Saylor v. State , 304 Neb. 779 ( 2020 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    02/21/2020 12:06 AM CST
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 779
    James Saylor, appellant, v. State of
    Nebraska et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed January 10, 2020.   No. S-18-793.
    1. Tort Claims Act: Actions: Time. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,227 (Reissue
    2014) sets out a 2-year limitations period that governs not just the time
    for submitting claims to the Risk Manager, but also the time for begin-
    ning suit under the State Tort Claims Act.
    2. ____: ____: ____. Before suit can be filed under the State Tort Claims
    Act, a claimant must submit the claim in writing to the Risk Manager
    within 2 years after the claim accrued.
    3. ____: ____: ____. Generally speaking, a claimant cannot file suit under
    the State Tort Claims Act until the Risk Manager or State Claims Board
    makes a final disposition of the claim, but if no final disposition of a
    claim has been made after 6 months, the claimant is permitted to with-
    draw the claim and file suit.
    4. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm
    a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admit-
    ted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
    or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and
    that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    5. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
    judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences deducible from the evidence.
    6. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question
    of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
    7. ____: ____. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary
    meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to
    ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and
    unambiguous.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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    SAYLOR v. STATE
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    8. Statutes. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into
    a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the
    province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of
    a statute.
    9. ____. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if
    it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as super-
    fluous or meaningless.
    10. Statutes: Immunity. Statutes authorizing suits against the State are
    to be strictly construed because such statutes are in derogation of the
    State’s sovereign immunity.
    11. Tort Claims Act: Actions: Time: Legislature. The Legislature
    expressly states in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,227(5) (Reissue 2014) that
    § 81-8,227 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213 (Reissue 2016) “shall consti-
    tute the only statutes of limitations applicable to the State Tort Claims
    Act.” Because Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-201.02 (Reissue 2016) is not one
    of the applicable statutes listed in § 81-8,227(5), it cannot be applied
    to extend the time period for bringing an action under the State Tort
    Claims Act.
    Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Robert
    R. Otte, Judge. Affirmed.
    Michael J. Wilson, of Schaefer Shapiro, L.L.P., for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, Scott R. Straus,
    and, on brief, David A. Lopez, Deputy Solicitor General,
    for appellees State of Nebraska and Nebraska Department of
    Correctional Services.
    Henry L. Wiedrich, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson &
    Oldfather, L.L.P., for appellee Correct Care Solutions, L.L.C.
    Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Funke, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    The central issue in this appeal is whether the savings clause
    of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-201.01 (Reissue 2016) applies to an
    action under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA).1 We conclude
    it does not. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
    court dismissing this STCA action as time barred.
    1
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,235 (Reissue 2014).
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 779
    BACKGROUND
    This appeal requires us to consider the timeliness of a tort
    action filed in 2017 by James Saylor against the State of
    Nebraska, the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services
    (DCS), and 10 others alleged to be employed by DCS. Tort
    claims against the State and its agents and employees are gov-
    erned by the STCA.2 Here, no one disputes that the tort claims
    alleged in Saylor’s 2017 action are governed by the STCA;
    instead, the dispute is whether his 2017 action was timely com-
    menced under the STCA.
    This case has a complicated factual and procedural history.
    In this opinion, we address only that which bears directly on
    resolving the central question of whether this action is time
    barred under the STCA. We begin by setting out the statutes
    that govern timeliness under the STCA.
    STCA
    [1-3] Section 81-8,227 sets out a 2-year limitations period
    that governs not just the time for submitting claims to the Risk
    Manager, but also the time for beginning suit under the STCA.
    Pursuant to § 81-8,227(1), before suit can be filed under the
    STCA, a claimant must submit the claim in writing to the Risk
    Manager within 2 years after the claim accrued. Generally
    speaking, a claimant cannot file suit under the STCA until the
    Risk Manager or State Claims Board makes a final disposition
    of the claim, but if no final disposition of a claim has been
    made after 6 months, the claimant is permitted to withdraw the
    claim and file suit under the STCA.3
    Section 81-8,227 also contains several provisions that allow
    the 2-year limitations period to be extended under certain cir-
    cumstances. For instance, § 81-8227(1) provides:
    2
    See Komar v. State, 
    299 Neb. 301
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 610
    (2018). See, also,
    § 81-8,209 (“State of Nebraska shall not be liable for the torts of its
    officers, agents, or employees, and no suit shall be maintained against
    the state, any state agency, or any employee of the state on any tort claim
    except to the extent, and only to the extent, provided by the [STCA]”).
    3
    § 81-8,227(1).
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    SAYLOR v. STATE
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    The time to begin suit under [the STCA] shall be extended
    for a period of six months from the date of mailing of
    notice to the claimant by the Risk Manager or State
    Claims Board as to the final disposition of the claim or
    from the date of withdrawal of the claim under section
    81-8,213 if the time to begin suit would otherwise expire
    before the end of such period.4
    Section 81-8,227(3) provides that if a claim is “made or filed
    under any other law of this state and a determination is made
    by a state agency or court” that the STCA is the exclusive
    remedy, “the time to make a claim and begin suit . . . shall be
    extended for a period of six months.” And § 81-8,227(4) pro-
    vides that if a claim is brought under the Nebraska Hospital-
    Medical Liability Act, time to begin suit under the STCA can
    be extended for 90 days.
    Section 81-8,227(5) expressly states: “This section and sec-
    tion 25-213 shall constitute the only statutes of limitations
    applicable to the [STCA].” Generally speaking, Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 25-213 (Reissue 2016) tolls the running of the statute of
    limitations for certain claims, including those under the STCA,
    if a person is “within the age of twenty years, a person with a
    mental disorder, or imprisoned” when the claim accrues.
    Saylor’s Tort Claim
    Saylor is an inmate in the custody of DCS. On September
    14, 2012, he filed a claim with the State Claims Board pursuant
    to the STCA.5 Summarized, the claim asserted that on multiple
    occasions, employees and agents of DCS negligently failed
    to provide him necessary medical care. No one contends that
    Saylor failed to timely submit his claim to the State Claims
    Board within 2 years of the date it accrued.
    On October 19, 2012, the State Claims Board mailed its
    denial of Saylor’s claim. As such, under § 81-8,227(1), Saylor
    had 6 months from that date to file suit under the STCA. The
    4
    
    Id. 5 See
    id.
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    SAYLOR v. STATE
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    304 Neb. 779
    Legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine,
    and render judgment on any suit or tort claim under the STCA
    in the district court of the county in which the act or omission
    complained of occurred.6
    Saylor Files Tort Action
    Saylor filed the instant action in the district court for
    Lancaster County on May 30, 2017. The named defendants
    included the State, DCS, and 10 others alleged to be employed
    by DCS. The 2017 complaint appears to allege the same claims
    of negligent medical care that Saylor presented to the State
    Claims Board, and no one contends otherwise. Saylor’s 2017
    complaint also alleged civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983 (2012) against the same defendants, premised on the
    same facts.
    On December 6, 2017, the district court dismissed Saylor’s
    complaint against several defendants who, according to the
    court file, had not been served within the statutory time period.7
    Action Removed to Federal Court
    On December 8, 2017, the State and DCS filed a notice of
    removal to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446
    (2012). Section 1446(d) expressly provides that after notice
    of removal is given, “the State court shall proceed no further
    unless and until the case is remanded.”
    After the case was removed to federal court, the State and
    DCS sought dismissal of Saylor’s action, asserting it was
    barred by principles of claim preclusion. They argued that
    Saylor’s 2017 complaint alleged the same § 1983 claims pre-
    viously litigated in a federal court action filed by Saylor in
    June 2012. In response to the motion to dismiss, Saylor was
    allowed to amend the 2017 complaint to eliminate the § 1983
    claims, leaving only the negligence claims. After doing so,
    Saylor moved to have the case—now alleging only the STCA
    6
    § 81-8,214.
    7
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-217 (Reissue 2016).
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    SAYLOR v. STATE
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    claims—remanded to state court. That request was granted on
    April 10, 2018.
    Proceedings After Remand
    After the action was remanded to the state district court, the
    State and DCS moved to dismiss the “[operative] Amended
    Complaint” pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(1) and
    (6), on the ground the tort claims were time barred under the
    STCA. Saylor requested and was granted leave to amend his
    original 2017 complaint to make it “identical” to the amended
    complaint that had been remanded by the federal court, and no
    party objected to this procedure. Thereafter, the parties agreed
    that the motion to dismiss could be converted into a motion for
    summary judgment and that it should be treated as relating to
    Saylor’s amended complaint.
    In support of summary judgment, the State and DCS argued
    that Saylor’s negligence claims were time barred under the
    STCA because the State Claims Board had denied the claims
    on October 19, 2012, and Saylor did not file suit on those
    claims until May 30, 2017. In response, Saylor argued the sav-
    ings clause in § 25-201.01 should be applied to extend the time
    period for bringing suit under the STCA.
    Summarized, § 25-201.01 provides that if an action is com-
    menced within the time prescribed by the applicable statute
    of limitations but then fails for a reason other than the mer-
    its, voluntary dismissal, failure of service, or inaction on the
    part of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff may commence a new
    action “within a period equal to the lesser of (a) six months
    after the failure of the action or (b) a period after the failure
    of the action equal to the period of the applicable statute of
    limitations of the original action.” Relying on a somewhat
    tortuous timeline involving the claims Saylor included in his
    2012 federal lawsuit, Saylor argued that even though his 2017
    tort action was filed more than 4 years after the State Claims
    Board denied the claim, it was still commenced within the time
    allowed by § 25-201.01 and thus should be deemed timely
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    304 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 779
    filed. The State and DCS disagreed and generally argued that
    the factual circumstances did not implicate the savings clause
    under § 25-201.01.
    The district court found § 25-201.01 did not apply and dis-
    missed Saylor’s amended complaint with prejudice, finding
    it was time barred under the STCA. Saylor filed this appeal,
    which we moved to our docket on our own motion.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Saylor assigns, restated, that the district court erred in dis-
    missing this action as time barred under the STCA and in not
    applying the savings clause under § 25-201.01. Because we
    find this assignment of error to be dispositive, we do not reach
    Saylor’s other assignments of error related to rulings made by
    the district court after the case was removed to federal court
    but prior to remand.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [4,5] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant
    of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.8 In reviewing a summary judgment, an appel-
    late court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    party against whom the judgment was granted and gives that
    party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
    the evidence.9
    [6] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.10
    8
    Larsen v. 401 Main Street, 
    302 Neb. 454
    , 
    923 N.W.2d 710
    (2019).
    9
    
    Id. 10 Patterson
    v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 
    302 Neb. 442
    , 
    923 N.W.2d 717
         (2019).
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    SAYLOR v. STATE
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 779
    ANALYSIS
    STCA Statute of Limitations Not Met
    It is undisputed that Saylor’s May 30, 2017, lawsuit was
    filed more than 6 months after his claim was denied by the
    State Claims Board on October 19, 2012, and thus, the law-
    suit was filed outside the statute of limitations set forth in
    § 81-8,227(1). Before the district court, and again in the appel-
    late briefing, the parties focused their arguments primarily on
    whether Saylor could satisfy the requirements of the savings
    clause in § 25-201.01. But at oral argument, the defendants
    below argued for the first time that there is no circumstance
    under which the savings clause of § 25-201.01 could apply to
    an action governed by the STCA, because the plain language
    of § 81-8,227(5) provides: “This section and section 25-213
    shall constitute the only statutes of limitations applicable to
    the [STCA].” We ordered supplemental briefing on the issue,
    which presents a question of statutory interpretation.
    [7-9] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary
    meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation
    to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
    direct, and unambiguous.11 It is not within the province of a
    court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted
    by the language; neither is it within the province of a court to
    read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a statute.12 A
    court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if
    it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected
    as superfluous or meaningless.13
    When it comes to determining the statute of limitations
    governing commencement of STCA actions, the plain lan-
    guage of § 81-8,227(5) identifies just two applicable stat-
    utes: §§ 81-8,227 and 25-213. Saylor concedes that the plain
    11
    JB & Assocs. v. Nebraska Cancer Coalition, 
    303 Neb. 855
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 71
         (2019).
    12
    
    Id. 13 Id.
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    SAYLOR v. STATE
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    language of § 81-8,227(5) prevents courts from applying any
    other statute of limitations to a STCA claim. But he contends
    that § 25-201.01 is not a statute of limitations, but, rather, is
    a savings clause. According to Saylor, “a statute of limitations
    is not a savings clause, and a savings clause is not a statute
    of limitations.”14 Saylor’s argument invites us to construe
    the term “statutes of limitations” in § 81-8,227(5) to exclude
    statutes that extend the statutory time for filing under cer-
    tain circumstances.
    Saylor’s argument ignores the fact that both statutes ref-
    erenced in § 81-8,227(5) include provisions that could be
    characterized as savings clauses. Specifically, § 81-8,227(1)
    and (3) each authorize the 2-year statute of limitations to be
    extended for 6 months under certain circumstances. Section
    81-8,227(4) authorizes a 90-day extension of the time to begin
    suit under the STCA when a request for review is filed under
    the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act. And finally,
    § 25-213 tolls the time period for commencing an action under
    the STCA for persons under certain disabilities at the time
    their claim accrues.
    Given the nature of the statutes described in § 81-8,227(5)
    as “statutes of limitations,” we see no principled reason to
    construe the term to refer only to statutes prescribing the time
    period for bringing an action, but not to statutes extending the
    prescribed time for commencing an action.
    [10,11] Statutes authorizing suits against the State are to
    be strictly construed because such statutes are in derogation
    of the State’s sovereign immunity.15 The Legislature expressly
    states in § 81-8,227(5) that §§ 81-8,227 and 25-213 “shall
    constitute the only statutes of limitations applicable to the
    [STCA].” Because § 25-201.02 is not one of the applicable
    statutes listed in § 81-8,227(5), it cannot be applied to extend
    the time period for bringing an action under the STCA. Saylor
    14
    Supplemental brief for appellant at 3.
    15
    SID No. 1 v. Adamy, 
    289 Neb. 913
    , 
    858 N.W.2d 168
    (2015).
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    SAYLOR v. STATE
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    does not contend that any other provision in § 81-8,227 or
    § 25-213 applies to extend the time period for commencing
    his STCA action, and we therefore agree with the district court
    that, as a matter of law, Saylor’s STCA claim is time barred.
    Additional Assignments
    Because the foregoing analysis shows that Saylor’s STCA
    claims were time barred, we need not address his assignments
    of error related to other rulings made by the district court. An
    appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is
    not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.16
    CONCLUSION
    Because Saylor’s STCA action is time barred, the district
    court correctly dismissed it with prejudice.
    Affirmed.
    Heavican, C.J., and Papik and Freudenberg, JJ., not
    participating.
    16
    Woodmen of the World v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 
    299 Neb. 43
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 1
    (2018).