State v. Swindle , 300 Neb. 734 ( 2018 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    09/21/2018 09:09 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    300 Nebraska R eports
    STATE v. SWINDLE
    Cite as 
    300 Neb. 734
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    A nthony L. Swindle, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed August 10, 2018.   No. S-17-761.
    1.	 Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. Whether jury instructions are
    correct is a question of law, which an appellate court resolves indepen-
    dently of the lower court’s decision.
    2.	 Motions for Mistrial: Appeal and Error. Whether to grant a mistrial is
    within the trial court’s discretion, and an appellate court will not disturb
    its ruling unless the court abused its discretion.
    3.	 Rules of Evidence. In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules
    apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska
    Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make
    discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
    4.	 Judges: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The exercise of judicial discre-
    tion is implicit in determining the relevance of evidence, and a trial
    court’s decision regarding relevance will not be reversed absent an abuse
    of discretion.
    5.	 ____: ____: ____. An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a
    trial court’s evidentiary rulings on the sufficiency of a party’s foundation
    for admitting evidence.
    6.	 Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sen-
    tence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion
    by the trial court.
    7.	 Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. In an appeal based on
    a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden
    to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise
    adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.
    8.	 Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. In an appeal based on a claim
    of an erroneous jury instruction, all the jury instructions must be read
    together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not
    misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings
    and the evidence, there is no prejudicial error necessitating reversal.
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    STATE v. SWINDLE
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    9.	 Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. To establish reversible
    error from a court’s refusal to give a requested instruction, an appel-
    lant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct
    statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the
    evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to
    give the tendered instruction.
    10.	 Jury Instructions. In giving instructions to the jury, it is proper for the
    court to describe the offense in the language of the statute.
    11.	 Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning
    into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
    a statute.
    12.	 Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In determining the meaning of statutory
    language, its ordinary and grammatical construction is to be followed,
    unless an intent appears to the contrary or unless, by following such
    construction, the intended effect of the provisions would apparently
    be impaired.
    13.	 Sexual Misconduct: Evidence: Proof. Subject to several exceptions,
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-412(1) (Reissue 2016) bars evidence offered to
    prove that any victim engaged in other sexual behavior and evidence
    offered to prove any victim’s sexual predisposition in civil or criminal
    proceedings involving alleged sexual misconduct.
    14.	 Sexual Assault: Evidence. The rape shield statute is not meant to pre-
    vent defendants from presenting relevant evidence, but to deprive them
    of the opportunity to harass and humiliate the complaining witness and
    divert the jury’s attention to irrelevant matters.
    15.	 Sexual Assault: Trial: Witnesses. In limited circumstances, a defend­
    ant’s right to confrontation can require the admission of evidence that
    would be inadmissible under the rape shield statute.
    16.	 Constitutional Law: Trial: Juries: Witnesses. An accused’s consti-
    tutional right of confrontation is violated when either (1) he or she is
    absolutely prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
    examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of
    the witness, or (2) a reasonable jury would have received a significantly
    different impression of the witness’ credibility had counsel been permit-
    ted to pursue his or her proposed line of cross-examination.
    17.	 Criminal Law: Motions for Mistrial: Appeal and Error. A mistrial
    is properly granted in a criminal case where an event occurs during the
    course of a trial which is of such a nature that its damaging effect can-
    not be removed by proper admonition or instruction to the jury and thus
    prevents a fair trial.
    18.	 Courts: Motions for Mistrial. A trial court is vested with considerable
    discretion in passing on a motion for mistrial in order to more nearly
    effectuate the ends of justice.
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    STATE v. SWINDLE
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    300 Neb. 734
    19.	 Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys. When considering a claim of prosecuto-
    rial misconduct, an appellate court first considers whether the prosecu-
    tor’s acts constitute misconduct.
    20.	 ____: ____. A prosecutor’s conduct that does not mislead and unduly
    influence the jury is not misconduct.
    21.	 Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys: Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error.
    Not every variance between a prosecutor’s advance description and the
    actual presentation constitutes reversible error, when a proper limit-
    ing instruction has been given and the remarks are not crucial to the
    State’s case.
    22.	 Verdicts: Juries: Jury Instructions: Presumptions. Absent evidence
    to the contrary, it is presumed that a jury followed the instructions given
    in arriving at its verdict.
    23.	 Trial: Appeal and Error. On appeal, a defendant may not assert a dif-
    ferent ground for his or her objection than was offered at trial.
    24.	 Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Unless an objection to offered evi-
    dence is sufficiently specific to enlighten the trial court and enable it to
    pass upon the sufficiency of such objections and to observe the alleged
    harmful bearing of the evidence from the standpoint of the objector, no
    question can be presented therefrom on appeal.
    25.	 Rules of Evidence: Hearsay. It is a fundamental rule of evidence that a
    statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is the party’s
    own statement.
    26.	 Trial: Hearsay. Where the reason for a trial court’s overruling of a
    hearsay objection is left at large, arguably, it is the opponent’s burden to
    demand an explanatory ruling.
    27.	 Trial: Waiver: Appeal and Error. Failure to make a timely objection
    waives the right to assert prejudicial error on appeal.
    28.	 Trial: Witnesses: Hearsay. A witness who hears an oral admission by a
    party may testify as to that admission.
    29.	 Sentences: Appeal and Error. An abuse of discretion in imposing a
    sentence occurs when a sentencing court’s reasons or rulings are clearly
    untenable and unfairly deprive the litigant of a substantial right and a
    just result.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Thomas
    A. Otepka, Judge. Affirmed.
    James J. Regan for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Glen Th. Parks
    for appellee.
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    STATE v. SWINDLE
    Cite as 
    300 Neb. 734
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, and
    Papik, JJ.
    Funke, J.
    Anthony L. Swindle was convicted by a jury of two counts
    of sexual assault of a child in the first degree, one count of
    sex trafficking of a victim under 16 years of age, and one
    count of sex trafficking by inflicting or threatening serious
    personal injury. The district court for Douglas County sen-
    tenced Swindle to consecutive terms totaling between 180
    years’ to life imprisonment, and Swindle filed this appeal.
    We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Swindle was the “pimp” of Lisa Villanova-White. Swindle
    and Villanova-White used the website “backpage.com” to
    receive calls and texts to perform sex acts for money. Villanova-
    White testified she had the telephone numbers of 406 men
    saved in her cell phone. The soliciting included both “incalls,”
    where the client or “john” arrived at Villanova-White’s house
    in Omaha, Nebraska, and “outcalls” at hotel rooms or casi-
    nos. Villanova-White estimated that Swindle drove her to 50
    outcalls to anywhere from Omaha to Norfolk, Nebraska, to
    Woodbine, Iowa. She testified about an outcall at a motel in
    Fremont, Nebraska. The client refused to pay for the full hour,
    so Swindle went up to the room, “knocked him out,” and took
    his money.
    Swindle’s involvement in Villanova-White’s online prostitu-
    tion business expanded over time. At first, Villanova-White
    thought that Swindle was her business partner and that she
    was just loaning him money, but he soon began to take and
    keep half or more of her money from clients. He had a key
    to her house and would take money from her purse or money
    that she kept hidden in books or clothes. Villanova-White said
    Swindle threatened her indirectly by constantly mentioning
    that he had physically harmed people, sometimes with the use
    of guns. Swindle once joked while Villanova-White was in his
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    car about killing someone, and he showed her a handgun he
    kept hidden underneath his seat.
    Within the first few months, Swindle asked Villanova-White
    to be a “madam” and started bringing other women to her
    house, including a homeless woman, A.R., age 21.
    1. A.R.
    A.R. had a long history of physical and sexual abuse. She
    was abused by her stepfather from ages 6 to 12, until she left
    her home and went under the care of Lutheran Family Services.
    At age 18, A.R.’s mother, in exchange for payment, took her to
    a party and left her there to be gang raped by 10 men. During
    that same time period, A.R. had a boyfriend who was convicted
    for abusing her after she testified against him.
    Swindle met A.R. in March 2015 when he drove up to her
    while she was walking down a North Omaha street. A.R. testi-
    fied that she and Swindle began dating. A.R. had been living
    with her mother and grandmother, but when her mother moved,
    A.R. was not welcome to go with them and found herself
    homeless. Swindle told her that she could stay at his friend’s
    house, but that she would need to have sex with clients to pay
    for rent. Swindle first brought A.R. to his “brother’s” house
    so that she would have sex in exchange for money that he had
    already been paid. He then brought A.R. to Villanova-White’s
    house and had Villanova-White set up an online account for her.
    Villanova-White took photographs of A.R. wearing Villanova-
    White’s lingerie and posted them online.
    Swindle told A.R. about the house “rules.” He provided
    her with condoms and marijuana, and instructed her to leave
    money from clients on the edge of the dresser so that when she
    walked them out, Swindle would take the money.
    Swindle instructed Villanova-White that A.R. was never
    allowed to leave without his knowledge and to report to him if
    A.R. left, because “she’s not gonna give [sex] away for free.”
    Villanova-White used an alarm system in the house and did not
    give A.R. the code. The alarm signaled when there was activity
    downstairs and at the front door.
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    A.R. stayed at the house for the next 2 to 3 months and had
    sex with clients from the online website, but was never given
    any of the money. During her stay, Swindle impregnated A.R.
    and she had a miscarriage while with a client. On one occasion,
    Swindle drove A.R. to an “outcall” in Omaha, where the client
    refused to pay and stabbed A.R. in the wrist. She contacted
    the 911 emergency dispatch service and went to the hospital.
    Law enforcement officials suspected that A.R. was involved in
    prostitution, but did not intervene because she was unwilling to
    provide information.
    A.R. testified that on the first day at the house, she told
    Swindle that she did not want to be a prostitute. Swindle told
    her to “just get it over and done with.” A.R. testified that she
    repeated to Swindle that she did not want to be a prostitute
    many times thereafter. She testified she had never engaged in
    prostitution before, but that she stayed with Swindle because
    she had feelings for him, felt intimidated by him, and felt she
    had no choice but to stay. A.R. knew that Swindle kept a hand-
    gun underneath his driver’s seat, and he told her that he had
    used the handgun to kill someone. On one occasion, A.R. tried
    to keep $42 she received from a client to pay her cell phone
    bill. Swindle demanded the money, and when she refused, he
    choked her using both his hands.
    A.R. later saved $200 to “try to get away.” She messaged
    a friend on social media to come and pick her up. When she
    got into her friend’s car, she realized she had forgotten her
    cell phone and went to retrieve it from the house. By then,
    Villanova-White had informed Swindle that A.R. was leaving
    with money. Swindle was waiting for A.R. at the front door.
    He said, “bitch, I told you not to leave,” and “[p]unched her in
    the face”; she fell to the ground on the front lawn, and he then
    took the money.
    In July 2015, Villanova-White was evicted from her home.
    She moved to a hotel in Omaha, and Swindle ensured that she
    took A.R. with her. The day of the move, A.R. convinced her
    mother to pick her up at the hotel and she escaped.
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    2. M.M.
    Swindle met the minor victim, M.M., between 4 and 5 a.m.
    on September 15, 2015, when she was walking alone down
    the street after she had run away from home. M.M. had been
    diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and disruptive mood
    dysregulation disorder. She was assessed to be low functioning
    and needed assistance with all aspects of daily living.
    Swindle pulled up next to her and asked her if she wanted
    to earn some money. She said “sure” and got into his car, and
    he drove to an empty street and pulled over. He asked her to
    take off her shirt, and she said no. Swindle yelled at her, “I
    told you[,] you have to do what I say.” He then took off her
    shirt, had her remove her pants, and had sexual intercourse
    with her.
    Swindle then called Villanova-White while in the car and
    said, “I have another girl to help you pay for the hotel.” He
    took M.M. to the hotel and had Villanova-White advertise
    M.M. online. M.M. performed sex acts with men for money
    over the course of a few days. In the early morning hours
    between September 15 and 16, 2015, while Villanova-White
    was out, Swindle confronted M.M. in the hotel room and
    forced her to have sexual intercourse with him a second time.
    M.M. testified that she tried to get away but that Swindle held
    her down with “one hand on my chest and the other on my
    arm, so I couldn’t, like, flail.”
    On September 18, 2015, a police officer determined that
    M.M.’s photograph from an online escort advertisement
    matched a missing person’s report of a 15-year-old. Law
    enforcement acted immediately; M.M. was removed from the
    hotel, and Swindle and Villanova-White were subsequently
    arrested. Villanova-White entered into a proffer agreement to
    testify, without any promises of leniency. At the time of trial,
    she faced charges of pandering, with a possible penalty of
    between 1 and 50 years’ imprisonment.
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    STATE v. SWINDLE
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    300 Neb. 734
    3. Trial and Sentences
    After a 7-day trial, the jury found Swindle guilty on counts
    1 and 2: sexual assault of a child in the first degree, in viola-
    tion of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-319.01(1)(b) and (2) (Reissue
    2016), each a Class IB felony; count 3: sex trafficking of a
    victim under 16 years of age, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 28-831(1) (Reissue 2016), a Class II felony; and count 4:
    sex trafficking by inflicting or threatening serious personal
    injury, in violation of § 28-831(2), a Class IIA felony. The
    district court determined Swindle was a habitual criminal and
    sentenced him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment of
    between 60 years to life on count 1, between 60 years to life
    on count 2, between 40 to 60 years on count 3, and between 20
    to 60 years on count 4.
    Swindle appeals.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Swindle assigns, restated, that the district court erred by
    (1) failing to instruct the jury that a defendant’s knowledge
    of the victim’s age is an essential element of the offense of
    sex trafficking of a minor, (2) refusing to allow Swindle to
    question the minor victim about her history of making false
    claims of rape when she got in trouble for running away, (3)
    admitting statements made by the defendant without ade-
    quate foundation, (4) refusing to grant a mistrial based upon
    claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and (5) imposing exces-
    sive sentences.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Whether jury instructions are correct is a question of
    law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the
    lower court’s decision.1
    1
    State v. Schwaderer, 
    296 Neb. 932
    , 
    898 N.W.2d 318
    (2017).
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    [2] Whether to grant a mistrial is within the trial court’s
    discretion, and we will not disturb its ruling unless the court
    abused its discretion.2
    [3-5] In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules
    apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the
    Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only
    when the rules make discretion a factor in determining admis-
    sibility.3 The exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in deter-
    mining the relevance of evidence, and a trial court’s decision
    regarding relevance will not be reversed absent an abuse of
    discretion.4 We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s
    evidentiary rulings on the sufficiency of a party’s foundation
    for admitting evidence.5
    [6] An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed
    within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the
    trial court.6
    IV. ANALYSIS
    1. Court Did Not Err
    in I nstructing Jury
    Swindle argues that the district court erred when it refused
    his proposed jury instruction. He contends that a defendant’s
    knowledge of the victim’s age is an essential element of the
    offense of sex trafficking of a minor. At the jury instruction
    conference, Swindle offered the following proposed instruc-
    tion, which he fashioned from NJI2d Civ. 7.62, Negligent
    Entrustment:
    2
    State v. Castillo-Zamora, 
    289 Neb. 382
    , 
    855 N.W.2d 14
    (2014); State v.
    Ramirez, 
    287 Neb. 356
    , 
    842 N.W.2d 694
    (2014).
    3
    State v. Hill, 
    298 Neb. 675
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 668
    (2018). See State v. Lessley,
    
    257 Neb. 903
    , 
    601 N.W.2d 521
    (1999).
    4
    State v. Scott, 
    284 Neb. 703
    , 
    824 N.W.2d 668
    (2012); State v. Ford, 
    279 Neb. 453
    , 
    778 N.W.2d 473
    (2010).
    5
    See State v. Burries, 
    297 Neb. 367
    , 
    900 N.W.2d 483
    (2017).
    6
    See State v. Brown, ante p. 57, 
    912 N.W.2d 241
    (2018).
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    STATE v. SWINDLE
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    In your deliberations with regard to Count III of the
    Information/Amended Information, in order for you to
    determine that [Swindle] is guilty of Trafficking of a
    person who has not attained the age of 16 years, you
    must find that [Swindle] knew or should have known
    that the victim i[n] question had not attained the age of
    16 years.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    The court refused the proposed instruction and gave an
    instruction which recited the elements of the offense as (1)
    that on the relevant dates the defendant engaged in sex traf-
    ficking of a minor and (2) that at that time, M.M. was less than
    16 years of age. The court provided a definitional instruction
    which stated:
    “Sex trafficking of a minor” means knowingly recruit-
    ing, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtain-
    ing by any means or knowingly attempting to recruit,
    entice, harbor, transport, provide, or obtain by any means
    a minor for the purpose of having such minor engage in
    commercial sexual activity, sexually explicit performance,
    or the production of pornography or to cause or attempt
    to cause a minor to engage in commercial sexual activ-
    ity, sexually explicit performance, or the production of
    pornography.7
    Swindle argues the statutory definition of sex trafficking of
    a minor supports his proposed instruction, because the defini-
    tion contains the word “knowingly.” Swindle contends that
    “knowingly” commonly requires a defendant’s perception of
    facts which make up the crime. Swindle claims the prosecution
    failed to prove that he knew M.M. was 15 years old, because
    M.M. admitted that she lied about her age and told Swindle
    that she was 20 years old.
    Swindle claims that he received a greater sentence as a
    result of the court’s denial of his proposed instruction. Putting
    7
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-830(14) (Reissue 2016) (now found at
    § 28-830(12) (Supp. 2017)).
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    aside Swindle’s habitual criminal status, sex trafficking of a
    minor is a Class IB felony,8 with a minimum penalty of 20
    years’ imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment;
    whereas sex trafficking of an adult is a Class II felony,9 with a
    minimum penalty of 1 year’s imprisonment and a maximum of
    50 years’ imprisonment.10
    [7,8] In an appeal based on a claim of an erroneous jury
    instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the
    questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely
    affected a substantial right of the appellant.11 All the jury
    instructions must be read together, and if, taken as a whole,
    they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately
    cover the issues supported by the pleadings and the evidence,
    there is no prejudicial error necessitating reversal.12
    [9] To establish reversible error from a court’s refusal to
    give a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden to
    show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement
    of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the
    evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s
    refusal to give the tendered instruction.13 We conclude that the
    court did not err in refusing Swindle’s proposed instruction.
    [10] In giving instructions to the jury, it is proper for the
    court to describe the offense in the language of the statute.14
    Although the law does not require that a jury instruction track
    the exact language of the statute,15 using the specific language
    of a statute is an effective means of implementing the intent of
    8
    See § 28-831(1).
    9
    See § 28-831(2).
    10
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105(1) (Supp. 2017).
    11
    State v. McCurry, 
    296 Neb. 40
    , 
    891 N.W.2d 663
    (2017).
    12
    
    Id. 13 Id.
    14
    State v. Duncan, 
    293 Neb. 359
    , 
    878 N.W.2d 363
    (2016); State v. Armagost,
    
    291 Neb. 117
    , 
    864 N.W.2d 417
    (2015).
    15
    State v. Erpelding, 
    292 Neb. 351
    , 
    874 N.W.2d 265
    (2015).
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    the Legislature.16 This practice provides the added benefits of
    easing the process of preparing jury instructions and creating
    certainty for trial courts that the jury has been provided the
    essential elements of an offense.17
    [11] Swindle’s proposed instruction, borrowed from the civil
    context of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, assumes
    conduct, liability, and consequences distinct from the charged
    offense of sex trafficking of a minor, and therefore cannot be a
    correct statement of the law in this case. To provide one exam-
    ple, the instruction introduces the mens rea element of “should
    have known,” which is absent from the statutory definition of
    sex trafficking of a minor. For that reason alone, Swindle’s
    instruction goes beyond the plain reading of the statute. It is
    not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a
    statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out
    of a statute.18
    We agree with the State that the better analogy is the crime
    of sex trafficking of an adult. The Legislature used identical
    language to define the crimes of sex trafficking of a minor and
    sex trafficking of an adult, except sex trafficking of a minor
    applies to victims under the age of 18.19 If Swindle’s argument
    is accepted, then by parity of reasoning, the State would be
    unable to sustain a conviction of sex trafficking of an adult
    unless it proved that a defendant knew that the victim was 18
    years of age or older. We agree with the State that this is an
    absurd result. Instead, the natural reading of these offenses is
    that the victim’s age is intended to classify sex trafficking of
    a minor as a more serious offense and that the victim’s age
    does not relate to the defendant’s mens rea. This reasoning is
    further strengthened by the Legislature’s decision to increase
    the penalty for sex trafficking of a minor who is under 16 years
    16
    Armagost, supra note 14.
    17
    See 
    id. 18 Becher
    v. Becher, 
    299 Neb. 206
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 12
    (2018).
    19
    See § 28-830(10), (13), and (14).
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    of age.20 The plain language of the criminal statutes supports
    this conclusion.
    [12] In determining the meaning of statutory language,
    its ordinary and grammatical construction is to be followed,
    unless an intent appears to the contrary or unless, by following
    such construction, the intended effect of the provisions would
    apparently be impaired.21 The language of § 28-830(14), as it
    existed at the time of the offense, does not define the word
    knowingly. However, it is clear that “‘knowingly’ . . . is an
    adverb, and common usage makes clear that an adverb modi-
    fies the verbs that come after it,” and not the noun “a minor”
    that follows.22 Under this interpretation, the prosecution was
    required to prove that Swindle knew that he recruited, enticed,
    harbored, transported, or provided a minor for the purpose of
    sex trafficking, or knew that he attempted to do so. Thus, even
    if we accept Swindle’s argument that there was no evidence
    that he knew M.M.’s age, an ordinary reading of § 28-830(14)
    shows that the term “knowingly” requires only that a defend­
    ant had knowledge that he or she engaged in conduct for the
    purpose of sex trafficking and does not require a defendant to
    have knowledge that the victim was a minor. Dispensing with
    the knowledge requirement is appropriate where the underlying
    conduct is illegal, irrespective of a defendant’s knowledge of
    the victim’s age.23
    Yet, another analogy is to the crime of first degree sexual
    assault of a child.24 Under § 28-319.01(1), a person commits
    sexual assault of a child (a) when he or she subjects another
    person under 12 years of age to sexual penetration and the
    actor is at least 19 years of age or older or (b) when the victim
    20
    See § 28-831.
    21
    Placek v. Edstrom, 
    148 Neb. 79
    , 
    26 N.W.2d 489
    (1947); Nebraska State
    Railway Commission v. Alfalfa Butter Co., 
    104 Neb. 797
    , 
    178 N.W. 766
          (1920).
    22
    See State v. Sims, 
    195 So. 3d 441
    , 446 (La. 2016).
    23
    See Sims, supra note 22.
    24
    See § 28-319.01.
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    is at least 12 years of age but less than 16 years of age and the
    actor is 25 years of age or older. In regard to the age of the
    victim, our case law provides that reasonable mistake as to the
    age of the victim is not a defense.25
    When the Legislature has intended to make age an essential
    element of the offense of sexual assault upon a child, it has
    used plain language.26 Section 28-319.01(4) states that “[i]n
    any prosecution under this section, the age of the actor shall
    be an essential element of the offense that must be proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Indeed, following Swindle’s trial,
    the Legislature used plain language when it codified the rule
    that “[i]t is not a defense in a prosecution [of the offense of
    sex trafficking of a minor] that the defendant believed that the
    minor victim was an adult.”27
    Similarly, in construing the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 et
    seq. (2012 & Supp. IV 2016), federal courts have considered
    and rejected the claim that knowledge of the age of the vic-
    tim is an element of sex trafficking of a minor.28 “It would be
    nonsensical to require proof of knowledge of the victim’s age
    when the statute exists to provide special protection for all
    minors, including, if not especially, those who could too easily
    be mistaken for adults.”29
    The trial court correctly instructed the jury that to obtain a
    conviction under § 28-831(1), the prosecution needed to prove
    25
    See, State v. Heitman, 
    262 Neb. 185
    , 
    629 N.W.2d 542
    (2001); State v.
    Sanchez, 
    257 Neb. 291
    , 
    597 N.W.2d 361
    (1999); State v. Campbell, 
    239 Neb. 14
    , 
    473 N.W.2d 420
    (1991); State v. Navarrete, 
    221 Neb. 171
    , 
    376 N.W.2d 8
    (1985).
    26
    See § 28-319.01(4).
    27
    See 2017 Neb. Laws, L.B. 289, § 9 (codified at § 28-831(4)(c) (Supp.
    2017)).
    28
    See, U.S. v. Cox, 
    577 F.3d 833
    (7th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Jones, 
    471 F.3d 535
    (4th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Griffith, 
    284 F.3d 338
    (2d Cir. 2002); U.S. v.
    Taylor, 
    239 F.3d 994
    (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hamilton, 
    456 F.2d 171
    (3d Cir. 1972).
    29
    Jones, supra note 
    28, 471 F.3d at 540
    .
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    only that Swindle engaged in sex trafficking of M.M. and that
    at the time, M.M. was less than 16 years of age. Swindle’s
    proposed instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, and
    the court appropriately gave an instruction which used statu-
    tory language to define the offense. Swindle was not preju-
    diced by the court’s refusal of his instruction. Swindle’s first
    assignment of error is without merit.
    2. Court Did Not Err in Determining
    Swindle’s Line of Questioning
    of M.M. Was I mpermissible
    Swindle argues the district court erred in refusing to allow
    him to question M.M. about her history of making false
    claims of rape. Swindle argues his questioning went to M.M.’s
    credibility and was not precluded by Nebraska’s rape shield
    statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-412 (Reissue 2016), and that
    the district court’s ruling violated Swindle’s right to confront
    his accuser.
    (a) Additional Background
    Prior to trial, Swindle filed a notice of intent to present
    § 27-412 evidence. He sought to adduce evidence that M.M.
    had on multiple prior occasions run away from home and,
    when caught, falsely claimed that she had been raped. At
    a hearing on the issue, Swindle’s counsel made an offer of
    proof that, if called to testify, M.M.’s mother would testify
    that she told healthcare providers that M.M. “is hypersexual
    and seeks out sexual behaviors with older men.” Swindle’s
    counsel stated M.M.’s mother would testify that on mul-
    tiple occasions, M.M. has run away, lied about her age, had
    intercourse, and then stated that it was rape and “yell out for
    help.” Swindle said the mother would state this is part of
    M.M.’s mental illness.
    The court entered a pretrial order which stated:
    [T]his Court may allow [Swindle] to question M.M. about
    prior false assertions of rape. The Court, however, will not
    allow [Swindle] to venture into M.M.’s sexual history. . . .
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    ....
    [Swindle’s] own Motion concedes that the evidence he
    hopes to elicit “is relevant to a determination of the cred-
    ibility of [M.M.].” [Swindle] may not undermine M.M.’s
    credibility by drudging up her sexual behavior or sexual
    predisposition.
    At trial, the following exchange took place during direct
    examination of M.M. by the prosecution:
    Q And how old did you tell [Swindle] you were?
    A Twenty.
    Q Okay. Was that true?
    A No.
    Q Okay. And why did you give him — why did you
    say you were 20 as opposed to 15?
    A Because when I usually ran away, I would have an
    older male take me somewhere or back to their [sic] place.
    During cross-examination, Swindle’s counsel asked M.M.
    what she meant by her answer. The prosecution objected
    based on relevance and § 27-412. At a sidebar, Swindle’s
    counsel stated that he intended to establish that M.M. had run
    away on multiple occasions and that he would end the line of
    questioning at that point. The court ruled that it would permit
    Swindle’s counsel to ask M.M. about lying about her age, but
    found that testimony about running away was not relevant.
    Cross-examination of M.M. continued, and Swindle’s counsel
    asked the following questions, and M.M. gave the follow-
    ing answers:
    Q So it was getting caught for running away that got
    you into the frame of mind that you had to blow it out
    of proportion?
    A Yes.
    Q You’d been in that situation before on multiple occa-
    sions; right?
    A Yes.
    Q And on those occasions have you responded by tell-
    ing people that you’ve been raped?
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    The prosecution objected based on § 27-412 and relevance,
    and argued that there was no evidence that M.M. had falsified
    claims of rape. The court asked for an offer of proof from
    Swindle’s counsel. Receiving no offer of proof at that time, the
    court sustained the prosecution’s relevance objection.
    The following morning of trial, Swindle’s counsel moved for
    a mistrial and argued that he intended to question M.M. about
    prior false allegations of rape that she made following running
    away. Swindle’s counsel stated:
    [M]y proffer and offer of proof was that [M.M] will
    admit, if I would have been allowed to question her, that
    she had run away on multiple prior occasions — and I
    would not have inquired with regard to her promiscuity
    or sexual activity during those runaways, but that she
    then, upon being taken back into custody following the
    runaway, saw medical providers or saw — talked to other
    people in a therapeutic setting and basically admitted that
    she falsified her claims of being raped when — after she
    ran away and got caught.
    Swindle’s counsel offered a portion of M.M.’s medical
    records. The records provide a background of events lead-
    ing up to a suicide attempt by M.M following her assault by
    Swindle. The records include statements from M.M.’s mother,
    consistent with Swindle’s pretrial proffer, that M.M. had run
    away multiple times in the past year and that each time, M.M.
    sought out sex with older men. Her mother stated that in each
    instance, M.M. lied about her age, had sex, and later claimed
    that it was rape.
    Swindle’s counsel claimed that based on the court’s pretrial
    ruling, he anticipated he would be able to ask M.M. about these
    events. He claimed that had he known he would not be permit-
    ted to pursue this line of questioning, he would have called
    M.M.’s mother as a witness. He argues the court’s refusal to
    allow cross-examination of M.M. regarding her credibility
    denied Swindle his right to a fair trial.
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    (b) Disposition
    We consider the application of § 27-412 to the facts of this
    case and whether the questions posed to M.M. were so rele-
    vant that Swindle’s right of confrontation required the admis-
    sion of M.M.’s testimony regarding her prior false claims of
    rape. We note that while Swindle’s brief included separate
    assignments of error regarding these two issues, he consoli-
    dated them into a single argument and, thus, we discuss the
    issues together.
    [13] Subject to several exceptions, § 27-412(1) bars
    “[e]vidence offered to prove that any victim engaged in other
    sexual behavior” and “[e]vidence offered to prove any victim’s
    sexual predisposition” in civil or criminal proceedings involv-
    ing alleged sexual misconduct.30
    [14] Nebraska’s rape shield statute serves two purposes.
    First, the statute protects rape victims from grueling cross-
    examination about their past sexual behavior or sexual pre-
    disposition that too often yields testimony of questionable
    relevance.31 Second, the rape shield statute prevents the use
    of evidence of the complaining witness’ past sexual conduct
    with third parties or sexual predisposition from which to infer
    consent or undermine the witness’ credibility.32 The rape shield
    statute is not meant to prevent defendants from presenting
    relevant evidence, but to deprive them of the opportunity to
    harass and humiliate the complaining witness and divert the
    jury’s attention to irrelevant matters.33
    Section 27-412 is subject to three enumerated excep-
    tions, generally stated: (1) evidence offered to prove a person
    other than the accused was the source of physical evidence;
    30
    § 27-412(a) and (b).
    31
    State v. Lavalleur, 
    289 Neb. 102
    , 
    853 N.W.2d 203
    (2014), disapproved in
    part 
    292 Neb. 424
    , 
    873 N.W.2d 155
    (2016); Lessley, supra note 3.
    32
    Lavalleur, supra note 31; State v. Sanchez-Lahora, 
    261 Neb. 192
    , 
    622 N.W.2d 612
    (2001).
    33
    Lavalleur, supra note 31.
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    (2) evidence relevant to the issue of consent; and (3) evidence
    which, if excluded, would violate the accused’s constitutional
    rights.34 Swindle’s stated purpose of the cross-examination
    was not to show another source of physical evidence or that
    M.M. consented to sex with Swindle. Rather, Swindle contends
    that evidence of M.M.’s prior false claims of rape went to
    M.M.’s credibility.
    Although there is no Nebraska case directly on point, we
    agree with the majority of jurisdictions which hold that a
    false accusation of rape where no sexual activity is involved,
    is itself not “sexual behavior” involving the victim, and that
    such statements fall outside of the rape shield law.35 However,
    before defense counsel launches into cross-examination about
    false allegations of sexual assault, a defendant must establish,
    outside of the presence of the jury, by a greater weight of the
    evidence, that (1) the accusation or accusations were in fact
    made, (2) the accusation or accusations were in fact false,
    and (3) the evidence is more probative than prejudicial.36 If
    the defendant satisfies these three conditions, the trial court
    will authorize cross-examination of the complaining witness
    concerning the alleged false accusations.37 The defendant may
    thereafter present extrinsic evidence of the false accusations
    only if the complaining witness denies or fails to recall having
    made such accusations.38
    In this case, we find Swindle failed to satisfy the necessary
    conditions. While the evidence relied upon by Swindle did
    indicate that M.M. had previously alleged that she had been
    raped, Swindle did not demonstrate those claims were false.39
    34
    § 27-412(2)(a)(i) through (iii).
    35
    See, State v. Boggs, 
    63 Ohio St. 3d 418
    , 
    588 N.E.2d 813
    (1992); Miller v.
    State, 
    105 Nev. 497
    , 
    779 P.2d 87
    (1989); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 
    235 Va. 319
    , 
    368 S.E.2d 263
    (1988).
    36
    See State v. Daffin, 
    387 Mont. 154
    , 
    392 P.3d 150
    (2017).
    37
    
    Id. 38 Id.
    39
    See State v. Welch, 
    241 Neb. 699
    , 
    490 N.W.2d 216
    (1992).
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    The evidence relied upon by Swindle indicates that M.M. did
    in fact have sexual relations with other men prior to making
    the accusations. The evidence also indicates that M.M. was
    14 years of age at the time of these other encounters. Section
    28-319(1)(c) provides that a person under 16 years of age may
    not legally consent to sexual penetration by an actor over 19
    years of age.40 As the evidence indicates that at least one of
    the men with whom M.M. had sexual relations was 24 years
    of age and that Swindle did not demonstrate the age of any
    of the others or that M.M. recanted any of the allegations,
    Swindle failed to show M.M.’s accusation that she was raped
    was false.
    We must continue our analysis, however, to consider whether
    the exclusion of the evidence in question violated Swindle’s
    constitutional right to confront his accuser.
    [15,16] The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all crimi-
    nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
    be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have
    compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . .
    . .”41 We have recognized that in limited circumstances, a
    defendant’s right to confrontation can require the admission
    of evidence that would be inadmissible under the rape shield
    statute.42 This court has held that an accused’s constitutional
    right of confrontation is violated when either (1) he or she is
    absolutely prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate
    cross-­examination designed to show a prototypical form of
    bias on the part of the witness, or (2) a reasonable jury would
    have received a significantly different impression of the wit-
    ness’ credibility had counsel been permitted to pursue his or
    her proposed line of cross-examination.43
    40
    See In Interest of J.M., 
    223 Neb. 609
    , 
    391 N.W.2d 146
    (1986).
    41
    U.S. Const. amend. VI.
    42
    See, Ford, supra note 4; Lessley, supra note 3; State v. Johnson, 9 Neb.
    App. 140, 
    609 N.W.2d 48
    (2000).
    43
    State v. Privat, 
    251 Neb. 233
    , 
    556 N.W.2d 29
    (1996).
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    In this case, Swindle was not absolutely prohibited from
    impeaching M.M. on cross-examination. Swindle was per-
    mitted to ask M.M. whether she had run away on multiple
    occasions and whether she was trying to “blow it out of pro-
    portion” when she was caught. The court’s exclusion of evi-
    dence concerning M.M.’s prior false claims of rape would not
    have given the jury a significantly different impression of her
    credibility. M.M. had already admitted on direct examination
    that she lied about her age and that “when [she] usually ran
    away, [she] would have an older male take [her] somewhere
    or back to their [sic] place.” She also admitted that when she
    was first interviewed by a detective, she falsely stated that
    the defendant had a gun, and said that she was scared of the
    defendant and “was trying to blow the story out of propor-
    tion.” There was evidence before the jury upon which Swindle
    could have argued that M.M.’s version of the events was not
    to be believed.
    We also find the excluded evidence was not so relevant
    and probative that it triggered Swindle’s constitutional right
    to confrontation.44 The excluded evidence was limited to prior
    sexual contact with people other than Swindle. This evidence
    concerned a collateral issue that did not have any relevance as
    to whether Swindle had assaulted M.M. As discussed above,
    consent is not a defense to sexual assault of a child. And even
    if M.M. were not a child, Nebraska’s rape shield statute rec-
    ognizes that consent to sex with one person is not consent to
    sex with all people. There is simply no relevant connection
    between M.M.’s alleged prior false claims of rape and the
    crimes at issue. Swindle sought to discuss M.M.’s past sexual
    conduct in order to undermine her credibility for the improper
    purpose of arguing that Swindle’s assault of M.M. did not
    take place. There is no indication that Swindle was prevented
    from asking M.M. directly whether she falsified her claims of
    44
    See State v. Earl, 
    252 Neb. 127
    , 
    560 N.W.2d 491
    (1997).
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    assault in this case. Swindle had a full and fair opportunity to
    confront his accuser.
    We determine that the district court did not abuse its discre-
    tion when it determined that Swindle’s questions about M.M.’s
    prior sexual conduct were irrelevant.
    3. Court Did Not Err in Overruling
    Swindle’s Motion for Mistrial Based
    on P rosecutorial M isconduct
    (a) Additional Background
    Swindle’s counsel also moved for a mistrial based on the
    argument that the prosecution engaged in an improper presen-
    tation of the evidence. In its opening statement, the prosecu-
    tion stated that “[M.M.] will tell you that [Swindle] didn’t
    ejaculate inside of her vagina. Instead, he pulled out and
    ejaculated into 15-year-old [M.M.’s] mouth.” The prosecution
    also stated that “[s]he’ll be able to tell you that [Swindle] had
    a gun. She can describe that gun to you. It was a handgun. She
    was terrified of what would happen if she tried to leave that
    hotel room.” These two predictions of M.M.’s testimony were
    not borne out at trial and were not repeated by the State in its
    closing argument.
    Swindle argues the State knew or should have known that
    these aspects of its opening statement were inaccurate and
    that its actions constituted prosecutorial misconduct. As dis-
    cussed above, contrary to the State’s opening statement, M.M.
    admitted on direct examination that she lied to police when
    she first reported that Swindle had threatened her with a gun.
    With respect to the State’s comment about ejaculation, Swindle
    argues that a nurse’s forensic examination report indicated
    there had been no ejaculation. He claims the State intended
    to inflame the jury with its opening statement, and later acted
    unfairly by calling the nurse to testify before M.M., hear the
    nurse tell the jury there was no evidence of ejaculation, and
    then decline to ask M.M. about ejaculation during her testi-
    mony. Swindle argues the references to ejaculation and the gun
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    during the State’s opening statement were the “most dramatic”
    and “fundamental” and the “most offensive” aspects of the
    State’s case.
    (b) Disposition
    [17,18] A mistrial is properly granted in a criminal case
    where an event occurs during the course of a trial which is of
    such a nature that its damaging effect cannot be removed by
    proper admonition or instruction to the jury and thus prevents
    a fair trial.45 A trial court is vested with considerable discretion
    in passing on a motion for mistrial in order to more nearly
    effectuate the ends of justice.46
    [19,20] When considering a claim of prosecutorial miscon-
    duct, we first consider whether the prosecutor’s acts constitute
    misconduct.47 A prosecutor’s conduct that does not mislead
    and unduly influence the jury is not misconduct.48 Though
    Swindle identified two contradictions between the State’s
    preview of the evidence and M.M.’s testimony, there was
    no misconduct.
    During its opening statement, the State previewed evidence
    that Swindle sexually assaulted M.M. and had her perform
    sexual acts with other men for financial gain. These claims
    were supported through testimony at trial. Neither ejaculation
    nor use of force are elements of the crime of sexual assault of
    a minor or sex trafficking of a minor.49 Swindle’s argument
    regarding the State’s incorrect predictions of the evidence
    ignores the nature of the crimes at issue in this case.
    The pretrial investigation of M.M.’s assaults yielded con-
    flicting evidence concerning whether Swindle had ejaculated.
    45
    State v. Hernandez, 
    299 Neb. 896
    , 
    911 N.W.2d 524
    (2018); State v. Cotton,
    
    299 Neb. 650
    , 
    910 N.W.2d 102
    (2018).
    46
    See Castillo-Zamora, supra note 2.
    47
    See Cotton, supra note 45.
    48
    See 
    id. 49 §§
    28-319.01 and 28-831(1).
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    A police report described that “it took [Swindle] a while to
    ejaculate and when he finally did, he ejaculated in her mouth.”
    Yet, the nurse’s report concerning multiple sexual assaults of
    M.M. marked that there had been no ejaculation associated
    with penetration of the mouth. These facts and M.M.’s diag-
    nosed mental state created some uncertainty about what her
    testimony would be. Swindle’s own counsel recognized this in
    his opening statement when he said, “I don’t think I’ve ever
    been in a situation in a courtroom where I’m less certain of
    what someone’s gonna say. I don’t know what these people are
    gonna say.”
    In the context of the trial, the State’s comment that M.M.
    would testify that Swindle threatened her with a gun was not
    imperative given that both A.R. and Villanova-White testi-
    fied Swindle had indirectly threatened them with his handgun.
    Because M.M. admitted that her statements about the gun were
    not true and that the State’s incorrect claims during its opening
    statement were not later repeated, we cannot conclude there
    was any effort to mislead the jury. Swindle’s claim of prosecu-
    torial conduct is without merit.
    [21,22] Even if there were misconduct, there is no evidence
    that Swindle was prejudiced. Not every variance between a
    prosecutor’s advance description and the actual presentation
    constitutes reversible error, when a proper limiting instruction
    has been given and the remarks are not crucial to the State’s
    case.50 Absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a
    jury followed the instructions given in arriving at its verdict.51
    The court instructed the jury that “[s]tatements and argu-
    ments by the lawyers for the State and for [Swindle] are
    not evidence,” and there is no indication the jury did not
    follow this instruction. We determine that the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in overruling Swindle’s motion
    for mistrial.
    50
    State v. Hill, 
    298 Neb. 675
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 668
    (2018).
    51
    
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    4. Court Did Not Err in
    A dmitting Statements
    by Swindle
    In his next assignment of error, Swindle argues the court
    erred by admitting statements that he made. Swindle argues
    that Villanova-White was permitted to paraphrase his words
    and that his out-of-court statements cannot be admitted unless
    a witness is able to recite the specific words that he used rather
    than relay the “general tenor” of his comments.52
    [23,24] Based on our discussion of the record below, we
    agree with the State that Swindle did not articulate this objec-
    tion to the trial court. On appeal, a defendant may not assert
    a different ground for his or her objection than was offered at
    trial.53 Unless an objection to offered evidence is sufficiently
    specific to enlighten the trial court and enable it to pass upon
    the sufficiency of such objections and to observe the alleged
    harmful bearing of the evidence from the standpoint of the
    objector, no question can be presented therefrom on appeal.54
    In explaining his assignment of error, Swindle points to four
    portions of Villanova-White’s testimony that where admitted
    over his objection. Swindle’s objections included hearsay, form
    of the question, and foundation.
    [25] “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
    declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
    evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”55 It is a
    fundamental rule of evidence that a statement is not hearsay if
    it is offered against a party and is the party’s own statement.56
    [26] The first objection came as a hearsay objection to
    Villanova-White’s testimony that Swindle “had his way of
    52
    Brief for appellant at 23.
    53
    Schwaderer, supra note 1.
    54
    State v. Henry, 
    292 Neb. 834
    , 
    875 N.W.2d 374
    (2016).
    55
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-801(3) (Reissue 2016).
    56
    See § 27-801(4)(b)(i).
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    threatening without really threatening, but he would men-
    tion all the time about how many people he would beat up
    and gun activity and things like that.” The court presumably
    overruled the objection, because Villanova-White’s testimony
    concerned nonhearsay statements made by a party opponent.
    Where the reason for a trial court’s overruling of a hearsay
    objection is left at large, arguably, it is the opponent’s bur-
    den to demand an explanatory ruling.57 Swindle did not then
    argue that § 27-801(4)(b)(i) did not apply absent the recital
    of his precise statement. Therefore, Swindle failed to meet his
    burden to show that Villanova-White’s testimony was inad-
    missible. The court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
    Swindle’s hearsay objection.
    [27] The second objection was a form and foundation objec-
    tion when the prosecution asked Villanova-White, “Based on
    conversations that you had with [Swindle], do you know if
    [A.R.] was ever able to keep any of the money that she made
    from the business?” Swindle objected as to the form of the
    question and that it called for a narrative. The court overruled
    the objection and allowed Villanova-White to answer. The
    question permitted Villanova-White to answer yes or no as to
    whether she had knowledge regarding A.R.’s being allowed to
    keep any money. In response to the question, Villanova-White
    stated, “No, she was never able to keep the money.” After the
    answer was given, Swindle did not object to the answer on the
    ground that the answer was a voluntary statement or for some
    specific reason such as hearsay or a conclusion of the wit-
    ness.58 Failure to make a timely objection waives the right to
    assert prejudicial error on appeal.59 As a result, Swindle waived
    any error which may have occurred.
    The third objection was an “[a]sked and answered objec-
    tion” when the prosecution asked Villanova-White why
    57
    Henry, supra note 54.
    58
    Ford, supra note 4.
    59
    Schwaderer, supra note 1.
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    Swindle called A.R. a “bitch.” The court sustained the objec-
    tion as to being a compound question. The prosecution then
    asked Villanova-White why Swindle was angry, to which
    Swindle objected on the ground that the question had been
    asked and answered. The court overruled the objection,
    and Villanova-White answered, “I know that it was always
    about money. It was always having to do with money.”
    Villanova-White’s answer was based on her recollection. It
    did not include hearsay evidence and, according to the record,
    was not cumulative. The court did not err in overruling
    Swindle’s objection.
    Finally, Swindle made a foundation objection to a line of
    questioning about why Swindle did not want A.R. to leave
    the house. Swindle asked that the State lay in its ques-
    tions to Villanova-White “the typical foundational require-
    ments” of specific times, dates, and places. The court then
    required the State to lay foundation. The State asked whether
    Villanova-White had conversations with Swindle between
    March and July 2015 about why he did not want A.R. to
    leave. Villanova-White responded that she did, and the State
    asked her what Swindle said in those conversations. Swindle
    objected based on foundation, and the court overruled his
    objection. Villanova-White answered, “He didn’t want her to
    leave because he was making — she was making him money
    and that he could keep track of her.”
    [28] Swindle did not object that Villanova-White’s answer
    did not contain his exact statement. In addition, Swindle has
    not cited any authority to suggest that if he had made that
    objection, the State would have been required to lay addi-
    tional foundation. A witness who hears an oral admission by
    a party may testify as to that admission.60 Swindle has not
    argued that Villanova-White did not hear his admissions or
    that she lacked personal knowledge as to why he wanted A.R.
    60
    See State v. Neujahr, 
    248 Neb. 965
    , 
    540 N.W.2d 566
    (1995).
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    to stay at the house. The trial court did not abuse its discre-
    tion in overruling Swindle’s evidentiary objections. Swindle’s
    assignment of error is without merit.
    5. Court Did Not Impose
    Excessive Sentences
    Swindle argues that his sentences, which amounted to 180
    years’ to life imprisonment, were disproportionate, because he
    had no prior similar criminal history and his sentences exceed
    those imposed even in certain cases of homicide. The State
    claims the sentences imposed were all within the statutory lim-
    its and that Swindle does not argue otherwise.
    The jury found Swindle guilty of four felonies, and the court
    determined Swindle to be a habitual criminal. Upon conviction
    of a felony, a habitual criminal shall be sentenced to a manda-
    tory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of
    up to 60 years’ imprisonment.61 The court sentenced Swindle to
    consecutive sentences of imprisonment of between 60 years to
    life on count 1, between 60 years to life on count 2, between
    40 to 60 years on count 3, and between 20 to 60 years on
    count 4.
    [29] An abuse of discretion in imposing a sentence occurs
    when a sentencing court’s reasons or rulings are clearly unten-
    able and unfairly deprive the litigant of a substantial right and
    a just result.62
    The court’s sentencing of Swindle was not inappropri-
    ate in this case. Swindle’s guilt was largely uncontested.
    Swindle’s theory of defense at trial was that Villanova-White
    was primarily responsible for the online business and that
    A.R.’s and M.M.’s prostitutions were voluntary on their part.
    The evidence left little question, however, that Swindle sex-
    ually assaulted M.M. on two separate occasions and that
    he engaged in sex trafficking of both A.R. and M.M. The
    61
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2221 (Reissue 2016).
    62
    Brown, supra note 6.
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    court’s sentencing is not clearly untenable, given that the
    State proved that Swindle repeatedly sought out vulnerable
    victims and used violence and manipulation to force them
    into his sex trafficking business. The court was within its dis-
    cretion to impose sentences on the high end of the statutory
    range. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
    sentencing Swindle.
    V. CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the court’s refusal of Swindle’s proposed
    jury instruction was not in error. We further conclude that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
    Swindle’s motions for mistrial and in overruling his eviden-
    tiary objections. We conclude the court did not abuse its dis-
    cretion in sentencing Swindle. We therefore affirm Swindle’s
    convictions and sentences.
    A ffirmed.