State on behalf of Walter E. v. Mark E. , 302 Neb. 483 ( 2019 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    04/12/2019 08:07 AM CDT
    - 483 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    302 Nebraska R eports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 483
    State     of   Nebraska               Walter E.,
    on behalf of
    a minor child, appellant, and     Nebraska
    Department of Health and Human
    Services, appellee, v.
    M ark E., appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 8, 2019.    No. S-18-436.
    1.	 Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Determination of a juris-
    dictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of
    law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions indepen-
    dent from a trial court.
    2.	 Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
    power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class or
    category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
    the general subject matter involved.
    3.	 Jurisdiction. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
    time by any party or by the court sua sponte.
    4.	 Jurisdiction: Child Support: Actions. As a prerequisite for an action
    under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03(1)(a) (Reissue 2016), there cannot
    be an existing child support order in any jurisdiction. Hence, a court
    has subject matter jurisdiction for an action under § 43-512.03(1)(a)
    only “when there is no existing child support order” in Nebraska or any
    other jurisdiction.
    Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: George A.
    Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
    Sarah E. Preisinger, Deputy Sarpy County Attorney, for
    appellant.
    No appearance for appellee Mark E.
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 483
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    The State of Nebraska on behalf of Walter E. appeals the
    order of the district court for Sarpy County which dismissed
    the State’s complaint filed against his father, Mark E., to
    establish an order of support. The complaint was filed pur-
    suant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03 (Reissue 2016). We
    conclude that because there was an existing support order,
    the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
    § 43-512.03(1)(a) to consider the State’s complaint. We there-
    fore affirm the district court’s order which dismissed the
    State’s complaint.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The record on appeal indicates that on February 9, 2016,
    the juvenile court ordered Walter to be placed in the custody
    of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services
    (DHHS) with placement at home pending an assessment for
    safety and services. In an order filed February 22, the juve-
    nile court determined that Walter should be in the protective
    custody of DHHS, because although his parents had attempted
    numerous therapeutic interventions, he continued to engage
    in “extremely aggressive and out-of-control behaviors as well
    as self-harming behaviors.” The juvenile court ordered Walter
    to be placed in the temporary custody of DHHS, pending an
    appropriate placement for treatment. In the February 22 order,
    the juvenile court further ordered that “[t]he costs of the child’s
    care to the extent not covered by the parent’s insurance shall
    be borne by the State of Nebraska.” On March 11, the juvenile
    court ordered Walter to be placed at the Boys Town psychiatric
    residential treatment facility.
    On July 19, 2016, the juvenile court filed an order in which
    it found Walter to be a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev.
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    302 Nebraska R eports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 483
    Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Supp. 2015) and ordered him to remain
    in the custody of DHHS for placement at the Boys Town main
    campus. The juvenile court further ordered, inter alia, that
    DHHS “continue to be responsible for all costs associated with
    the Order herein not covered by insurance.” The record on
    appeal contains two orders filed by the juvenile court follow-
    ing subsequent reviews: one order was filed February 14, 2017,
    and the other was filed June 19. In both orders, the juvenile
    court ordered Walter to remain in the custody of DHHS for
    placement at the Boys Town main campus.
    On June 12, 2017, the State, through a deputy Sarpy
    County Attorney, filed a complaint in the district court on
    behalf of Walter and against Walter’s father, Mark. The State
    alleged that the complaint was filed pursuant to § 43-512.03,
    which generally authorizes the county attorney to take certain
    actions in connection with child support, including filing a
    complaint against a nonsupporting party when there is no
    existing child or medical support order. See § 43-512.03(1)(a).
    The State alleged that Walter was under the jurisdiction of
    the juvenile court, that he had been placed in the custody
    of DHHS in an out-of-home placement, that he was in need
    of financial support from Mark, and that Mark had a duty
    of support for Walter. The State requested an order from the
    district court determining that Mark had a duty of support and
    ordering Mark to “pay a sum certain each month to meet that
    duty of support” and to “provide ongoing medical support
    for [Walter].”
    Mark filed an answer in which he alleged, inter alia, that the
    juvenile court had placed Walter at Boys Town and had ordered
    that the State should be responsible for costs associated with
    the placement. He also alleged that he continued to provide
    coverage for Walter under his private medical insurance.
    The district court’s child support referee held a hearing on
    the State’s complaint and thereafter filed a report finding that
    Mark was able to and should pay child support in accord­
    ance with the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines. The referee
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 483
    recommended that Mark be ordered to pay to DHHS child sup-
    port of $631 per month beginning September 1, 2017.
    Mark took exception to the referee’s report. Mark asserted
    that the district court and referee lacked jurisdiction, because
    there was a pending case in the juvenile court and the juvenile
    court had already entered support orders specifically requiring
    the State to pay support beyond that covered by Mark’s insur-
    ance. Mark filed a motion to transfer the matter to the juvenile
    court. Mark later filed a motion to dismiss the district court
    action for lack of jurisdiction.
    The district court held a hearing on Mark’s motion to dis-
    miss, motion to transfer, and exception to the referee’s report.
    The district court received evidence, including the juvenile
    court orders discussed above. After the hearing, the district
    court filed an order on March 13, 2018, in which it dismissed
    the State’s complaint and ordered the parties to pay their
    own costs.
    In its order of March 13, 2018, the district court stated that
    it had examined the juvenile court orders and that the orders
    showed that “at each juncture [the juvenile court] has assigned
    the costs of care for the child shall be paid by [Mark’s] insur-
    ance and to the extent that costs are not covered by insurance,
    they shall be paid by the State of Nebraska.” The district court
    further stated that the juvenile court had “made findings that
    the parents cannot afford appropriate treatment and costs were
    waived in that matter.”
    The district court noted that § 43-512.03 authorizes an
    action seeking a support order “in cases where there is no
    existing child or medical support order.” The district court
    determined that there was “an existing order for support as
    announced by Juvenile Court.” As part of its order, the dis-
    trict court observed that “res judicata” prevented the parties
    from relitigating the issues in this action and noted that “the
    issue of support has been address[ed] by the Juvenile Court,
    the support order has the same finality as in this proceed-
    ing, the merits were litigated, and all of the parties are the
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 483
    same.” The district court finally determined that because the
    juvenile court had jurisdiction over Walter and because the
    juvenile proceeding was still ongoing, the issue of whether
    the matter may or should be transferred to juvenile court
    was moot.
    Following the denial of the State’s motion to reconsider, the
    State appealed.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The State claims, restated and consolidated, that the district
    court erred when it dismissed the case based on its determina-
    tion that an order of support had been entered by the juvenile
    court and that res judicata barred this action. The State alter-
    natively claims that the district court erred when it declined to
    transfer the action to the juvenile court.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not
    involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an
    appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial
    court. Retroactive, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm.,
    
    298 Neb. 936
    , 
    906 N.W.2d 328
    (2018).
    ANALYSIS
    The State challenges at length the district court’s reliance
    on “res judicata” in its order of dismissal. However, as we
    explain below, because the action was properly dismissed on a
    statutory basis for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we need
    not engage in an analysis of the relevance of the principle of
    res judicata.
    [2,3] Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal
    to hear and determine a case in the general class or category
    to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
    the general subject matter involved. Boyd v. Cook, 
    298 Neb. 819
    , 
    906 N.W.2d 31
    (2018). A lack of subject matter jurisdic-
    tion may be raised at any time by any party or by the court sua
    sponte. 
    Id. - 488
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    302 Nebraska R eports
    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 483
    In its complaint, the State alleged that it was filing the
    complaint in district court pursuant to § 43-512.03. We note
    that § 43-512.03 provides for various types of child sup-
    port enforcement actions, including actions for enforcement
    of existing child support orders and actions for paternity.
    However, the State in its complaint sought an order to estab-
    lish Mark’s child and medical support obligations, and there-
    fore, it is clear that the State was specifically proceeding
    under § 43-512.03(1)(a), which authorizes a county attorney,
    on request of DHHS, to “file a complaint against a non-
    supporting party in the district, county, or separate juve-
    nile court praying for an order for child or medical support
    in cases when there is no existing child or medical sup-
    port order.”
    [4] In State ex rel. Gaddis v. Gaddis, 
    237 Neb. 264
    , 267-68,
    
    465 N.W.2d 773
    , 775 (1991), we held that “as a prerequisite
    for an action under § 43-512.03, there cannot be an existing
    child support order in any jurisdiction. Hence, a court has sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction for an action under § 43-512.03 only
    ‘when there is no existing child support order’ in Nebraska
    or any other jurisdiction.” See, also, State ex rel. Cammarata
    v. Chambers, 
    6 Neb. Ct. App. 467
    , 
    574 N.W.2d 530
    (1998). We
    concluded in Gaddis that because there was an existing child
    support order issued in Colorado, the district court lacked sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction for an action brought under § 43-512.03
    and that therefore, the district court should have dismissed the
    proceedings on that basis.
    Recently, in House v. House, 
    24 Neb. Ct. App. 595
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 362
    (2017), the Nebraska Court of Appeals clarified that the
    above-quoted holding in Gaddis applied specifically to a com-
    plaint filed under the part of the juvenile statute that is now
    found at § 43-512.03(1)(a). The Court of Appeals further clari-
    fied that the requirement in § 43-512.03(1)(a) that there be “no
    existing . . . support order” did not apply to actions brought
    under other subsections of § 43-512.03, such as the one at
    issue in House brought under § 43-512.03(1)(c) to enforce an
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 483
    already existing child support order. We agree with the Court
    of Appeals’ analysis in House.
    In this case, the district court determined that there was
    already an existing support order issued by the juvenile court
    and therefore dismissed the complaint. The district court made
    this determination by reviewing the juvenile court orders that it
    received into evidence and that we have described above. We
    agree with the district court’s determination that “[t]he Juvenile
    Court has issued an order of support . . . .”
    On appeal, the State contends that the orders of the juve-
    nile court were not general child support orders and that the
    juvenile court did not employ child support calculations like
    those available in the district court. As discussed below, we
    reject the contention that juvenile court orders were not gen-
    eral child support orders, and we do not address the State’s
    contention that the juvenile court did not employ proper pro-
    cedures to determine child support. Instead, we conclude that
    the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of
    § 43-512.03(1)(a).
    In the July 19, 2016, order in which the juvenile court
    adjudicated Walter to be a child within the meaning of
    § 43-247(3)(a) and ordered him to remain in the custody of
    DHHS for placement at the Boys Town main campus, the
    juvenile court ordered, inter alia, that DHHS “continue to be
    responsible for all costs associated with the Order herein not
    covered by insurance.” As did the district court, we read “all
    costs” to refer broadly to all necessary support required by the
    placement and not limited to medical support.
    For completeness, we note that juvenile courts have author-
    ity to order support. Specifically, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-290
    (Reissue 2016), which is part of the Nebraska Juvenile Code,
    authorizes a juvenile court to order support to be paid by a par-
    ent. Section 43-290 provides in part:
    Pursuant to a petition filed by a county attorney or
    city attorney having knowledge of a juvenile in his or her
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
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    302 Neb. 483
    jurisdiction who appears to be a juvenile described in sub-
    division (1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 43-247, whenever
    the care or custody of a juvenile is given by the court to
    someone other than his or her parent, which shall include
    placement with a state agency, or when a juvenile is given
    medical, psychological, or psychiatric study or treatment
    under order of the court, the court shall make a determi-
    nation of support to be paid by a parent for the juvenile
    at the same proceeding at which placement, study, or
    treatment is determined or at a separate proceeding. Such
    proceeding, which may occur prior to, at the same time
    as, or subsequent to adjudication, shall be in the nature of
    a disposition hearing.
    We conclude that the district court did not err when it
    determined that there was an existing support order from
    the juvenile court. Therefore, under § 43-512.03(1)(a), the
    district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
    the State’s complaint and, consequently, the district court did
    not err when it dismissed the complaint. The State asserts
    that, in any event, the juvenile court did not follow adequate
    procedures to determine the amount of Mark’s support obli-
    gation. The State’s attempt to use a separate district court
    proceeding to challenge the sufficiency of the juvenile court
    proceeding was an impermissible collateral attack, which the
    district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain. However, as we
    noted above, juvenile courts have authority to enter support
    orders, and our decision in this matter does not foreclose
    subsequent filings in juvenile court to further consider sup-
    port issues.
    Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the State alter-
    natively claims that the district court erred when it did not
    transfer the present action to the juvenile court. However,
    we agree with the district court’s reasoning that there was
    already an ongoing proceeding in the juvenile court in which
    the State was a party and that therefore, the transfer issue
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.
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    302 Neb. 483
    was moot. We conclude that the district court did not err in
    this regard.
    CONCLUSION
    We determine that because there was an existing support
    order issued by the juvenile court, the district court did not
    have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
    the State under § 43-512.03(1)(a). We affirm the district
    court’s order which dismissed the State’s complaint.
    A ffirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S-18-436

Citation Numbers: 302 Neb. 483

Filed Date: 3/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/10/2019