Komar v. State , 299 Neb. 301 ( 2018 )


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    299 Nebraska R eports
    KOMAR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 301
    Stacey L. Komar, appellant, v.
    State of Nebraska et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 16, 2018.    No. S-16-127.
    1.	 Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. A district court’s
    grant of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings is reviewed de novo,
    accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all rea-
    sonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
    2.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.
    3.	 Tort Claims Act: Limitations of Actions. Before suit can be filed
    under the State Tort Claims Act, a claimant must submit the claim in
    writing to the Risk Manager within 2 years after the claim accrued.
    4.	 ____: ____. Generally speaking, a claimant cannot file suit under the
    State Tort Claims Act until the Risk Manager or State Claims Board
    makes a final disposition of the claim. However, if the board has not
    made final disposition of a claim after 6 months, the claimant is permit-
    ted to withdraw the claim and file suit.
    5.	 ____: ____. The 2-year limitations period referenced in Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 81-8,227(1) (Reissue 2014) governs not just the time for submitting
    claims to the Risk Manager, but also the time for beginning suit under
    the State Tort Claims Act.
    6.	 Tort Claims Act: Limitations of Actions: Notice. Under Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 81-8,227(1) (Reissue 2014), the time to begin suit under the State
    Tort Claims Act shall be extended for a period of 6 months from the
    date of mailing of notice to the claimant by the Risk Manager or State
    Claims Board as to the final disposition of the claim or from the date
    of withdrawal of the claim under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,213 (Reissue
    2014) if the time to begin suit would otherwise expire before the end of
    such period.
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    7.	 ____: ____: ____. Claimants who allow the State Claims Board to reach
    a decision must file suit on the claim within 2 years after the claim
    accrued, or within 6 months after the board mails notice of final disposi-
    tion, whichever occurs later. On the other hand, claimants who withdraw
    their claim must file suit on the claim within 2 years after the claim
    accrued, or within 6 months after the first date on which the claim could
    have been withdrawn, whichever occurs later.
    Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
    Pirtle, Bishop, and A rterburn, Judges, on appeal thereto from
    the District Court for Douglas County, W. Russell Bowie III,
    Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
    Denise E. Frost, of Johnson & Mock, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellant.
    Brien M. Welch and John A. McWilliams, of Cassem,
    Tierney, Adams, Gotch & Douglas, for appellees.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, K elch, and
    Funke, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    This case involves a dispute over the calculation of the
    2-year statute of limitations under the State Tort Claims Act
    (STCA).1 The district court for Douglas County dismissed
    the action as time barred, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    affirmed.2 On further review, we agree the claim is time barred
    and affirm the dismissal.
    BACKGROUND
    According to the allegations of the complaint, on January
    15, 2013, Stacey L. Komar learned that an employee of the
    State of Nebraska had accessed her electronically stored medi-
    cal records without her permission. Approximately 17 months
    1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,235 (Reissue 2014).
    2
    Komar v. State, 
    24 Neb. Ct. App. 692
    , 
    897 N.W.2d 310
    (2017).
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    KOMAR v. STATE
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    299 Neb. 301
    later, on June 27, 2014, Komar presented a tort claim to the Risk
    Manager for the State Claims Board alleging the employee had
    invaded her privacy by accessing her medical records without
    permission. Under the STCA, Komar had to present her claim
    to the Risk Manager as a prerequisite to bringing suit.3
    Komar’s claim remained pending before the State Claims
    Board for more than 1 year without final disposition. On July
    14, 2015, she withdrew the claim. The next day, Komar filed
    a complaint in the Buffalo County District Court, alleging
    invasion of privacy and naming as defendants the State of
    Nebraska, the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska,
    and Nebraska Medicine (collectively the State).
    District Court Action
    The State moved to dismiss Komar’s complaint, arguing
    it was barred by the STCA statute of limitations set out in
    § 81-8,227(1). That statute provides:
    [E]very tort claim permitted under the [STCA] shall be
    forever barred unless within two years after such claim
    accrued the claim is made in writing to the Risk Manager
    in the manner provided by such act. The time to begin
    suit under such act shall be extended for a period of six
    months from the date of mailing of notice to the claim-
    ant by the Risk Manager or State Claims Board as to the
    final disposition of the claim or from the date of with-
    drawal of the claim under section 81-8,213 if the time
    to begin suit would otherwise expire before the end of
    such period.
    This court has held that the 2-year limitations period refer-
    enced in § 81-8,227(1) governs not just the time for submit-
    ting claims to the Risk Manager, but also the time for begin-
    ning suit.4
    3
    See §§ 81-8,212 and 81-8,213.
    4
    Hullinger v. Board of Regents, 
    249 Neb. 868
    , 
    546 N.W.2d 779
    (1996),
    overruled on other grounds, Collins v. State, 
    264 Neb. 267
    , 
    646 N.W.2d 618
    (2002).
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    In analyzing the timeliness of Komar’s complaint, the dis-
    trict court found her claim accrued on January 15, 2013—the
    date she learned of the alleged invasion of privacy. It reasoned
    that under § 81-8,227(1), Komar had until January 15, 2015, to
    file her complaint, unless the 6-month extension applied. No
    party has disputed either the accrual date or this preliminary
    calculation of the applicable limitations period.
    Komar claimed she was entitled to the 6-month exten-
    sion under § 81-8,227(1) and argued the extension began
    to run on the date she actually withdrew her claim, so her
    complaint filed the next day would be timely. The State
    argued that under this court’s holdings in Coleman v. Chadron
    State College5 and Hullinger v. Board of Regents,6 the
    6-month extension began to run on the first day Komar could
    have withdrawn her claim, not on the date she actually with-
    drew it.
    In both Coleman and Hullinger, this court held:
    “[A] claimant who files a tort claim with the Risk Manager
    of the State Claims Board 18 months or more after his or
    her claim has accrued, but within the 2-year statute of
    limitations, has 6 months from the first day on which the
    claim may be withdrawn from the claims board in which
    to begin suit.”7
    The district court found the first day Komar could have with-
    drawn her claim to begin suit was December 28, 2014, and,
    applying the rationale from Coleman and Hullinger, calculated
    that the last date on which Komar could timely have filed
    suit was June 28, 2015. Because she did not file suit until
    July 15, the district court dismissed her action as time barred.
    Komar appealed.
    5
    Coleman v. Chadron State College, 
    237 Neb. 491
    , 
    466 N.W.2d 526
    (1991),
    overruled on other grounds, Collins, supra note 4.
    6
    Hullinger, supra note 4.
    7
    
    Id. at 871-72,
    546 N.W.2d at 783 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Coleman,
    supra note 5).
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    Court of A ppeals
    The Court of Appeals affirmed.8 Like the district court, it
    reasoned Komar’s claim accrued on January 15, 2013, and
    she had 2 years thereafter to bring suit unless the 6-month fil-
    ing extension of § 81-8,227(1) applied. In addressing whether
    Komar was entitled to the filing extension, the Court of
    Appeals reasoned:
    Komar . . . filed her claim with the [Risk Manager] on
    June 27, 2014, a little more than 17 months after her
    claim accrued, but still within the 2-year statute of limi-
    tations. Pursuant to the language of § 81-8,213, Komar
    could have withdrawn her claim from the [State Claims]
    Board and filed her complaint in the district court as early
    as December 28, 2014. On December 28, there remained
    approximately 19 days before the expiration of the 2-year
    statute of limitations for Komar’s claim. If Komar had
    withdrawn her claim during these 19 days, she would
    have had an additional 6 months from the date of her
    withdrawal to file her complaint in the district court, pur-
    suant to the language of § 81-8,227(1). However, Komar
    did not withdraw her claim from the Board until July 14,
    2015, almost 6 months after the 2-year statute of limita-
    tions had expired.9
    Like the district court, the Court of Appeals calculated June
    28, 2015, was the last date on which Komar could timely have
    filed suit. Because she did not file suit until July 15, the Court
    of Appeals concluded Komar’s action was time barred and
    affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
    Komar petitioned for further review, urging this court to
    overrule our holdings in Coleman and Hullinger and interpret
    § 81-8,227(1) to authorize a 6-month filing extension that
    runs from the date a claim is actually withdrawn, rather than
    the first date on which the claim could have been withdrawn
    8
    Komar, supra note 2.
    9
    
    Id. at 696,
    897 N.W.2d at 313-14.
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    under § 81-8,213. We granted further review to address the
    proper application and computation of the 6-month filing
    extension under this factual scenario.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    On further review, Komar assigns several errors which we
    consolidate into one: The Court of Appeals erred in concluding
    her complaint was time barred under § 81-8,227(1).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the
    pleadings is reviewed de novo, accepting the allegations in
    the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
    favor of the nonmoving party.10
    [2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.11
    ANALYSIS
    Statutory Background
    [3,4] Tort claims against the State are governed by the
    STCA. Before suit can be filed under the STCA, a claimant
    must submit the claim in writing to the Risk Manager within
    2 years after the claim accrued.12 Generally speaking, a claim-
    ant cannot file suit under the STCA until the Risk Manager or
    State Claims Board makes a final disposition of the claim.13
    However, if no final disposition of a claim has been made after
    6 months, the claimant is permitted to withdraw the claim and
    file suit under the STCA.14
    10
    Amend v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., 
    298 Neb. 617
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 551
          (2018).
    11
    
    Id. 12 §
    81-8,227(1).
    13
    § 81-8,213.
    14
    
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    [5,6] The 2-year limitations period referenced in
    § 81-8,227(1) governs not just the time for submitting claims
    to the Risk Manager, but also the time for beginning suit under
    the STCA.15 Under certain circumstances, the STCA provides
    a 6-month extension for beginning suit:
    The time to begin suit under [the STCA] shall be extended
    for a period of six months from the date of mailing of
    notice to the claimant by the Risk Manager or State
    Claims Board as to the final disposition of the claim or
    from the date of withdrawal of the claim under section
    81-8,213 if the time to begin suit would otherwise expire
    before the end of such period.16
    Overview of Case Precedent
    This court has had several opportunities to interpret and
    apply the 6-month filing extension of § 81-8,227(1). We have
    addressed its application when the State Claims Board makes
    a final disposition17 and when a claimant withdraws the claim
    to begin suit, as Komar did here.18
    This court first interpreted § 81-8,227 in Coleman v. Chadron
    State College.19 In that case, the tort claim was submitted to
    the State Claims Board 22 months after the cause of action
    accrued. Ten months later, the board had not made final dis-
    position, so the claimant withdrew the claim and, a few weeks
    later, filed suit in district court. The district court dismissed the
    action as time barred, and the claimant appealed.
    15
    Hullinger, supra note 4.
    16
    § 81-8,227(1).
    17
    See, Collins, supra note 4, disapproved on other grounds, Geddes v.
    York County, 
    273 Neb. 271
    , 
    729 N.W.2d 661
    (2007); Sharkey v. Board
    of Regents, 
    260 Neb. 166
    , 
    615 N.W.2d 889
    (2000), abrogated on other
    grounds, A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 
    280 Neb. 205
    , 
    784 N.W.2d 907
    (2010).
    18
    See, Hullinger, supra note 4; Coleman, supra note 5.
    19
    Coleman, supra note 5.
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    We observed that under § 81-8,227(1), the 2-year limita-
    tions period “shall be extended for a period of six months
    from . . . the date of withdrawal of the claim under section
    81-8,213 if the [2-year period] to begin suit would other-
    wise expire before the end of such period.” We provided an
    example of how the 6-month extension would work in a typi-
    cal case:
    If, for example, one filed his or her claim in the 17th
    month after the claim accrued and withdrew the claim in
    the 23rd month after it accrued, § 81-8,227 provides that
    he or she is given an additional 6 months in which to file
    suit, as the 2-year period of limitation would otherwise
    expire during the ensuing 6 months.20
    In Coleman, the defendant argued the claimant was not enti-
    tled to the 6-month extension, because by the time the claimant
    withdrew his claim to file suit, the 2-year limitations period
    already had expired. This court recognized the “dilemma”
    confronted by those who submitted claims to the State Claims
    Board 18 months or more after their claim accrued, but within
    the 2-year limitations period.21 We described these claim-
    ants as “fourth quarter” claimants,22 and we observed that the
    interplay between §§ 81-8,213 and 81-8,277(1) presented a
    predicament for such claimants:
    The source of [the claimant’s] predicament is
    § 81-8,213. As stated, that section mandates that before
    suit may be filed in court, a claim may not be withdrawn
    from the State Claims Board for at least 6 months. In
    order to comply with § 81-8,213, [the claimant], who
    filed his claim with the board in the 22d month after his
    claim accrued, was prevented from filing his lawsuit in
    the district court before the 24-month statute of limita-
    tions ran. In essence, one statute prevents filing of a
    20
    
    Id. at 499,
    466 N.W.2d at 532.
    21
    
    Id. at 500,
    466 N.W.2d at 532.
    22
    
    Id. at 501,
    466 N.W.2d at 533.
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    claim in court and another requires filing of that same
    claim in court. This appears to be a classic example
    of the “right hand not knowing what the left hand
    is doing.”23
    We applied the statutory rule of construction that a court will,
    if possible, avoid construing a statute in a way that leads to
    absurd, unjust, or unconscionable results,24 and we held:
    A statutory scheme which precludes one from with-
    drawing a claim from the State Claims Board and thereby
    prevents that person from filing suit before the statute of
    limitations runs leads to absurd, unjust, or unconscion­
    able results. We, therefore, hold that a claimant who
    files a tort claim with the Risk Manager of the State
    Claims Board 18 months or more after his or her claim
    has accrued, but within the 2-year statute of limitations,
    has 6 months from the first day on which the claim
    may be withdrawn from the claims board in which
    to begin suit. This interpretation ensures that effect is
    given to the legislative intent embodied in §§ 81-8,213
    and 81-8,227 and that both are applied in a consistent
    and commonsense fashion. Furthermore, fourth-quarter
    claimants are given the same opportunity as those who
    file earlier to withdraw their claim and file suit within 6
    months thereafter.25
    Because the claimant in Coleman filed his lawsuit within 6
    months after the first day on which he could have withdrawn
    his claim, we found the 6-month extension applied to render
    his lawsuit timely.
    Five years later, in Hullinger v. Board of Regents,26 we
    applied the same rule to a different factual scenario. The
    23
    
    Id. at 499,
    466 N.W.2d at 532.
    24
    See, Dean v. State, 
    288 Neb. 530
    , 
    849 N.W.2d 138
    (2014); In re Boundaries
    of McCook P.P. Dist., 
    217 Neb. 11
    , 
    347 N.W.2d 554
    (1984).
    25
    Coleman, supra note 5, 237 Neb. at 
    501, 466 N.W.2d at 533
    .
    26
    Hullinger, supra note 4.
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    claimant in Hullinger submitted his claim to the State Claims
    Board just 2 days before the end of the 2-year limitations
    period. He let the claim pend for more than a year before he
    withdrew it, and 51⁄2 months later, he filed suit in district court.
    We reiterated the rule, announced in Coleman, that fourth-
    quarter claimants have 6 months from the date the claim
    first could have been withdrawn from the board in which to
    begin suit.
    But unlike the claimant in Coleman, we found that by the
    time the claimant in Hullinger withdrew his claim and filed
    suit, the 6-month extension period had already expired. The
    claimant in Hullinger urged an interpretation of § 81-8,227(1)
    that would allow claimants to withdraw a claim at any point
    after the 6-month repose period and still receive an additional
    6 months after withdrawal to begin suit. We rejected that inter-
    pretation as inconsistent with Coleman and contrary to the
    purposes of a statute of limitations. We noted such a construc-
    tion would effectively allow claimants to extend the 2-year
    limitations period for as long as they wanted and then receive
    an additional 6 months to file suit once they finally withdrew
    the claim. We observed that “[t]he mischief which a statute
    of limitations is intended to remedy is general inconvenience
    resulting from delay in assertion of a legal right which it is
    practicable to assert.”27
    In Sharkey v. Board of Regents,28 we again considered the
    applicability of the 6-month extension under § 81-8,822(1). In
    that case, the claimants’ cause of action accrued on October
    6, 1993. The claimants submitted their first claim to the State
    Claims Board on February 15, 1994, and received notice of the
    board’s denial roughly 4 months later on June 13, 1994. They
    submitted a second claim on January 24, 1995, and that claim
    was denied on June 2, 1995. Thereafter, the claimants filed suit
    on their claims in district court on September 20, 1995.
    27
    
    Id. at 873,
    546 N.W.2d at 784.
    28
    Sharkey, supra note 17.
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    Although suit had been filed within 2 years of the date the
    claim accrued, the district court dismissed the suit as untimely,
    reasoning the claimants had not begun suit within 6 months
    after receiving notice that their first claim had been denied. We
    noted that the rule announced in Coleman was an extension
    of time in which to bring suit, not a limitation as the district
    court concluded. Because the claimants in Sharkey had filed
    suit within 2 years of the accrual of their claim, we held their
    suit was timely, and the 6-month extension under § 81-8,227(1)
    was inapplicable.
    And finally, in Collins v. State,29 we had the opportunity to
    consider how the 6-month extension under § 81-8,227(1) is
    calculated when a claimant elects not to withdraw the claim
    after 6 months and instead waits for the State Claims Board
    to make a final disposition. The claimant in Collins submit-
    ted her claim to the board 6 days before the 2-year limitations
    period expired. More than 7 months later, the board rejected
    the claim. The claimant in Collins filed suit on the claim just
    over 5 months later. The district court applied the reason-
    ing of Coleman and Hullinger, and found the suit was time
    barred because it had been filed more than 6 months after
    the first date on which the claim could have been withdrawn.
    On appeal, we explained that our holdings in Coleman and
    Hullinger do not apply when a claimant allows the board to
    reach a decision:
    Under the plain language of § 81-8,227, a claimant
    has 6 months to file suit after notice of the denial of the
    claim is mailed by the claims board. The reasoning of
    Coleman and Hullinger does not apply to claims that are
    decided by the claims board. Accordingly, we hold that
    a claimant who files a tort claim with the Risk Manager
    of the State Claims Board 18 months or more after his
    or her claim has accrued, but within 2 years as provided
    by § 81-8,227(1), has 6 months to file suit from the date
    29
    Collins, supra note 4.
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    the board gives written notice to the claimant as to the
    final disposition of the claim. . . . Because [the claimant]
    filed suit within 6 months after the claims board denied
    her claim, her suit was not time barred.30
    [7] These cases illustrate the following general rules for cal-
    culating the statute of limitations under the STCA. Claimants
    who allow the State Claims Board to reach a decision must
    file suit on the claim within 2 years after the claim accrued, or
    within 6 months after the board mails notice of final disposi-
    tion, whichever occurs later.31 On the other hand, claimants
    who withdraw their claim must file suit on the claim within 2
    years after the claim accrued, or within 6 months after the first
    date on which the claim could have been withdrawn, whichever
    occurs later.32
    Komar’s Action Is Time Barred
    Applying these principles to the present case, we agree
    with the district court and the Court of Appeals that Komar’s
    suit is time barred. Komar’s claim accrued on January 15,
    2013. She filed her claim with the Risk Manager for the State
    Claims Board on June 27, 2014, a little more than 17 months
    after it accrued and well within the 2-year statute of limita-
    tions. Section 81-8,213 prevented Komar from withdrawing
    her claim for a period of 6 months.
    Nebraska has a statutory rule for computing time,33 and we
    have held this rule governs time calculations of the 6-month
    time period under the STCA.34 As such, the 6-month period
    is computed by excluding the day the claim was filed, and
    including the last day of the period unless it falls on a
    30
    
    Id. at 272,
    646 N.W.2d at 621.
    31
    Id.; Sharkey, supra note 17.
    32
    See, Hullinger, supra note 4; Coleman, supra note 5.
    33
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2221 (Reissue 2016).
    34
    See Geddes, supra note 17.
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    Saturday, Sunday, or a day on which the courts of record may
    legally be closed, in which event the period shall run until
    the end of the next day on which the courts of record will be
    open.35 Using this computation, the district court and Court of
    Appeals found the first day on which Komar could have with-
    drawn her claim was December 28, 2014. However, because
    that date fell on a Sunday, the first date on which Komar
    could have withdrawn her claim was actually December
    29, 2014.
    If Komar had withdrawn her claim on December 29, 2014,
    she would have been entitled to the 6-month filing extension
    under the plain language of § 81-8,227(1), because the 2-year
    statute of limitations would otherwise have expired during the
    ensuing 6-month period. Indeed, the typical factual scenario
    Justice Fahrnbruch described in Coleman in 1991 is precisely
    how the 6-month extension would have functioned in the pres-
    ent case if Komar had withdrawn her claim on the first date
    allowed by § 81-8,213.
    But Komar did not withdraw her claim until much later,
    on July 14, 2015, and did not file suit until July 15. By that
    time, the 2-year statute of limitations had expired, as had the
    6-month extension under § 81-8,227. The district court and
    Court of Appeals correctly found this action was time barred.
    Komar urges this court to overrule our holdings in Coleman
    and Hullinger, and instead interpret § 81-8,227(1) to autho-
    rize a 6-month filing extension that runs from the date a claim
    is actually withdrawn, rather than the first date on which the
    claim could have been withdrawn under § 81-8,213. For the
    same reasons we rejected this interpretation in Hullinger,
    we reject it here. Such a construction would allow claim-
    ants to extend the 2-year limitations period for as long as
    they wanted and then receive an additional 6 months to file
    suit once they finally withdrew the claim. In addition, the
    35
    
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    expansive interpretation urged by Komar runs contrary to the
    settled rule that statutes purporting to waive the State’s pro-
    tection of sovereign immunity are strictly construed in favor
    of the sovereign.36
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
    Court of Appeals.
    A ffirmed.
    K elch, J., not participating in the decision.
    Wright, J., not participating.
    36
    See Amend, supra note 10.