In re Claim of Roberts for Attorney Fees , 307 Neb. 346 ( 2020 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    307 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 346
    In re Claim of Roberts for Attorney Fees.
    Kristine Roberts, appellee, v. County of
    Washington, Nebraska, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed October 2, 2020.     Nos. S-19-378, S-19-533, S-19-932.
    1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law. An appellate court independently reviews questions of law
    decided by the lower court.
    2. Judgments: Statutes: Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and
    Error. For purposes of construction, Nebraska Supreme Court rules
    are treated like statutes, and therefore an appellate court independently
    reviews the conclusion of a lower court.
    3. Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. When attorney fees are authorized,
    the trial court exercises its discretion in setting the amount of the
    fee, which ruling an appellate court will not disturb absent an abuse
    of discretion.
    4. Courts: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in Nebraska
    is purely statutory, and courts have no power to allow an appeal when it
    is not authorized by statute.
    5. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Supp.
    2019) authorizes appeals from four types of final orders: (1) those
    affecting a substantial right in an action that, in effect, determines the
    action and prevents a judgment; (2) those affecting a substantial right
    made during a special proceeding; (3) those affecting a substantial right
    made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered;
    and (4) those denying a motion for summary judgment when such
    motion is based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity
    of a government official.
    6. Juvenile Courts: Attorney Fees: Final Orders. Orders fixing fees
    for court-appointed counsel in juvenile cases under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-273
     (Reissue 2016) fall into the second category of final order
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    307 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 346
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Supp. 2019), because they are made in
    a special proceeding and affect a substantial right.
    7.   Actions: Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A “special proceeding”
    occurs where the law confers a right and authorizes a special application
    to a court to enforce the right. A special proceeding includes every spe-
    cial statutory remedy that is not in itself an action, and a proceeding may
    be special, even if the proceeding is connected with a pending action.
    8.   Juvenile Courts: Attorney Fees: Final Orders. Fee applications under
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-273
     (Reissue 2016) meet the definition of a spe-
    cial proceeding.
    9.   Attorney Fees: Statutes: Final Orders: Counties. When court-
    appointed counsel is authorized by statute to apply to the appointing
    court to fix reasonable fees for legal services rendered, an order fixing
    such fees is a final, appealable order from which either appointed coun-
    sel or the county board responsible for payment may appeal.
    10.   Statutes: Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and Error. When
    construing both statutes and Nebraska Supreme Court rules, an appellate
    court applies familiar rules of statutory interpretation. The language is
    to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will
    not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of words which
    are plain, direct, and unambiguous. It is not within the province of the
    courts to read meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything
    direct and plain out of a statute.
    11.   Juvenile Courts: Attorney Fees: Rules of the Supreme Court. Neither
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-273
     (Reissue 2016) nor Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1407
    requires that the county must be notified when a fee application is filed
    by court-appointed counsel, nor does either require that an evidentiary
    hearing be routinely held on such an application.
    12.   Attorney Fees: Statutes: Evidence. When a statute requires the court
    to fix reasonable fees for appointed counsel, the trial court has a duty to
    determine whether the requested fees are in fact reasonable, even if there
    is no objection to the application or no contrary evidence presented.
    13.   Juvenile Courts: Attorney Fees. Once a juvenile court appoints coun-
    sel in a juvenile proceeding, it has a duty under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-273
     (Reissue 2016) to fix reasonable fees for the necessary legal
    services performed.
    14.   Attorney Fees. When fixing reasonable fees, a court considers several
    factors: the nature of the litigation, the time and labor required, the nov-
    elty and difficulty of the questions raised, the skill required to properly
    conduct the case, the responsibility assumed, the care and diligence
    exhibited, the result of the suit, the character and standing of the attor-
    ney, and the customary charges of the bar for similar services.
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    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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    15. Attorney Fees: Counties: Appeal and Error. In the absence of an
    appeal, a court’s order fixing court-appointed counsel fees is conclusive
    upon both appointed counsel and the county as to the amount allowed.
    16. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when
    the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
    depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in mat-
    ters submitted for disposition.
    17. Courts: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. While both trial courts and
    appellate courts are regarded as experts on the value of legal services, a
    trial court ordinarily has a better opportunity for practically appraising
    the situation, and an appellate court will interfere only to correct a patent
    injustice, where the allowance is clearly excessive, or insufficient.
    18. Juvenile Courts: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. When a juvenile
    case is appealed, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-273
     (Reissue 2016) requires
    appointed counsel to apply to the juvenile court, not the appellate court,
    for payment of services performed on appeal.
    Appeals from the County Court for Washington County: C.
    Matthew Samuelson, Judge. Affirmed.
    M. Scott Vander Schaaf, Washington County Attorney, and
    Desirae M. Solomon for appellant.
    Kristine Roberts, of Roberts Law Office, L.L.C., for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    In these consolidated appeals, the county attorney for
    Washington County, Nebraska, challenges a series of orders
    fixing fees for court-appointed counsel in a juvenile proceed-
    ing. This opinion clarifies the statutory framework for appeal-
    ing such orders and explains how the appeal should be styled.
    It then addresses the procedural and evidentiary challenges
    raised by the county, including its contentions that (1) the
    county is entitled by law to notice and an evidentiary hearing
    whenever a fee application is filed, (2) fee applications must
    be supported by evidence of the client’s continued indigency,
    (3) courts may not allow fees for defending objections to a
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    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 346
    fee application, and (4) only an appellate court may award fees
    for services performed on appeal.
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the fee orders
    entered by the juvenile court.
    I. BACKGROUND
    1. Procedural History of
    Juvenile Proceedings
    In March 2016, the State filed a petition in the county court
    for Washington County alleging the minor children of Kilynn
    K. were within the meaning of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (3)(a)
    (Supp. 2015) due to the faults and habits of Kilynn. Pursuant
    to an ex parte order, the children were removed from Kilynn’s
    home, which was alleged to be unsanitary and bug infested.
    Early in the case, the county court, sitting as a juvenile
    court, granted Kilynn’s request for court-appointed counsel and
    appointed attorney Kristina Roberts. 1 Roberts has represented
    Kilynn during all phases of this juvenile proceeding.
    Eventually, the children were adjudicated under
    § 43-247(3)(a). The court set a permanency goal of reunifi-
    cation, and Kilynn was ordered to work with family support
    services, complete a psychological evaluation, attend therapy,
    attend parenting classes, learn how to clean and organize the
    home, and eradicate insects from the home. At regular review
    hearings throughout 2017, the court found that Kilynn was
    making progress and that supervised visits were going well.
    However, in the spring of 2018, Kilynn started to backslide,
    and in June 2018, the State moved to terminate her paren-
    tal rights.
    Trial on the motion to terminate was held in November
    2018. The trial lasted 4 full days; more than 20 witnesses testi-
    fied, and approximately 90 exhibits were offered. At the con-
    clusion of trial, the juvenile court denied the State’s motion,
    1
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279.01
    (1) (Reissue 2016) (authorizing juvenile
    court to appoint counsel to represent parent in adjudication and termination
    proceeding if parent unable to afford attorney).
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    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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    307 Neb. 346
    finding it had not shown that Kilynn was unfit or that termi­
    nating her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
    The State timely appealed that ruling, and the Nebraska Court
    of Appeals affirmed. 2
    2. Orders Compensating Court-Appointed Counsel
    (a) Fee Applications From 2016
    Through 2018
    During the first few years of this juvenile proceeding,
    Roberts filed an application in the county court for Washington
    County every 3 to 4 months seeking payment for past legal
    services at the approved hourly rate, which at the time was $75
    per hour. There were no objections to any of these fee appli-
    cations. The court routinely allowed Roberts’ fee applications
    without a hearing, and no appeals were taken from any of the
    fee orders during this time period.
    (b) February 2019 Fee Application
    On February 13, 2019, Roberts filed a verified fee applica-
    tion seeking payment of $12,103.80 for 151 hours of services
    rendered from August 30, 2018, through February 6, 2019. The
    application included time billed by Roberts in preparing for and
    defending the 4-day termination trial. The fee application was
    supported by Roberts’ affidavit, which included a detailed bill-
    ing statement. Roberts served a copy of the February 2019 fee
    application, along with a notice of hearing, on the Washington
    County Attorney.
    Washington County filed a written objection to Roberts’ fee
    application, alleging Roberts’ affidavit contained hearsay and
    lacked necessary foundation. In a subsequently filed brief, the
    county also challenged evidence of Kilynn’s indigency and
    argued that Roberts’ fee application should be denied because
    prior fee orders had sufficiently compensated Roberts for
    her services.
    2
    In re Interest of A.M. & S.K.S., No. A-19-247, 
    2019 WL 5561409
     (Neb.
    App. Oct. 29, 2019) (selected for posting to court website).
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    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 346
    At the hearing, Roberts offered a copy of her affidavit and
    the court received it without objection. Roberts also called a
    local attorney, who testified that for the past 30 years, a portion
    of his general law practice involved representing parents in
    termination proceedings. He described parental rights termina-
    tion cases as the “capital punishment of all family law cases.”
    When privately retained, he billed his time for such work at
    $200 an hour. He also accepted juvenile court appointments
    despite the lower hourly rate, because he understood the court
    “wants experienced trial attorneys to be available on the court
    list.” The attorney testified that trial preparation time varies
    from case to case, but that, generally, an attorney prepares
    approximately 2 hours for each hour spent in trial. He testified
    that other attorneys in the area often consult him about han-
    dling parental rights termination cases and that Roberts con-
    sulted him several times during the pendency of this case but
    did not bill the county for any of that time. The attorney was
    familiar with the history of this juvenile case and had reviewed
    Roberts’ affidavit and her billing statement. When asked his
    opinion on whether Roberts’ fees and expenses were fair and
    reasonable, he testified that if anything, Roberts underbilled for
    the time she spent defending Kilynn.
    Washington County offered no evidence at the hearing. It
    instead urged the court to deny Roberts’ February 2019 fee
    application in its entirety, based on the arguments it raised in
    its objection and brief. Summarized, it was the county’s pri-
    mary position that Roberts’ past fee awards were sufficient to
    compensate her for all of her legal services in the case, even if
    it meant she received no payment for the time billed defending
    Kilynn in the parental rights termination trial.
    On March 28, 2019, the court entered an order overruling
    Washington County’s objection to Roberts’ February 2019 fee
    application. The court found Roberts’ requested fees were fair
    and reasonable, and it allowed fees in the sum of $12,103.80.
    The county timely appealed from that order, and the appeal
    was docketed as case No. A-19-378.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 346
    (c) April 2019 Fee Application
    Roberts filed another verified fee application on April 25,
    2019, seeking payment of $2,347.50 for approximately 31
    hours of legal services performed from February 11 to April
    25, 2019. This application included 3 hours billed in connec-
    tion with preparing for and attending the evidentiary hearing on
    Washington County’s objection to the February 2019 fee appli-
    cation and 1.2 hours of work in connection with the county’s
    direct appeal of the decision declining to terminate Kilynn’s
    parental rights. Roberts’ April 2019 fee application was sup-
    ported by her own affidavit and a detailed billing invoice.
    Roberts served the Washington County Attorney with a copy of
    the April 2019 fee application and a notice of hearing.
    The county did not file an objection to the April 2019 fee
    application, but it did appear at the scheduled hearing. At the
    hearing, Roberts offered a copy of her affidavit and the court
    received it over the State’s objections. Washington County
    offered no evidence, but made an oral objection to the fee
    application, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction over the
    matter, because the county had appealed some of the juvenile
    court’s recent orders.
    The juvenile court rejected the county’s jurisdictional argu-
    ment and, speaking from the bench, found that Roberts had
    been properly appointed and that “[t]here were no irregulari-
    ties” in her fee request. The county took exception to the lat-
    ter finding and asked to be heard, arguing that Roberts’ April
    2019 fee application was irregular because some of the billed
    time pertained to work performed in defending the county’s
    appeals. It was the county’s position that Roberts could not
    ask the juvenile court to compensate her for work performed
    in the appellate court. According to the county, if Roberts
    wanted to be paid for work performed on appeal, she would
    need to “re-apply to the Court of Appeals to get separately
    appointed for the purposes of the appeal,” and then “the Court
    of Appeals takes up that application for attorney fees when that
    case closes.”
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    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 346
    The county also argued that Roberts’ fee request was irregu-
    lar because she was seeking compensation for time spent
    defending the county’s objection to her February 2019 fee
    application. The county argued that such time “ha[d] nothing
    to do with” representing Kilynn in the juvenile proceeding
    and, thus, was not compensable under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-273
    (Reissue 2016). When the court asked what Roberts should
    have done when the county objected to her fee application,
    the county conceded it was appropriate for Roberts to prepare
    for and appear at the hearing on the county’s objection. But
    it maintained Roberts was not entitled to be compensated for
    that time.
    The juvenile court ruled from the bench and allowed
    Roberts’ fee request after making a minor deduction. Later that
    same day, the court entered an order overruling the county’s
    objection, finding that Roberts’ fees were fair and reasonable,
    and allowing fees in the sum of $2,325. The county timely
    appealed from that order, and the appeal was docketed as case
    No. A-19-533.
    (d) July 2019 Fee Application
    On July 12, 2019, Roberts filed a verified application seek-
    ing fees in the amount of $2,991.85 for nearly 40 hours of legal
    services performed from April 26 through July 1, 2019. This
    application included approximately 19 hours of time billed for
    activities related to defending Kilynn in the ongoing juvenile
    court proceedings, approximately 1 hour billed for defending
    the county’s objection to Roberts’ April 2019 fee application,
    and approximately 20 hours billed for reviewing, researching,
    and drafting briefs in the various appeals taken by the county.
    Roberts’ July 2019 fee application was accompanied by a
    detailed billing statement, but unlike her prior two applications,
    it contained no certificate of service and no notice of hearing.
    Washington County contends it was never served with a copy
    of this fee application.
    Without setting the matter for hearing, the court entered an
    order on August 26, 2019, allowing Roberts’ July 2019 fee
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    application in the amount of $ 2,991.85. Washington County
    timely appealed from that order, and the appeal was docketed
    as case No. A-19-932.
    We moved all three appeals to our docket on our own motion
    and consolidated them for purposes of this opinion.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    In its first appeal, Washington County assigns, restated,
    that the juvenile court’s February 2019 fee order was errone-
    ous, because Roberts offered no evidence that Kilynn was still
    unable to afford a lawyer and because Roberts had already
    been adequately compensated by prior fee orders.
    In its second appeal, Washington County assigns that the
    April 2019 fee order was erroneous for the same reasons raised
    in the first appeal and, in addition, assigns that the allowed
    fees were excessive because Roberts was compensated for time
    spent defending the county’s objection to her February 2019
    fee application.
    In its third appeal, Washington County assigns that the July
    2019 fee order was erroneous for the same reasons raised in the
    first and second appeals and, in addition, assigns that the order
    was erroneous because fees were allowed without providing
    Washington County notice or an opportunity to be heard.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. 3 An
    appellate court independently reviews questions of law decided
    by the lower court. 4
    [2] For purposes of construction, Nebraska Supreme Court
    rules are treated like statutes, 5 and therefore an appellate court
    independently reviews the conclusion of a lower court. 6
    3
    State v. Brye, 
    304 Neb. 498
    , 
    935 N.W.2d 438
     (2019).
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    Hotz v. Hotz, 
    301 Neb. 102
    , 
    917 N.W.2d 467
     (2018).
    6
    See Sellers v. Reefer Systems, 
    305 Neb. 868
    , 
    943 N.W.2d 275
     (2020).
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    IN RE CLAIM OF ROBERTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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    [3] When attorney fees are authorized, the trial court exercises
    its discretion in setting the amount of the fee, which ruling an
    appellate court will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. 7
    IV. ANALYSIS
    When the juvenile case was filed in 2016, Kilynn advised the
    court she could not afford to hire a lawyer and she requested
    court-appointed counsel. 8 The court appointed Roberts, and
    Washington County does not, in these appeals, challenge the
    basis for that appointment. Instead, the county challenges the
    court’s 2019 orders fixing Roberts’ attorney fees.
    The parties’ appellate briefing demonstrates considerable
    confusion regarding the proper procedure under Nebraska law
    for requesting and fixing fees for court-appointed counsel in
    juvenile proceedings. We therefore begin by setting out the
    statutes and uniform court rules governing that procedure.
    1. Statutes and Court Rules Governing
    Payment of Court-Appointed Counsel
    Section 43-273 provides in relevant part that counsel
    appointed under the juvenile code
    shall apply to the court before which the proceedings
    were had for fees for services performed. The court upon
    hearing the application shall fix reasonable fees. The
    county board of the county wherein the proceedings were
    had shall allow the account, bill, or claim presented by
    any attorney . . . in the amount determined by the court.
    No such account, bill, or claim shall be allowed by the
    county board until the amount thereof shall have been
    determined by the court.
    In addition to the statutory process outlined in § 43-273,
    the Supreme Court has adopted a uniform court rule which
    applies in all county courts and governs the content and filing
    7
    See State v. Rice, 
    295 Neb. 241
    , 
    888 N.W.2d 159
     (2016).
    8
    See § 43-279.01(1).
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    of fee applications in both criminal and juvenile matters. 9
    That uniform court rule provides:
    Before the claim of any attorney appointed by the court
    is allowed in criminal and juvenile matters, such attorney
    shall make a written application for fees, positively veri-
    fied, stating time and expenses in the case. Counsel shall
    also state in the application that counsel has not received
    and has no contract for the payment of any compensation
    by such defendant or anyone in the defendant’s behalf,
    or, if counsel has received any fee or has a contract for
    the payment of same, shall disclose the same fully so that
    the proper credit may be taken on counsel’s application.
    The application shall be filed with the clerk. If a hearing
    is required, the time and date of hearing shall be set by
    court order. 10
    A different uniform court rule governs the rate of compensation
    for court-appointed counsel and provides in relevant part:
    (E) Compensation for Court-Appointed Attorneys.
    (1) An attorney appointed by a court shall be paid at
    the hourly rate established by the court.
    (2) Generally, no distinction should be made between
    rates for services performed in and outside of court,
    and the same rate should be paid for any time the attor-
    ney spends traveling in fulfilling his or her professional
    obligations. 11
    Similar uniform court rules apply to court-appointed counsel in
    separate juvenile courts. 12
    Finally, in addition to the statute and uniform court rules
    just referenced, some judicial districts have adopted local
    court rules, not inconsistent with statute or Supreme Court
    9
    Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1407.
    10
    Id.
    11
    Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1470(E) (rev. 2017).
    12
    See Neb. Ct. R. §§ 6-1704 (rev. 2014) and 1706(B)(3) and (E) (rev. 2017).
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    rules, 13 establishing additional procedures for paying court-
    appointed counsel in that district. 14 However, during the rel-
    evant time period, the county court judges in the Sixth Judicial
    District, which includes Washington County, had no local
    court rule governing the procedure for paying court-appointed
    counsel.
    We note the appellate briefing in this case refers to a
    “Washington County Attorney Fee Policy” 15 which purportedly
    requires court-appointed counsel to present all fee applications
    to the county attorney for “approval or objection” 16 before the
    court rules on the application. But no such policy was included
    in our record, and no local court rule reflecting such a policy
    has been adopted by the judges of that district or approved
    by the Supreme Court. We therefore do not consider, and
    express no opinion regarding, any informal procedures or poli-
    cies in Washington County pertaining to compensating court-
    appointed counsel.
    2. Right to Appeal From
    Order Allowing Fees
    In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reach-
    ing the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an
    13
    See, Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1448 (providing each county court by majority
    of its judges may adopt local rules not inconsistent with uniform court
    rules or state statute); Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1501 (providing each district court
    by majority of its judges may adopt local rules concerning matters not
    covered by uniform district court rules which are not inconsistent with
    statute or any Supreme Court directive).
    14
    See, e.g., Rules of Dist. Ct. of First Jud. Dist. 1-19 (rev. 2005); Rules of
    Dist. Ct. of Third Jud. Dist. 3-14 (rev. 2013); Rules of Dist. Ct. of Fifth
    Jud. Dist. 5-17 (rev. 2016); Rules of Dist. Ct. of Sixth Jud. Dist. 6-8 (rev.
    2010); Rules of Dist. Ct. of 10th Jud. Dist. 10-23 (rev. 2010); Rules of
    Dist. Ct. of 11th Jud. Dist. 11-6 (rev. 2002). See, also, Rules of Sep. Juv.
    Ct. of Douglas Cty. 11.4 and 11.6 (rev. 2014); Rules of Sep. Juv. Ct. of
    Lancaster Cty. VI(G) (rev. 2018).
    15
    Brief for appellee in case No. S-19-932 at 9.
    16
    Id.
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    appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over
    the matter before it. 17 Washington County filed a timely notice
    of appeal within 30 days after the entry of each of the fee
    orders it seeks to challenge, but the threshold jurisdictional
    question is whether those orders are appealable.
    The right to appeal from orders in juvenile court is governed
    by 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2
    ,106.01(1) (Reissue 2016). That stat-
    ute permits authorized parties to appeal from “[a]ny final order
    or judgment” entered by a juvenile court. 18 The instant appeals
    were filed by the county attorney, who is among those autho-
    rized by § 43-2,106.01 to take an appeal. Setting aside for now
    the question of whether the county attorney has styled these
    appeals to correctly reflect the proper parties, the pertinent
    jurisdictional question is one we have not yet addressed: Is an
    order ruling on a fee application of court-appointed counsel
    in a juvenile matter a final, appealable order? Our opinions
    addressing appeals of fee awards in other appointed-counsel
    contexts provide some guidance. 19
    In the 1987 case of In re Claim of Rehm and Faesser
    (Rehm), 20 court-appointed counsel in a criminal case appealed
    from a fee order, claiming the fees were inadequate to com-
    pensate counsel for the work performed. We recognized that
    some of our earlier cases had been inconsistent regarding both
    the right to appeal, and the procedure for appealing, from fee
    awards to appointed counsel in criminal cases. Rehm expressly
    disapproved of our prior cases on the issue and announced the
    following rule regarding the appealability of fee orders and the
    manner in which such appeals should be styled:
    17
    In re Interest of Paxton H., 
    300 Neb. 446
    , 
    915 N.W.2d 45
     (2018).
    18
    § 43-2,106.01(1). See § 43-2,106.01(2)(a) through (d).
    19
    See, e.g., White v. White, 
    296 Neb. 772
    , 
    896 N.W.2d 600
     (2017); Rice,
    
    supra note 7
    ; White v. White, 
    293 Neb. 439
    , 
    884 N.W.2d 1
     (2016); In re
    Claim of Rehm and Faesser, 
    226 Neb. 107
    , 
    410 N.W.2d 92
     (1987).
    20
    Rehm, 
    supra note 19
    .
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    We hold, therefore, that either appointed counsel or the
    county involved may appeal to this court from an order
    determining the amount of fees and expenses allowed
    appointed counsel under § 29-1804.12. Such an appeal is
    a proceeding separate from the criminal case. It should
    be docketed separately and disposed of without regard
    to the result of any appeal in the criminal case itself. In
    the absence of an appeal, the order of the district court is
    conclusive upon both appointed counsel and the county as
    to the amount allowed. 21
    Rehm acknowledged that the county was not a party to
    the criminal case “in the usual sense,” 22 because the county
    attorney was prosecuting the matter on behalf of the State, not
    the county. But Rehm reasoned that because any order award-
    ing fees to court-appointed counsel would be presented to the
    county for payment, the county attorney could be expected to
    “make whatever showing is necessary” 23 to ensure a proper
    decision regarding fees. And Rehm expressly found that “both
    appointed counsel and the county must be afforded a right of
    [appellate review] in the event either is dissatisfied with the
    order of the district court.” 24
    We have applied the reasoning from Rehm to appeals from
    fee awards to appointed counsel in both postconviction pro-
    ceedings 25 and domestic relations proceedings. 26 We see no
    principled reason to depart from the Rehm reasoning in appeals
    from fee awards to appointed counsel in juvenile proceedings.
    We do, however, take this opportunity to explain the statutory
    basis for our conclusion in Rehm that such orders are final
    and appealable.
    21
    Id. at 113-14, 
    410 N.W.2d at 96
    .
    22
    
    Id. at 113
    , 
    410 N.W.2d at 96
    .
    23
    
    Id.
    24
    
    Id.
    25
    Rice, 
    supra note 7
    .
    26
    White, 
    supra note 19
     (2017); White, 
    supra note 19
     (2016).
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    (a) Order Fixing Fees Under
    § 43-273 Is Final Order
    [4-6] The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely statutory,
    and courts have no power to allow an appeal when it is not
    authorized by statute. 27 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Supp. 2019)
    authorizes appeals from four types of final orders: (1) those
    affecting a substantial right in an action that, in effect, deter-
    mines the action and prevents a judgment; (2) those affecting
    a substantial right made during a special proceeding; (3) those
    affecting a substantial right made on summary application in
    an action after judgment is rendered; and (4) those denying
    a motion for summary judgment when such motion is based
    on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a
    government official. 28 As we explain below, orders fixing fees
    for court-appointed counsel in juvenile cases under § 43-273
    fall into the second category of final order under § 25-1902,
    because they are made in a special proceeding and affect a
    substantial right.
    [7] A “special proceeding” occurs where the law confers a
    right and authorizes a special application to a court to enforce
    the right. 29 A special proceeding includes every special statu-
    tory remedy that is not in itself an action, 30 and “a proceeding
    may be special, even if the proceeding is connected with a
    pending action.” 31 Section 43-273 authorizes appointed coun-
    sel to apply to the appointing court for payment of earned
    fees, and once the appointing court fixes a reasonable fee,
    the county board is required to allow the claim in the amount
    determined by the court.
    [8] Fee applications under § 43-273 meet the definition of a
    special proceeding. The law authorizes the fee application so
    27
    Heckman v. Marchio, 
    296 Neb. 458
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 296
     (2017).
    28
    See State v. Kelley, 
    305 Neb. 409
    , 
    940 N.W.2d 568
     (2020).
    29
    See State v. Jacques, 
    253 Neb. 247
    , 
    570 N.W.2d 331
     (1997).
    30
    In re Estate of Abbott-Ochsner, 
    299 Neb. 596
    , 
    910 N.W.2d 504
     (2018).
    31
    Jacques, 
    supra note 29
    , 
    253 Neb. at 253
    , 
    570 N.W.2d at 336
    .
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    that appointed counsel can enforce the right to be compensated
    for services rendered, and the application is not itself an action
    or a step in an action. Moreover, while we did not expressly
    use final order terminology in Rehm, our analysis recognized
    that orders determining court-appointed attorney fees affect a
    substantial right of both the lawyer seeking payment of earned
    fees and the county responsible for paying those fees. 32 And
    while an order fixing fees does not result in a judgment, it “is
    conclusive upon both appointed counsel and the county as to
    the amount allowed.” 33
    [9] We therefore hold that when court-appointed counsel
    is authorized by statute to apply to the appointing court to
    fix reasonable fees for legal services rendered, an order fix-
    ing such fees is a final, appealable order from which either
    appointed counsel or the county board responsible for payment
    may appeal.
    (b) Proper Parties in Appeal From
    Final Order Fixing Fees
    The county attorney has styled these appeals as though the
    State of Nebraska is the appellant and Kilynn is the appellee.
    This is not accurate, because neither the State nor Kilynn was
    involved in the special proceeding to fix court-appointed coun-
    sel’s fees. Rather, these consolidated appeals were brought by
    the county attorney for Washington County on behalf of the
    county board to challenge the fee orders. And it is Roberts,
    not Kilynn, who was allowed the fees and is defending the fee
    orders on appeal.
    We therefore modify the caption of these consolidated
    appeals to reflect that Washington County is the appellant
    and that Roberts is the appellee. Consistent with the man-
    ner in which Rehm was styled, the proper caption for these
    appeals is as follows: In re Claim of Roberts for Attorney
    32
    See Rehm, 
    supra note 19
    .
    33
    
    Id. at 114
    , 
    410 N.W.2d at 96
    .
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    Fees. Kristine Roberts, Appellee, v. County of Washington,
    Nebraska, Appellant.
    3. Arguments on Appeal
    Regarding the merits of these consolidated appeals,
    Washington County’s assignments of error fall generally into
    one of three categories: (1) claims that the juvenile court
    erred in the procedure followed when fixing fees, (2) claims
    that the evidence was insufficient to support the fee orders,
    and (3) claims that the amount of fees allowed was excessive.
    We address these assignments collectively where appropriate,
    and we begin with the county’s procedural claim that it was
    entitled to notice and an evidentiary hearing on the July 2019
    fee application.
    (a) Notice and Hearing
    In its third appeal, Washington County argues the August
    2019 fee order should be vacated because it was entered
    without providing notice to the county that the July 2019 fee
    application had been filed and without holding an evidentiary
    hearing on the application. The county generally frames this as
    a constitutional due process violation, arguing, “The juvenile
    court in this case violated the due process of the county by
    ordering fees without [a] hearing, notice or evidence.” 34
    We dispense quickly with the county’s constitutional due
    process argument, because the law is well settled that the
    county has no such constitutional right. 35 We instead focus
    34
    Supplemental brief for appellant in case No. S-19-932 at 4.
    35
    See, White, 
    supra note 19
     (2016) (holding county has no constitutional
    right to due process); Schropp Indus. v. Washington Cty. Atty.’s Ofc.,
    
    281 Neb. 152
    , 164, 
    794 N.W.2d 685
    , 696 (2011) (holding “Washington
    County has no constitutional right to due process that the court could have
    violated”); City of Lincoln v. Central Platte NRD, 
    263 Neb. 141
    , 146,
    
    638 N.W.2d 839
    , 844 (2002) (refusing to consider county’s constitutional
    due process arguments, because “[a] county, as a creature and political
    subdivision of the State, is neither a natural nor an artificial person”).
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    our analysis on whether § 43-273, or any of the applicable
    court rules, entitles the county to notice that a fee application
    has been filed, or requires that an evidentiary hearing be held
    before the court fixes reasonable fees.
    [10] When construing both statutes and Supreme Court
    rules, we apply familiar rules of statutory interpretation. 36 The
    language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an
    appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the
    meaning of words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 37
    It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning into
    a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain
    out of a statute. 38
    Washington County directs us to nothing in the plain lan-
    guage of either § 43-273 or the applicable court rules that
    requires notifying the county or holding an evidentiary hear-
    ing when a fee application is filed by court-appointed counsel.
    Instead, Washington County argues we should construe the
    following statutory language to require evidentiary hearings on
    all fee applications: “The court upon hearing the application
    shall fix reasonable fees.” 39 The county suggests this language
    “indicates that there should be a hearing conducted” 40 on every
    fee application. We disagree.
    Section 43-273 requires the court to fix reasonable fees
    “upon hearing the application,” but we understand that phrase
    to refer broadly to the court’s consideration of the fee applica-
    tion, not as a mandate to hold an evidentiary hearing before
    fixing fees. When the Legislature wants to mandate an evi-
    dentiary hearing before allowing a ruling, it knows how to
    36
    See Hotz, 
    supra note 5
     (explaining for purposes of construction, Supreme
    Court rules treated like statutes).
    37
    See State v. Wal, 
    302 Neb. 308
    , 
    923 N.W.2d 367
     (2019).
    38
    Rogers v. Jack’s Supper Club, 
    304 Neb. 605
    , 
    935 N.W.2d 754
     (2019).
    39
    § 43-273.
    40
    Brief for appellant in case No. S-19-932 at 10.
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    do so. 41 Rather than mandating a hearing, § 43-273 describes
    an informal fee application process which is administrative
    rather than adversarial. The court rule regarding application for
    fees accommodates that informal statutory procedure, while
    also recognizing that judges have discretion to set a hearing
    on a fee application if they determine one is required. 42 The
    court rule also adds several administrative requirements to the
    statutory fee application process, including that the application
    must be written, must be positively verified by counsel, must
    include specific information, and must be filed with the clerk. 43
    These requirements ensure both that a written record exists
    of any fee application that is allowed and that the court has
    positively verified information upon which to rely when fix-
    ing reasonable fees. In other words, the court rule is designed
    to reduce the need for courts to set an evidentiary hearing on
    fee applications, not to mandate hearings in every case, as the
    county contends.
    [11] We hold as a matter of law that neither § 43-273 nor
    court rule § 6-1407 requires that the county must be notified
    when a fee application is filed by court-appointed counsel, nor
    does either require that an evidentiary hearing be routinely
    held on such an application. And while it is true that several
    courts have adopted local rules requiring fee applications to
    be styled as motions and served on the county attorney, 44 the
    county court for Washington County had no local court rule
    41
    See, e.g., 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3702
     (Reissue 2016); 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3703
     (Reissue 2016); 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104.05
     (Reissue 2016);
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.02
     (Cum. Supp. 2018).
    42
    See § 6-1407 (“[i]f a hearing is required, the time and date of hearing shall
    be set by court order”).
    43
    See id.
    44
    See, e.g., Rules of Dist. Ct. of First Jud. Dist. 1-19; Rules of Dist. Ct. of
    Third Jud. Dist. 3-14; Rules of Dist. Ct. of Fifth Jud. Dist. 5-17; Rules
    of Dist. Ct. of Sixth Jud. Dist. 6-8; Rules of Dist. Ct. of 10th Jud. Dist.
    10-23.
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    requiring either notice to the county or an evidentiary hearing
    when appointed counsel files a fee application. We therefore
    find no merit to the county’s claim that the juvenile court erred
    in allowing the July 2019 fee application without first provid-
    ing the county with notice and a hearing.
    We are aware the local practice in some jurisdictions has
    long been to provide the county with notice when fee applica-
    tions are filed and to set such matters for hearing. Our opinion
    today does not condemn such practices, whether formalized
    through the adoption of local court rules or not. Indeed,
    appointed counsel in this case provided notice to the county
    of her February 2019 and April 2019 fee applications, and
    counsel set both for hearing. But the question before us is not
    whether it is the common practice, or even the best practice,
    to provide notice to the county and set fee applications for
    hearing. Rather, the question presented is whether notice and a
    hearing are required by the applicable statutes and court rules.
    They are not, and the county’s arguments to the contrary are
    without merit.
    (b) Sufficiency of Evidence
    In all three appeals, Washington County assigns the juvenile
    court erred in allowing fees without first receiving evidence
    that Kilynn remained unable to afford an attorney at the time of
    the fee application. In making this argument, the county does
    not challenge the initial appointment of counsel for Kilynn,
    nor does it contend that after counsel was appointed, Kilynn
    became able to afford counsel. Instead, it is the county’s posi-
    tion that each time Roberts applied for fees under § 43-273,
    she had the burden to prove that Kilynn was still unable to
    afford to hire private counsel. The county is incorrect.
    The evidentiary requirements governing Roberts’ fee appli-
    cation are set out in court rule § 6-1407. That rule requires
    that before appointed counsel’s fees are allowed in a criminal
    or juvenile matter, counsel must file a written fee application
    with the clerk which is positively verified and which states
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    counsel’s time and expenses in the case. 45 It also requires the
    application must either state that counsel “has not received
    and has no contract for the payment of any compensation by
    [the client] or anyone in [the client’s] behalf” or disclose “if
    counsel has received any fee or has a contract for the payment
    of same . . . so that the proper credit may be taken on coun-
    sel’s application.” 46
    Because Washington County does not assign or argue that
    any of Roberts’ fee applications failed to meet the evidentiary
    requirements of court rule § 6-1407, we express no opinion in
    that regard. We do, however, reject as unfounded the county’s
    contention that before fees can be allowed under § 43-273,
    appointed counsel is required to affirmatively prove that his or
    her client remains unable to afford an attorney.
    (c) Reasonableness of Allowed Fees
    [12] When attorney fees are authorized by statute, the court
    exercises its discretion in setting the amount of the fee, which
    ruling an appellate court will not disturb absent an abuse
    of discretion. 47 We have recognized that when a trial court
    appoints counsel in either a criminal or a postconviction action,
    Nebraska statutes require the court to fix reasonable fees and
    expenses. 48 As such, we have found it amounts to an abuse
    45
    § 6-1407.
    46
    Id.
    47
    See Rice, 
    supra note 7
    .
    48
    See, e.g., Rice, 
    supra note 7
     (holding that once counsel is appointed in
    postconviction case, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004
     (Reissue 2016) requires
    court to fix reasonable fees and expenses); State v. Ortega, 
    290 Neb. 172
    ,
    
    859 N.W.2d 305
     (2015) (recognizing that once counsel is appointed to
    represent defendant in criminal matter, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3905
     (Reissue
    2016) requires appointing court to fix reasonable fees and expenses);
    State v. Ryan, 
    233 Neb. 151
    , 154, 
    444 N.W.2d 656
    , 659 (1989) (holding
    appointed counsel in criminal cases must be paid reasonable fees and
    expenses and finding an abuse of discretion in refusing to pay counsel for
    “substantial hours” devoted to such representation).
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    of discretion to refuse to allow any fees 49 or to refuse to
    compensate court-appointed counsel for services necessarily
    performed in representing the defendant. 50 Moreover, when a
    statute requires the court to fix reasonable fees for appointed
    counsel, the trial court has a duty to determine whether the
    requested fees are in fact reasonable, even if there is no objec-
    tion to the application or no contrary evidence presented. 51
    These same principles apply when a court appoints counsel in
    a juvenile proceeding.
    [13,14] Here, once the juvenile court appointed Roberts to
    represent Kilynn in the juvenile proceedings, it had a duty
    under § 43-273 to “fix reasonable fees” for the necessary legal
    services Roberts performed in those proceedings. When fixing
    reasonable fees, a court considers several factors: the nature
    of the litigation, the time and labor required, the novelty and
    difficulty of the questions raised, the skill required to properly
    conduct the case, the responsibility assumed, the care and dili-
    gence exhibited, the result of the suit, the character and stand-
    ing of the attorney, and the customary charges of the bar for
    similar services. 52
    In these consolidated appeals, Washington County does not
    contend the juvenile court failed to consider any of these
    factors when fixing fees. Instead, it argues the fees allowed
    in 2019 were excessive and unreasonable, because Roberts
    already has been paid significant fees, because some of the
    billed time related to defending the county’s objection to her
    fee applications, and because some of the billed time pertained
    to activities on appeal. We address each of these arguments
    in turn.
    49
    See Rice, 
    supra note 7
    .
    50
    See, Ryan, 
    supra note 48
    ; Rehm, 
    supra note 19
    .
    51
    See Rice, 
    supra note 7
    .
    52
    
    Id.
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    (i) Prior Fee Orders
    The juvenile proceeding involving Kilynn has been pend-
    ing since 2016. Washington County’s primary opposition to
    Roberts’ 2019 fee applications has been that considering the
    total amount of fees allowed since the inception of the case,
    the additional fees allowed in 2019 were excessive and unrea-
    sonable. The record generally shows that before the 2019 fee
    orders at issue in these consolidated appeals, Roberts applied
    for and was paid a total of $23,788.40 in fees for legal services
    performed in the juvenile proceeding since 2016.
    [15] In arguing the fees allowed in 2019 were unreason-
    able and excessive, the county does not directly challenge the
    reasonableness of any earlier fee orders, nor could it. In the
    absence of an appeal, a court’s order fixing court-appointed
    counsel fees is conclusive upon both appointed counsel and the
    county as to the amount allowed, 53 and courts have no power
    to extend the time for appeal, either directly or indirectly. 54
    Nor, for the most part, does the county argue that any particu-
    lar time billed by Roberts in 2019 was unnecessary. Instead,
    the county complains that the fees allowed in 2019, when
    considered “in conjunction with” 55 the fees allowed since the
    inception of the case in 2016, amount to excessive compensa-
    tion for a “simple” 56 abuse/neglect case. The county’s primary
    argument is that Roberts has “essentially been billing the
    county for working on the case nearly daily for three years” 57
    without offering any “explanation of why it was reasonable
    and necessary.” 58
    53
    See, generally, Rehm, 
    supra note 19
    .
    54
    See Bryson L. v. Izabella L., 
    302 Neb. 145
    , 
    921 N.W.2d 829
     (2019).
    55
    Brief for appellant in case No. S-19-378 at 18.
    56
    
    Id. at 17
    .
    57
    
    Id. at 18
    .
    58
    
    Id. at 17
    .
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    Roberts counters that this has not been a simple juvenile
    case, and in response to the county’s suggestion that she regu-
    larly billed time in this case, her brief cites the practice guide-
    lines applicable to attorneys in juvenile court, which require
    “high quality legal representation by all attorneys appearing
    before the juvenile court.” 59 Roberts highlights that in 2019,
    she successfully defended Kilynn in a 4-day parental rights ter-
    mination trial, and Roberts adds that while her representation
    of Kilynn has been continuous since 2016, these appeals have
    effectively prevented her from being paid for any legal services
    in the case since September 2018.
    We agree with the county that the total amount of fees
    allowed in this juvenile proceeding since 2016 has been signif-
    icant. But we cannot find, on that basis alone, that the juvenile
    court abused its discretion in allowing Roberts’ fee applications
    in 2019.
    [16,17] A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the rea-
    sons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
    depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just
    results in matters submitted for disposition. 60 While both trial
    courts and appellate courts are regarded as experts on the value
    of legal services, a trial court ordinarily has a better opportu-
    nity for practically appraising the situation, and an appellate
    court will interfere only to correct a patent injustice, where the
    allowance is clearly excessive, or insufficient. 61
    Here, the juvenile court was in the best position to determine
    whether the time billed in Roberts’ 2019 fee applications was
    reasonable and necessary for the services performed in the
    case, and we find ample support in the record for the court’s
    59
    See §§ 6-1470 and 6-1706 (practice guidelines for attorneys practicing
    in juvenile court). See, also, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-272
    (5) (Reissue 2016)
    (requiring Supreme Court to provide guidelines for standards of all
    attorneys practicing in juvenile court).
    60
    State v. Edwards, 
    294 Neb. 1
    , 
    880 N.W.2d 642
     (2016).
    61
    See Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 
    200 Neb. 31
    ,
    
    262 N.W.2d 175
     (1978).
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    findings in that regard. Moreover, we soundly reject the coun-
    ty’s suggestion that the court should have refused to allow any
    fees at all for necessary legal services in 2019 simply because
    prior fee allowances were significant. The juvenile court was
    correct in concluding it would have been an abuse of discre-
    tion either to refuse to fix any fees 62 or to refuse to reasonably
    compensate Roberts for services necessarily performed. 63
    We therefore reject the county’s argument that the fees
    allowed in 2019 were unreasonable and excessive merely
    because significant fees had previously been allowed.
    (ii) Paying Appointed Counsel for Defending
    Objections to Fee Application
    Collectively, the juvenile court’s 2019 fee orders compen-
    sated Roberts for approximately 222 hours of time billed in the
    case; approximately 4 of those hours pertained to time billed to
    prepare for and attend the hearings on the county’s objections
    to her fee applications. Roberts did not bill for preparing or fil-
    ing her fee applications.
    Washington County contends it was error to compensate
    Roberts for any time defending the fee applications, arguing
    such time pertained to litigating counsel’s right to compensa-
    tion and thus was not “for services performed” in the pro-
    ceedings under § 43-273. Roberts responds that she is a solo
    practitioner and was required to take time away from other bill-
    able work to defend her statutory right to be reasonably com-
    pensated for services performed in the case. She suggests that
    if reasonable fees are never allowed for time spent defending
    meritless objections to fee applications, then appointed counsel
    will “be forced to take whatever the county attorney felt was
    appropriate” 64 and it would effectively be the county attorney,
    rather than the court, fixing appointed counsel fees.
    62
    See Rice, 
    supra note 7
    .
    63
    See, Ryan, 
    supra note 48
    ; Rehm, 
    supra note 19
    .
    64
    Brief for appellee in case No. S-19-533 at 15.
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    On this record, where the juvenile court essentially con-
    cluded the county’s objections to the fee applications had no
    basis in law or fact, we cannot find the trial court abused its
    discretion in concluding that the 4 hours billed by appointed
    counsel to defend against the county’s meritless objections was
    compensable as “services performed” in the proceeding under
    § 43-273. We caution that in so holding, we are not suggest-
    ing that appointed counsel is always entitled to be paid for
    time defending an objection to a fee application, nor are we
    suggesting that it can never be an abuse of discretion to allow
    fees for defending against objections to fee applications. The
    reasonableness of allowing fees for defending an objection to
    a fee application is highly fact dependent and will vary from
    one case to the next. However, we reject the county’s conten-
    tion that appointed counsel can never be allowed fees under
    § 43-273 for defending an objection to a fee application, and
    to the extent the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in In re Interest
    of Antone C. et al. 65 can be read to support such a contention,
    it is disapproved.
    Here, the record shows the juvenile court found no merit to
    any of the county’s objections to Roberts’ fee applications, and
    it expressly found that Roberts’ time defending her fee applica-
    tions was reasonable and necessary. Because the trial court’s
    reasons and rulings in that regard were not clearly untenable,
    we find no abuse of discretion and we reject the county’s argu-
    ment that the court erred in compensating appointed counsel
    for this time.
    (iii) Applying to Juvenile Court for Payment
    of Legal Services Performed on Appeal
    Roberts’ April 2019 fee application included approximately
    1.2 hours billed for services performed on appeal, and her
    July 2019 fee application included approximately 20 hours of
    time billed for services on appeal. Washington County objected
    65
    In re Interest of Antone C. et al., 
    12 Neb. App. 152
    , 
    669 N.W.2d 69
    (2003).
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    to this time and took the position that if Roberts wanted to be
    paid for services performed on appeal, she needed to first seek
    appointment in the appellate court, and then needed to apply
    to the appellate court for payment once the appeal was con-
    cluded. The juvenile court rejected both of these arguments and
    allowed the fees.
    We have not previously addressed whether appointed coun-
    sel in a juvenile proceeding should apply to the juvenile court,
    or to the appellate court, for payment of services performed on
    appeal. But before we discuss that issue, we find it necessary
    to correct the county’s assertion that Roberts needed to seek
    reappointment in the appellate court once the county took an
    appeal. Our appellate rules make clear that “[t]he attorneys of
    record and guardians ad litem of the respective parties in the
    court below shall be deemed the attorneys and guardians ad
    litem of the same parties in [the appellate] court, until a with-
    drawal of appearance has been filed” and the procedure for
    withdrawal has been followed. 66 As such, there is no need for
    appointed counsel to seek reappointment in the appellate court
    when a case is appealed.
    The question whether counsel appointed in a juvenile pro-
    ceeding should apply to the juvenile court or to the appellate
    court for payment of services performed on appeal requires more
    discussion. We begin with the pertinent statutory language.
    Section 43-273 provides that counsel appointed under the
    juvenile code “shall apply to the court before which the pro-
    ceedings were had for fees for services performed” and that the
    court “shall fix reasonable fees.” It also provides that once fees
    are fixed, “[t]he county board of the county wherein the pro-
    ceedings were had shall allow [fees] in the amount determined
    by the court.” 67
    The language of § 43-273 is somewhat different from
    the statutory language governing payment of court-appointed
    66
    Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-101(F)(1) (rev. 2015).
    67
    § 43-273.
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    counsel in criminal cases, which expressly requires that
    appointed counsel “shall apply to the . . . court which appointed
    him or her . . . for fees for services performed pursuant to such
    appointment.” 68 Our appellate rules are clear that if a criminal
    case is appealed, court-appointed counsel may, “after issuance
    of a mandate by the appellate court, apply to the appointing
    court for an attorney fee regarding services in the appeal.” 69
    Currently, there is no similar court rule addressing whether
    court-appointed counsel in a juvenile proceeding should apply
    to the juvenile court or to the appellate court for services per-
    formed when a juvenile proceeding is on appeal.
    We understand Washington County to take the position that
    once a juvenile proceeding is appealed, the appellate court
    becomes “the court before which the proceedings were had” 70
    and appointed counsel must apply to the appellate court for
    payment of fees for all services performed on appeal. However,
    were we to construe § 43-273 to require court-appointed coun-
    sel to apply to the appellate court, rather than the juvenile
    court, for payment of legal services performed on appeal, it
    would cause an absurd result.
    Nebraska’s appellate courts are located in Lancaster County,
    and § 43-273 requires that once fees are fixed, “[t]he county
    board of the county wherein the proceedings were had” is
    required to allow the claim. As such, construing § 43-273 to
    require appointed counsel to apply to the appellate court for
    payment would make Lancaster County responsible for pay-
    ing all fees fixed for services performed by court-appointed
    counsel on appeal. An appellate court should try to avoid, if
    possible, the construction of a statute that would lead to an
    absurd result. 71
    68
    § 29-3905.
    69
    Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(F) (rev. 2014) (emphasis supplied).
    70
    § 43-273.
    71
    See Hotz, 
    supra note 5
    .
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    [18] The more sensible construction of § 43-273 is that
    “the court before which the proceedings were had” refers
    to the appointing juvenile court, even if an appeal is taken.
    We therefore hold that when a juvenile case is appealed,
    § 43-273 requires appointed counsel to apply to the juvenile
    court, not the appellate court, for payment of services per-
    formed on appeal. The juvenile court here was correct to reject
    Washington County’s suggestion that Roberts must apply to the
    appellate court for payment of her fees.
    Ordinarily, a juvenile court will want to wait for issuance of
    the appellate mandate before fixing reasonable fees for services
    on appeal, because that will allow it to fully evaluate the vari-
    ous factors a court is to consider when fixing fees. 72 But on this
    record, and absent a statute or court rule requiring appointed
    counsel to wait for the appellate mandate before applying for
    fees, we cannot find the juvenile court abused its discretion in
    fixing fees before the appellate mandate issued.
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the fee orders of the
    juvenile court.
    Affirmed.
    72
    See Rice, 
    supra note 7
     (when fixing fees for court-appointed counsel,
    courts should consider nature of litigation, time and labor required,
    novelty and difficulty of questions involved, skill required, responsibility
    assumed, diligence exhibited, result of suit, standing of attorney, and
    customary charges for similar services).