Hughes v. Christensen , 31 Neb. Ct. App. 561 ( 2023 )

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
02/07/2023 09:05 AM CST
- 561 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561Emmett Hughes, appellant, v. Lexus
Christensen and Dashaun
Falcon, appellees.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed February 7, 2023. No. A-22-080.
1. Child Custody: Visitation: Appeal and Error. Child custody determi-
nations, and visitation determinations, are matters initially entrusted to
the discretion of the trial court, and although reviewed de novo on the
record, the trial court’s determination will normally be affirmed absent
an abuse of discretion.
2. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when
a trial court bases its decision upon reasons that are untenable or unrea-
sonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
and evidence.
3. Parent and Child: Child Custody: Visitation: Standing. A claim for
custody or parenting time by a nonparent may be brought by a common-
law right to standing based on the doctrine of in loco parentis where the
exercise of those rights is in the best interests of the child.
4. Parent and Child: Words and Phrases. A person standing in loco
parentis to a child is one who has put himself or herself in the situation
of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental
relationship, without going through the formalities necessary to a legal
adoption, and the rights, duties, and liabilities of such person are the
same as those of the lawful parent.
5. Parent and Child. The focus of an in loco parentis analysis must be on
the relationship between the child and the party seeking in loco parentis
status, examining what, if any, bond has formed between the child and
the nonparent.
6. Parent and Child: Child Custody: Standing. Once the doctrine of in
loco parentis confers standing on the nonbiological parent, a full hearing
is required on whether custody in favor of the individual with in loco
parentis status is in the best interests of the minor child.
- 562 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 5617. Parent and Child: Standing: Proof. Once a party has demonstrated
an intimate parent-like relationship with a child, courts recognize that
the child’s best interests require that the third party be granted stand-
ing so as to have the opportunity to litigate fully the issue of whether
that relationship should be maintained even over the natural par-
ent’s objection.
8. Parent and Child. Unlike biological and adoptive parenthood, the sta-
tus of in loco parentis is temporary, flexible, and capable of being both
suspended and reinstated.
9. ____. Application of the in loco parentis doctrine depends upon the
circumstances in existence when the nonparent claims a child’s best
interests lie in allowing him or her to exercise parental rights.
10. ____. Once the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer dis-
charges all duties incident to the parental relationship, the person is no
longer in loco parentis.
11. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. A trial court has the discretion to
determine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and such deter-
minations will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse
of that discretion.
12. Trial: Courts. A trial court has broad discretion to make evidentiary
rulings conducive to the conduct of a fair and orderly trial.
Appeal from the District Court for Hall County: John H.
Marsh, Judge. Affirmed.
Mitchell C. Stehlik, of Stehlik Law Firm, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellant, and Emmett Hughes, pro se.
David V. Chipman, of Monzón, Guerra & Chipman, for
appellee Lexus Christensen.
Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Bishop and Arterburn, Judges.
Bishop, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Emmett Hughes appeals from the Hall County District
Court’s dismissal of his complaint seeking physical custody
and parenting time with Mylez C. Although Hughes is not
Mylez’ biological father, he claimed he stood in loco parentis
to the child. Mylez’ biological mother, Lexus Christensen, dis-
agreed. Following a 2-day trial, the district court acknowledged
- 563 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561that Hughes had “acted in a parental role to Mylez at one
time,” but failed to prove he had “assumed all obligations
incident to the parental relationship,” and further, that Hughes
had “fallen woefully short in minimizing the child’s exposure
to harmful parental conflict.” In dismissing Hughes’ complaint,
the court concluded that Hughes “failed to prove that continu-
ing any in loco parentis status [was] in Mylez’ best interest.”
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
2016 Case Involving Parties’
Biological Daughter
Mylez was born in December 2011. A year later, Christensen
and Hughes began a relationship and, shortly after, began liv-
ing together. In February 2015, Christensen and Hughes had
a daughter, Rielle L. While the parties were together, Hughes
fostered a relationship with Mylez resembling that of a par-
ent and child. According to Hughes, while cohabitating with
Christensen, he changed Mylez’ diapers, took him to doctors’
appointments, was involved in his schooling, enrolled him in
extracurricular activities, took him to church, and provided
him with necessities such as housing, clothing, and food. For a
period of time, Mylez even called Hughes his father.
In May 2016, when Christensen and Hughes’ relationship
ended, Christensen moved out without notifying Hughes and
she took Mylez and Rielle with her. Hughes filed a “Complaint
to Establish Paternity” in relation to Rielle in the Hall County
District Court. On August 3, 2016, the court issued a tempo-
rary order finding Hughes to be the biological father of Rielle.
The court also addressed Mylez, finding that Hughes was
not Mylez’ biological father, but the parties had recognized
Hughes had “stood in loco parentis” to Mylez, and that it
was in Mylez’ best interests to be “included only in the par-
enting plan.” The court went on to state that it did not have
jurisdiction to require Christensen to have Mylez “partici-
pate in visitation,” and that “allowing Mylez to participate in
- 564 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561visitation is entirely voluntary.” The court made it clear that
nothing in the order provided or created “a right of visitation
or custody” in Hughes, nor did it prevent Christensen from
“denying visitation” between Hughes and Mylez. However,
the order granted joint legal custody of the “children” to the
parties and physical custody to Christensen, subject to Hughes’
visitation rights.
The 2016 order was effective until the final order was
entered on March 20, 2019. In that order, the district court
retained legal custody of Rielle and placed her physical custody
with Hughes, subject to Christensen’s parenting time. Although
the court pointed out that Hughes had assumed a parental role
for Mylez and that the “evidence is undisputed that Hughes and
[Mylez] have a good relationship,” the remainder of the order
was silent as to Mylez.
In October 2019, Hughes filed an “Application to Add Minor
Child and Application to Modify Parenting Time,” wherein he
asked the court to add Mylez to the action and grant him cus-
tody of Mylez. Following a hearing, the court entered an order
on December 30, 2019, finding that “[w]hile the evidence is
clear that . . . Hughes has a close relationship with Mylez[,]
he is not Mylez[’] biological father,” and “has no legal right
to receive custody or visitation.” The court dismissed Hughes’
application to add Mylez, but “emphasize[d] that nothing” in
the order “should be construed as the Court attempting to for-
bid contact between . . . Hughes and Mylez[,] [b]ut that con-
tact must be [by] agreement of the parties rather than through
court order.”
Current Proceedings
Approximately a year later, on December 16, 2020, Hughes
filed a “Complaint to Establish Custody and Visitation In
Loco Parentis” in the Hall County District Court. Hughes
claimed that he had established a parent-child relationship
with Mylez such that he stood in loco parentis and asked
the district court to award him parenting time and primary
- 565 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561physical custody of Mylez. Trial took place on September 9
and December 8, 2021. Christensen was represented by coun-
sel. Hughes appeared pro se, but he had counsel available on
a limited scope basis during the first day of trial to provide
guidance regarding trial procedure; counsel withdrew for the
second day of trial. The parties offered exhibits and witness
testimony. We summarize some of the evidence here and set
forth further evidence as necessary in our analysis below.
Hughes testified that although he and Christensen “love[d]
each other,” their relationship was “toxic” during “the entire
five years that [they] were together.” According to Christensen,
Hughes assaulted her numerous times throughout their relation-
ship. Although called to testify by Hughes, one of Christensen’s
friends stated that Hughes frequently became aggressive toward
Christensen and called her a “stupid bitch” in the presence of
Mylez and Rielle. Christensen stated that she had assaulted
Hughes, but only in self-defense.
Following the parties’ breakup, their relationship only further
deteriorated—so much so, that in August 2016, Christensen
obtained a domestic abuse protection order against Hughes.
Hughes also exhibited concerning behaviors toward Christensen
which led to various criminal convictions. In July 2017, Hughes
was convicted of “Attempt of a [C]lass 2A Felony” because he
attempted to strike Christensen and her then-boyfriend with
his vehicle. In May 2018, Christensen obtained a harassment
protection order against Hughes; 4 months later, Hughes was
charged with violating the protection order, and in March
2019, he was convicted of the charge. In February, Hughes
was found guilty of reckless driving and negligent child abuse;
the convictions involved an incident where Hughes withheld
Mylez and Rielle from Christensen and drove recklessly with
the children in the vehicle in an attempt to “lose” Christensen
as she followed him.
After the March 2019 order pertaining to Rielle was
entered, Christensen cut off Hughes’ contact with Mylez and
Hughes continued to exhibit concerning behaviors toward
- 566 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561Christensen. According to Christensen, Hughes stalked her,
ambushed her at her home, video recorded their every inter-
action, threatened her, insulted her in the presence of Mylez,
and informed her that “he had people watching [her].” Another
one of Christensen’s friends called by Hughes to testify stated
that in late 2020, Hughes arrived at Christensen’s trailer home
unannounced while Christensen, Mylez, and Christensen’s
friends and their children were in the trailer. When Hughes
attempted to enter the trailer, Christensen’s friend told him to
leave. Hughes then began peering through the windows of the
trailer. Shortly after, law enforcement arrived after receiving
a report from Hughes that Christensen and her friends were
“hiding somebody in the house.” Law enforcement searched
the property but did not find anything and ultimately did not
charge Christensen or her friends with any crime. This incident
was consistent with a pattern Hughes exhibited of weaponizing
law enforcement to harass Christensen.
According to Hughes, he contacted law enforcement “[p]rob-
ably more than 70 times” about Christensen from 2016 to the
date of the trial. No criminal charges against Christensen ever
resulted from these calls to law enforcement, but at least two
of the calls resulted in criminal charges against Hughes. In
November 2018, law enforcement forwarded a report detailing
Hughes’ repeated contacts to law enforcement which resulted
in “unfounded or unenforceable incident[s]” to the Hall County
Attorney’s office for a potential harassment protection order
violation. No charges resulted from this report.
In its December 15, 2021, order, the district court found
that Christensen had allowed Hughes “to have extensive con-
tact” with Mylez for several years and that the “acts and
declaration of the parties, including [Christensen] referring to
[Hughes] as Mylez’ father support an inference that [Hughes]
was assuming at least some obligations of the parental rela-
tionship.” The court further stated:
Parental rights are an important constitutional right.
[Hughes] did not plead parental unfitness and the Court
- 567 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561did not allow evidence on that issue. The parental pref-
erence doctrine does not determine the outcome of this
action. This action directly implicates a parent’s right
to determine who should have contact with her child. A
natural parent’s right to determine the identity of people
who will be involved in a child’s life seems an important
aspect of the parent-child relationship. The mother’s opin-
ion that continued contact is not in Mylez’ best interest is
entitled to some deference by the Court.
The Court finds that there are objective reasons sup-
porting the mother’s concern for a continuing relation-
ship between Mylez and [Hughes]. [Hughes] was con-
victed of a felony assault of [Christensen]. [Hughes] was
convicted of [c]hild neglect involving the child of the
parties. [Hughes] was convicted of violating a [p]rotec-
tion [o]rder.
Although the court found that Hughes “acted in a parental role
to Mylez at one time” and “has continued some contact and . . .
provided some degree of support,” he failed to prove he had
“assumed all obligations incident to the parental relationship.”
The court further considered Hughes’ “continued efforts at
contact with Mylez contrary to the consent of [Christensen],”
as well as his actions toward Christensen, and the court also
observed that Hughes had “fallen woefully short in minimiz-
ing [Mylez’] exposure to harmful parental conflict.” As a
result, the court dismissed Hughes’ complaint, concluding that
Hughes “failed to prove that continuing any in loco parentis
status” was in Mylez’ best interests.
Hughes appeals. Although Hughes was represented by coun-
sel in limited scope in preparation of a brief to this court,
Hughes appeared pro se at oral argument.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Hughes claims, restated and renumbered, that the district
court erred in (1) finding that he was no longer in loco paren-
tis to Mylez, (2) failing to grant him custody or visitation
- 568 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561rights, and (3) refusing to allow him to present evidence
regarding Christensen’s parental unfitness.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Child custody determinations, and visitation determina-
tions, are matters initially entrusted to the discretion of the
trial court, and although reviewed de novo on the record, the
trial court’s determination will normally be affirmed absent
an abuse of discretion. Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 282 Neb.
121, 802 N.W.2d 66 (2011), disapproved on other gorunds,
Windham v. Griffin, 295 Neb. 279, 887 N.W.2d 710 (2016).
[2] An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court bases its
decision upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if
its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and
evidence. State on behalf of Daphnie F. v. Christina C., 310
Neb. 638, 967 N.W.2d 690 (2021).
ANALYSIS
In Loco Parentis Status
Hughes contends the district court erred in finding that he
“did not have standing in loco parentis to pursue custody of
[Mylez].” Brief for appellant at 16. However, the district court
did not decide this case on standing grounds. Rather, the court
found that Hughes “failed to prove that continuing any in loco
parentis status [was] in Mylez’ best interest.” (Emphasis sup-
plied.) In other words, the court necessarily found that Hughes
had standing to bring an action seeking custody of or parenting
time with Mylez, but that after being provided an opportunity
to fully litigate the issue, Hughes failed to prove continuing his
in loco parentis status was in Mylez’ best interests.
[3-5] With regard to standing, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has established that a claim for custody or parenting time by a
nonparent may be brought by a common-law right to standing
based on the doctrine of in loco parentis where the exercise
of those rights is in the best interests of the child. See Latham
v. Schwerdtfeger, supra. A person standing in loco parentis
- 569 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561to a child is one who has put himself or herself in the situa-
tion of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to
the parental relationship, without going through the formali-
ties necessary to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and
liabilities of such person are the same as those of the lawful
parent. Id. But see Windham v. Griffin, supra (clarifying that
common-law doctrine of in loco parentis does not confer
same rights as those of lawful parent for all purposes; parental
preference doctrine gives biological parent superior right to
custody unless shown to be unfit or to have forfeited superior
right to custody). The focus of an in loco parentis analysis
must be on the relationship between the child and the party
seeking in loco parentis status, examining what, if any, bond
has formed between the child and the nonparent. See Latham v.
Schwerdtfeger, supra.
[6,7] When considering the issue of standing in the context
of in loco parentis, the Nebraska Supreme Court agreed with
the reasoning of several other states, including this explanation
from a Pennsylvania case:
“The in loco parentis basis for standing recognizes
the need to guard the family from intrusions by third
parties and to protect the rights of the natural parent
must be tempered by the paramount need to protect the
child’s best interest. Thus, while it is presumed that a
child’s best interest is served by maintaining the fam-
ily’s privacy and autonomy, that presumption must give
way where the child has established strong psychological
bonds with a person who, although not a biological par-
ent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture,
and affection, assuming in the child’s eye a stature like
that of a parent. Where such a relationship is shown, our
courts recognize that the child’s best interest requires
that the third party be granted standing so as to have
the opportunity to litigate fully the issue of whether that
relationship should be maintained even over a natural
parent’s objection.”
- 570 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 282 Neb. 121, 130, 802 N.W.2d
66, 73-74 (2011) (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa. Super.
78, 682 A.2d 1314 (1996)), disapproved on other grounds,
Windham v. Griffin, 295 Neb. 279, 887 N.W.2d 710 (2016).
The Nebraska Supreme Court further commented that the
Pennsylvania case “went on to state that when the doctrine of
in loco parentis is viewed in the context of standing principles
in general, its purpose is to ensure that actions are brought
only by those with a genuine substantial interest,” and that
“the doctrine must be applied flexibly and is dependent upon
the particular facts of each case.” Latham v. Schwerdtfeger,
282 Neb. at 130, 802 N.W.2d at 74. Once the doctrine of in
loco parentis confers standing on the nonbiological parent, a
full hearing is required on whether custody in favor of the
individual with in loco parentis status is in the best interests
of the minor child. See id. In other words, it is necessary to
first assess the relationship established between the child and
the individual seeking in loco parentis status to determine
whether that person assumed the obligations incident to a
parental relationship. See id. This initial inquiry “protects
the family from allowing intervention by individuals who
have not established an intimate relationship with the child”
while at the same time “affording rights to a person who has
established an intimate parent-like relationship with a child,
the termination of which would not be in the best interests
of the child.” Id. at 131-32, 802 N.W.2d at 74-75. Once a
party has demonstrated an intimate parent-like relationship
with a child, “‘courts recognize that the child’s best interest
requires that the third party be granted standing so as to have
the opportunity to litigate fully the issue of whether that rela-
tionship should be maintained even over the natural parent’s
objection.’” Id. at 130, 802 N.W.2d at 74 (quoting J.A.L. v.
E.P.H., supra).
[8-10] In this case, Hughes was granted standing to fully
litigate the issue of whether his relationship with Mylez should
be maintained even over Christensen’s objection. However,
- 571 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561unlike biological and adoptive parenthood, the status of in
loco parentis is temporary, flexible, and capable of being both
suspended and reinstated. Whilde v. Whilde, 298 Neb. 473,
904 N.W.2d 695 (2017). Application of the in loco parentis
doctrine depends upon the circumstances in existence when
the nonparent claims a child’s best interests lie in allowing
him or her to exercise parental rights. Id. Once the person
alleged to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all duties
incident to the parental relationship, the person is no longer
in loco parentis. See id. The district court concluded against
continuing Hughes’ in loco parentis status. And while we
found Hughes to be sincere at oral argument about his genuine
desire to maintain a relationship with Mylez and that he “just
want[s] to be there for [his] son,” we are unable to say that the
district court abused its discretion in reaching its decision, as
we discuss next.
Hughes presented evidence at trial that he had fostered a
parent-like relationship with Mylez during the course of his
relationship with Christensen. The district court acknowledged
that Hughes “acted in a parental role to Mylez at one time” and
“has continued some contact and . . . provided some degree
of support.” However, the court further observed that Hughes
“failed to prove that he has assumed all obligations incident
to the parental relationship and discharged all of those obliga-
tions.” The court also pointed out that “[t]hrough [Hughes’]
continued efforts at contact with Mylez contrary to the consent
of [Christensen] as well as his actions towards [Christensen],
[Hughes] has fallen woefully short in minimizing the child’s
exposure to harmful parental conflict.”
In reaching its decision, the district court referenced
Nebraska’s Parenting Act, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2920 et seq.
(Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2022), which offers guidance as
to the obligations that the Legislature has deemed important to
the parental relationship. The court also specifically referenced
§ 43-2922(17), which provides:
- 572 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561Parenting functions means those aspects of the relation-
ship in which a parent or person in the parenting role
makes fundamental decisions and performs fundamental
functions necessary for the care and development of a
child. Parenting functions include, but are not limited to:
(a) Maintaining a safe, stable, consistent, and nurturing
relationship with the child;
(b) Attending to the ongoing developmental needs of
the child, including feeding, clothing, physical care and
grooming, health and medical needs, emotional stability,
supervision, and appropriate conflict resolution skills and
engaging in other activities appropriate to the healthy
development of the child within the social and economic
circumstances of the family;
(c) Attending to adequate education for the child,
including remedial or other special education essential to
the best interests of the child;
(d) Assisting the child in maintaining a safe, positive,
and appropriate relationship with each parent and other
family members, including establishing and maintain-
ing the authority and responsibilities of each party with
respect to the child and honoring the parenting plan duties
and responsibilities;
(e) Minimizing the child’s exposure to harmful paren-
tal conflict;
(f) Assisting the child in developing skills to main-
tain safe, positive, and appropriate interpersonal relation-
ships; and
(g) Exercising appropriate support for social, academic,
athletic, or other special interests and abilities of the
child within the social and economic circumstances of
the family.
Although there is evidence that Hughes engaged in some
parenting functions related to Mylez for a period of time when
cohabitating with Christensen, there is also evidence that his
parenting role with Mylez diminished significantly once the
- 573 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561parties separated. From 2019 to the date of trial, Hughes
made various attempts to provide Christensen with cloth-
ing and food for Mylez. Hughes also loaded $50 each week
on a “Greenlight” card that he provided to Mylez. However,
this support was minimal and often forced onto Christensen
without her consent. Further, Hughes’ relationship with Mylez
diminished due to the lack of contact between the two. To the
extent that Hughes attempted to maintain a relationship with
Mylez, his attempts only served to further alienate Mylez from
Hughes. For example, a social worker at Mylez’ school testi-
fied that in the year prior to trial, the school issued a “stay
away letter” to Hughes because he entered the school without
permission in an attempt to contact Mylez. The social worker
further testified that in that same year, Hughes attempted to
approach Mylez just outside the school and she observed
Mylez become concerned, “put his head down,” and “try[]
to walk away from [Hughes].” Hughes contends that these
facts cannot be used against him because Christensen cut off
the relationship between Mylez and him in 2019. However,
the district court found that Christensen had “objective rea-
sons supporting” her withholding of Mylez from Hughes,
citing Hughes’ convictions for attempted felony assault of
Christensen, child neglect involving Rielle, and the protection
order violation.
Regardless of whether it was Christensen’s or Hughes’ fault
that the relationship between Hughes and Mylez was dimin-
ished, it is clear that Hughes failed to minimize Mylez’ expo-
sure to harmful parental conflict. Among Hughes’ harassing
and abusive behaviors toward Christensen, Hughes insulted
Christensen in front of Mylez, made excessive frivolous reports
to law enforcement about Christensen, and subjected her to
surveillance. Although Hughes made some efforts to finan-
cially support Mylez from 2019 to the date of trial, those
efforts are outweighed by the substantial evidence showing his
role in exposing Mylez to harmful parental conflict.
- 574 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561Upon our review of the record, we cannot say the district
court abused its discretion when it concluded that Hughes had
failed to prove that continuing in loco parentis status was in
Mylez’ best interests. That said, nothing prevents Christensen
and Hughes from setting aside their personal grievances and
troubled history in an effort to improve their own relationship
to better coparent their biological child, Rielle, and in doing
so, perhaps rebuild enough trust for Christensen to consider
allowing periodic contact between Hughes and Mylez, as she
did in the past.
Remaining Assignments of Error
Because our finding regarding the first assignment of error
is dispositive, we are not required to address Hughes’ remain-
ing assignments of error, namely that the district court erred in
failing to grant him custody or visitation rights and in refus-
ing to allow him to present evidence regarding Christensen’s
parental unfitness. See Lang v. Howard County, 287 Neb.
66, 840 N.W.2d 876 (2013) (appellate court not obligated to
engage in analysis not necessary to adjudicate case before it).
We likewise decline to discuss Christensen’s proposal that a
higher burden for those seeking in loco parentis status should
be established.
[11,12] However, because Hughes appeared at oral argu-
ment pro se and expressed that he should have been allowed
to present evidence on Christensen’s alleged unfitness, we take
a moment to briefly address his argument. We first point out
that a trial court has the discretion to determine the relevancy
and admissibility of evidence, and such determinations will
not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of
that discretion. Noah’s Ark Processors v. UniFirst Corp., 310
Neb. 896, 970 N.W.2d 72 (2022). Further, a trial court has
broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings conducive to the
conduct of a fair and orderly trial. See Putnam v. Scherbring,
297 Neb. 868, 902 N.W.2d 140 (2017). In the present matter,
regardless of the sufficiency of the pleadings, it was within
- 575 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
HUGHES V. CHRISTENSEN
Cite as 31 Neb. App. 561the trial court’s discretion to decline to receive evidence on
Christensen’s fitness when Hughes’ in loco parentis status had
not yet been fully litigated. Christensen’s parental fitness in the
present case would have been relevant only upon the court’s
determination that the evidence supported the granting of in
loco parentis status to Hughes.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s
December 15, 2021, order dismissing Hughes’ complaint.
Affirmed.