State v. Havens , 2011 Ohio 5019 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Havens, 
    2011-Ohio-5019
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO                                      :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                         :   C.A. CASE NO. 10CA0027
    vs.                                               :    T.C. CASE NO. 08CR0344
    TIMOTHY HAVENS                                     :   (Criminal Appeal from
    Common Pleas Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                        :
    . . . . . . . . .
    O P I N I O N
    Rendered on the 30th day of September, 2011.
    . . . . . . . . .
    Nick A. Selvaggio, Pros. Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0055607, 200
    North Main Street, Urbana, OH 43078
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Kathryn L. Bowling, Atty. Reg. No. 0084442, 111 West First Street,
    Suite 518, Dayton, OH 45402
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    . . . . . . . . .
    GRADY, P.J.:
    {¶ 1} Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant
    Timothy Havens entered pleas of guilty on March 10, 2009, to one
    count of assault, R.C. 2903.13(B), a misdemeanor of the first
    degree, and one count of violation of a civil protection order,
    R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), (B)(3), a felony of the fifth degree.                       In
    2
    exchange, the State dismissed eleven other charges and recommended
    community control sanctions.    The trial court sentenced Defendant
    on May 12, 2009, to three years of community control sanctions,
    which include special conditions prohibiting Defendant from having
    any contact with the victim, his wife.
    {¶ 2} Defendant did not appeal his conviction and sentence.
    On June 22, 2010, following a hearing, the trial court found that
    Defendant had violated the terms of his community control by
    committing a new criminal offense, causing or attempting to cause
    physical harm to his wife on June 9, 2010.        The trial court
    continued Defendant on community control, however, with additional
    conditions, including prohibiting Defendant from having any
    contact with the victim/wife.
    {¶ 3} On July 22, 2010, following a hearing, the trial court
    found that Defendant had once again violated his community control
    by repeatedly making contact with the victim between July 5, 2010
    and July 13, 2010.   The trial court revoked Defendant’s community
    control and sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms of six
    months for assault and twelve months for violation of a civil
    protection order.
    {¶ 4} Defendant timely appealed to this court from the trial
    court’s decision revoking his community control.       Defendant’s
    appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, Anders v. California
    3
    (1967), 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    , 
    19 L.Ed.2d 493
    , stating that
    she could find no meritorious issues for appellate review.        We
    notified Defendant of his appellate counsel’s representations and
    afforded him ample time to file a pro se brief.       None has been
    received.   This case is now before us for our independent review
    of the record.   Penson v. Ohio (1988), 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 
    109 S.Ct. 346
    ,
    
    102 L.Ed.2d 300
    .
    {¶ 5} Defendant’s   appellate   counsel   has   identified   one
    possible issue for appeal.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶ 6} “APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED KNOWINGLY,
    INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY AS REQUIRED BY LAW.”
    {¶ 7} Defendant did not appeal the conviction for assault and
    violation of a protection order that was entered on his guilty
    pleas.   In State v. Perry (1967), 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    , at ¶9 of the
    syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
    {¶ 8} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment
    of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by
    counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an
    appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due
    process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant
    at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or
    on an appeal from that judgment.”
    4
    {¶ 9} Defendant’s claim that his guilty pleas were not entered
    knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily clearly could have been
    raised on direct appeal, but was not.           Accordingly, that claim
    is now barred by res judicata.             Perry.     In any event, our
    examination of this record discloses that the trial court complied
    with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in accepting Defendant’s guilty pleas which
    were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
    {¶ 10} In order to be constitutionally valid and comport with
    due   process,    a   guilty     plea    must   be   entered    knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily.          Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 
    395 U.S. 238
    , 
    89 S.Ct. 1709
    , 
    23 L.Ed.2d 274
    .        Compliance with Crim.R.
    11(C)(2) in accepting guilty or no contest pleas portrays those
    qualities.       State   v.    Fisher,   Montgomery    App.    No.   23992,
    
    2011-Ohio-629
    , at ¶6.
    {¶ 11} Crim. R. 11(C)(2) provides:
    {¶ 12} “In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea
    of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea
    of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant
    personally and doing all of the following:
    {¶ 13} “(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
    voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
    of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the
    defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
    5
    community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
    {¶ 14} “(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that
    the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
    contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
    proceed with judgment and sentence.
    {¶ 15} “(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
    defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving
    the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or
    her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the
    defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
    cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”
    {¶ 16} In   State   v.   Russell,   Clark   App.   No.   10CA54,
    
    2011-Ohio-1738
    , at ¶7-8, we stated:
    {¶ 17} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts to
    literally comply with Crim.R. 11. Clark at ¶ 29. The trial court
    must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), as it pertains to
    the waiver of constitutional rights. Clark at ¶ 31. The failure
    to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional rights would
    invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered
    involuntarily and unknowingly. State v. Griggs, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 85
    , 2004–Ohio–4415, ¶ 12.
    {¶ 18} “However, because Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) involve
    6
    non-constitutional rights, the trial court need only substantially
    comply with those requirements. State v. Nero (1990), 
    56 Ohio St.3d 106
    , 108; Greene at ¶ 9. Substantial compliance means that, under
    the totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively
    understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is
    waiving. State v. Miller, Clark App. No. 08 CA 90, 2010–Ohio–4760,
    ¶ 8, citing State v. Veney, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 2008–Ohio–5200,
    ¶ 15. A defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the ground
    that the trial court did not substantially comply with Crim.R.
    11(C)(2)(a) and (b) must show a prejudicial effect, which requires
    the defendant to show that the plea would otherwise not have been
    entered. Griggs at ¶ 12.”
    {¶ 19} The record of the plea hearing in this case demonstrates
    that the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)
    in advising Defendant about the various constitutional rights he
    would be giving up by pleading guilty.         Furthermore, the trial
    court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) in
    determining    Defendant’s    understanding       of   the     various
    non-constitutional matters.   Pursuant to the plea agreement, the
    State recommended community control sanctions and the trial court
    imposed that recommended sentence.     Defendant’s guilty pleas were
    entered   knowingly,   intelligently     and    voluntarily.      This
    assignment of error lacks arguable merit.
    7
    {¶ 20} In addition to reviewing the possible issues for appeal
    raised by Defendant’s appellate counsel, we have conducted an
    independent review of the trial court’s proceedings and have found
    no error having arguable merit.   Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal
    is without merit and the judgment of the trial court will be
    affirmed.
    FROELICH, J., And HALL, J., concur.
    Copies mailed to:
    Nick A. Selvaggio, Esq.
    Kathryn L. Bowling, Esq.
    Timothy Havens
    Hon. Roger B. Wilson
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10CA0027

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 5019

Judges: Grady

Filed Date: 9/30/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014