Shelter Ins. Co. v. Gomez , 306 Neb. 607 ( 2020 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    SHELTER INS. CO. v. GOMEZ
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 607
    Shelter Insurance Company, appellee and
    cross-appellee, v. Santos Gomez, Jr., et al.,
    appellees and cross-appellants, Carlene S.
    Calder, Personal Representative of the
    Estate of Jason Kraeger, deceased,
    appellant, and Kate Benjamin,
    appellee and cross-appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed July 31, 2020.    No. S-18-927.
    1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm
    a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admit-
    ted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
    or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and
    that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    2. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
    judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences deducible from the evidence.
    3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an
    independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court
    below.
    4. Motor Carriers. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-363 (Cum. Supp. 2014) adopts,
    as Nebraska law, several parts of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Regulations and makes them applicable to certain intrastate motor carri-
    ers not otherwise subject to federal regulation.
    5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain
    and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
    pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
    direct, and unambiguous.
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    6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of
    statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
    should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the
    intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, har-
    monious, and sensible.
    7. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning
    into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
    a statute.
    8. Motor Carriers: Insurance. Under the plain language of Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 75-363 (Cum. Supp. 2014) and part 387 of title 49 of the Code
    of Federal Regulations adopted therein, compliance with the minimum
    financial responsibility requirements is the responsibility of the motor
    carrier, not the insurer.
    9. ____: ____. Neither Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-363 (Cum. Supp. 2014) nor
    part 387 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations adopted therein
    require an insurer to issue a policy with liability limits that satisfy a
    motor carrier’s minimum level of financial responsibility.
    Appeal from the District Court for Box Butte County:
    Derek C. Weimer, Judge. Affirmed.
    Maren Lynn Chaloupka, of Chaloupka, Holyoke, Snyder,
    Chaloupka & Longoria, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
    Raymond E. Walden and Michael T. Gibbons, of Woodke &
    Gibbons, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee Shelter Insurance Company.
    Amy L. Patras, of Crites, Shaffer, Connealy, Watson, Patras
    & Watson, P.C., L.L.O., for appellees Santos Gomez, Jr., et al.
    Steven W. Olsen and Paul W. Snyder, of Simmons Olsen
    Law Firm, P.C., for appellee Kate Benjamin.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    Through the enactment of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-363 (Cum.
    Supp. 2014), the Nebraska Legislature adopted several parts of
    the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and made those
    regulations applicable to certain intrastate motor carriers not
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    SHELTER INS. CO. v. GOMEZ
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    306 Neb. 607
    otherwise subject to the federal regulations. 1 One of the fed-
    eral regulations adopted by statute sets out minimum levels of
    financial responsibility for motor carriers. 2 The central ques-
    tion in this appeal is whether that federal regulation imposes a
    duty on insurers to issue policies that satisfy a motor carrier’s
    minimum level of financial responsibility. Because we con-
    clude that compliance with the financial responsibility require-
    ments under § 75-363 and the pertinent federal regulations is
    the duty of the motor carrier and not its insurer, we affirm the
    judgment of the district court.
    I. UNDISPUTED FACTS
    1. Collision
    On May 27, 2015, Jason Kraeger was riding his bicycle on
    a highway in Morrill County, Nebraska, when he was struck by
    a 1988 Peterbilt semi-tractor being driven by Santos Gomez,
    Jr. (Gomez Jr.). The negligence of Gomez Jr. is not in dispute.
    Kraeger died from injuries sustained in the collision.
    The Peterbilt involved in the collision was owned by the
    driver’s parents, Santos Gomez, Sr., and Julia Gomez, who
    operate Santos Gomez Trucking, an unincorporated commer-
    cial trucking business operating exclusively within Nebraska
    (collectively Gomez Trucking).
    2. Shelter’s Policy
    At the time of the collision, Gomez Trucking insured the
    Peterbilt under a commercial automobile liability policy
    with Shelter Insurance Company (Shelter). When applying
    for insurance with Shelter, Gomez Trucking represented that
    it had no federal motor carrier number and that its trucks
    made no deliveries outside Nebraska. It requested a bodily
    injury liability limit of $1 million. Gomez Trucking used local
    Shelter agent Kate Benjamin to procure the Shelter policy
    1
    See Cruz v. Lopez, 
    301 Neb. 531
    , 
    919 N.W.2d 479
    (2018).
    2
    See § 75-363(3)(d) (adopting “Part 387” of title 49 of the Code of Federal
    Regulations).
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    and to request periodic adjustments to the liability limits of
    such policy.
    Gomez Trucking had a business practice of adjusting the
    liability limits on the Shelter policy either up or down, depend-
    ing on how its trucks were to be used. The apparent goal of
    this practice was to minimize the premium cost over time by
    reducing the liability limit when a truck was not in use. The
    evidence shows that after initially purchasing liability lim-
    its of $1 million, Gomez Trucking requested, and Benjamin
    made, the following adjustments to the liability limits on the
    Shelter policy:
    •  On November 24, 2014, the liability limit was reduced from
    $1 million to $100,000;
    •  On December 4, 2014, the liability limit was increased to
    $1 million;
    •  On March 15, 2015, the policy was renewed and the liability
    limit was reduced to $500,000;
    •  On March 19, 2015, the liability limit was reduced again to
    $100,000;
    •  On April 15, 2015, the liability limit was increased to
    $1 million;
    •  On April 20, 2015, the liability limit was reduced to $100,000.
    On the day of the fatal collision, May 27, 2015, Julia vis-
    ited Benjamin’s office twice, both times seeking to adjust the
    liability limits. The first time, Julia asked to increase the lia-
    bility limit from $100,000 to $500,000, explaining that Gomez
    Jr. was going to be using the Peterbilt. Benjamin entered data
    on the requested policy limit change into the computer sys-
    tem, and Julia left Benjamin’s office. About 15 minutes after
    Julia left Benjamin’s office, she returned, noticeably upset.
    She told Benjamin that Gomez Jr. had collided with a bicy-
    clist while driving the Peterbilt, and she asked whether the
    liability limit could be increased again. Benjamin told Julia
    she could do so, but the higher limit would not “backdate” to
    an accident that already had occurred. The precise time of the
    collision is not apparent from our record, but the appellant’s
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    brief states the collision occurred just before Julia’s first visit
    to Benjamin’s office.
    As discussed in the next section, under § 75-363(3)(d) and
    the federal regulation adopted therein, intrastate motor carri-
    ers are required to obtain and have in effect certain minimum
    levels of financial responsibility. Because those regulatory
    requirements are central to the dispute which gave rise to this
    declaratory judgment action, we set them out now and discuss
    them in more detail later in our analysis.
    3. § 75-363
    At the time of the collision, § 75-363 provided, in perti-
    nent part:
    (1) The parts, subparts, and sections of Title 49 of the
    Code of Federal Regulations listed below, as modified in
    this section . . . in existence and effective as of January 1,
    2014, are adopted as Nebraska law.
    (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the
    regulations shall be applicable to:
    (a) All motor carriers, drivers, and vehicles to which
    the federal regulations apply; and
    (b) All motor carriers transporting persons or property
    in intrastate commerce[.]
    Subsection (3) of § 75-363 contained a list of the federal
    regulations adopted as Nebraska law, and it included 49 C.F.R.
    § 387 (2014) (Part 387), which sets out the financial responsi-
    bility requirements for motor carriers. 3
    Part 387 is titled “Minimum Levels of Financial Respon­
    sibility for Motor Carriers,” and it is composed of several sub-
    parts. Only subpart A, which applies to for-hire motor carriers
    transporting property, 4 is pertinent to this case. The purpose of
    that subpart is to prescribe
    the minimum levels of financial responsibility required
    to be maintained by motor carriers of property [and] to
    3
    § 75-363(1) and (2) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
    4
    49 C.F.R. § 387.3(a).
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    create additional incentives to motor carriers to main-
    tain and operate their vehicles in a safe manner and to
    assure that motor carriers maintain an appropriate level
    of financial responsibility for motor vehicles operated on
    public highways. 5
    Under this federal regulation, “No motor carrier shall oper-
    ate a motor vehicle until the motor carrier has obtained and
    has in effect the minimum levels of financial responsibility as
    set forth in § 387.9 of this subpart.” 6 That section identifies
    different minimum levels of financial responsibility depend-
    ing on the nature of the property being transported; the
    type of vehicle being used; and whether it is being operated
    in interstate, foreign, or intrastate commerce. 7 The lowest
    level of financial responsibility is $750,000, and it applies
    to for-hire vehicles operated in interstate or foreign com-
    merce with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,001 pounds or
    more transporting nonhazardous property. 8 Higher levels of
    financial responsibility are required for vehicles transporting
    certain hazardous materials in interstate, intrastate, and for-
    eign commerce. 9
    As such, in Nebraska, § 75-363(2) makes the federal regu-
    lations just described applicable not only to the motor carriers,
    drivers, and vehicles to which the federal regulations already
    apply, 10 but also to “[a]ll motor carriers transporting persons
    or property in intrastate commerce,” 11 with certain excep-
    tions. 12 The record suggests that before the fatal collision,
    5
    49 C.F.R. § 387.1.
    6
    49 C.F.R. § 387.7(a).
    7
    See 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1) through (4).
    8
    49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1).
    9
    See 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(2) through (4).
    10
    § 75-363(2)(a).
    11
    § 75-363(2)(b).
    12
    See, e.g., § 75-363(5) (excluding certain farm trucks operated only in
    intrastate commerce).
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    SHELTER INS. CO. v. GOMEZ
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    the parties were generally unaware of the minimum financial
    responsibility requirements imposed by § 75-363(3)(d) and
    Part 387. 13
    4. Wrongful Death Action
    In 2015, the duly appointed personal representative for
    Kraeger’s estate filed a wrongful death and survival action
    against “Gomez Jr. and Santos Gomez, Sr., d/b/a Santos Gomez
    Trucking.” Shelter offered to settle the suit on behalf of the
    defendants for $100,000—the liability limit Shelter asserted
    was in effect at the time of the collision. The personal rep-
    resentative rejected Shelter’s offer, but eventually reached a
    settlement directly with the defendants. Under that settlement,
    the defendants confessed judgment in the amount of $750,000
    and assigned to the personal representative any claim they may
    have against Shelter and/or Benjamin under the policy issued
    to Gomez Trucking.
    5. Declaratory Judgment Action
    In 2016, Shelter filed a declaratory judgment action in the
    district court for Box Butte County. It sought a declaration
    of the applicable liability limit under the policy issued to
    Gomez Trucking for damages arising from the fatal bicycle
    collision of May 27, 2015. Named as defendants and interested
    parties in the declaratory judgment action were Benjamin,
    Gomez Trucking, Gomez Jr., and the personal representative of
    Kraeger’s estate.
    As relevant to the issues on appeal, Shelter’s operative
    amended complaint alleged that on the date of the fatal col-
    lision, Shelter insured Gomez Trucking under a commercial
    automobile liability policy with liability limits of $100,000,
    13
    But see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-369 (Reissue 2018) (requiring Department of
    Motor Vehicles and county treasurers to distribute declaration regarding
    federal regulations to each applicant who registers commercial motor
    vehicle subject to § 75-363; applicants required to acknowledge they have
    read declaration and are aware Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
    have been enacted into state law).
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    and further alleged that the Peterbilt was a covered vehicle on
    that policy. Shelter also alleged that the personal representa-
    tive for Kraeger’s estate had demanded damages in excess of
    Shelter’s $100,000 policy limits and was asserting Shelter was
    “obligated to afford coverage in excess of that stated in the
    policy due to certain federal regulations.”
    Benjamin answered the amended complaint and gener-
    ally joined in Shelter’s request for a declaratory judgment.
    Summarized, Benjamin’s answer alleged the Shelter policy was
    originally issued with liability limits of $1 million and that all
    subsequent adjustments to the liability limits were made at the
    insured’s request.
    The personal representative answered Shelter’s amended
    complaint both in her capacity as the personal representative
    of Kraeger’s estate and as the assignee of Gomez Trucking
    and Gomez Jr. The personal representative’s answer generally
    denied Shelter’s allegation that the liability limits in place at the
    time of the collision were $100,000, and she asserted that under
    § 75-363 and the federal regulations adopted therein, Benjamin
    was required to sell, and Shelter was required to issue, a policy
    with liability limits of at least $750,000. However, no request
    was made to reform the policy. Instead, the personal represent­
    ative took the position that the parties’ real dispute was not
    based in contract at all, but in professional negligence.
    In that regard, the personal representative filed a counter-
    claim against Shelter and a cross-claim against Benjamin, seek-
    ing to recover $750,000 in damages for negligence and demand-
    ing a jury trial. The cross-claim alleged Benjamin was negligent
    in failing to advise Gomez Trucking that § 75-363 required
    intrastate motor carriers to have a minimum of $750,000 in
    liability coverage. The counterclaim alleged Benjamin’s neg-
    ligence should be imputed to Shelter under an agency theory.
    Shelter and Benjamin denied any negligence and raised several
    affirmative defenses, including that Gomez Trucking was con-
    tributorily negligent in failing to obtain the minimum levels of
    financial responsibility required by § 75-363.
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    SHELTER INS. CO. v. GOMEZ
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    6. Summary Judgment
    All parties moved for summary judgment. In an order entered
    September 20, 2018, the district court disposed of all issues in
    the case by granting the summary judgment motions filed by
    Shelter and Benjamin, and overruling those filed by all other
    parties. The parties’ arguments, and the court’s reasoning, are
    summarized below.
    (a) Declaratory Judgment
    In seeking and opposing summary judgment on the declara-
    tory judgment, the parties did not dispute that the Shelter
    policy issued to Gomez Trucking had a liability limit of
    $100,000 at the time of the fatal collision. But they did dispute
    whether such a limit was enforceable, given the provisions of
    § 75-363(3)(d).
    The personal representative argued the $100,000 liability
    limit was void and unenforceable as a matter of law because
    it failed to comply with the minimum financial responsibil-
    ity requirements imposed by § 76-363 and Part 387. Shelter
    and Benjamin argued these provisions had no impact on the
    enforceability of the $100,000 liability limit, because § 75-363
    and Part 387 make it the responsibility of the motor carrier, not
    the insurer, to obtain and have in effect the required minimum
    levels of financial responsibility.
    After analyzing the provisions of § 75-363 and Part 387, the
    district court agreed with Shelter and Benjamin, reasoning:
    [T]here is no reference to be found within the operative
    statute and regulations that specifically create a duty on
    the part of an insurer to ascertain or confirm the existence
    of sufficient insurance policies, sureties or resources to
    satisfy the minimum required amount of insurance under
    [49 C.F.R.] § 387.9. All of the relevant provisions relate
    to requirements of or for the “motor carrier”. The motor
    carrier is to obtain and have in effect the minimum lev-
    els of financial responsibility. The motor carrier is not to
    operate a motor vehicle until it has so done. Neb. Rev.
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    Stat. § 75-363 puts the onus on the motor carrier to com-
    ply with the applicable C.F.R. provisions.
    The district court also found it significant that under the fed-
    eral regulations, “financial responsibility” was not limited to
    insurance policies, but included surety bonds and approved
    self-insurance. 14
    The district court ultimately concluded there were no genu-
    ine issues of material fact related to Shelter’s amended com-
    plaint for declaratory judgment. It found that § 75-363 imposed
    no duty on Shelter or Benjamin to “only sell or market an
    insurance policy [to Gomez Trucking for] $750,000 or more,”
    and it ultimately concluded, as a matter of law, that the
    $100,000 liability limit in place at the time of the accident was
    enforceable.
    (b) Cross-Claim and Counterclaim
    Regarding the cross-claim and counterclaim for professional
    negligence, the district court also found Shelter and Benjamin
    were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Relying on
    Hansmeier v. Hansmeier, 15 the court found Benjamin had
    no legal duty to advise Gomez Trucking about the finan-
    cial responsibility requirements of § 75-363 and no duty
    to sell Gomez Trucking a liability policy that satisfied the
    motor carrier’s minimum level of financial responsibility under
    that statute. 16
    The personal representative timely appealed from the sum-
    mary judgment order, and Gomez Trucking and Gomez Jr.
    cross-appealed. We moved the case to our docket on our own
    motion.
    14
    See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 387.5 and 387.7(b) and (d).
    15
    Hansmeier v. Hansmeier, 
    25 Neb. Ct. App. 742
    , 752, 
    912 N.W.2d 268
    , 275-
    76 (2018) (holding “an insurance agent has no duty to anticipate what
    coverage an insured should have. . . . Rather, when an insured asks an
    insurance agent to procure insurance, the insured has a duty to advise the
    insurance agent as to the desired insurance”).
    16
    See, also, Dahlke v. John F. Zimmer Ins. Agency, 
    245 Neb. 800
    , 
    515 N.W.2d 767
    (1994).
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    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The personal representative assigns a single error: The dis-
    trict court erred in granting declaratory judgment in favor of
    Shelter and Benjamin and declaring the liability limit of the
    Shelter policy was $100,000 “irrespective of the statutorily-
    required minimum” under § 75-673. Similarly, the cross-appeal
    of Gomez Trucking and Gomez Jr. assigns it was error to grant
    summary judgment in favor of Shelter because its policy did
    not provide “lawful coverage.”
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant of
    summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
    or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. 17
    [2] In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court
    views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
    against whom the judgment was granted and gives that party
    the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the
    evidence. 18
    [3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below. 19
    IV. ANALYSIS
    As a threshold matter, we note that neither the appellant nor
    the cross-appellants assigned error to the trial court’s judg-
    ment in favor of Benjamin and Shelter on the professional
    17
    JB & Assocs. v. Nebraska Cancer Coalition, 
    303 Neb. 855
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 71
         (2019).
    18
    Id. 19
         Id.; Cruz, supra note 1.
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    negligence cross-claim and counterclaim. Instead, their assign-
    ments of error focus exclusively on the district court’s declara-
    tory judgment ruling which interpreted § 75-363(3)(d) and the
    federal regulations incorporated therein. We limit our analysis
    accordingly. 20
    1. Minimum Levels of Financial
    Responsibility Under
    § 75-363 and Part 387
    [4] As stated earlier, § 75-363 adopts, as Nebraska law,
    several parts of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
    and makes them applicable to certain intrastate motor carriers
    not otherwise subject to federal regulation. 21 Since 2006, one
    of the federal regulations included in § 75-363 has been Part
    387, 22 which governs minimum levels of financial responsibil-
    ity for motor carriers. This case presents our first opportunity
    to consider the financial responsibility requirements imposed
    by § 75-363 and Part 387, and the parties urge significantly
    different interpretations.
    The appellant and the cross-appellants argue that § 75-363
    and Part 387 require insurers, when issuing policies to intra-
    state motor carriers, to provide liability limits that will satisfy
    the motor carrier’s minimum financial responsibility under 49
    C.F.R. § 387.9. They contend that the Peterbilt was required to
    have a minimum level of financial responsibility of $750,000
    and argue that any policy providing lower limits was “illegal” 23
    and unenforceable.
    20
    State v. Ferrin, 
    305 Neb. 762
    , 770-71, 
    942 N.W.2d 404
    , 411-12 (2020)
    (“[t]o be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be both
    specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party
    asserting the error”).
    21
    See Cruz, supra note 1.
    22
    See 2006 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1007, § 13, codified as § 75-363(3)(d)
    (adopting 49 C.F.R. § 387).
    23
    See, brief for appellant at 16, 18, 19, and 21; brief for appellees Gomez
    Trucking and Gomez Jr. on cross-appeal at 41.
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    Shelter and Benjamin generally argue that § 75-363 and
    Part 387 put the burden on the motor carrier to obtain and
    maintain the required minimum levels of financial respon­
    sibility and do not require an insurer to issue a policy with
    liability limits that satisfy the motor carrier’s financial respon-
    sibility. They contend that by enacting § 75-363 and Part 387,
    the Legislature sought to regulate motor carriers, not insur-
    ers, and they point out that Part 387 permits motor carriers to
    meet their minimum level of financial responsibility through
    more than one policy of insurance, and using methods other
    than insurance. 24
    [5-7] In considering the competing interpretations advanced
    by the parties, we are guided by settled principles. Statutory
    language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and
    an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain
    the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and
    unambiguous. 25 Components of a series or collection of stat-
    utes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia
    and should be conjunctively considered and construed to deter-
    mine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions
    are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. 26 It is not within the
    province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is
    not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. 27
    We apply these rules of statutory construction both to § 75-383
    and to Part 387, because that federal regulation has been
    adopted as Nebraska law.
    Before beginning our analysis, we pause to note that our
    appellate record does not include evidence of the gross weight
    rating of the Peterbilt or the nature of the load, if any, being
    transported at the time of the accident. Consequently, while the
    parties appear to generally agree the Peterbilt was the type of
    24
    See 49 C.F.R. §§ 387.5 and 387.7(b) and (d).
    25
    In re Application No. OP-0003, 
    303 Neb. 872
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 653
    (2019).
    26
    Id. 27
         State v. Montoya, 
    304 Neb. 96
    , 
    933 N.W.2d 558
    (2019).
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    vehicle described in 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1) and thus was subject
    to minimum financial responsibility of $750,000, we express
    no opinion in that regard. Instead, as we explain further below,
    we conclude that even if the Peterbilt was the type of vehicle
    described in 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1), the district court was cor-
    rect to conclude that Part 387 imposes the minimum financial
    responsibility requirements only on the motor carrier, not on
    the insurer.
    2. Compliance With § 75-363 and
    Part 387 Is Responsibility
    of Motor Carrier
    The plain language of both § 75-363 and Part 387 focuses
    exclusively on regulating motor carriers. Section 75-363 makes
    the selected federal regulations applicable to “[a]ll motor car-
    riers transporting . . . property in intrastate commerce” and to
    the vehicles and drivers of such motor carriers. 28
    Similarly, Part 387 applies only to “for-hire motor carriers,” 29
    and the stated purpose of the regulation is to create additional
    incentives for “motor carriers to maintain and operate their
    vehicles in a safe manner and to assure that motor carriers
    maintain an appropriate level of financial responsibility for
    motor vehicles operated on public highways.” 30 The financial
    responsibility requirements under Part 387 are directed to the
    motor carrier, requiring that “[n]o motor carrier shall operate
    a motor vehicle until the motor carrier has obtained and has
    in effect the minimum levels of financial responsibility as set
    forth in [49 C.F.R. § 387.9].” 31
    [8] Given the plain language of § 75-363 and Part 387, we
    conclude that compliance with the minimum financial respon-
    sibility requirements is the responsibility of the motor carrier,
    not the insurer.
    28
    § 75-363(2)(b) (emphasis supplied).
    29
    49 C.F.R. § 387.3(a) (emphasis supplied).
    30
    49 C.F.R. § 387.1 (emphasis supplied).
    31
    49 C.F.R. § 387.7(a) (emphasis supplied).
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    3. Motor Carriers Can Satisfy Minimum
    Financial Responsibility Requirements
    Through Combination of Resources
    Importantly, Part 387, and the federal statute on which that
    regulation is based, 32 allows a motor carrier to meet its mini-
    mum financial responsibility through more than just a single
    insurance policy. The federal statute provides that a “motor
    carrier may obtain the required amount of financial respon-
    sibility from more than one source provided the cumulative
    amount is equal to the minimum requirements.” 33 Further, that
    federal statute generally authorizes financial responsibility to
    be established using “one or a combination of the following,”
    including insurance, a guarantee, a surety bond, or qualifi-
    cation as a self-insurer. 34 Part 387 similarly permits proof
    of the required level of financial responsibility to be shown
    through “[p]olicies of [i]nsurance,” surety bonds, or authorized
    self-insurance. 35
    The interpretation of Part 387 proposed by the appellant and
    the cross-appellants does not accommodate, and would require
    that we read out of the federal regulation altogether, those
    provisions allowing motor carriers to combine more than one
    policy, and use more than one method, to meet the minimum
    financial responsibility requirement under Part 387.
    4. Part 387 Does Not Require Insurers to Issue
    Policy With Liability Limits That Satisfy
    Motor Carrier’s Minimum Level of
    Financial Responsibility
    The appellant and the cross-appellants repeatedly character-
    ize the $100,000 liability limit in Shelter’s policy as illegal
    or unlawful under Part 387. The appellant relies on Steffen v.
    32
    See 49 U.S.C. § 31139 (2012).
    33
    49 U.S.C. § 31139(f)(3).
    34
    49 U.S.C. § 31139(f)(2).
    35
    49 C.F.R. § 387.7(d).
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    Progressive Northern Ins. Co. 36 to argue that Shelter should
    not be permitted to issue a policy containing less than the
    statutorily required coverage and to argue that the minimum
    financial responsibility requirements of Part 387 should be
    read into the Shelter policy. We find the appellant’s position in
    this regard contrary to the plain language of Part 387, and we
    find the appellant’s reliance on Steffen to be misplaced.
    It is true there are some Nebraska statutes which mandate
    the type and amount of coverage insurers must provide when
    issuing an automobile liability policy. For instance, Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 44-6408 (Reissue 2010) provides, “No policy
    insuring against liability imposed by law for bodily injury,
    sickness, disease, or death suffered by a natural person aris-
    ing out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of
    a motor vehicle . . . shall be delivered, issued for delivery,
    or renewed” unless it provides uninsured and underinsured
    motorist coverage with limits of $25,000 per person and
    $50,000 per accident. Similarly, other statutes within the
    Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage
    Act 37 (UUMICA) mandate definitions of an uninsured motor
    vehicle 38 and an underinsured motor vehicle, 39 list avail-
    able exclusions, 40 and address the priority of payment when
    multiple policies apply. 41 As such, the plain language of the
    UUMICA seeks to regulate the issuance of automobile insur-
    ance policies in Nebraska and places the burden of complying
    with certain statutory provisions directly on the insurer. For
    36
    Steffen v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 
    276 Neb. 378
    , 
    754 N.W.2d 730
         (2008) (insurers may not issue policies that carry terms and conditions less
    favorable to insured than those provided in Uninsured and Underinsured
    Motorist Insurance Coverage Act).
    37
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-6401 to 44-6414 (Reissue 2010).
    38
    See § 44-6405.
    39
    See § 44-6406.
    40
    See §§ 44-6407 and 44-6413.
    41
    See § 44-6411.
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    the sake of completeness, we note the Shelter policy included
    uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in limits higher
    than required by § 44-6408.
    As this court made clear in Steffen, insurers may not issue
    policies that carry terms and conditions less favorable to the
    insured than those provided in the UUMICA. 42 When the terms
    of such a policy are less favorable than the UUMICA requires,
    the UUMICA, and not the policy, will be controlling. 43
    But neither Steffen nor its reasoning apply here. Unlike the
    compulsory provisions of the UUMICA, § 75-363 and Part
    387 do not regulate the terms and conditions of insurance poli-
    cies; instead, their purpose is to regulate motor carriers. The
    plain language of § 75-363 applies only to motor carriers as
    defined in that statute, and the stated purpose of Part 387 is
    to “assure that motor carriers maintain an appropriate level of
    financial responsibility for motor vehicles operated on public
    highways.” 44 In construing a statute, a court must determine
    and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as
    ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered
    in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. 45
    [9] The district court correctly concluded that neither
    § 75-363 nor Part 387 require an insurer to issue a policy with
    liability limits that satisfy a motor carrier’s minimum level of
    financial responsibility.
    5. Declaratory Judgment
    Correctly Decided
    For the reasons set out above, we conclude the district
    court was correct in finding, as a matter of law, that Shelter
    was not required by the provisions of § 75-363 and Part 387
    to issue Gomez Trucking a policy with liability limits of at
    42
    Steffen, supra note 36.
    43
    See
    id. 44 49
    C.F.R. § 387.1.
    45
    Steffen, supra note 36.
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    least $750,000 and that the $100,000 liability limit in place
    at the time of the fatal collision was neither inconsistent with
    nor repugnant to Nebraska law. Our conclusion in this regard
    is compelled by the plain language of § 75-363 and Part 387,
    both of which place the burden of compliance on the motor
    carrier, and our reasoning is consistent with that of other courts
    to have considered similar questions. 46
    V. CONCLUSION
    Finding no merit to the assigned errors, we affirm the dis-
    trict court’s judgment.
    Affirmed.
    46
    See, e.g., Illinois Central R. Co. v. Dupont, 
    326 F.3d 665
    (5th Cir. 2003)
    (financial responsibility under Part 387 is directed at motor carrier and
    does not impose duty on insurer to make sure motor carrier complies
    with requirements); North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc.
    v. Armwood, 
    361 N.C. 576
    , 
    653 S.E.2d 392
    (2007) (reversing decision
    to reform commercial automobile insurance policy to reflect minimum
    liability limit of $750,000, reasoning federal motor carrier regulations
    place duty to provide minimum level of financial responsibility on motor
    carrier, not insurer); Howard v. Quality Xpress, Inc., 
    128 N.M. 79
    , 82, 
    989 P.2d 896
    , 899 (N.M. App. 1999) (“regulatory scheme [in Part 387] appears
    to place the burden of compliance with the compulsory insurance coverage
    requirements upon the motor carrier, not the insurer”).