United States v. Muhammad , 337 F. App'x 349 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4882
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAEED ABDUL MUHAMMAD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00146-REP-1)
Submitted: July 13, 2009 Decided: July 24, 2009
Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Shannon L. Taylor, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana
Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Roderick C. Young,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Saeed Abdul Muhammad appeals his conviction and life
sentence after he was convicted by a jury of one count of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 846 (2006), and possession with
intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) (2006). Muhammad’s sole
argument on appeal is that the district court erred when it
denied his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal
because he asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conspiracy to distribute cocaine base conviction.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We find that the Government presented ample evidence
to establish that Muhammad engaged in a conspiracy to distribute
fifty grams or more of cocaine base. Although Muhammad
correctly asserts that he could not be convicted of a conspiracy
to distribute cocaine base if the only other member of the
conspiracy was a confidential informant, see United States v.
Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 1967), Muhammad’s argument
that the Government presented no other evidence, circumstantial
or otherwise, to establish the existence of other members of the
conspiracy does not withstand scrutiny.
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To the contrary, the Government established that
Muhammad used homes belonging to two other individuals to
conduct his drug transactions; used one of those individuals to
distribute cocaine base on Muhammad’s behalf on at least one
occasion; and confessed to officers that he had been dealing
cocaine base for approximately six months, purchased more than
fifty grams of powder cocaine from a distributor in Maryland,
purchased from a distributor in Virginia, and that he used a
friend’s home to prepare cocaine base. Since the evidence also
established that cocaine like that converted by Muhammad could
not have been grown locally, the logical inference was that
Muhammad obtained the large amounts of cocaine from another
individual who, based on the amount of drugs purchased, likely
knew that Muhammad would distribute the drug.
Additionally, although a criminal conviction cannot
validly rest solely upon an uncorroborated confession, United
States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 234 (4th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009), we find that the Government
offered sufficient independent circumstantial evidence tending
to establish the trustworthiness of Muhammad’s confession.
“[C]orroborating evidence need not, itself, establish every
element of the offense.” United States v. Waller, 326 F.2d 314,
315 (4th Cir. 1963). Rather, “extrinsic proof” is sufficient if
it “merely fortifies the truth of the confession, without
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independently establishing the crime charged.” Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 489 (1963) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In other words, corroborative
evidence will be adequate if it “supports the essential facts
admitted sufficiently to justify a jury’s inference of their
truth.” Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954); see
also Warring v. United States, 222 F.2d 906, 911 (4th Cir. 1955)
(holding that corroborative evidence “need not be proof of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but need only tend to support
the admitted fact”). Circumstantial evidence can be used to
corroborate a confession. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 236 (citations
omitted).
In light of testimony regarding the extent and
locations of Muhammad’s drug sales between January 18 through
February 27, 2008, the inability to grow the cocaine locally,
and the marked bills and amount of drugs recovered from Muhammad
on the day of his arrest, we find that sufficient evidence
exists to allay any concerns about the veracity or
trustworthiness of Muhammad’s confession.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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