In re Interest of Violet T. ( 2013 )


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  •                           Nebraska Advance Sheets
    IN RE INTEREST OF VIOLET T.	949
    Cite as 
    286 Neb. 949
    with a lack of information regarding the nature and extent
    of the misconduct and the attorney’s present or future fit-
    ness to practice law. We declined to disbar the attorney and
    instead imposed an indefinite suspension. Similarly, under
    the facts of this case, we conclude that an indefinite suspen-
    sion, with a minimum suspension of 3 years, is the appropri-
    ate discipline.
    CONCLUSION
    We find and hereby order that Tonderum should be indefi-
    nitely suspended from the practice of law in the State of
    Nebraska effective upon the filing of this opinion, with a
    minimum suspension of 3 years. Any application for reinstate-
    ment filed by Tonderum after the minimum suspension period
    shall include a showing under oath which demonstrates her
    fitness to practice law and fully addresses the circumstances
    of the instant violation.
    Tonderum is directed to comply with Neb. Ct. R. § 3-316,
    and upon failure to do so, she shall be subject to punishment
    for contempt of this court. Tonderum is also directed to pay
    costs and expenses in accordance with 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-114
    and 7-115 (Reissue 2012) and Neb. Ct. R. §§ 3-310(P) and
    3-323(B) within 60 days after the order imposing costs and
    expenses, if any, is entered by the court.
    Judgment of suspension.
    In   re I nterest of     Violet T.,     a child
    under   18   years of age.
    State    of Nebraska, appellant, v.
    Abigael T., appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed November 22, 2013.    No. S-13-084.
    1.	 Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which
    does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent from
    the lower court’s decision.
    2.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which
    an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    950	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    3.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s power
    to hear and determine a case in the general class or category to which the pro-
    ceedings in question belong and to deal with the general subject involved in the
    action or proceeding before the court and the particular question which it assumes
    to determine.
    4.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Statutes. As a statutorily created court of limited
    and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has been con-
    ferred on it by statute.
    5.	 Juvenile Courts. The Nebraska Juvenile Code should be liberally construed.
    6.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. To obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile, the juve-
    nile court’s only concern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile pres-
    ently finds himself or herself fit within the asserted subsection of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
     (Reissue 2008).
    7.	 Jurisdiction: Minors: Domicile: Child Custody. The jurisdiction of a state to
    regulate the custody of an infant found within its territory does not depend upon
    the domicile of the parents.
    Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
    Douglas F. Johnson, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
    Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, Debra Tighe-
    Dolan, and Emily H. Anderson, Senior Certified Law Student,
    for appellant.
    Kate E. Placzek, of Law Office of Kate E. Placzek, for
    appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack,
    Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.
    Heavican, C.J.
    INTRODUCTION
    The Douglas County Attorney (the State) filed an amended
    petition alleging Violet T. was a minor child within the mean-
    ing of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (3)(a) (Reissue 2008) due to the
    faults and habits of her biological mother, Abigael T. The State
    also filed a motion for temporary custody. Abigael moved to
    dismiss. Finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the sepa-
    rate juvenile court of Douglas County dismissed the petition.
    We dismiss this appeal.
    BACKGROUND
    Violet was born in a hospital located in Douglas County,
    Nebraska, in November 2012. According to the petition filed
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    IN RE INTEREST OF VIOLET T.	951
    Cite as 
    286 Neb. 949
    by the State, Violet tested positive for methamphetamine at
    birth. Abigael admitted to using methamphetamine during
    pregnancy and stated she was not prepared to care for an
    infant. Violet was discharged from the hospital a few days after
    her birth and was taken to live with relatives in Iowa. It is not
    apparent from the record who took Violet from the hospital to
    her relatives in Iowa.
    On November 16, 2012, the State filed a petition alleging
    Violet was a minor child living or to be found in Douglas
    County who came within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) due to
    the faults and habits of Abigael. The petition alleged that Violet
    was in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and
    Human Services (DHHS). The State also filed a motion for a
    protective custody hearing.
    On November 21, 2012, a hearing was held in juvenile
    court. At that hearing, DHHS clarified that Violet was not in
    its custody. Counsel for Violet’s mother moved to dismiss,
    arguing that although Violet was born in Nebraska and Abigael
    had requested voluntary services from DHHS, Violet had never
    actually lived in Nebraska. The State objected to the motion.
    The objection was sustained, and the case was set for a hearing
    on the motion to dismiss.
    On December 3, 2012, the State filed an amended petition
    alleging that Violet was a minor child “born, domiciled, liv-
    ing or to be found in Douglas County, Nebraska,” who came
    within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) due to the faults and hab-
    its of her biological mother, Abigael. The petition stated that
    Abigael’s address was unknown and that Violet was currently
    residing in Council Bluffs, Iowa. The State also filed a motion
    for temporary custody, along with an affidavit from the social
    worker who had investigated the case while Violet was still in
    the hospital. The same day, the juvenile court issued an order
    granting DHHS immediate custody of Violet.
    On December 10, 2012, a hearing was held in the juvenile
    court. Abigael renewed her motion to dismiss based on lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. DHHS joined
    the motion, agreeing that there was no jurisdiction because
    Violet was “not found in Douglas County [and] had already
    been voluntarily placed by [Abigael] with relatives in Iowa.”
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    952	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    The State and the guardian ad litem objected to the motion.
    The juvenile court heard arguments and received evidence. The
    parties stipulated that Violet was born in Douglas County but
    that upon discharge from the hospital, she went to live in Iowa
    and remained there at the time of filing the petition and at the
    time of the hearing.
    On January 2, 2013, the juvenile court issued an order dis-
    missing the amended petition for lack of subject matter juris-
    diction. The State appeals.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    On appeal, the State assigns that the juvenile court erred in
    refusing to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the minor
    child, Violet.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
    tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
    law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion
    independent from the lower court’s decision.1
    [2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
    appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.2
    ANALYSIS
    [3] The State’s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile
    court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
    tion. Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear and
    determine a case in the general class or category to which the
    proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general
    subject involved in the action or proceeding before the court
    and the particular question which it assumes to determine.3
    Abigael asserted, and the juvenile court found, that the court
    lacked authority to hear and determine whether Violet was a
    juvenile within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a).
    1
    See In re Interest of Trey H., 
    281 Neb. 760
    , 
    798 N.W.2d 607
     (2011).
    2
    See 
    id.
    3
    
    Id.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    IN RE INTEREST OF VIOLET T.	953
    Cite as 
    286 Neb. 949
    [4,5] As a statutorily created court of limited and special
    jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has
    been conferred on it by statute.4 The Nebraska Juvenile Code
    should, however, be liberally construed.5
    [6] Section 43-247(3) states that the juvenile court in each
    county shall have jurisdiction over “[a]ny juvenile . . . who
    lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of
    his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.” We have held that
    “to obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile, the court’s only con-
    cern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile presently
    finds himself or herself fit within the asserted subsection of
    § 43-247.”6 Section 43-247 mentions neither the residence of a
    parent nor the residence of a child.
    [7] The State argues that Violet’s absence from Nebraska
    was temporary and, further, that the domicile of a child is
    determined by the residence of the child’s custodian. But we
    have stated:
    The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody
    of an infant found within its territory does not depend
    upon the domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the
    protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless.
    As we said in In re Application of Reed [
    152 Neb. 819
    ,
    
    43 N.W.2d 161
     (1950)]: “The jurisdiction of a state to
    regulate the custody of infants found within its territory
    does not depend upon the domicile of the child, but it
    arises out of the power that every sovereignty possesses
    as parens patriae to every child within its borders to
    determine its status and the custody that will best meet
    its needs and wants, and residence within the state
    suffices even though the domicile may be in another
    jurisdiction.”7
    4
    In re Interest of Jorge O., 
    280 Neb. 411
    , 
    786 N.W.2d 343
     (2010).
    5
    See In re Interest of Gabriela H., 
    280 Neb. 284
    , 
    785 N.W.2d 843
     (2010).
    6
    In re Interest of Angelica L. & Daniel L., 
    277 Neb. 984
    , 1004-05, 
    767 N.W.2d 74
    , 91 (2009).
    7
    Jones v. State, 
    175 Neb. 711
    , 717, 
    123 N.W.2d 633
    , 637 (1963) (emphasis
    supplied).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    954	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    In the case at hand, Violet was born in Nebraska, but was
    no longer within this state’s borders at the time the petition
    was filed. Although the State suggests Violet was in Iowa
    temporarily, the facts of this case as established by the record
    indicate that apart from the days just following her birth, Violet
    has never lived anywhere else but in Iowa. As is established
    by this record, there is no Nebraska home to which Violet
    might return.
    Additionally, we note that 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-274
    (1)
    (Reissue 2008) authorizes a county attorney “having knowl-
    edge of a juvenile in his or her county” who appears to
    be within § 43-247 to file a petition in “the court having
    j
    ­urisdiction in the matter.” In this case, however, Violet was
    not in Douglas County, even temporarily, at the time the
    petition was filed. We conclude the parens patriae power of
    the State does not provide a basis for finding jurisdiction in
    this case.
    We also find no jurisdiction under the Uniform Child
    Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).8 The
    UCCJEA provides that a court has jurisdiction to make a cus-
    tody determination if:
    (1) [T]his state is the home state of the child on the
    date of the commencement of the proceeding or was
    the home state of the child within six months before the
    commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
    from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
    continues to live in this state;
    (2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction
    under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, or a court of the
    home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdic-
    tion on the ground that this state is the more appropriate
    forum under section 43-1244 or 43-1245, and:
    (A) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and
    at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have
    a significant connection with this state other than mere
    physical presence; and
    8
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1226
     et seq. (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    IN RE INTEREST OF VIOLET T.	955
    Cite as 
    286 Neb. 949
    (B) substantial evidence is available in this state con-
    cerning the child’s care, protection, training, and per-
    sonal relationships;
    (3) all courts having jurisdiction under subdivision
    (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section have declined to exercise
    jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the
    more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the
    child under 43-1244 or 43-1245; or
    (4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction
    under the criteria specified in subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2), or
    (a)(3) of this section.9
    “Home state” is defined as the state in which a child has
    lived with a parent or person acting as parent for at least 6 con-
    secutive months, or from birth, before the commencement of
    the proceeding.10 Because, apart from a few days just follow-
    ing her birth, Violet has never lived in Nebraska, and Nebraska
    is not Violet’s home state under the UCCJEA. This is true
    despite the fact that Violet was born in Nebraska.11 Therefore,
    in the case at hand, none of the provisions of the UCCJEA
    provide a statutory basis for jurisdiction.
    Finally, the State cites to In re Interest of Breana M.12 But
    contrary to the arguments of the State, that case provides us
    with no basis for jurisdiction in this matter. In re Interest
    of Breana M. involves the exercise of jurisdiction across
    Nebraska counties but is wholly inapplicable here, where the
    issue involves the jurisdiction of a child located in a state other
    than Nebraska.
    CONCLUSION
    We agree the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
    tion in this case. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the
    State’s appeal.
    Appeal dismissed.
    9
    § 43-1238.
    10
    § 43-1227(7).
    11
    See Carter v. Carter, 
    276 Neb. 840
    , 
    758 N.W.2d 1
     (2008).
    12
    In re Interest of Breana M., 
    18 Neb. App. 910
    , 
    795 N.W.2d 660
     (2011).