State v. Thelen , 305 Neb. 334 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    04/10/2020 12:08 AM CDT
    - 334 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    John E. Thelen, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 20, 2020.    No. S-19-604.
    1. Criminal Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of a criminal
    case from the county court, the district court acts as an intermediate
    court of appeals, and its review is limited to an examination of the
    record for error or abuse of discretion.
    2. Courts: Appeal and Error. Both the district court and a higher appel-
    late court generally review appeals from the county court for error
    appearing on the record.
    3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
    appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the deci-
    sion conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is
    neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    4. Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently reviews questions
    of law in appeals from the county court.
    5. Criminal Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. When deciding appeals
    from criminal convictions in county court, an appellate court applies the
    same standards of review that it applies to decide appeals from criminal
    convictions in district court.
    6. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
    conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence
    is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the
    same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
    on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters
    are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an appellate court
    is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
    ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    - 335 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    7. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.
    8. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In discerning the meaning of a statute,
    a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the
    Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute con-
    sidered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, as it is the court’s duty
    to discover, if possible, the Legislature’s intent from the language of the
    statute itself.
    9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court does not consider
    a statute’s clauses and phrases as detached and isolated expressions.
    Instead, the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
    fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
    10. Criminal Law: Statutes. While a penal statute is to be construed
    strictly, it is to be given a sensible construction in the context of the
    object sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be
    remedied, and the purpose sought to be served.
    11. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of
    statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
    should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the
    intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, har-
    monious, and sensible.
    12. Highways: Words and Phrases. A “public road” in Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 39-301 (Reissue 2016) includes the entire area within the county’s
    right-of-way.
    Appeal from the District Court for Cedar County, Paul J.
    Vaughan, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for
    Cedar County, Douglas L. Luebe, Judge. Judgment of District
    Court affirmed.
    Bradley C. Easland, of Egley, Fullner, Montag, Morland &
    Easland, P.C., for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Matthew Lewis
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    - 336 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    Freudenberg, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    The defendant landowner appeals from criminal misde-
    meanor convictions for violating Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-301
    (Reissue 2016), by repeatedly erecting an electric fence approx-
    imately 3 feet from the edge of a county gravel roadway and
    within the county’s right-of-way that extends into the ditch.
    The central question is whether a county’s right-of-way extend-
    ing into a ditch along a county roadway is a “public road” for
    purposes of § 39-301.
    BACKGROUND
    In September 2016, John E. Thelen was charged with three
    counts of obstructing a public road in violation of § 39-301,
    based on repeated instances of erecting an electric fence within
    the ditch right-of-way of Cedar County, Nebraska (County),
    alongside a county road. Count I alleged that Thelen obstructed
    a public road on August 31, count II alleged that he obstructed
    a public road on September 6, and count III alleged that Thelen
    obstructed a public road on September 13. The pertinent lan-
    guage of § 39-301 provides, “Any person who . . . obstructs a
    public road . . . by encroaching upon the same with any fence
    . . . shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a Class V mis-
    demeanor . . . .” The complaint alleged that the County had
    incurred a total cost of approximately $400 in removing the
    obstructions.
    A bench trial was held on stipulated evidence. The evidence
    was undisputed that the Cedar County Board of Commissioners
    (Board) had established pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1702
    (Reissue 2016) that the County’s public roads’ rights-of-way
    are 66 feet, measured from the centerline of the roadway on
    each side to a 33-foot distance to the ditch on each side. It was
    also undisputed that the County controls a public road running
    along the south side of Thelen’s property and controls, main-
    tains, and is responsible for its 66-foot right-of-way.
    Both the County’s highway superintendent, Carla Schmidt,
    and the chairman of the Board, David McGregor, averred that
    - 337 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    since 2013, Thelen has continuously and repeatedly placed a
    fence within the County’s right-of-way and has refused to vol-
    untarily remove his fence after being given reasonable notice
    to do so.
    According to Schmidt, for purposes of moving his cattle
    from one pasture to another, Thelen regularly placed his fence
    in the County’s ditch right-of-way beginning in June and
    removed it in October or November. Schmidt noted that the
    fence had been repeatedly placed a mere 161⁄2 feet from the
    roadway centerline.
    McGregor averred that it was the County’s duty to keep its
    public roads’ rights-of-way free of debris, crops, fences, or any
    other obstructions. McGregor described that such obstructions
    presented a safety issue and that the County would subject
    itself to the loss of its tort liability insurance coverage if it
    failed to keep its ditches free of obstructions.
    Schmidt similarly averred that the fences repeatedly placed
    by Thelen in the County’s right-of-way endangered the travel-
    ing public and created liability for the County for the failure to
    comply with its statutory duty under § 39-301 to remove road
    obstacles.
    According to Schmidt’s and McGregor’s affidavits, the
    County gave Thelen notices in August and October 2013 to
    remove his fence from the ditch right-of-way and he refused
    to comply. Instead, Thelen complained that other people in the
    County similarly obstructed the County’s rights-of-way. Thelen
    sent a letter through his attorney requesting permission to
    place his fence in the County’s right-of-way from June through
    October. In the letter, attached to Schmidt’s affidavit, Thelen
    asserted that if his fence is removed by the County, his cattle
    would stray onto the roadway. The Board denied Thelen’s
    request in October 2013.
    Schmidt and McGregor both stated that, again, in March
    2014, Thelen placed a newly erected fence in the right-of-way
    and refused to remove it after notice was given. Schmidt’s
    affidavit, as well as other exhibits entered into evidence in
    - 338 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    the 2016 actions, demonstrate that in September 2014, Thelen
    appeared before the Board at a regularly conducted meeting
    and the Board again denied Thelen’s request for permission to
    erect a fence within the County’s right-of-way.
    In 2015, Thelen was found guilty of violating § 39-301
    for erecting in July 2015 the same type of fence at the same
    location as alleged in the 2016 criminal complaint leading to
    the misdemeanor convictions presently on appeal. In its 2015
    order, the county court found that the County’s ditch right-of-
    way was encompassed by the term “public road.” Further, the
    court explained that the law does not recognize as a defense the
    fact that others are violating the same law.
    Thereafter, in September 2015, according to Schmidt and
    McGregor, Thelen placed his fence anew in the County’s right-
    of-way. However, no additional criminal charges were filed
    against Thelen by the State in 2015 regarding the fence.
    Chief Deputy Sheriff Chad Claussen averred that in 2016,
    he investigated the scene on July 18 and 21 and ascertained
    that Thelen had again erected an electric fence along the
    county road and in the County’s right-of-way, which Thelen
    had previously been advised not to do. The fence was located
    approximately 16 to 31 feet from the centerline. The County
    gave notice to Thelen on July 26, directing him to remove
    the fence.
    Claussen averred that on August 31, 2016, he again investi-
    gated the scene and found the fence still present. According to
    a report, the fence was no longer standing but was lying in the
    ditch right-of-way. Claussen seized as evidence approximately
    1,500 feet of electric fence wire, 50 posts, and 68 electric fence
    insulators belonging to Thelen.
    During the seizure, Thelen approached Claussen and “com-
    plained about the situation.” When Claussen suggested that
    Thelen place the fence on his own property and outside of the
    right-of-way, Thelen advised Claussen that a prior county com-
    missioner had given him permission to erect the fence there
    and that the new county commissioner, who he believed would
    - 339 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    be elected in an upcoming election, would give him permission
    to do so in the future.
    When Claussen attempted to give Thelen a receipt for the
    seized fence, however, he refused to take it, saying that “it was
    not his fence.” Claussen left the receipt on a fencepost. The
    Cedar County Attorney averred that on September 1, 2016,
    Thelen came to his office requesting that the sheriff’s office
    “return to him the fence seized” by Claussen on August 31.
    Claussen averred that on September 4, 2016, he found that
    Thelen had erected another fence at the same location. He
    removed the fence and seized as evidence approximately 1,500
    feet of single strand electric fence wire, 40 steel posts, and
    40 electric fence insulators, which Claussen averred belonged
    to Thelen.
    On September 13, 2016, Claussen observed that yet another
    fence had been erected in the same location. Claussen seized
    approximately 1,500 feet of single strand electric fence wire
    and an insulated gate belonging to Thelen.
    According to McGregor, in July, August, and September
    2016, the County received citizen complaints that Thelen was
    placing his fence in the County’s ditch right-of-way, which
    led to Claussen’s investigations. Schmidt summarized in her
    affidavit that in the spring of 2016, Thelen placed his fence in
    the County’s right-of-way. Further, from July 2016 to the date
    of the affidavit, December 2016, Thelen had placed his fence
    in the County’s right-of-way on three separate occasions and,
    each time, the County had removed the fence. According to
    Schmidt, Thelen “has indicated that he will continue to disre-
    gard my notices in the future because the fine is only $25.00,
    indicating cheap pasture rent.”
    The stipulated exhibits also included reports by Claussen
    and a deputy sheriff, describing their observations of the elec-
    tric fence in the aforementioned right-of-way on August 31 and
    on September 4, 6, and 13, 2016. The deputy sheriff described
    that on September 4, he observed the “single strand hotwire”
    fence along the road approximately 3 feet from where the
    - 340 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    gravel started, with multiple cows inside the fence. The affida-
    vits and reports described the removal of the fence by county
    employees on September 6, as well as the removal on August
    31 and September 13 of fencing that had been left lying in the
    ditch right-of-way.
    Thelen submitted an affidavit in which he described the inci-
    dent on September 1, 2016, when he went to the Cedar County
    Attorney’s office to ask that the fencing materials taken be
    returned to him, because “my name was on the receipt.” Thelen
    recounted that he had told both Claussen and the Cedar County
    Attorney that the materials were not his. Thelen did not, how-
    ever, aver that the fencing materials were not his.
    Finally, an exhibit entered into evidence by stipulation
    reflects $401 in labor costs by the County’s road department
    for removal of fencing on August 31 and September 6, 2016,
    and for picking up wire in the ditch on September 13.
    In August 2017, the county court convicted Thelen of three
    counts of violating § 39-301. Thelen was fined $100 for each
    violation. Thelen appealed to the district court, which, on May
    22, 2019, affirmed the county court’s judgment. Thelen appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Thelen assigns that the county court erred in finding him
    guilty of the crimes charged because (1) there was insufficient
    evidence presented to prove that he was the individual who
    placed the electric fence in the ditch and (2) the placement of
    an electric fence in a ditch does not violate § 39-301. Thelen
    assigns that for these same reasons, the district court erred in
    affirming the county court’s judgment.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the
    district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and its
    review is limited to an examination of the record for error or
    abuse of discretion. 1
    1
    State v. McCave, 
    282 Neb. 500
    , 
    805 N.W.2d 290
    (2011).
    - 341 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    [2] Both the district court and a higher appellate court gener-
    ally review appeals from the county court for error appearing
    on the record. 2
    [3] When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the
    record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision
    conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
    is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 3
    [4] We independently review questions of law in appeals
    from the county court. 4
    [5] When deciding appeals from criminal convictions in
    county court, we apply the same standards of review that
    we apply to decide appeals from criminal convictions in dis-
    trict court. 5
    [6] In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of
    the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circum-
    stantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same:
    An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence,
    pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence;
    such matters are for the finder of fact. 6 The relevant question
    for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
    of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. 7
    [7] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below. 8
    2
    Id. 3 Id.
    4
    Id. 5 Id.
    6
    State v. McCurdy, 
    301 Neb. 343
    , 
    918 N.W.2d 292
    (2018).
    7
    Id. 8 Saylor
    v. State, 
    304 Neb. 779
    , 
    936 N.W.2d 924
    (2020).
    - 342 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    ANALYSIS
    Thelen asserts that the County’s ditch right-of-way alongside
    the county roadway does not constitute a “public road” for pur-
    poses of § 39-301. He does not contest that an electric fence
    is a “fence” constituting an obstruction under the statute. He
    does, however, argue that the evidence was insufficient to find
    that he erected the fences in question.
    Is Ditch Part of Public Road
    for Purposes of § 39-301?
    The question of whether a ditch right-of-way is part of a
    “public road” for purposes of § 39-301 is a question of statu-
    tory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question
    of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by
    the court below. 9
    [8-10] In discerning the meaning of a statute, a court must
    determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the
    Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the stat-
    ute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, as it is
    the court’s duty to discover, if possible, the Legislature’s intent
    from the language of the statute itself. 10 An appellate court
    does not consider a statute’s clauses and phrases as detached
    and isolated expressions. Instead, the whole and every part of
    the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
    its parts. 11 While a penal statute is to be construed strictly, it is
    to be given a sensible construction in the context of the object
    sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be
    remedied, and the purpose sought to be served. 12
    Chapter 39, article 3, of the Nebraska Revised Statutes sets
    forth duties, rules, and penalties related to the safety and main-
    tenance of “roads” and, to a lesser extent, “highways.” Section
    9
    Id. 10 Fisher
    v. PayFlex Systems USA, 
    285 Neb. 808
    , 
    829 N.W.2d 703
    (2013).
    11
    Dean v. State, 
    288 Neb. 530
    , 
    849 N.W.2d 138
    (2014).
    12
    State v. Stanko, 
    304 Neb. 675
    , 
    936 N.W.2d 353
    (2019).
    - 343 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    39-301, the statute directly at issue in these appeals, provides
    in relevant part:
    Any person who injures or obstructs a public road
    by felling a tree or trees in, upon, or across the same,
    by placing or leaving any other obstruction thereon, by
    encroaching upon the same with any fence, by plowing or
    digging any ditch or other opening thereon, by diverting
    water onto or across such road so as to saturate, wash,
    or impair the maintenance, construction, or passability
    of such public road, or by allowing water to accumulate
    on the roadway or traveled surface of the road or who
    leaves the cutting of any hedge thereupon for more than
    five days shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a
    Class V misdemeanor and, in case of placing any obstruc-
    tion on the road, be charged an additional sum of not
    exceeding three dollars per day for every day he or she
    allows such obstruction to remain after being ordered to
    remove the same by the road overseer or other officer in
    charge of road work in the area where such obstruction
    is located, complaint to be made by any person feeling
    aggrieved.
    This section shall not apply to any person who law-
    fully fells any tree for use and will immediately remove
    the same out of the road nor to any person through whose
    land a public road may pass who desires to drain such
    land and gives due notice of such intention to the road
    overseer or other officer in charge of road work nor when
    damage has been caused by a mechanical malfunction of
    any irrigation equipment, when a sprinkler irrigation sys-
    tem had been set so that under normal weather conditions
    no water would have been placed upon the right-of-way
    of any road, when the county board grants permission for
    the landowner to divert water from one area to another
    along a county highway right-of-way, or when a munici-
    pality has granted permission along or across the right-
    of-way under its jurisdiction, except that if damage has
    been caused by a mechanical malfunction of irrigation
    - 344 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    equipment more than two times in one calendar year, the
    penalty provided in this section shall apply.
    (Emphasis supplied.) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-304 (Reissue 2016)
    provides that “[a]ny person who willfully and maliciously
    injures any lawful public road in this state . . . shall, for every
    such offense, be guilty of a Class V misdemeanor . . . .”
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-310 (Reissue 2016), which refers to
    depositing materials on “public road[s]” or inside the “ditches
    of such road,” provides:
    Any person who deposits any wood, stone, or other
    kind of material on any part of any lawful public road
    in this state, inside of the ditches of such road, or out-
    side of the ditches but so near thereto as to cause the
    banks thereof to break into the same, causes the accu-
    mulation of rubbish, or causes any kind of obstruction,
    shall be guilty of (1) a Class III misdemeanor for the
    first offense, (2) a Class II misdemeanor for the second
    offense, and (3) a Class I misdemeanor for the third or
    subsequent offense.
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-311 (Reissue 2016) is a similar, but
    more extensive, provision related to depositing materials on
    “highway[s].”
    On its face, § 39-301 clearly distinguishes between a “road-
    way,” which is the “traveled surface of the road,” and the
    “road,” which is something greater than the “roadway.” Section
    39-310 clearly includes ditches as part of the “road.” Section
    39-301 also makes several references to the “right-of-way,”
    describing the right-of-way “of any road,” and states that a
    person does not violate the statute when a sprinkler irrigation
    system was set so that under normal weather conditions no
    water would have been placed upon the right-of-way of any
    road or by diverting water along or across a right-of-way with
    permission of “the county board [or] municipality.”
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-101(11) (Reissue 2016) defines “[r]oad-
    way” as that “portion of a highway improved, designed, or
    ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm
    - 345 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    or shoulder.” “Shoulder,” in turn, is defined in § 39-101(12)
    as that “part of the highway contiguous to the roadway and
    designed for the accommodation of stopped vehicles, for emer-
    gency use, and for lateral support of the base and surface
    courses of the roadway.” There is no statutory definition of
    a “berm.”
    [11] The terms “road” and “public road” are not defined in
    chapter 39, article 1, of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. But
    components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to
    a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be con-
    junctively considered and construed to determine the intent of
    the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, har-
    monious, and sensible. 13 We have accordingly found it appro-
    priate to consider in pari materia different articles in the same
    chapter, when they concern related matters. 14
    “Road” is defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1302(32) (Reissue
    2016), in chapter 39, article 13, relating to the state highway
    system, and expressly includes “the entire area within the
    right-of-way”: “Road shall mean a public way for the purposes
    of vehicular travel, including the entire area within the right-
    of-way. A road designated as part of the state highway system
    may be called a highway, while a road in an urban area may be
    called a street.”
    This definition of “road” as including the entire area within
    the right-of-way is consistent with numerous other statutes
    in chapter 39. Section 39-1702(2) provides that the right-of-
    way for “[c]ounty road purposes” “shall be of such width as
    is deemed necessary by the county board,” and it specifically
    13
    Pittman v. Western Engineering Co., 
    283 Neb. 913
    , 
    813 N.W.2d 487
         (2012). See, also, Farmers Co-op v. State, 
    296 Neb. 347
    , 
    893 N.W.2d 728
    (2017), modified on denial of rehearing 
    297 Neb. 132
    , 
    898 N.W.2d 674
    ; Fontenelle Equip. v. Pattlen Enters., 
    262 Neb. 129
    , 
    629 N.W.2d 534
         (2001).
    14
    See, Cookson v. Ramge, 
    299 Neb. 128
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 296
    (2018); In re
    Application of Tail, Tail v. Olson, 
    144 Neb. 820
    , 
    14 N.W.2d 840
    (1944);
    Greb v. Hansen, 
    123 Neb. 426
    , 
    243 N.W. 278
    (1932); Brown Real Estate
    Co. v. Lancaster County, 
    108 Neb. 514
    , 
    188 N.W. 247
    (1922).
    - 346 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    described the “right-of-way for such roads,” providing in rel-
    evant part:
    County road purposes, as referred to in subsection (1) of
    this section, shall include provisions for, but shall not be
    limited to, the following: (a) The establishment, construc-
    tion, reconstruction, relocation, improvement, or main-
    tenance of any county road. The right-of-way for such
    roads shall be of such width as is deemed necessary by
    the county board . . . .
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    A “highway” under chapter 39 is just one form of a “road,”
    and it is also consistently described as including the right-
    of-way. “Highway” is defined by § 39-101(3) as “the entire
    width between the boundary limits of any street, road, avenue,
    boulevard, or way which is publicly maintained when any part
    thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicu-
    lar travel.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 39-1302(22), which
    contains extensive provisions relating to the creation and main-
    tenance of the state highway system, similarly defines “[h]igh-
    way” as “a road or street, including the entire area within the
    right-of-way, which has been designated a part of the state
    highway system.” (Emphasis supplied.)
    “State highway system” is defined in § 39-1302(37) as
    the roads, streets, and highways shown on the map pro-
    vided for in section 39-1311 as forming a group of
    highway transportation lines for which the [Nebraska
    Department of Transportation] shall be the primary
    authority. The state highway system shall include, but not
    be limited to, rights-of-way, connecting links, drainage
    facilities, and the bridges, appurtenances, easements, and
    structures used in conjunction with such roads, streets,
    and highways.
    (Emphasis supplied.) In § 39-1302(31), “[r]ight-of-way
    shall mean land, property, or interest therein, usually in a
    strip, acquired for or devoted to a road, street, or highway.”
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    - 347 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    The “entire area” within the right-of-way is similarly
    included in the definitions in § 39-1302 of “[h]ighway” and
    “[s]treet” for purposes of cities of the metropolitan class.
    Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-384(7) (Reissue 2012), pertaining
    to “highways” and “streets” in cities of the metropolitan class,
    “[h]ighway shall mean a road or street including the entire area
    within the right-of-way which has been designated a part of the
    State Highway System by appropriate authority,” and under
    § 14-384(9), “[s]treet shall mean a public way for the purpose
    of vehicular and pedestrian travel in the city and shall include
    the entire area within the right-of-way.” (Emphasis supplied.)
    Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1309(3) (Reissue 2016), “high-
    ways” that are not part of the state highway system are part
    of the “county road system,” with title “to the right-of-way of
    such roads” vesting with the county:
    Any highways not designated as a part of the state high-
    way system as provided by sections 39-1301 to 39-1362
    and 39-1393 shall be a part of the county road system,
    and the title to the right-of-way of such roads shall vest in
    the counties in which the roads are located.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    The statutes pertaining to the county road system do not oth-
    erwise elaborate on county rights-of-way. Pertaining to the state
    highway system, however, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1359 (Reissue
    2016) describes rights-of-way acquired by the Department of
    Transportation as “inviolate for state highway and departmen-
    tal purposes” and, with limited statutory exceptions or unless
    with written consent of the Department of Transportation,
    prohibits any “physical or functional encroachments, struc-
    tures, or uses” within the right-of-way limits. Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 39-1360 (Reissue 2016) provides that “[n]o person may
    use the drainage facilities of a highway for private purposes
    without first obtaining the written consent of the [Department
    of Transportation].”
    [12] All these provisions in chapter 39 illustrate that a
    “road” includes the right-of-way, which cannot be obstructed
    - 348 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    without express permission. Consistent with § 39-1302(32)
    and numerous other statutes in chapter 39, we hold that a
    “public road” in § 39-301 includes the entire area within the
    county’s right-of-way. The object sought to be accomplished
    by § 39-301 is the maintenance for the public safety of the
    “road,” the boundaries of which are designated by the county
    through its acquisition of the right-of-way. Thus, the area
    of the ditch here at issue, which was within the county’s
    right-of-way, was part of the “public road” for purposes of
    § 39-301.
    Did Thelen Erect the Fences?
    Having determined that the area in question was a “public
    road,” we address Thelen’s contention that there was insuf-
    ficient evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that he was
    responsible for erecting the fences obstructing the public road.
    In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the
    district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and its
    review is limited to an examination of the record for error or
    abuse of discretion. 15 Both the district court and a higher appel-
    late court generally review appeals from the county court for
    error appearing on the record. 16 When reviewing a judgment
    for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry
    is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by
    competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor
    unreasonable. 17 When deciding appeals from criminal convic-
    tions in county court, we apply the same standards of review
    that we apply to decide appeals from criminal convictions in
    district court. 18
    In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of the
    evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial,
    15
    State v. McCave, supra note 1.
    16
    Id. 17 Id.
    18
    Id. - 349
    -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appel-
    late court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on
    the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such
    matters are for the finder of fact. 19 The relevant question for
    an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
    of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
    The evidence was sufficient to support the county court’s
    finding that Thelen erected the fences or left them lying in
    the ditch right-of-way. The right-of-way in question adjoined
    Thelen’s land, and Thelen repeatedly described that he used
    a fence there for his cattle. At least twice, Thelen expressly
    sought permission to erect a fence on the land in question.
    He was convicted of violating § 39-301 for erecting a fence
    on the same land the year prior to the violations at issue
    in this appeal. He indicated to Schmidt that he intended to
    keep erecting a fence there. Thelen asked for the return of
    fencing materials confiscated from the ditch right-of-way by
    law enforcement.
    This evidence might be considered circumstantial evidence,
    which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact,
    gives rise to a logical inference that such fact exists. 21 As
    Thelen points out, there is no evidence that anyone observed
    Thelen erect the fence, nor is there a clear direct admission
    by Thelen. But a fact proved by circumstantial evidence is
    nonetheless a proven fact. 22 Circumstantial evidence is not
    inherently less probative than direct evidence. 23 We find the
    evidence sufficient to support the convictions in the criminal
    case of three counts of violating § 39-301.
    19
    State v. McCurdy, supra note 6.
    20
    Id. 21 See
    State v. Mowry, 
    245 Neb. 213
    , 
    512 N.W.2d 140
    (1994).
    22
    State v. Pierce, 
    248 Neb. 536
    , 
    537 N.W.2d 323
    (1995).
    23
    Id. - 350
    -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. THELEN
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 334
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
    district court affirming the judgment and convictions of the
    county court.
    Affirmed.