the 2008 amend-
    ments and needed to be followed by the juvenile court in order
    to make a custody determination as between two parents.19
    These procedures differ depending upon whether there is a
    prior custody decree, but include the filing of a petition or a
    complaint20 and the development of a parenting plan as pro-
    vided in the Parenting Act.21
    [4] In In re Interest of Ethan M., the Court of Appeals noted
    that when the juvenile court does not enter a final custody
    order under the appropriate procedures for domestic relations
    17
    In re Interest of Ethan M., supra note 13.
    18
    See 
    id. See, also,
    Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14.
    19
    See In re Interest of Ethan M., supra note 13.
    20
    See § 25-2740(2).
    21
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364 (Reissue 2016).
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    matters, but merely enters a dispositional order placing the
    child with the noncustodial parent, such order can no longer
    be enforced once the court terminates its jurisdiction over the
    juvenile case.22 Under § 43-247(12), the juvenile court retains
    jurisdiction as to any individual adjudicated under various
    subsections, including subsection (3)(a), only “until the indi-
    vidual reaches the age of majority or the court otherwise dis-
    charges the individual from its jurisdiction.” Thus, the juvenile
    court loses jurisdiction to order compliance with dispositional
    plans once it has terminated jurisdiction over the juvenile and
    the parties.23
    One of the reasons the juvenile court may terminate its juris-
    diction over a juvenile is that the child is no longer in need
    of protection.24 And § 43-246.02(1)(d) indicates that a bridge
    order is appropriate only when the juvenile case can safely be
    closed. Section 43-246.02(1)(d) states that one of the neces-
    sary criteria for a bridge order is that the juvenile court has
    determined “its jurisdiction under subdivision (3)(a) of section
    43-247 should properly end once orders for custody, physical
    care, and visitation are entered by the district court.” Section
    43-246.02(3)(a) provides that any motion for a bridge order
    shall allege that “the juvenile court action filed under subdivi-
    sion (3)(a) of section 43-247 may safely be closed once orders
    for custody, physical care, and visitation have been entered by
    the district court.” The Introducer’s Statement of Intent was to
    authorize the creation of “‘Bridge Orders’ to transfer a case
    from juvenile court to district court when a noncustodial parent
    has been deemed fit to safely care for a child, and close the
    unnecessary juvenile case.”25
    22
    See 
    id. 23 See
    In re Interest of Lisa V., 
    3 Neb. Ct. App. 559
    , 
    529 N.W.2d 805
    (1995).
    24
    In Interest of Amanda H., 
    4 Neb. Ct. App. 293
    , 
    542 N.W.2d 79
    (1996).
    25
    Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 180, Judiciary Committee, 105th
    Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 26, 2017).
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    A bridge order “shall only address matters of legal and
    physical custody and parenting time,”26 but it is not a domestic
    relations custody decree. As such, the procedural requirements
    leading up to the bridge order of custody are significantly less
    onerous than for a domestic relations custody decree under
    § 25-2740(3). The Legislature noted in enacting L.B. 180 that
    juvenile courts do not always have the time on their dockets to
    determine domestic relations custody matters.27 Accordingly,
    § 43-246.02(4) specifically states that “[t]he Parenting Act
    shall not apply to the entry of the bridge order in juvenile
    or district court” and that “[n]o mediation or specialized
    alternative dispute resolution under section 42-364 shall be
    required . . . .”
    [5] In enacting § 43-246.02, authorizing bridge orders, the
    Legislature crafted a solution for temporary continuity when
    the child is no longer in need of the juvenile court’s protec-
    tion; the juvenile court has made, through a dispositional order,
    a custody determination in the child’s best interests; and the
    juvenile court does not wish to enter a domestic relations cus-
    tody decree under the power granted by § 25-2740(3). Such
    custody decree is instead entered by the district court after
    the transfer of jurisdiction over the child from juvenile court
    to district court, which transfer is inherent to the bridge order.
    Section 43-246.02(1) states that “[a] juvenile court may termi-
    nate its jurisdiction under subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247
    by transferring jurisdiction over the juvenile’s custody, physi-
    cal care, and visitation to the district court through a bridge
    order . . . .” Section 43-246.02(5) states that “[u]pon transfer-
    ring jurisdiction from a juvenile court to a district court, the
    clerk of the district court shall docket the case under either
    a new docket or any previous docket establishing custody or
    paternity of a child.”
    26
    § 43-246.02(4).
    27
    Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 180, 105th Leg., 1st Sess. 79 (Jan. 26,
    2017).
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    Upon transfer, the district court shall “give full force and
    effect to the juvenile court bridge order as to custody and
    parenting time.”28 However, either party may “file a petition
    in district court for modification of the bridge order” and, if
    filed within 1 year after the filing date of the bridge order,
    “the party requesting modification shall not be required to
    demonstrate a substantial change of circumstance but instead
    shall demonstrate that such modification is in the best interests
    of the child.”29 In such modification proceedings, the statutory
    scheme requires no deference to the juvenile court’s judgment
    of the child’s best interests. Further, § 43-246.02(6) now pro-
    vides that “[t]he transfer of jurisdiction shall not result in new
    filing fees and other court costs being assessed against the
    parties.”30 In other words, the custody determination made by
    the juvenile court has no legally preclusive effect and will be
    made anew by the district court if either parent is discontent
    with the custody arrangement originally set forth by the bridge
    order. And § 43-246.02(6) ensures that there will be no new
    filing costs when seeking what in effect is a de novo review of
    the best interests of the child.
    [6,7] To summarize the statutory scheme, a bridge order is
    a tool for juvenile courts to temporarily ensure continuity for
    the child without endeavoring to issue a final custody decree.
    A juvenile court can ensure through a bridge order that during
    the transfer of jurisdiction to the district court for entry of a
    custody decree, the custody arrangement that the juvenile court
    has found to be in the child’s best interests remains in place.
    The Legislature, through enacting § 43-246.02, bridged the gap
    that would otherwise occur between the time that the juvenile
    court terminated its jurisdiction and the district court picked
    up the case, by avoiding a reversion, before district court
    28
    § 43-246.02(6) (now found at § 43-246.02(7) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
    29
    § 43-246.02(8) (now found at § 43-246.02(9) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
    30
    See 2018 Neb. Laws, L.B. 708, § 1 (eff. July 19, 2018).
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    proceedings can be commenced, back to whatever custody
    arrangement controlled before adjudication.
    [8-10] The unique nature of the bridge order does not place
    it squarely within our final order jurisprudence. Juvenile court
    proceedings are special proceedings, and an order in a juvenile
    special proceeding is final and appealable if it affects a parent’s
    substantial right to raise his or her child.31 A substantial right
    is an essential legal right, not a mere technical right.32 It is
    not enough that the right itself be substantial; the effect of the
    order on that right must also be substantial.33
    [11,12] “Most fundamentally, an order affects a substantial
    right when the right would be significantly undermined or
    irrevocably lost by postponing appellate review.”34 If the right
    affected would not be significantly undermined by delaying
    appellate review, then the order falls under the general pro-
    hibition of immediate appeals from interlocutory orders. This
    general prohibition operates to avoid piecemeal appeals arising
    out of the same set of operative facts, chaos in trial procedure,
    and a succession of appeals in the same case to secure advisory
    opinion to govern further actions of the trial court.35
    As stated, a bridge order is an order transferring jurisdiction
    over the child from the juvenile court to the district court. We
    held in In re Interest of Sandrino T.36 that the transfer from
    juvenile court to county court of juvenile cases brought under
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01 (Reissue 2016) was not a final
    order. We held that the court in which the case would proceed
    31
    
    Id. 32 In
    re Estate of Abbott-Ochsner, 
    299 Neb. 596
    , 
    910 N.W.2d 504
    (2018).
    33
    
    Id. 34 Tilson
    v. Tilson, supra note 
    3, 299 Neb. at 71
    , 907 N.W.2d at 37.
    35
    See In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al., 
    293 Neb. 646
    , 
    879 N.W.2d 34
          (2016).
    36
    Compare, e.g., In re Interest of Sandrino T., 
    295 Neb. 270
    , 
    888 N.W.2d 371
    (2016), with In re Interest of L.P. and R.P., 
    240 Neb. 112
    , 
    480 N.W.2d 421
    (1992).
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    for the delinquency proceedings was a mere technical right and
    not a substantial right and that the right affected by the transfer
    order could be effectively vindicated in an appeal at the con-
    clusion of the criminal proceedings.37
    [13] A bridge order does more than simply transfer the case
    to district court. It orders a change in custody as between two
    parents. Still, such order is merely temporary until given “full
    force and effect”38 by the district court, and it has no legally
    preclusive effect in the event that either parent wishes to chal-
    lenge it in district court. Custody is generally considered an
    essential legal right implicating a parent’s fundamental, con-
    stitutional right to raise his or her child, but the duration of
    a court’s order is also relevant to whether an order affects a
    substantial right.39
    We have held that certain orders affecting custody or other
    parental rights had a substantial effect on those rights and
    were, therefore, final, despite being of limited duration. Such
    cases generally involve either (1) a change in permanency plan
    or (2) orders of substantial or uncertain duration.40 Further,
    such cases involve the State’s taking significant parenting
    contact or parental prerogatives away from a parent and, thus,
    implicate the parental preference doctrine.41 In contrast, in
    37
    In re Interest of Sandrino T., supra note 36.
    38
    § 43-246.02(6) (now found at § 43-246.02(7) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
    39
    See In re Interest of Karlie D., 
    283 Neb. 581
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 214
    (2012).
    40
    See, In re Interest of LeVanta S., 
    295 Neb. 151
    , 
    887 N.W.2d 502
    (2016);
    In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., supra note 5; In re Interest of Mya C.
    & Sunday C., 
    286 Neb. 1008
    , 
    840 N.W.2d 493
    (2013). See, also, In re
    Interest of Karlie D., supra note 39.
    41
    Compare In re Interest of Becka P. et al., 
    296 Neb. 365
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 247
          (2017), and In Interest of Loomis, 
    195 Neb. 552
    , 
    239 N.W.2d 266
    (1976),
    with In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., 
    287 Neb. 27
    , 
    840 N.W.2d 533
          (2013), In re Interest of Borius H. et al., 
    251 Neb. 397
    , 
    558 N.W.2d 31
          (1997), and In re Interest of Stephanie H. et al., supra note 10. But see In
    re Interest of Jaydon W. & Ethan W., 
    25 Neb. Ct. App. 562
    , 
    909 N.W.2d 385
          (2018).
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    several other juvenile court cases, we have found that orders
    temporarily affecting a parent’s custodial, visitation, or edu-
    cational rights were not final. This has generally been when it
    was clear that the orders will be for a very limited duration.42
    Despite the importance of the rights affected, we held that such
    orders of limited duration failed to have a substantial effect on
    those rights.43
    The temporary custody orders that we have held to be final
    are distinguishable from bridge orders inasmuch as bridge
    orders do not change the requirements for reunification and
    they are not orders determining a child custody controversy
    between a biological parent and one who is neither a biologi-
    cal nor adoptive parent. The constitutional right at issue in a
    domestic relations custody decree is usually the right of visita-
    tion.44 And, when the custody-related rights have been affected
    by orders entered in the context of domestic relations between
    two parents, such orders have been held not to be final, and
    thus not immediately appealable, when the court has yet to
    decide pending matters such as child support.45 Even an order
    depriving a parent of all visitation in an underlying custody
    dispute between two parents has been held not to be final,
    when the order was temporary.46 We have implicitly determined
    that the parent’s rights affected by the order can be effectively
    vindicated even when the parent must wait to appeal until all
    pending matters are resolved.
    42
    See, In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., supra note 41; In re Interest of
    R.R., 
    239 Neb. 250
    , 
    475 N.W.2d 518
    (1991); Gerber v. Gerber, 
    218 Neb. 228
    , 
    353 N.W.2d 4
    (1984); In re Interest of Angeleah M. & Ava M., 
    23 Neb. Ct. App. 324
    , 
    871 N.W.2d 49
    (2015), disapproved on other grounds, In
    re Estate of Abbott-Ochsner, supra note 32; In re Interest of Nathaniel P.,
    
    22 Neb. Ct. App. 46
    , 
    846 N.W.2d 681
    (2014).
    43
    Tilson v. Tilson, supra note 3.
    44
    See Koch v. Koch, 
    219 Neb. 195
    , 
    361 N.W.2d 548
    (1985).
    45
    See Schepers v. Schepers, 
    236 Neb. 406
    , 
    461 N.W.2d 413
    (1990).
    46
    See Steven S. v. Mary S., 
    277 Neb. 124
    , 
    760 N.W.2d 28
    (2009). See, also,
    Tilson v. Tilson, supra note 3.
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    Furthermore, in a somewhat different domestic relations
    context of a custody order during military deployment,47 we
    held, in Huskey v. Huskey,48 that an order changing sole legal
    and physical custody from the mother to the father while
    the mother was deployed for 8 months was not a final order
    because it was temporary. The temporary custody order during
    deployment that was addressed in Huskey is similar to a bridge
    order insofar as it automatically continues to be in effect until
    one of the parties files a motion. Section 43-2929.01(5) pro-
    vided that upon the return of the military parent from mobili-
    zation or deployment, either parent may request a rehearing or
    reinstatement of a prior order. If the temporary order was the
    initial order, the court is required to rehear the matter and make
    a new determination. And if the temporary order was a modi-
    fication, the court is required to reinstate the original order
    unless the best interests of the child or child support guidelines
    require otherwise. It thus contemplates further action without
    issue preclusion as to the best interests determination made in
    relation to the temporary order. Such an order is considered
    temporary and without a substantial effect on important cus-
    tody rights.49
    [14,15] A bridge order is designed to preserve the status
    quo by continuing the placement with the noncustodial par-
    ent until the matter can be heard in district court, if either of
    the parties are dissatisfied with the custody decree that the
    district court enters in accordance with the bridge order. The
    initial placement with Samuel occurred during a dispositional
    order, which would have been final under § 25-1902,50 and
    47
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2929.01(4)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2012) (see, currently,
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-4601 et seq. (Reissue 2016)).
    48
    Huskey v. Huskey, 
    289 Neb. 439
    , 
    855 N.W.2d 377
    (2014). See, also,
    Carmicheal v. Rollins, 
    280 Neb. 59
    , 
    783 N.W.2d 763
    (2010).
    49
    See 
    id. 50 See
    In re Interest of Karlie D., supra note 39. See, also, In re Interest of
    Tayla R., 
    17 Neb. Ct. App. 595
    , 
    767 N.W.2d 127
    (2009).
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    Nateesha did not appeal that dispositional order. We have said
    in similar contexts that an order merely preserving the status
    quo pending a further order is not final.51
    Granted, placement while working toward reunifica-
    tion is not the same as a domestic relations custody order.
    Nevertheless, because Nateesha can immediately move for a
    de novo reevaluation in district court of whether the custody
    decree is in Kamille and Kamiya’s best interests—without a
    showing of a change of circumstances or incurring additional
    filing fees or costs—we ultimately conclude that any rights
    affected by the bridge order would not be significantly under-
    mined or irrevocably lost if not immediately appealable to our
    appellate courts.
    We recognize that some things will change due to the
    transfer. If Nateesha moves to modify the custody decree that
    gives full force and effect to the bridge order, she will have
    to demonstrate that the child’s best interests are served by a
    different arrangement and she will no longer have the right to
    appointment of counsel. Still, parties generally do not have a
    right to counsel in domestic relations matters and the provi-
    sion for modification in district court without demonstrat-
    ing a change of circumstances operates as a form of review
    that can be accessed more quickly and with less cost than a
    direct appeal.
    Even if we were to review the bridge order, such review
    would serve no purpose other than to extend its duration. Any
    determination upon direct review of the juvenile court’s bridge
    order would have little meaning, because under the statutory
    scheme, the best interests determination could be made anew
    by the district court regardless.
    [16,17] Immediate appellate review of a bridge order
    would undermine the rights affected more than it would vin-
    dicate them. The goal of quickly resolving domestic relations
    51
    See Tilson v. Tilson, supra note 3.
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    custody disputes would be hindered, not assisted, by permit-
    ting interlocutory appeals of bridge orders.52 For this rea-
    son, we hold that a bridge order is not final for purposes of
    § 25-1902.
    CONCLUSION
    Because we lack appellate jurisdiction, the appeal is
    dismissed.
    A ppeal dismissed.
    Heavican, C.J., participating on briefs.
    52
    See Steven S. v. Mary S., supra note 46.