Christensen v. Broken Bow Public Schools , 312 Neb. 814 ( 2022 )


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    11/18/2022 01:07 AM CST
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    312 Nebraska Reports
    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    Michael T. and Cathy D. Christensen, individually
    and as parents and next friends of Chad M.
    Christensen, and as Coguardians and
    Coconservators of Chad M. Christensen,
    a protected person, appellants and
    cross-appellees, v. Broken Bow Public Schools,
    also known as Broken Bow School District 25,
    a political subdivision of the State of Nebraska,
    defendant and third-party plaintiff, appellee
    and cross-appellant, and Beverly L. Sherbeck,
    Personal Representative of the Estate of
    Albert F. Sherbeck, deceased, third-party
    defendant, appellee and cross-appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed November 4, 2022.   No. S-21-885.
    1. Directed Verdict: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s rul-
    ing on a motion for directed verdict, an appellate court must treat the
    motion as an admission of the truth of all competent evidence submit-
    ted on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed; such
    being the case, the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled
    to have every controverted fact resolved in its favor and to have the
    benefit of every inference which can reasonably be deduced from
    the evidence.
    2. Statutes: Ordinances: Legislature: Intent: Torts: Liability. In deter-
    mining whether a statute or ordinance creates a duty, a court may deter-
    mine that a statute gives rise to a tort duty to act in the manner required
    by the statute where the statute is enacted to protect a class of persons
    which includes the plaintiff, the statute is intended to prevent the par-
    ticular injury that has been suffered, and the statute is intended by the
    Legislature to create a private liability as distinguished from one of a
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    312 Nebraska Reports
    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    public character. Consideration of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting
    a statute is central to the analysis of whether the statute defines a duty
    in tort and creates private civil liability.
    3.   Negligence: Proof: Statutes. The violation of a statute alone does not
    prove negligence.
    4.   Negligence: Proof: Probable Cause: Damages. A plaintiff in ordinary
    negligence must prove all four essential elements of the claim: the
    defendant’s duty not to injure the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proxi-
    mate causation, and damages.
    5.   Negligence: Proof. A cause of action for negligence depends not only
    upon the defendant’s breach of duty to exercise care to avoid injury to
    the plaintiff, but also depends upon a showing that the injury suffered
    by the plaintiff was caused by the alleged wrongful act or omission of
    the defendant.
    6.   Proximate Cause: Evidence. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6
    ,273 (Reissue 2021)
    explicitly makes all “[e]vidence that a person was not wearing an occu-
    pant protection system or a three-point safety belt system” inadmissible
    for the issue of proximate cause.
    7.   Statutes. Statutory text is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
    8.   Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not at liberty to add
    language to the plain terms of a statute to restrict its meaning.
    Appeal from the District Court for Custer County: Karin L.
    Noakes, Judge. Affirmed.
    David S. Houghton and Keith A. Harvat, of Houghton,
    Bradford & Whitted, P.C., L.L.O., and James V. Duncan and
    John O. Sennett, of Sennett, Duncan, Jenkins & Wickham,
    P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.
    Matthew B. Reilly and Thomas J. Culhane, of
    Erickson | Sederstrom, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee Broken Bow
    Public Schools.
    Jared J. Krejci, of Smith, Johnson, Allen, Connick & Hansen,
    for appellee Beverly L. Sherbeck.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    and Papik, JJ., and Stratman, District Judge.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    312 Nebraska Reports
    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    I. NATURE OF CASE
    Appellants, Michael T. and Cathy D. Christensen, brought
    this case in the district court for Custer County individually
    and as parents of their son, Chad M. Christensen, who was
    seriously injured when a Broken Bow Public Schools (BBPS)
    activities van in which he was a passenger was hit head on by
    a truck driven by Albert F. Sherbeck. Chad was not wearing a
    seatbelt. The Christensens separately sued Sherbeck’s widow,
    Beverly L. Sherbeck, as personal representative of Sherbeck’s
    estate (the Sherbeck estate) and the cases were consolidated.
    On remand from a memorandum opinion of the Nebraska
    Court of Appeals that reversed a directed verdict in favor of
    BBPS, the district court considered several additional argu-
    ments by BBPS. Following due consideration, the district
    court granted a directed verdict in favor of BBPS and against
    the Christensens, dismissed the Christensens’ complaint, and
    dismissed BBPS’ third-party complaint against the Sherbeck
    estate as moot. These rulings give rise to the instant appeal
    by the Christensens and the cross-appeals by BBPS and the
    Sherbeck estate.
    In its order directing a verdict in favor of BBPS, the dis-
    trict court stated, inter alia, that despite the provision in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6
    ,267(2) (Reissue 2021) that drivers ensure
    seatbelt use for children, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6
    ,269 (Reissue
    2021) “explicitly states, ‘violations of the provisions of sec-
    tions 60-6,267 . . . shall not constitute prima facie evidence
    of negligence.’” The district court noted that 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6
    ,273 (Reissue 2021) prohibits “using evidence that
    a person was not wearing a seatbelt to establish proximate
    cause” and in the absence of other admissible evidence of
    proximate cause, the Christensens’ claims failed and were dis-
    missed. Because we agree with the district court’s reading of
    the relevant statutes, we affirm its order of a directed verdict
    in favor of BBPS and in addition dismiss the cross-appeals
    as moot.
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    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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    312 Neb. 814
    II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
    1. The Collision
    On June 1, 2012, a BBPS activities van collided with
    a truck driven by Sherbeck. The van was driven by Zane
    Harvey, a high school basketball coach for BBPS. Another
    coach, Anthony Blum, and eight students, including Chad,
    were passengers in the van, which was returning from a
    summer basketball clinic in Kearney, Nebraska. Sherbeck’s
    vehicle crossed the centerline and collided head on with the
    van. Sherbeck, Harvey, and Blum died at the scene. The
    Christensens’ son, Chad, was riding in the van unrestrained by
    a seatbelt and was seriously injured. Chad was age 17 at the
    time of the accident.
    2. Procedural History
    The Christensens filed separate actions against BBPS and
    against Sherbeck’s widow, as personal representative of the
    Sherbeck estate. In the action against BBPS, the Christensens
    asserted five separate theories of recovery, including claims
    that (1) BBPS was negligent in its operation of the van and was
    negligent in its supervision of the students because it failed to
    ensure that students were wearing seatbelts and (2) BBPS vio-
    lated § 60-6,267(2), which provides:
    Any person in Nebraska who drives any motor vehicle
    which has or is required to have an occupant protection
    system or a three-point safety belt system shall ensure
    that all children eight years of age and less than eighteen
    years of age being transported by such vehicle use an
    occupant protection system.
    The district court consolidated the cases; the case against the
    Sherbeck estate was tried to a jury and the case against BBPS
    was tried to the court. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
    the Sherbeck estate on the Christensens’ claims against it. The
    Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in the case against the
    Sherbeck estate in Christensen v. Sherbeck, 
    28 Neb. App. 332
    ,
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    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    943 N.W.2d 460
     (2020), and we denied the Christensens’ peti-
    tion for further review.
    At the close of evidence in the Christensens’ case in chief
    against BBPS, BBPS moved for a directed verdict. The dis-
    trict court granted a directed verdict in favor of BBPS on
    the grounds that Sherbeck’s vehicle’s crossing the centerline
    constituted an efficient intervening cause that broke the causal
    connection between Chad’s injuries and any failure on the part
    of BBPS to ensure that Chad was wearing a seatbelt.
    The Christensens appealed, and the Court of Appeals
    reversed the district court’s decision to grant a directed verdict.
    See Christensen v. Broken Bow Public Schools, No. A-19-125,
    
    2020 WL 5785351
     (Neb. App. Sept. 29, 2020) (selected for
    posting to court website).
    The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred
    when it found, as a matter of law, that Sherbeck’s actions
    constituted an efficient intervening cause. For purposes of its
    analysis, the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that
    BBPS had a duty to ensure that Chad was wearing a seat-
    belt while riding in the school activities van. Based on that
    assumption, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose
    of such a duty would be to protect children in the event of
    any sort of traffic accident and that therefore, the potential
    for liability based on a violation of that duty did not rest on
    the foreseeability of the exact circumstances of the collision.
    The Court of Appeals concluded that because a head-on colli-
    sion between the van and another vehicle was the sort of harm
    against which a seatbelt was meant to protect, the collision
    could not, as a matter of law, constitute an efficient intervening
    cause to insulate BBPS from liability for failing to ensure that
    Chad was wearing a seatbelt. The Court of Appeals remanded
    the cause to the district court with directions to consider the
    other arguments BBPS made in its motion for directed ver-
    dict, and, if it rejected those other arguments, to proceed with
    BBPS’ presentation of evidence in its defense.
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    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    BBPS moved for rehearing and argued that the Court of
    Appeals should have addressed its alternative argument that
    § 60-6,269 precluded the Christensens from establishing a neg-
    ligence claim against BBPS based on the failure to ensure that
    Chad was wearing a seatbelt. The Court of Appeals denied the
    motion for rehearing, and we denied further review.
    3. District Court Order
    on Remand
    Upon remand, the district court, as directed by the Court of
    Appeals, considered BBPS’ other arguments for directed ver-
    dict. The district court rejected BBPS’ argument that Harvey’s
    and Blum’s actions related to the trip in the van were outside
    the scope of their employment with BBPS because, as asserted
    by BBPS, the trip occurred during the summer, which was out-
    side the period of their teaching/coaching contracts. The court
    reasoned that although their work was gratuitously provided
    outside the time of their contracts, it was within the scope of
    their employment, and that BBPS was not relieved of liability
    on that basis.
    The district court then considered BBPS’ argument regard-
    ing the effect of § 60-6,269. The district court noted that
    § 60-6,269 “explicitly states, ‘violations of the provisions of
    sections 60-6,267 and 60-6,268 shall not constitute prima facie
    evidence of negligence.’” The court determined that given
    the language of § 60-6,269, the Christensens’ claim based on
    violation of § 60-6,267 must fail, and that BBPS’ motion for
    directed verdict should be granted.
    In its analysis, the district court noted that there was no
    evidence that the actions of Harvey and Blum were deficient
    in any way other than failing to ensure that the students were
    wearing seatbelts. In considering the evidence of the elements
    of the Chistensens’ negligence claim, the court noted the provi-
    sions of § 60-6,273, which state:
    Evidence that a person was not wearing an occupant
    protection system or a three-point safety belt system at
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    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    the time he or she was injured shall not be admissible in
    regard to the issue of liability or proximate cause but may
    be admissible as evidence concerning mitigation of dam-
    ages, except that it shall not reduce recovery for damages
    by more than five percent.
    The court stated that the plain language of § 60-6,273
    “prohibits using evidence that a person was not wearing a
    seatbelt to establish proximate cause” and that it also “clearly
    prohibits evidence of non-use in regard to liability.” The
    court determined that because § 60-6,273 “does not allow
    evidence of non-use of a seatbelt to prove liability or proxi-
    mate cause” and because the Christensens presented no other
    evidence of proximate cause, their various claims for negli-
    gence must fail.
    Having determined that the Christensens had not presented
    evidence to support their claims, the court dismissed all of
    the Christensens’ claims against BBPS. The court later denied
    the Christensens’ motion for a new trial and dismissed BBPS’
    third-party complaint against the Sherbeck estate as moot.
    The Christensens appeal, and BBPS and the Sherbeck estate
    cross-appeal.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The Christensens claim, summarized and restated, that
    the district court erred when it interpreted §§ 60-6,269 and
    60-6,273 to preclude their claims against BBPS and determined
    that they had not presented evidence other than nonuse of seat-
    belts to support their claims.
    In its cross-appeal, BBPS claims, restated, that the district
    court erred when it found that BBPS employed Harvey and
    Blum on the date of the collision, and BBPS also asserts that it
    was entitled to summary judgment on various defenses, includ-
    ing assumption of risk and contributory negligence.
    In its cross-appeal, the Sherbeck estate contends that all
    claims against it in this case are barred by issue preclusion and
    the law-of-the-case doctrine.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
    directed verdict, an appellate court must treat the motion as an
    admission of the truth of all competent evidence submitted on
    behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed; such
    being the case, the party against whom the motion is directed
    is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in its favor
    and to have the benefit of every inference which can reason-
    ably be deduced from the evidence. de Vries v. L & L Custom
    Builders, 
    310 Neb. 543
    , 
    968 N.W.2d 64
     (2021).
    V. ANALYSIS
    The Christensens claim that the district court erred when
    it granted a directed verdict and dismissed all of their claims
    against BBPS. We conclude that through Nebraska’s statutes
    addressing civil litigation and seatbelt use, the Legislature
    has determined the legal significance of seatbelt nonuse and
    specifically did not intend for evidence of seatbelt nonuse to
    be admissible to show proximate cause and create civil liabil-
    ity. As we explain below and given the record, we affirm the
    order of the district court, which directed a verdict in favor of
    BBPS. Consequently, the cross-appeals filed by BBPS and the
    Sherbeck estate are moot.
    1. Relevant Statutes
    We begin by setting forth the statutes relevant to our analy-
    sis. Section 60-6,267(2) describes a driver’s responsibility to
    ensure seatbelt use by children. It provides:
    Any person in Nebraska who drives any motor vehicle
    which has or is required to have an occupant protection
    system or a three-point safety belt system shall ensure
    that all children eight years of age and less than eighteen
    years of age being transported by such vehicle use an
    occupant protection system.
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6
    ,268 (Reissue 2021) makes it an
    infraction to violate subsections (1) or (2) of § 60-6,267 and
    provides for a monetary fine.
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    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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    312 Neb. 814
    Section 60-6,269 provides for the legal significance of viola-
    tions and compliance with seatbelt usage and states:
    Violations of the provisions of sections 60-6,267 and
    60-6,268 shall not constitute prima facie evidence of neg-
    ligence nor shall compliance with such sections constitute
    a defense to any claim for personal injuries to a child or
    recovery of medical expenses for injuries sustained in
    any motor vehicle accident. Violation of such sections by
    a driver shall not constitute a defense for another person
    to any claim for personal injuries to a child or recovery
    of medical expenses for injuries sustained in any motor
    vehicle accident.
    Critical to our analysis is the evidentiary rule set forth in
    § 60-6,273:
    Evidence that a person was not wearing an occupant
    protection system or a three-point safety belt system at
    the time he or she was injured shall not be admissible in
    regard to the issue of liability or proximate cause but may
    be admissible as evidence concerning mitigation of dam-
    ages, except that it shall not reduce recovery for damages
    by more than five percent.
    2. Christensens’ Claims Against BBPS
    Many of the Christensens’ arguments are based on their
    linguistic examination of the statutory framework set forth
    above that they contend distinguishes between seatbelt use by
    adults, which is inadmissible in regard to liability or proximate
    cause, and seatbelt use by children, which they contend may be
    admitted to demonstrate the negligence of a driver who fails to
    secure them. As we explain below, we reject these arguments.
    Reading the statutes in harmony, we conclude that a driver’s
    violation of a seatbelt statute does not form a prima facie case
    of his or her negligence and that such evidence is inadmis-
    sible on the issue of liability or proximate cause predicated
    on seatbelt nonuse, including a claim on behalf of a child for
    personal injuries.
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    CHRISTENSEN V. BROKEN BOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 814
    (a) Breach of a Statutory “Duty” and
    Evidence of Proximate Cause
    The Christensens assert that §§ 60-6,269 and 60-6,273 apply
    only to seatbelt use by adults. They further contend that by
    not securing a child, a driver has violated § 60-6,267(2) and
    has thereby breached his or her duty to protect children from
    collisions. That is, the Chistensens claim that failure to com-
    ply with § 60-6,267(2) in and of itself forms the basis for a
    breach of a statutory duty for purposes of negligence. The
    Christensens contend that the policy goals of the Legislature
    are tailored to protect an accident victim and not to protect a
    driver who broke a child safety law from being held account-
    able in civil court by the parents of an injured child.
    [2] In determining whether a statute or ordinance creates
    a duty, a court may determine that a statute gives rise to a
    tort duty to act in the manner required by the statute where
    the statute is enacted to protect a class of persons which
    includes the plaintiff, the statute is intended to prevent the
    particular injury that has been suffered, and the statute is
    intended by the Legislature to create a private liability as
    distinguished from one of a public character. Stonacek v. City
    of Lincoln, 
    279 Neb. 869
    , 
    782 N.W.2d 900
     (2010) (quoting
    Claypool v. Hibberd, 
    261 Neb. 818
    , 
    626 N.W.2d 539
     (2001)).
    Consideration of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting a stat-
    ute is central to the analysis of whether the statute defines a
    duty in tort and creates private civil liability. Stonacek v. City
    of Lincoln, 
    supra.
    We conclude that the plain statutory language does not sup-
    port the Christensens’ theory of the Legislature’s intention.
    The provision in § 60-6,269 that a violation of § 60-6,267
    “shall not constitute prima facie evidence of negligence” is
    antithetical to the prosecution of a negligence case based on a
    driver’s failure to secure a child. The Legislature’s inclusion
    of § 60-6,269 shows that the purpose of the statutory scheme
    was decidedly not to create private civil liability.
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    [3-5] Even if BBPS’ violation of § 60-6,267 breached a
    statutory duty to ensure Chad was using an occupant protection
    system, it is fundamental that the violation of a statute alone
    does not prove negligence. A plaintiff in ordinary negligence
    must prove all four essential elements of the claim: the defend­
    ant’s duty not to injure the plaintiff, a breach of that duty,
    proximate causation, and damages. Susman v. Kearney Towing
    & Repair Ctr., 
    310 Neb. 910
    , 
    970 N.W.2d 82
     (2022). A cause
    of action for negligence depends not only upon the defendant’s
    breach of duty to exercise care to avoid injury to the plaintiff,
    but also depends upon a showing that the injury suffered by
    the plaintiff was caused by the alleged wrongful act or omis-
    sion of the defendant. 
    Id.
     In Susman, we recently recalled one
    of our earliest negligence cases, which stated: “‘“The cause
    of action in any case embraces not only the injury which the
    complaining party has received, but it includes more. All the
    facts which, taken together, are necessary to fix the responsi-
    bility are parts of the cause of action.”’” 310 Neb. at 921, 970
    N.W.2d at 91 (quoting Westover v. Hoover, 
    94 Neb. 596
    , 
    143 N.W. 946
     (1913)).
    [6-8] Even assuming that the violation of § 60-6,267
    breached a duty of care, there is no admissible evidence that
    violation of the child seatbelt requirement proximately caused
    Chad’s injuries. To the contrary, § 60-6,273 explicitly makes
    all “[e]vidence that a person was not wearing an occupant
    protection system or a three-point safety belt system” inad-
    missible for the issue of proximate cause. Statutory text is to
    be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Dutcher v. Nebraska
    Dept. of Corr. Servs., ante p. 405, 
    979 N.W.2d 245
     (2022). An
    appellate court is not at liberty to add language to the plain
    terms of a statute to restrict its meaning. 
    Id.
     The Legislature
    has dictated that seatbelt nonuse is excluded on the issue of
    proximate cause.
    The Christensens urge us to factor in Chad’s age as a
    child into our statutory analysis. This argument is unavailing.
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    We are aware that the Legislature imposed a fine on drivers
    who fail to secure children in their vehicles. See § 60-6,268.
    However, it did not distinguish the age or status of the “per-
    son” without the seatbelt when setting forth the evidentiary
    rule in § 60-6,273. According to the Legislature, all nonuse
    evidence is inadmissible regarding proximate cause. Id. We
    are not inclined to add language regarding age to change the
    statute’s exclusionary plain meaning. See id. Indeed, we have
    explained in the past that given the language of § 60-6,273,
    evidence of seatbelt nonuse is admissible only for mitigation
    of damages. Werner v. County of Platte, 
    284 Neb. 899
    , 
    824 N.W.2d 38
     (2012); Fickle v. State, 
    273 Neb. 990
    , 
    735 N.W.2d 754
     (2007), modified on denial of rehearing 
    274 Neb. 267
    ,
    
    759 N.W.2d 113
    .
    In this case, aside from the failure to ensure Chad was
    restrained by a seatbelt in the activities van, there was no evi-
    dence that Harvey’s or Blum’s actions were deficient. Without
    the seatbelt evidence, the Christensens’ claims based on BBPS’
    violation of § 60-6,267, or even a purported breach of a statu-
    tory duty based in § 60-6,267, were properly dismissed. We
    find no error in the directed verdict in favor of BBPS.
    (b) Evidence of BBPS’ Negligent
    Supervision of Students
    The Christensens attempt to circumvent §§ 60-6,267 and
    60-6,269 by arguing that seatbelt nonuse by a student could
    be direct evidence that the school breached its duty to exer-
    cise reasonable care under the circumstances. We reject this
    argument.
    The circumstances of this case are unrestrained children in
    a van which was hit head on by a truck. Evidence of a per-
    son’s seatbelt nonuse is inadmissible for the issue of “liability
    or proximate cause.” § 60-6,273. The district court prop-
    erly excluded evidence of seatbelt nonuse. See § 60-6,273.
    Without evidence of seatbelt nonuse, which evidence was
    essential to the claim of negligent supervision, but which
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    was properly excluded, the Christensens’ evidence failed
    to show proximate cause. Taking every controverted fact
    resolved in the Christensens’ favor and giving them the ben-
    efit of every inference which can reasonably be deduced from
    the admissible evidence, we agree with the district court that
    the Christensens failed to show that BBPS caused Chad’s
    injuries. We find no error in the directed verdict in favor
    of BBPS.
    3. Cross-Appeals and BBPS’ Third-Party
    Complaint Against Sherbeck Estate
    In view of our disposition affirming the directed verdict in
    favor of BBPS, we determine that the district court correctly
    dismissed as moot BBPS’ third-party complaint against the
    Sherbeck estate.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons explained above, we affirm the order of the
    district court that directed the verdict in favor of BBPS and
    dismissed the Christensens’ claims against BBPS. The issues
    raised by the cross-appeals filed by BBPS and the Sherbeck
    estate are now moot or without merit, and we decline to reach
    them. See In re Maint. Fund of Sunset Mem. Park Chapel, 
    302 Neb. 954
    , 
    925 N.W.2d 695
     (2019).
    Affirmed.
    Freudenberg, J., not participating.