State v. Weichman , 31 Neb. Ct. App. 576 ( 2023 )


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    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    STATE V. WEICHMAN
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 576
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Roger L. Weichman, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 7, 2023.   No. A-22-093.
    1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Ordinarily, a trial court’s
    determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial
    grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
    clearly erroneous.
    2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Under a clearly erroneous standard of
    review, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but considers
    the judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party, resolving
    evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party, who is entitled to
    every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence.
    3. Speedy Trial: Prisoners. The statutory procedure under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3805
     (Reissue 2016), rather than the procedure under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
     (Reissue 2016), applies to instate prisoners.
    4. Good Cause: Words and Phrases. Good cause means a substantial
    reason; one that affords a legal excuse.
    5. ____: ____. Good cause is something that must be substantial, but also
    a factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
    Appeal from the District Court for Madison County: Mark
    A. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
    Chelsey R. Hartner, Chief Deputy Madison County Public
    Defender, for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Erin E. Tangeman
    for appellee.
    Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Arterburn and Welch, Judges.
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    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    STATE V. WEICHMAN
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 576
    Welch, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Roger L. Weichman appeals from the Madison County
    District Court’s order denying his motion for discharge based
    upon the State’s failure to try him within 180 days under appli-
    cable speedy trial statutes governing prison inmates. For the
    reasons stated herein, we affirm.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    County Court Procedural
    Background and Detainer
    On May 4, 2021, the State filed a criminal complaint in
    Madison County Court charging Weichman with two counts
    of theft by receiving stolen property in an amount of $5,000
    or more, both Class IIA felonies. At the time of the filing,
    Weichman was an inmate in the custody of the Department of
    Correctional Services (DCS) at the Nebraska State Penitentiary
    in Lincoln, Nebraska.
    On June 28, 2021, Weichman, acting pro se, filed a motion
    to dismiss the charges alleged in the complaint for “failure to
    bring [the matter] to [t]rial within 180 days” and demanded,
    in the alternative, to be brought before the Madison County
    Court for arraignment on the charges.
    On July 8, 2021, a letter from DCS was filed in Madison
    County Court which notified the Madison County Attorney
    that a detainer had been filed against Weichman and included
    Weichman’s signed request for disposition of untried charges
    pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3801
     through 29-3809
    (Reissue 2016). Weichman’s request for disposition also
    included a request for the appointment of counsel. The
    Madison County Attorney was served with the documents that
    same date.
    Weichman’s case proceeded in the Madison County Court
    with the arraignment and hearing on his motion to dismiss
    held on July 27, 2021, during which Weichman appeared in
    person. During the hearing, the court arraigned Weichman,
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    STATE V. WEICHMAN
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 576
    determined that Weichman was indigent, appointed counsel
    for him, and continued Weichman’s previously filed pro se
    motion to dismiss until August 10. After Weichman was unable
    to participate via videoconferencing at the August 10 hear-
    ing, his motion was continued to August 24. On August 24, at
    Weichman’s request, the court set the matter for a preliminary
    hearing on September 20. During the preliminary hearing, the
    county court bound over to the district court one count of theft
    by receiving stolen property and dismissed the other count due
    to insufficient evidence.
    District Court Procedural Background
    On October 14, 2021, the State charged Weichman by
    information in the Madison County District Court with one
    count of theft by receiving stolen property in an amount of
    $5,000 or more, a Class IIA felony. The arraignment was held
    on October 22, during which Weichman pled not guilty to the
    charged offense. The court scheduled the pretrial conference
    for December 3 and scheduled the jury trial for February 14,
    2022. The information was amended in January 2022 to add a
    second count of theft by receiving stolen property in an amount
    of $5,000 or more.
    At the December 3, 2021, pretrial conference, defense coun-
    sel orally moved for a continuance of the pretrial conference to
    review video discovery. The pretrial conference was resched-
    uled to January 7, 2022, at which time Weichman’s counsel
    requested a continuance because of Weichman’s quarantined
    status due to COVID-19. The pretrial conference was resched-
    uled for February 4.
    On February 4, 2022, Weichman filed a motion for dis-
    charge pursuant to § 29-3805, alleging that the State failed
    to bring him to trial within the required 180 days. A hearing
    on Weichman’s motion for discharge was held on February
    7. The district court received exhibits offered by the State
    consisting of a set of emails between the county court and
    DCS, as well as Madison County Court journal entries dated
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    STATE V. WEICHMAN
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    July 27, 2021; August 10, 2021; August 24, 2021; and
    September 20, 2021. The clerk of the county court also testi-
    fied regarding the continuances contained within the afore-
    mentioned exhibits.
    After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court denied
    the motion and articulated that the notice was received by the
    State on July 8, 2021, and that
    the request for preliminary hearing is proper cause to
    exclude days for calculation and upon [Weichman’s]
    request for counsel and appointment for [Weichman] that
    was good cause for exclusion of extension of hearing and
    not an unreasonable period of extension. The State has
    met its burden and the motion for speedy trial is overruled
    as 166 days have elapsed under this calculation.
    Weichman appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion
    for discharge.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Weichman’s sole assignment of error is that the district
    court erred in denying his motion for discharge pursuant to
    § 29-3805.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Ordinarily, a trial court’s determination as to whether
    charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a fac-
    tual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly
    erroneous. State v. Kolbjornsen, 
    295 Neb. 231
    , 
    888 N.W.2d 153
     (2016).
    [2] Under a clearly erroneous standard of review, an appel-
    late court does not reweigh the evidence but considers the
    judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party,
    resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party,
    who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from
    the evidence. State v. 
    Chase, 310
     Neb. 160, 
    964 N.W.2d 254
     (2021).
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    STATE V. WEICHMAN
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 576
    ANALYSIS
    Weichman’s sole argument on appeal is that the district
    court erred in denying his motion for discharge pursuant to
    § 29-3805.
    In State v. Soule, 
    221 Neb. 619
    , 624, 
    379 N.W.2d 762
    , 765
    (1986), the Nebraska Supreme Court noted:
    By adopting [§] 29-3801 et seq. the Nebraska
    Legislature has provided a specific mechanism for a
    Nebraska prison inmate to assert his right to speedy trial
    on pending Nebraska charges. If the State fails to bring
    the defendant to trial timely, then dismissal of the charge
    is required. The statute itself, however, is written to pro-
    vide an element of flexibility by providing an exception
    where a continuance is granted for good cause or agree-
    ment between the State and defendant.
    We quote the relevant provisions of this statutory construct.
    Section 29-3802 provides:
    The director [of DCS] shall promptly inform in writ-
    ing each prisoner in the custody of [DCS] of the source
    and nature of any untried indictment, information, or
    complaint against him or her of which the director has
    knowledge and of his or her right to make a request for
    final disposition thereof.
    Section § 29-3803 provides:
    Any person who is imprisoned in a facility operated by
    [DCS] may request in writing to the director final disposi-
    tion of any untried indictment, information, or complaint
    pending against him or her in this state. Upon receiving
    any request from a prisoner for final disposition of any
    untried indictment, information, or complaint, the direc-
    tor shall:
    (1) Furnish the prosecutor with a certificate stating the
    term of commitment under which the prisoner is being
    held, the time already served on the sentence, the time
    remaining to be served, the good time earned, the time of
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    the prisoner’s parole eligibility, and any decision of the
    Board of Parole relating to the prisoner;
    (2) Send by registered or certified mail, return receipt
    requested, one copy of the request and the certificate to
    the court in which the untried indictment, information,
    or complaint is pending and one copy to the prosecutor
    charged with the duty of prosecuting it; and
    (3) Offer to deliver temporary custody of the pris-
    oner to the appropriate authority in the city or county
    where the untried indictment, information, or complaint
    is pending.
    Section § 29-3805 provides:
    Within one hundred eighty days after the prosecutor
    receives a certificate from the director pursuant to sec-
    tion 29-3803 or 29-3804 or within such additional time as
    the court for good cause shown in open court may grant,
    the untried indictment, information, or complaint shall
    be brought to trial with the prisoner or his or her counsel
    being present. The parties may stipulate for a continu-
    ance or a continuance may be granted on a notice to the
    attorney of record and an opportunity for him or her to
    be heard. If the indictment, information, or complaint is
    not brought to trial within the time period stated in this
    section, including applicable continuances, no court of
    this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof nor
    shall the untried indictment, information, or complaint
    be of any further force or effect and it shall be dismissed
    with prejudice.
    The parties do not dispute that Weichman was imprisoned
    at the time he submitted his request for final disposition;
    that Weichman timely submitted his request to DCS for final
    disposition of the untried complaint filed in the Madison
    County Court; that DCS timely furnished the prosecutor with
    a certificate governing the terms of Weichman’s commit-
    ment and a copy of Weichman’s request, along with the DCS
    certificate to the Madison County Court; and that the notice
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    STATE V. WEICHMAN
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 576
    and certificate received by the prosecutor on July 8, 2021,
    triggered the time limitation to commence Weichman’s trial
    as set forth in § 29-3805. Weichman simply argues that by
    the time he submitted his motion for discharge on February
    4, 2022, the applicable 180-day time limitation to commence
    the trial had expired and he was entitled to discharge. The
    State argues that when the time limitation is computed with
    applicable continuances, the time to commence trial had not
    expired on February 4, 2022.
    [3] Both parties acknowledge that because Weichman was
    a “[c]ommitted offender” in the custody of DCS, as defined
    in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-170
    (2) (Cum. Supp. 2022), at the time
    that he submitted his request for final disposition of the mat-
    ter charged in the Madison County Court, his statutory speedy
    trial was governed by Nebraska’s intrastate detainer statutes
    found at §§ 29-3801 through 29-3809, not the speedy trial
    statute found at 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
     (Reissue 2016). We
    agree. The statutory procedure under § 29-3805, rather than the
    procedure under § 29-1207, applies to instate prisoners. State
    v. Kolbjornsen, 
    295 Neb. 231
    , 
    888 N.W.2d 153
     (2016). The
    Supreme Court in Kolbjornsen held:
    Because [the defendant] was a “committed offender” in
    the custody of [DCS] at the time that he filed his motions
    [to advance the defendant’s trial], his statutory speedy trial
    rights were governed by 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3801
     to
    29-3809 (Reissue 2016). The procedure under § 29-1207
    does not apply.
    
    295 Neb. at 235
    , 888 N.W.2d at 156. Accordingly, we must
    determine whether Weichman’s speedy trial rights were vio-
    lated under the applicable intrastate detainer statutes.
    Pursuant to the terms of § 29-3805, because the prosecu-
    tor was in receipt of the DCS certificate on July 8, 2021, the
    untried complaint against Weichman filed on May 4 had to
    be brought to trial within 180 days thereafter, subject to
    “such additional time as the court for good cause shown in
    open court may grant.” And further pursuant to § 29-3805,
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    STATE V. WEICHMAN
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    because the matter must stand dismissed “[i]f the indictment,
    information, or complaint is not brought to trial within the
    time period stated in [§ 29-3805], including applicable con-
    tinuances,” we must calculate whether Weichman’s speedy
    trial rights were violated by the time he filed his motion to
    discharge on February 4, 2022, subject to the language of
    that rule.
    Here, the parties agree that the 180-day period commenced
    running on July 8, 2021. Without any extensions, Weichman
    should have been tried by Tuesday, January 4, 2022. However,
    the district court found that three continuances were excludable
    from the speedy trial calculation for good cause. Those con-
    tinuances were as follows: (1) the continuance of Weichman’s
    motion to dismiss from July 27 to August 10, 2021, after coun-
    sel was appointed for him (14 days); (2) the continuance of the
    August 10 hearing to August 24, due to issues with videocon-
    ferencing that prevented Weichman from being able to appear
    at the hearing (14 days); and (3) the time from Weichman’s
    hearing held on August 24, when Weichman failed to appear,
    to the date the court could hold a preliminary hearing on
    September 20 to accommodate Weichman’s counsel’s request
    for a preliminary hearing which could be scheduled on that
    date (27 days). The district court, after deducting the 55 days
    from the 221 days that passed from July 8, 2021, to the date
    of Weichman’s motion for discharge filed on February 4, 2022,
    determined that the State had 14 days left to bring Weichman
    to trial. Weichman argues that the three continuances should
    not count against him.
    Without extension, Weichman was required to be tried by
    January 4, 2022. However, as the Nebraska Supreme Court
    held in State v. Kolbjornsen, 
    295 Neb. 231
    , 236, 
    888 N.W.2d 153
    , 157 (2016): “But, as § 29-3805 expressly states, the
    180-day period may be extended ‘for good cause shown in
    open court.’ And the State relies on an extension based on
    this language.”
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    [4,5] In defining good cause, the Nebraska Supreme Court
    elaborated in Kolbjornsen:
    We have not defined “good cause” for purposes of
    § 29-3805, but the Nebraska Court of Appeals has.
    “Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords
    a legal excuse.” It is “something that must be substan-
    tial, but also a factual question dealt with on a case-by-
    case basis.”
    We see no reason to depart from this definition,
    although it is concededly very general. And in applying
    the definition, each case must be determined based upon
    its particular facts and circumstances.
    The Nebraska appellate courts have applied the “good
    cause” extension of § 29-3805 to continuances obtained
    under a variety of circumstances. We have held that a
    continuance granted at an instate prisoner’s request in the
    county court where a complaint is pending against the
    prisoner extends the time within which such a prisoner
    must be brought to trial under § 29-3805. And the Court
    of Appeals has determined that a continuance granted at
    a prosecutor’s request but with the implicit consent of the
    prisoner’s attorney extended the time limit.
    
    295 Neb. at 237
    , 888 N.W.2d at 157.
    Nebraska appellate courts have additionally applied the good
    cause extension for continuances due to the unavailability of
    a courtroom for a jury trial, see Kolbjornsen, 
    supra;
     due to
    the pendency of a defendant’s plea in abatement, see State v.
    Rieger, 
    270 Neb. 904
    , 
    708 N.W.2d 630
     (2006); due to defense
    counsel’s request to continue a preliminary hearing, see State
    v. Soule, 
    221 Neb. 619
    , 
    379 N.W.2d 762
     (1986); due to defense
    counsel’s request to schedule the trial after expiration of the
    180-day time limit, see State v. Rouse, 
    13 Neb. App. 90
    , 
    688 N.W.2d 889
     (2004); due to a continuance based on the unavail-
    ability of a State’s witness for a scheduled trial date, see
    State v. Caldwell, 
    10 Neb. App. 803
    , 
    639 N.W.2d 663
     (2002);
    and due to a continuance occasioned by the defendant’s own
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    motion for discharge, see State v. Ebert, 
    235 Neb. 330
    , 
    455 N.W.2d 165
     (1990).
    After reviewing this record, we agree that by the time
    Weichman filed his motion for discharge on February 4, 2021,
    the 180-day speedy trial rule, computed with extensions for
    good cause, had not expired. However, our reasoning dif-
    fers from that of the district court, as we explain in greater
    detail below.
    In computing the applicable extensions, the court relied
    upon a continuance of the July 27 and August 10, 2021,
    hearings, followed by computing the number of days from
    the August 24 hearing (during which Weichman requested a
    preliminary hearing) to September 20 (when the preliminary
    hearing could be held). After reviewing the record govern-
    ing the nature of those hearings, we first note that Weichman,
    acting pro se, filed his own motion to dismiss on speedy trial
    grounds on June 28. The county court scheduled a hearing
    on that motion on July 27 but continued that hearing after
    the court appointed, on that date, defense counsel to repre-
    sent Weichman in future proceedings, including Weichman’s
    previously filed pro se motion to dismiss. On August 10, the
    county court continued the hearing a second time, because
    Weichman was unable to appear by videoconferencing due to
    technical difficulties. As such, the county court was not able to
    hear Weichman’s motion to dismiss until August 24. Although
    neither party provided a record from the August 24 hearing
    governing the county court’s specific ruling on the motion to
    dismiss held that day, the order itself indicates that the county
    court scheduled the matter for a preliminary hearing to be
    held on September 20, at Weichman’s request. Although we
    are unable to ascertain from the limited record how exactly
    the court ruled on Weichman’s pro se motion to dismiss held
    on August 24, we recognize that the proceeding itself stands
    continued from the date of Weichman’s June 28 pro se motion
    to dismiss to the date the court heard and ruled thereon
    on August 24. See Ebert, 
    supra
     (holding that extensions of
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    180-day speedy trial calculation include continuances occa-
    sioned by defendant’s own motion for discharge).
    From the July 8, 2021, filing which notified the Madison
    County Attorney that a detainer had been filed against
    Weichman, until Weichman’s February 4, 2022, filing of his
    motion for discharge, a total of 211 days elapsed. Although
    Weichman filed his pro se motion to dismiss on June 28,
    2021, which was 10 days before the speedy trial clock began
    to run, that motion was not disposed of until at least August
    24, when the record demonstrates it was thereafter no longer
    mentioned or continued. That means the case was deemed
    continued, at a minimum, from July 8, the day the speedy trial
    clock would normally have commenced to run, until at least
    August 24, when Weichman’s pro se motion for discharge
    was resolved. When that 47 days is subtracted from the 211
    days that fully elapsed from July 8, 2021, to February 4, 2022,
    the date Weichman filed his second motion for discharge,
    the State had 16 days remaining to bring Weichman to trial.
    Accordingly, although we compute the timeframe differently
    than the district court, we agree with the district court that at
    the time Weichman filed his February 4 motion for discharge,
    Weichman’s speedy trial rights found at §§ 29-3801 through
    29-3809 had not been violated. See State v. Grant, 
    310 Neb. 700
    , 
    968 N.W.2d 837
     (2022) (where record adequately demon-
    strates decision of trial court is correct, although such correct-
    ness is based on ground or reason different from that assigned
    by trial court, appellate court will affirm). Weichman’s assign-
    ment of error fails.
    CONCLUSION
    Having found that Weichman’s right to a speedy trial under
    §§ 29-3801 through 29-3809 had not been violated at the time
    he filed his February 4, 2022, motion for discharge, we affirm.
    Affirmed.