In re Interest of Audrey T. , 26 Neb. Ct. App. 822 ( 2019 )


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    IN RE INTEREST OF AUDREY T.
    Cite as 
    26 Neb. App. 822
    In   re I nterest ofAudrey T., a child
    under 18 years of age.
    State v. Nebraska, appellee,
    v. Sabra T., appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed January 29, 2019.    No. A-17-1308.
    1.	 Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juve-
    nile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions indepen-
    dently of the juvenile court’s findings.
    2.	 Parental Rights: Proof. The bases for termination of parental rights
    are codified in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292
     (Reissue 2016). Section 43-292
    provides 11 separate conditions, any one of which can serve as the basis
    for the termination of parental rights when coupled with evidence that
    termination is in the best interests of the child.
    3.	 Parental Rights: Evidence: Appeal and Error. If an appellate court
    determines that the lower court correctly found that termination of
    parental rights is appropriate under one of the statutory grounds set forth
    in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292
     (Reissue 2016), the appellate court need not
    further address the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination
    under any other statutory ground.
    4.	 Indian Child Welfare Act: Parental Rights: Proof: Expert Witnesses.
    To terminate parental rights, the State must prove by clear and con-
    vincing evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds listed in
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292
     (Reissue 2016) have been satisfied and that
    termination is in the child’s best interests. The Nebraska Indian Child
    Welfare Act adds two additional elements the State must prove before
    terminating parental rights in cases involving Indian children. First, the
    State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that active efforts
    have been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that
    these efforts have proved unsuccessful. Second, the State must prove by
    evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified
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    expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent
    or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
    damage to the child.
    5.	 ____: ____: ____: ____. Pursuant to the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare
    Act, before a court may terminate a parent’s rights to their child or
    children, the State must prove by evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
    custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
    in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. This evidence must
    be established by qualified expert testimony provided by a professional
    person having substantial education and experience in the area of his or
    her specialty.
    6.	 ____: ____: ____: ____. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1505
    (6) (Reissue 2016)
    requires that the qualified expert’s opinion must support the ultimate
    finding of the court, i.e., that continued custody by the parent will likely
    result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
    7.	 Parental Rights: Proof. Once a statutory basis for termination has been
    proved, the next inquiry is whether termination is in the child’s best
    interests.
    8.	 Parental Rights. When a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate
    himself or herself within a reasonable period of time, the child’s best
    interests require termination of parental rights.
    9.	 ____. Children cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care or be
    made to await uncertain parental maturity.
    10.	 Indian Child Welfare Act: Parental Rights: Proof: Notice. The stated
    purposes of the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act are best served by
    allowing parents to raise, in their direct appeal from a termination of
    parental rights, the issue of the State’s failure to notify the child’s Indian
    tribe of the termination of parental rights proceedings.
    Appeal from the County Court for Scotts Bluff County:
    James M. Worden, Judge. Affirmed.
    Bernard J. Straetker, Scotts Bluff County Public Defender,
    for appellant.
    Danielle Larson, Deputy Scotts Bluff County Attorney, for
    appellee.
    Pirtle, R iedmann, and Welch, Judges.
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    IN RE INTEREST OF AUDREY T.
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    Welch, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Sabra T., the biological mother of Audrey T., appeals the
    termination of her parental rights. She contends that the Scotts
    Bluff County Court, sitting in its capacity as a juvenile court,
    erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292
    (2), (5), (6), and (7) (Reissue 2016) and finding
    that termination was in Audrey’s best interests. Sabra further
    contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt, as required by the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act
    (NICWA), 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1501
     to 43-1517 (Reissue
    2016), through qualified expert witness testimony, that the
    continued custody of Audrey by Sabra was likely to result in
    serious emotional or physical damage to Audrey. Finally, Sabra
    contends that the State failed to provide proper notice to the
    Oglala Sioux Tribe in violation of NICWA. For the reasons set
    forth herein, we affirm the order terminating Sabra’s paren-
    tal rights.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Sabra is the biological mother of Audrey, who was born in
    August 2013. Because Audrey is an enrolled member of the
    Oglala Sioux Tribe, NICWA applies to this case.
    On January 5, 2016, the State filed an adjudication peti-
    tion alleging that Audrey was a child within the meaning of
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (3)(a) (Supp. 2015) for the reason
    that she lacked proper parental care by reason of the fault
    or habits of Sabra. Specifically, the State alleged Sabra was
    unable to meet Audrey’s basic needs for care and protec-
    tion, Sabra uses inappropriate discipline, and Sabra’s mental
    health issues put Audrey at risk of abuse and/or neglect. The
    petition further alleged that NICWA was applicable because
    Audrey was of Native American heritage. That same day, the
    court entered an order placing temporary custody of Audrey
    with Nebraska’s Department of Health and Human Services
    (DHHS), and Audrey was removed from Sabra’s home. Audrey
    has consistently been a ward of the State since that time.
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    On March 11, 2016, the court entered an order adjudicating
    Audrey as a child within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a). The
    court found the State had met its burden, by a preponderance
    of the evidence, that Sabra was unable to meet Audrey’s basic
    needs for care and protection and that her mental health issues
    put Audrey at risk of harm. The court further found that active
    efforts had been made by the State to “prevent the breakup of
    the Native American family,” including family support, food
    vouchers, transportation, parenting classes, and case manage-
    ment; that the child would experience serious emotional or
    physical damage if left in the family home; that court place-
    ment was with a family member and was “ICWA compliant”;
    and that the court’s “findings related to ICWA are supported by
    the testimony of an ICWA expert.”
    The State filed a motion to terminate Sabra’s parental rights
    on July 31, 2017, alleging that termination was appropriate
    pursuant to § 43-292(2), (5), (6), and (7) and that termination
    was in Audrey’s best interests. The termination motion also
    again set forth that NICWA was applicable to this case. The
    termination hearing was held on September 27 and concluded
    on October 27. The State adduced testimony from psychologist
    Dr. Gage Stermensky, mental health therapist Sarah Bernhardt,
    a youth transition support worker, Audrey’s aunt, DHHS child
    and family service specialist Cassie Beasant, and Theresa
    Stands. Sabra testified in her own behalf.
    The youth transition support worker testified that Sabra,
    who was born in 1994, has been in the youth transition sup-
    port program since March 2016. The youth transition sup-
    port program assists youth from 16 to 25 years old that
    have been diagnosed with mental illness and/or substance
    abuse to transition into adulthood by providing assistance
    in various areas such as housing, transportation, budgeting,
    finances, employment, vocational rehabilitation, and educa-
    tion. While in the program, Sabra has been receiving services
    specific to budgeting, forming healthy relationships, parent-
    ing techniques, and vocational rehabilitation. According to
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    the support worker, Sabra, who suffers from mental illness,
    struggles primarily in the areas of scheduling and engaging in
    healthy relationships.
    In April 2016, Audrey and Sabra were referred to Bernhardt
    for child-parent psychotherapy. Bernhardt explained that child-
    parent psychotherapy is for children up to age 5 and “is an
    attachment-focused intervention, a therapy that is intended to
    treat a relationship between a caregiver and a child, particularly
    when there’s been a trauma that has been experienced that has
    impacted their relationship.” Bernhardt testified that Sabra’s
    attendance at therapy was inconsistent: Bernhardt had a total
    of 25 visits with Sabra, 19 of which included Audrey, with
    16 missed visits. Bernhardt testified that Audrey “knows her
    mother,” they have a positive relationship, and there is a con-
    nection between them.
    Beasant testified that she became the caseworker for this
    case at the end of November 2016 and that she remained
    the caseworker at the time of the termination hearing. When
    Beasant was assigned the case, Sabra was living in an apart-
    ment and was working at a bakery. Beasant testified that for
    a period of time, Sabra was having some unsupervised visits
    with Audrey in her apartment, but that ended in December
    2016 after family support workers found unsafe individ­uals
    present with Audrey and Sabra during a drop-in visit. These
    “unsafe individuals” were people known to Beasant as meth-
    amphetamine users, individuals who were in treatment for
    alcoholism, or individuals who had their parental rights ter-
    minated to their own children. Sabra regained unsupervised
    visits between March and April 2017, but these unsupervised
    visits ended in August 2017 after Audrey alleged that an
    individual who lived at her foster home had sexually abused
    her. Audrey later recanted this accusation and said that Sabra
    had told her to make the accusation. Sabra had not regained
    unsupervised visits since that time. Further, to Beasant’s
    knowledge, Sabra’s visits with Audrey never included over-
    night visits.
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    Beasant testified that none of Sabra’s goals have changed
    in any of the case plans prepared by DHHS. She clarified this
    testimony by stating that in the original case plan, the priority
    goals for Sabra were for safe and stable housing, a legal means
    of income, and safe parenting. According to Beasant, although
    Sabra has had the same original goals throughout the entire
    case, there have been periods of time where Sabra does very
    well with her goals, but “it doesn’t last long and we’re back-
    sliding again.” Some examples of this “backsliding” were that
    there were periods of time, from a couple of weeks to a month
    at a time, where Sabra would not miss work; would attend
    all of her visits; would make nutritious, homemade meals for
    Audrey; and would do activities with Audrey; however, Sabra
    would not sustain that progress, and during unsupervised visits,
    she would have unsafe individuals around Audrey.
    Beasant explained that the permanency plan was changed to
    a goal of guardianship in April 2017. This change in the perma-
    nency goal was made, in part, at Sabra’s request, so she would
    have more time to become “a more suitable parent” and gain
    more skills, including recognizing “red flags” in relationships
    and having appropriate “informal supports.” Sabra wanted “to
    slow down the pace so that she wasn’t overwhelmed.” Even
    after Sabra had asked for more time to work on her case plan
    goals, she failed to make progress on them. Beasant explained,
    “It seemed to be at a standstill, plateaued, if you will, as to our
    progress that was being made. There was no consistency in
    therapy with Audrey, building those relationships, working on
    her parenting skills.”
    In part due to Sabra’s lack of progress, in July 2017, the
    permanency plan goal was changed to adoption. The rea-
    sons for DHHS’ recommendation that the goal be changed
    to adoption included Sabra’s lack of progress during the 22
    months the case had been open, the length of time the case
    had been open, and Sabra’s failure to show any sustainable
    progress. Beasant further testified that DHHS’ view is that it
    is in Audrey’s best interests for Sabra’s parental rights to be
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    terminated, because “Audrey is doing very well where she’s at
    and excelling . . . .”
    Stermensky testified that at DHHS’ request, he completed
    a parental capacity evaluation of Sabra in 2016, which eval­
    uation was received into evidence as an exhibit. According
    to Stermensky:
    The main goal for any child welfare capacity evaluation is
    to determine the ability for a parent to meet their child’s
    welfare needs. And if they have displayed they can’t meet
    those needs, why, [and are] there any types of processes
    or treatment we can find to help get them to a point where
    they’re able to fulfill those needs.
    His diagnostic impressions for Sabra included schizophrenia
    and post-traumatic stress disorder. Further, he testified that
    within a reasonable degree of “psychologic certainty,” Sabra
    did not appear to have the capacity to meet Audrey’s health
    and welfare needs; however, he opined that if Sabra was able
    to get longer-term treatment with medication compliance, the
    issue could be revisited. Stermensky based his opinion on
    Sabra’s denial and minimization of her severe psychotic disor-
    der and noncompliance with medications which placed her “at
    risk for decompensation,” as well as placing Audrey at risk.
    Stermensky explained that decompensation, as it pertained to
    Sabra, meant “[s]ymptom amplification,” including disorga-
    nized behavior, hallucinations, and delusions. Stermensky’s
    recommendation for Sabra was for long-term treatment and
    medication management.
    The State’s evidence from Stands was admitted via deposi-
    tion testimony received into evidence as an exhibit. Stands has
    been an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe since she
    was born and has raised her children in the tribal traditions.
    Additionally, for 36 years, Stands worked for the Scottsbluff
    Public Schools in the “Title 7, Indian education” program.
    Stands testified she worked for the parent committee and her
    job was “to be advocate for Native American students and their
    families between the home and the school” and she “was also
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    an advocate for the schools to try to help them culturally with
    the Native American families.” Stands also worked with native
    dance groups, set up a Lakota language class, and assisted with
    powwows. Stands testified that based upon her training, work
    experience, and her tribal membership, she is familiar with the
    values the Oglala Sioux Tribe places on its children. According
    to Stands, the tribe places a very high value on its children,
    stating that the children are provided “respect, generosity, our
    children are always considered sacred. So we take care of them
    and try to raise them by not just verbally but by living our lives
    so that they can do the right things.”
    Stands familiarized herself with Audrey’s case by review-
    ing the case file, which included the DHHS case plan and
    court reports, as well as the court’s journal entries and orders
    and documentation sent to the Oglala Sioux Tribe, guardian
    ad litem reports, and evaluations. Stands testified that based
    on her knowledge as an “expert witness in an ICWA case,”
    the State had made the following active efforts in this case:
    providing support for Audrey and Sabra, including physical
    support, housing, food, therapy, counseling, and transporta-
    tion. Further, based upon Stand’s review of the file in this
    case, it was her understanding that Audrey had ended up in
    the State’s care and custody because Sabra “was not mentally
    and emotionally able to care for her and Audrey may have
    been put in a place where she could have been neglected.”
    Specifically, she identified Sabra’s lack of knowledge of
    how to cook for Audrey, how to take care of her, or how to
    discipline her, as evidenced by one report that Sabra had dis-
    ciplined Audrey by “duct tap[ing] her in a car seat.” Stands
    opined that Sabra would make improvements in the case,
    but that she was not emotionally or mentally stable enough
    to maintain those improvements. She further testified that if
    the State “were to just walk away” from the case, it “was a
    possibility” that Audrey “would face emotional or physical
    damage” if left with Sabra due to Sabra’s mental state, which
    had been described as “being depressed [and] overwhelmed,
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    having anxiety, [and] not being able to really provide for
    [Sabra’s] own needs.”
    Sabra testified that she had been living in a two-bedroom
    apartment since the end of July 2017 and that she had been
    working part time at a fast-food restaurant for a little over 2
    months. Sabra also receives Social Security benefits for mental
    health illness and has someone to help her manage her money.
    She testified that she is not a “bad parent,” but, rather, she is
    just a “first-time parent,” and that Audrey benefits from having
    a continued relationship with her.
    In an order filed on December 8, 2017, the court terminated
    Sabra’s parental rights pursuant to § 43-292(2), (5), (6), and
    (7) and found that termination was in Audrey’s best interests.
    The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence,
    that active efforts had been made to provide remedial services
    and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of
    the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful as
    to Sabra. The court further found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    based upon the evidence at trial, including Stands’ opinion
    testimony, that Audrey’s continued custody or placement with
    Sabra was likely to result in serious emotional or physical dam-
    age. The court specifically found that Sabra’s “mental health,
    parenting style, dangerous associations, and inconsistency
    would place Audrey in great danger if Sabra was the custodial
    parent and the case closed.”
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Sabra assigns as error that the court erred in terminating
    her parental rights pursuant to § 43-292(2), (5), (6), and (7).
    Sabra further contends that the State failed to prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt, as required by NICWA, through quali-
    fied expert witness testimony, that the continued custody of
    Audrey by Sabra was likely to result in serious emotional or
    physical damage to Audrey. She also contends that the court
    erred in finding that termination was in Audrey’s best interests.
    Finally, Sabra contends that the State failed to provide proper
    notice to the Oglala Sioux Tribe in violation of NICWA.
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    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the
    record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juve-
    nile court’s findings. In re Interest of Giavonna G., 
    23 Neb. App. 853
    , 
    876 N.W.2d 422
     (2016).
    ANALYSIS
    Statutory Grounds for Termination
    Sabra first contends that the court erred in terminating
    her parental rights based upon its findings that the State had
    established by clear and convincing evidence that she had
    substantially and continuously neglected to give Audrey nec-
    essary parental care and protection (§ 43-292(2)), that Sabra
    was unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of
    mental illness or mental deficiency and there are reasonable
    grounds to believe that such condition will continue for a
    prolonged indeterminate period (§ 43-292(5)), that reasonable
    efforts failed to correct the condition which led to the adjudi-
    cation (§ 43-292(6)), and that Audrey had been in an out-of-
    home placement for 15 or more of the most recent 22 months
    (§ 43-292(7)).
    [2] The bases for termination of parental rights are codified
    in § 43-292. Section 43-292 provides 11 separate conditions,
    any one of which can serve as the basis for the termination
    of parental rights when coupled with evidence that termina-
    tion is in the best interests of the child. In re Interest of Sir
    Messiah T. et al., 
    279 Neb. 900
    , 
    782 N.W.2d 320
     (2010).
    Under § 43-292(7), grounds exist to terminate parental rights if
    a “juvenile has been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen or
    more months of the most recent twenty-two months.”
    The record establishes that Audrey was removed from
    parental care on January 5, 2016, and has not been returned
    to parental care since that time. As such, at the time the State
    filed its motion to terminate Sabra’s parental rights on July
    31, 2017, Audrey had been in an out-of-home placement for
    18 months. By the time the termination hearing began in
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    September, Audrey had been in an out-of-home placement for
    20 months. Thus, our de novo review of the record clearly
    and convincingly shows that Audrey had been in an out-of-
    home placement for 15 of the most recent 22 months and
    that grounds for termination of Sabra’s parental rights under
    § 43-292(7) were proved by sufficient evidence.
    [3] If an appellate court determines that the lower court
    correctly found that termination of parental rights is appropri-
    ate under one of the statutory grounds set forth in § 43-292,
    the appellate court need not further address the sufficiency
    of the evidence to support termination under any other statu-
    tory ground. In re Interest of Chloe C., 
    20 Neb. App. 787
    ,
    
    835 N.W.2d 758
     (2013). Having determined that termination
    of Sabra’s parental rights was proper pursuant to § 43-292(7),
    we need not consider whether termination was also appropriate
    under § 43-292(2), (5), or (6).
    Qualified Expert Testimony
    [4] To terminate parental rights, the State must prove by
    clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the statu-
    tory grounds listed in § 43-292 have been satisfied and that
    termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Interest of
    Walter W., 
    274 Neb. 859
    , 
    744 N.W.2d 55
     (2008). NICWA adds
    two additional elements the State must prove before terminat-
    ing parental rights in cases involving Indian children. 
    Id.
     First,
    the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
    active efforts have been made to prevent the breakup of the
    Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
    See § 43-1505(4). See, also, In re Interest of Walter W., 
    supra.
    Second, the State must prove by evidence beyond a reason-
    able doubt, “including testimony of qualified expert witnesses,
    that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
    custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
    damage to the child.” See § 43-1505(6).
    We note that although Sabra has not assigned any error with
    respect to the court’s findings that the State proved by clear
    and convincing evidence that active efforts had been made
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    to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those
    efforts were unsuccessful, we have reviewed the record and
    find no plain error as it relates to that element. Thus, we turn
    to Sabra’s specific alleged error that the State failed to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by NICWA, through
    qualified expert witness testimony, that the continued custody
    of Audrey by Sabra was likely to result in “serious emotional
    or physical damage” to Audrey.
    [5] Pursuant to NICWA, before a court may terminate a
    parent’s rights to their child or children, the State must prove
    by evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, “including testi-
    mony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody
    of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
    result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”
    § 43-1505(6). This evidence must be established by qualified
    expert testimony provided by a professional person having
    substantial education and experience in the area of his or her
    specialty. In re Interest of Shayla H. et al., 
    17 Neb. App. 436
    ,
    
    764 N.W.2d 119
     (2009).
    In this case, Sabra does not argue that Stands was not a qual-
    ified expert; she argues only that Stands’ opinion—that there
    “was a possibility” that Audrey would face emotional or physi-
    cal damage if left with Sabra—did not meet the State’s bur-
    den of proving this issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Sabra’s
    argument calls into question what testimony is required from
    a qualified expert as mandated by § 43-1505(6). We construe
    Sabra’s argument to be that the qualified expert’s testimony
    must establish that continued custody of the child by the parent
    is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
    the child beyond a reasonable doubt.
    A similar argument was propounded in In re M.F., 
    290 Kan. 142
    , 
    225 P.3d 1177
     (2010). In reviewing a federal statute
    which contains language identical to § 43-1505(6), the Kansas
    Supreme Court wrote:
    The GAL also takes issue with the Court of Appeals’
    statement that the qualified expert must “testify that
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    evidence existed to support the State’s burden under the
    ICWA.” In re M.F., 41 Kan.App.2d at 935, 
    206 P.3d 57
    .
    The GAL interprets this statement to mean that a quali-
    fied expert must offer a specific opinion as to whether
    or not the State’s evidence meets the burden of proof.
    It seems, rather, that the Court of Appeals’ statement is
    merely a reiteration of the ICWA standard that a decision
    to terminate parental rights must be based on “evidence
    beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of quali-
    fied expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the
    child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
    in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    (f). The expert need not opine on the ulti-
    mate issue of whether the State met its burden of proof.
    But the expert’s opinion must support the ultimate finding
    of the district court that continued custody by the parent
    will result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
    child. See, e.g., Marcia V., 201 P.3d at 506; Steven H. v.
    DES, 
    218 Ariz. 566
    , 572, 
    190 P.3d 180
     (2008); State ex
    rel. SOSCF v. Lucas, 
    177 Or.App. 318
    , 326, 
    33 P.3d 1001
    (2001), rev. denied 
    333 Or. 567
    , 
    42 P.3d 1245
     (2002).
    In re M.F., 290 Kan. at 155-56, 
    225 P.3d at 1186
    . See 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    (f) (2012).
    [6] We, likewise, construe § 43-1505(6) to require that the
    qualified expert’s opinion must support the ultimate find-
    ing of the court, i.e., that continued custody by the parent
    will likely result in serious emotional or physical damage
    to the child. This is consistent with the Nebraska Supreme
    Court’s holding in In re Interest of C.W. et al., 
    239 Neb. 817
    ,
    823-24, 
    479 N.W.2d 105
    , 111 (1992), overruled on other
    grounds, In re Interest of Zylena R. & Adrionna R., 
    284 Neb. 834
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 173
     (2012), wherein the Nebraska Supreme
    Court set forth the standard for qualified expert testimony in
    ICWA cases:
    Pursuant to the ICWA, qualified expert testimony is
    required in a parental rights termination case on the issue
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    of whether serious harm to the Indian child is likely
    to occur if the child is not removed from the home.
    See Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody
    Proceedings, 
    44 Fed. Reg. 67,584
    , 67,593 (1979) (not
    codified).
    To the extent Sabra is arguing there was inadequate opinion
    testimony from a qualified expert to support the ultimate find-
    ing of the county court that continued custody by Sabra is
    likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
    child, we disagree.
    Sabra argues that Stands’ opinion—that there “was a pos-
    sibility” that Audrey would face emotional or physical damage
    if left with Sabra—did not provide adequate support for the
    county court’s finding here, which was, that beyond a reason-
    able doubt, Sabra’s “mental health, parenting style, dangerous
    associations, and inconsistency would place Audrey in great
    danger if Sabra was the custodial parent and the case closed.”
    In addition to opining that physical and emotional damage to
    Audrey was possible, Stands also testified that although Sabra
    at times made some improvements, Sabra was not emotionally
    or mentally stable enough to maintain those improvements
    and expressed concern for Sabra’s reported conditions, which
    included being depressed, overwhelmed, having anxiety, and
    not being able to provide for Sabra’s own needs, much less
    those of Audrey.
    But this was not the only testimony from a qualified expert
    in this case. As the Nebraska Supreme Court noted:
    The Bureau of Indian Affairs sets forth guidelines
    under which expert witnesses most likely will meet the
    requirements of the ICWA:
    “(i) A member of the Indian child’s tribe who is rec-
    ognized by the tribal community as knowledgeable in
    tribal customs as they pertain to family organization and
    childrearing practices.
    “(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial experience
    in the delivery of child and family services to Indians,
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    and extensive knowledge of prevailing social and cul-
    tural standards in childrearing practices within the Indian
    child’s tribe.
    “(iii) A professional person having substantial educa-
    tion and experience in the area of his or her specialty.”
    In re Interest of C.W. et al., 
    239 Neb. at 824
    , 
    479 N.W.2d at 111
    .
    We also note that in its more recent guidelines, the Bureau
    of Indian Affairs provides, in part:
    The rule does not, however, strictly limit who may
    serve as a qualified expert witness to only those indi-
    viduals who have particular Tribal social and cultural
    knowledge. The rule recognizes that there may be certain
    circumstances where a qualified expert witness need not
    have specific knowledge of the prevailing social and cul-
    tural standards of the Indian child’s Tribe in order to meet
    the statutory standard.
    U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for
    Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act G.2 at 54 (Dec. 30,
    2016) (providing minimum federal standards regarding compli-
    ance with 
    25 C.F.R. § 23.122
     (2018) governing who may serve
    as qualified expert witness).
    Stermensky, a psychologist, performed a parental capac-
    ity examination of Sabra. Stermensky testified that the main
    goal of this evaluation is to determine whether the parent can
    meet a child’s welfare needs. In performing the examination,
    Stermensky opined that Sabra suffered from schizophrenia
    and post-traumatic stress disorder and that to a reasonable
    degree of “psychologic certainty,” Sabra did not appear to
    have the capacity to meet Aubrey’s health and welfare needs.
    Although he opined that with long-term treatment and medica-
    tion compliance the issue could be revisited, the overwhelming
    evidence in this case demonstrates that little or no progress
    has been made by Sabra to manage her condition as it relates
    to the future care of Audrey. Stemernsky further testified
    that Sabra’s denial and minimization of her severe psychotic
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    disorder and noncompliance with medication placed her “at
    risk of decompensation,” meaning “[s]ymptom amplification,”
    including disorganized behavior, hallucinations, and delusions,
    which placed Audrey at risk. This record adequately dem-
    onstrates that both Strands and Stermensky were qualified
    expert witnesses as required by ICWA, and taken together,
    their testimony adequately supports the ultimate finding by the
    county court.
    Moreover, other evidence presented at the termination hear-
    ing supports the ultimate finding here—that Audrey was likely
    to suffer serious emotional or physical damage if left with
    Sabra. Sabra has been inconsistent in attending child-parent
    therapy, her visitation has never progressed to overnight visits,
    and she has failed to make progress on her case plan goals even
    after requesting additional time to do so. Whenever Sabra’s vis-
    its with Audrey were changed to unsupervised visits, they did
    not remain that way for long due to Sabra’s allowing unsafe
    individuals around Audrey or coaching Audrey to make untrue
    allegations of sexual abuse. Taken together, this evidence and
    the expert testimony established, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    that Sabra’s continued custody of Audrey was likely to result in
    serious emotional or physical damage to Audrey. Sabra’s claim
    is without merit.
    Best Interests
    [7] Sabra also contends that the court erred in finding that
    termination was in Audrey’s best interests. Once a statu-
    tory basis for termination has been proved, the next inquiry
    is whether termination is in the child’s best interests. In re
    Interest of Giavonna G., 
    23 Neb. App. 853
    , 
    876 N.W.2d 422
     (2016).
    A parent’s right to raise his or her child is constitutionally
    protected. Therefore, before a court may terminate paren-
    tal rights, the State must show that the parent is unfit. . . .
    There is a rebuttable presumption that the best interests
    of the child are served by having a relationship with his
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    or her parent. Based on the idea that fit parents act in the
    best interests of their children, this presumption is over-
    come only when the State has proved that the parent is
    unfit. . . . In the context of the constitutionally protected
    relationship between a parent and a child, parental unfit-
    ness means a personal deficiency or incapacity which has
    prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a
    reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which
    caused, or probably will result in, detriment to a child’s
    well-being. . . . The best interests analysis and the paren-
    tal fitness analysis are fact-intensive inquiries, and while
    they are separate, each examines essentially the same
    underlying facts.
    In re Interest of Lizabella R., 
    25 Neb. App. 421
    , 436-37, 
    907 N.W.2d 745
    , 756 (2018).
    [8,9] Sabra contends that the State did not prove by clear
    and convincing evidence that termination was in Audrey’s
    best interests. She argues that she has obtained an apartment
    and employment, has made improvements in her parenting
    skills, and has a bond with Audrey. This court has no doubt
    of Sabra’s love for her daughter. Despite this, Sabra has been
    inconsistent in attending child-parent therapy, her visitation
    has never progressed to overnight visits, the case has been
    open over 22 months, and Sabra has failed to make progress
    even after requesting additional time to do so. The evidence
    further established that Audrey was “excelling” in her cur-
    rent placement. Sabra has been diagnosed with schizophrenia
    and post-traumatic stress disorder, and in Stermensky’s opin-
    ion, she does not have the capacity to meet Audrey’s health
    and welfare needs. Due to her denial of her severe psychotic
    disorder, Stermensky opined, she is at risk of “[s]ymptom
    amplification,” including hallucinations and delusions, which
    could place Audrey at risk of harm. The evidence outlined in
    the previous section further establishes that Sabra is an unfit
    parent and that termination of Sabra’s parental rights is in
    Audrey’s best interests. When a parent is unable or unwilling
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    to rehabilitate himself or herself within a reasonable period of
    time, the child’s best interests require termination of parental
    rights. In re Interest of Walter W., 
    274 Neb. 859
    , 
    744 N.W.2d 55
     (2008). Further, children cannot, and should not, be sus-
    pended in foster care or be made to await uncertain parental
    maturity. In re Interest of Alec S., 
    294 Neb. 784
    , 
    884 N.W.2d 701
     (2016).
    Failure to Give Proper
    Notice to Tribe
    [10] Sabra contends that the State failed to provide proper
    notice to the Oglala Sioux Tribe in violation of NICWA. We
    note that the State argues as follows in its brief:
    Allowing represented parties to wait until after the con-
    clusion of the case on the merits to raise issue with the
    beginning of the case is against public policy, ideas about
    judicial efficiency, and case law. The State would respect-
    fully request this Court hold by failing to timely and
    appropriately plea or motion their objection to the mailing
    of notice [to the tribe], [Sabra] has waived any defect in
    the notice.
    Brief for appellee at 20. We reject this argument based upon
    our holding in In re Interest of Walter W., 
    14 Neb. App. 891
    ,
    899, 
    719 N.W.2d 304
    , 310 (2006), which stated:
    Because in many, if not most, instances, tribes depend
    upon parents to notify the State of known or potential
    Indian ancestry, and because Indian tribes cannot inter-
    vene in cases of which they have received no notifica-
    tion, logic dictates that parents may often be best situated
    to raise claims of inadequate notice to tribes. Therefore,
    we believe the stated purposes of the ICWA are best
    served by allowing parents to raise, in their direct appeal
    from a termination of parental rights, the issue of the
    State’s failure to notify the child’s Indian tribe of the
    termination of parental rights proceedings as required by
    § 43-1505(1).
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    Thus, we determine that Sabra’s assigned error is properly
    before this court.
    Sabra acknowledges that notices were provided to the Oglala
    Sioux Tribe, but she claims that the addresses used by the State
    were incorrect. Her brief states that “[t]he Oglala Sioux Tribe’s
    website currently lists the Tribe’s ICWA Director as Shirley
    Blackstone-Weston, P.O. Box 604, Pine Ridge, SD 57770”
    and argues that the notices sent by the State to the Tribe at
    other “P.O. Box[es] . . . would not have gone to the designated
    ICWA directors.” Brief for appellant at 28. We agree with the
    State’s argument that any current address identified on the
    Oglala Sioux Tribe’s website is “irrelevant” to the address in
    effect in August 2017 when notice was sent to the tribe. Brief
    for appellee at 18.
    Section 43-1505(1) requires that to be proper, notice be
    sent (1) to the “Indian child’s tribe,” (2) by certified or reg-
    istered mail with return receipt requested, (3) with notice of
    the pending proceedings, (4) with notice of the tribe’s right
    of intervention, and (5) that no termination of parental rights
    proceeding shall be held until at least 10 days after receipt of
    notice by the tribe and that the tribe may have an additional
    20 days to prepare for the proceeding if requested. See In re
    Interest of Dakota L. et al., 
    14 Neb. App. 559
    , 
    712 N.W.2d 583
     (2006).
    In the case before this court, the termination of parental
    rights notice provided to the Oglala Sioux Tribe is not part of
    our record; however, there is an “Affidavit of Mailing Notice”
    from a legal secretary in the Scotts Bluff County Attorney’s
    office regarding the mailing of the ICWA notice to the tribe.
    The affidavit of mailing notice provides that the termination
    notice to the Oglala Sioux Tribe was mailed, by certified mail,
    return receipt requested, to the “Oglala Sioux Tribe, P. O.
    Box 2070, Pine Ridge, SD, 57770” on August 28, 2017. We
    note that “P. O. Box 2070” is the same address listed on the
    “Certificate of Indian Blood” submitted by the State and which
    certified that Audrey was an enrolled member of the Oglala
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    Sioux Tribe. This certificate was received into evidence in
    a prior hearing in this case as an exhibit. Further, the record
    reflects that two notices were mailed to the Oglala Sioux Tribe
    at the “P.O. Box 2070” address (in February 2016 and February
    2017) and that the return receipt was signed and returned in
    both instances from that address. Thus, the notice regarding
    the hearing on the termination of parental rights was sent, by
    certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Oglala Sioux
    Tribe at the address listed on the “Certificate of Indian Blood”
    and to the same address where previous notices were sent and
    received by the tribe. In this case, the affidavit provided by
    the State establishes that the State provided notice to the tribe
    at the address where it had been providing notice through-
    out this case. We decline to reverse the order of termination
    on the grounds that Sabra now deems that the address used
    was insufficient.
    CONCLUSION
    The county court, sitting in its capacity as a juvenile court,
    properly found that evidence supported termination of Sabra’s
    parental rights pursuant to § 43-292(7) and that termination
    of parental rights was in Audrey’s best interests. The State
    established through evidence, including testimony of qualified
    expert witnesses, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the contin-
    ued custody of Audrey by Sabra was likely to result in serious
    emotional or physical damage to Audrey. We further reject
    Sabra’s claim that the State failed to provide proper notice to
    the Oglala Sioux Tribe.
    A ffirmed.