In re Application No. C-4981 , 27 Neb. Ct. App. 773 ( 2019 )


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    IN RE APPLICATION NO. C-4981
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    In re Application No. C-4981
    of Beau Toben.
    Windstream Communications, Inc., appellant,
    v. Nebraska Public Service Commission
    et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed November 19, 2019.   No. A-19-054.
    1. Public Service Commission: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 75-136(2) (Reissue 2018), an appellate court reviews an order of the
    Nebraska Public Service Commission de novo on the record.
    2. Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court
    reappraises the evidence as presented by the record and reaches its own
    independent conclusions concerning the matters at issue.
    3. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. When an appellate court
    makes a de novo review, it does not mean that the court ignores the
    findings of fact made by the agency and the fact that the agency saw
    and heard the witnesses who appeared at its hearing. Where the evidence
    is in conflict, the appellate court will consider and may give weight to
    the fact that the agency hearing examiner observed the witnesses and
    accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
    4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
    law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
    5. ____: ____. In examining the language of a statute, its language is to
    be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not
    resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which
    are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
    6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. A court may inquire into legislative his-
    tory when a statute is open to construction because its terms require
    interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous.
    7. Statutes: Appeal and Error. When construing a statute, an appel-
    late court must look to the statute’s purpose and give to the statute a
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    reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a
    construction which would defeat it.
    8. Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. In construing a statute, an appel-
    late court looks to the statutory objective to be accomplished, the evils
    and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be served.
    9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court construes statutes
    relating to the same subject matter together to maintain a sensible and
    consistent scheme, so that effect is given to every provision.
    10. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. It is appropriate, even under
    a de novo standard of review, to adhere to the common practice among
    appellate courts to afford appropriate deference to the findings of the
    agency before which the record was created.
    Appeal from the Public Service Commission. Affirmed.
    Blake E. Johnson and Katherine J. Spohn, of Bruning Law
    Group, for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and L. Jay Bartel for
    appellee Nebraska Public Service Commission.
    Riedmann, Bishop, and Arterburn, Judges.
    Bishop, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Beau Toben filed an application with the Nebraska Public
    Service Commission (PSC) seeking advanced telecommunica-
    tions service, or broadband service, for a home he was building
    a few miles west of Doniphan, Nebraska. Toben claimed he was
    not receiving, and would not within a reasonable time receive,
    such service through the “Hansen Exchange” of Windstream
    Communications, Inc. (Windstream). He wished to modify his
    exchange service area so he could receive such service from
    the “Doniphan Exchange” of Hamilton Telecommunications
    (Hamilton). The PSC granted Toben’s application to revise
    the exchange boundaries. Windstream appeals, claiming the
    PSC was not authorized to grant the application because
    the evidence showed that Windstream would provide reason-
    able advanced telecommunications service within a reasonable
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    time pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-136(1) (Reissue 2014).
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On April 18, 2018, Toben, pro se, filed an application with
    the PSC, alleging he resided within Windstream’s Hansen
    Exchange, but he wished to receive advanced telecommu-
    nications service from Hamilton’s Doniphan Exchange. The
    PSC notified Windstream and Hamilton of Toben’s applica-
    tion. Hamilton consented to Toben’s request to be served
    by its Doniphan Exchange at no direct cost for construction
    and installation; Windstream objected because it had plans to
    deploy broadband service and “serve [Toben] within a reason-
    able period of time.” A hearing took place before the PSC in
    November 2018. Toben appeared pro se, Windstream appeared
    with counsel, and a representative appeared on behalf of the
    PSC. Hamilton did not appear. A summary of the evidence
    from the hearing follows.
    Toben testified that he did not have any service from
    Windstream (or any other local exchange carrier) for a new
    house he was building a few miles west of Doniphan. There
    were neither any Windstream lines buried there, nor “land
    service.” He offered photographs of Windstream’s equipment
    (presumably on his property) showing “line boxes” for their
    telephone service that “had been in disrepair for the last
    years [and] nobody has ever serviced [them].” He cited the
    “lack of maintenance or advancements to the services in [his]
    area” as one reason for his application. Toben hoped to move
    into his house by the end of 2018, but indicated installation
    of broadband service may interfere with finishing the yard
    and “dirt work” if “things” would have to be buried under
    his house. At the time of the hearing, Toben said, “[W]here
    I live I have Hamilton,” and he had internet service through
    Hamilton. According to Toben, Hamilton “buried fiber optics
    to the area” in 2016, which was why he applied for the bound-
    ary change to his new home. He testified, “We are building a
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    new house where there is currently not any service,” which he
    clarified meant no service from anyone, including Hamilton.
    Toben had contacted Hamilton, and “they [were] willing to
    provide [him] with Internet service,” but Toben acknowledged
    such service was not currently available through Hamilton.
    Toben said Hamilton was willing to provide him with internet
    service and that it could offer speeds of “Ten Mbps.” Toben
    was “hoping to be moved in [to the new house] by the end
    of the year [2018].” When asked where he was currently liv-
    ing, he indicated he was at his parents’ address “while we are
    building our house.”
    Regarding his communications with Windstream, Toben
    said he was told that he would not be able to receive “land
    serv­ice,” only (fixed) wireless service; Windstream explained
    in an email to Toben that “fixed wireless” is a system to pro-
    vide “high speed internet” by way of a “point to multi-point
    wireless technology that uses radio frequencies.” Toben had
    not had any experience with fixed wireless service, but was
    willing to give it a “chance.” However, he did not receive
    service “in the time that was promised.” Windstream had
    indicated in a July 13, 2018, email to Toben that it expected
    to complete its project to provide fixed wireless service to
    Toben’s area in “the first few weeks of September 2018.” On
    July 20, Windstream sent an email about servicing Toben’s
    new house with “the fixed wireless solution” and was “hope-
    ful” to avoid a hearing if possible. On July 26, Toben emailed
    the PSC asking to postpone a hearing scheduled in August so
    he could “see if the fixed wireless system that Windstream
    has planned will be sufficient.” In September, Toben con-
    tacted Windstream and was told someone would “get back to
    [him] within a couple of days.” After he did not hear from
    Windstream, Toben rescheduled the hearing.
    Brad Hedrick, Windstream’s president of operations for
    Nebraska and four other states, testified that Windstream
    wanted to expand its broadband services across rural serv­
    ice areas. He explained that Windstream’s fixed wireless
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    technology was a “much improved version over what other
    providers ha[d] deployed in these areas in the past.”
    Windstream’s fixed wireless system had not been deployed
    anywhere in Nebraska yet.
    Windstream intended to serve Toben with fixed wireless
    service. Hedrick stated that Toben’s new house address was
    within Windstream’s Hansen Exchange, but Windstream had
    yet to complete two towers in the “Doniphan-Hansen area”
    that would allow Toben to receive service. Once completed,
    those towers would provide a service range extending out
    in a radius of about 4 or 5 miles and would allow a “75 to
    100 Mbps download.” Although Toben had concerns about
    Windstream’s radius because his house “falls on the furthest
    boundary” of the Hansen Exchange, Hedrick testified that “RF
    engineering experts” said that Toben would receive “at least
    75 Mbps.”
    Hedrick explained why service had been delayed beyond the
    initial September timeframe provided to Toben. Hedrick identi-
    fied two “governmental delays,” one of which was related to
    a rules change by the Federal Communications Commission,
    but that issue had since been resolved. The outstanding issue,
    which Windstream was notified of about 2 weeks before the
    PSC hearing, concerned a zoning dispute with Adams County
    regarding Windstream’s permit application to place poles, or
    towers, throughout that county. The dispute was about the
    “location of the site” and whether it was within the “zone or
    cone of influence of the Hastings Airport.” If so, there were
    alternatives, such as changing the location of the pole or add-
    ing “lighting” to the site. According to Hedrick, Windstream
    was “hopeful” to resolve that issue “soon” and to “deploy
    service by the end of the year” but that was “not a guarantee.”
    He admitted it was “in the realm of possibility” that the issue
    could end up in the court system on appeal.
    Once the zoning issue was “sorted out,” Windstream
    could begin building and equipping tower sites. Hedrick
    indicated that Windstream intended to complete other tower
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    sites (in addition to those in the “Doniphan-Hansen area”)
    with fixed wireless service in the “Sutton exchange [and] the
    Juniata exchange”; “it would be beneficial to [Windstream]
    if [it] could do them all at the same time.” He thought
    Harvard, Nebraska, would be the first area to deploy (not the
    “Doniphan-Hansen area”) as it was “approved” the same day
    as the PSC hearing. Windstream had not yet advertised broad-
    band to Doniphan customers “because it would have been
    premature since [it did not] have any capability to provide
    service yet” and the “unknown issue [it was] dealing with in
    Adams County.”
    On December 18, 2018, the PSC issued its order. It noted
    that Hamilton and Windstream are local exchange carriers
    holding certificates of public convenience and necessity to
    provide local exchange service in their respective territories.
    The PSC found that Toben was not receiving, and would not
    receive within a reasonable time, advanced telecommunica-
    tions capability service from Windstream. The PSC further
    found that the revision of the exchange service area was eco-
    nomically sound and would not impair the capabilities of the
    telecommunications companies affected by the change to serve
    their subscribers. It acknowledged Toben’s willingness to pay
    construction and other costs related to the boundary change
    but found that Hamilton was willing to pay those costs. The
    PSC concluded that the requirements of § 86-136 were met.
    Therefore, it granted Toben’s application and ordered that the
    exchange boundaries of Hamilton’s Doniphan Exchange and
    Windstream’s Hansen Exchange be revised (as detailed in
    maps attached to the order) in such a way as to allow Toben to
    receive advanced telecommunications capability service from
    Hamilton’s Doniphan Exchange.
    Windstream appeals.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Windstream claims the PSC erred by determining Toben
    would not receive reasonable advanced telecommunications
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    capability service within a reasonable time absent a change of
    Windstream’s Hansen Exchange boundary.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1-3] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-136(2) (Reissue 2018),
    an appellate court reviews an order of the PSC de novo on
    the record. In re Application No. B-1829, 
    293 Neb. 485
    , 
    880 N.W.2d 51
    (2016). In a review de novo on the record, an
    appellate court reappraises the evidence as presented by the
    record and reaches its own independent conclusions concern-
    ing the matters at issue. 
    Id. When an
    appellate court makes
    a de novo review, it does not mean that the court ignores
    the findings of fact made by the agency and the fact that the
    agency saw and heard the witnesses who appeared at its hear-
    ing. In re Application No. OP-0003, 
    303 Neb. 872
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 653
    (2019). Where the evidence is in conflict, the appellate
    court will consider and may give weight to the fact that the
    agency hearing examiner observed the witnesses and accepted
    one version of the facts rather than another. See 
    id. [4] Statutory
    interpretation is a question of law that an
    appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. See In
    re Application of City of Minden, 
    282 Neb. 926
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 659
    (2011).
    ANALYSIS
    The Nebraska Telecommunications Regulation Act is codi-
    fied at Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 86-101 through 86-165 (Reissue
    2014 & Cum. Supp. 2018). It was passed to fulfill several
    policies, including to maintain and advance the efficiency and
    availability of telecommunications services. See § 86-102. As
    relevant here, § 86-135(1) states, “Any person may file an
    application with the [PSC] to obtain advanced telecommuni-
    cations capability service furnished by a telecommunications
    company in the local exchange area adjacent to the local
    exchange area in which the applicant resides.” “Advanced
    telecommunications capability service means high-speed,
    broadband telecommunications capability provided by a local
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    exchange carrier that enables users to originate and receive
    high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video communications
    using any technology.” § 86-103.01. A “[l]ocal exchange
    area” is a “territorial unit established by a telecommunica-
    tions company for the administration of telecommunications
    service within a specific area generally encompassing a city
    or village and its environs as described in maps filed with and
    approved by the [PSC].” § 86-115. There must be a hearing
    before the PSC if all of the “directly affected” telecommuni-
    cations companies involved do not consent to an application.
    § 86-135(2).
    Section 86-136 provides that upon the completion of the
    hearing on an application made pursuant to § 86-135 (if a hear-
    ing is required), the PSC may grant the application, in whole or
    in part, if the evidence establishes each of the following:
    (1) That such applicant is not receiving, and will not
    within a reasonable time receive, reasonable advanced
    telecommunications capability service from the telecom-
    munications company which furnishes telecommunica-
    tions service in the local exchange area in which the
    applicant resides;
    (2) That the revision of the exchange service area
    required to grant the application is economically sound,
    will not impair the capability of any telecommunications
    company affected to serve the remaining subscribers in
    any affected exchanges, and will not impose an undue and
    unreasonable technological or engineering burden on any
    affected telecommunications company; and
    (3) That the applicant is willing and, unless waived
    by the affected telecommunications company, will pay
    such construction and other costs and rates as are fair and
    equitable and will reimburse the affected telecommunica-
    tions company for any undepreciated investment in exist-
    ing property as determined by the [PSC]. The amount of
    any payment by the applicant for construction and other
    costs associated with providing service to the applicant
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    may be negotiated between the applicant and the affected
    telecommunications company.
    On appeal, Windstream takes issue only with whether
    § 86-136(1) set forth above was satisfied—specifically, whether
    advanced telecommunications capability service would be avail-
    able to Toben within a reasonable time. Windstream claims it
    would have been able to provide such service to Toben within
    a reasonable time.
    Although not raised by the parties, nor addressed by the
    PSC in its order, we initially observe that at the time Toben
    completed his application in April 2018 and at the time of
    the PSC hearing in November, Toben was residing at his par-
    ents’ home within Hamilton’s Doniphan Exchange. He was
    not yet residing at the home being built within Windstream’s
    Hansen Exchange. Section 86-135(1) permits a person to file
    an application with the PSC to seek service from a telecom-
    munications company in the local exchange area adjacent
    to the local exchange area in which the applicant resides.
    Therefore, in order for the PSC to have concluded as it did, it
    would necessarily have had to interpret the words “the local
    exchange area in which the applicant resides” to include prop-
    erty an applicant presently owns and on which the applicant
    does not presently reside, but has demonstrated an intent to
    reside on such property in the future. At the PSC hearing,
    questions were asked about Toben’s current residence. Toben
    acknowledged he was still living in Doniphan, in the Hamilton
    exchange, but anticipated moving to his new residence in the
    Windstream exchange at the end of 2018. He testified that he
    was currently receiving internet service through Hamilton, but
    that “nobody” provided internet service to the location where
    he was building his new house. It is evident that at the time
    of his application and at the time of the PSC hearing, Toben
    was still residing in Hamilton’s Doniphan Exchange. There is
    also no dispute that when Toben begins residing in the house
    being built a few miles west of Doniphan, he will then be
    residing in Windstream’s Hansen Exchange; Hedrick agreed
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    that “[Toben’s] new address for the house they are building
    is within the [Windstream] Hansen exchange.” Therefore, the
    PSC necessarily interpreted the words “the local exchange
    area in which the applicant resides” to include property an
    applicant presently owns and on which the applicant does not
    presently reside, but has demonstrated an intent to reside on
    such property in the future. At the hearing before the PSC,
    Windstream did not take issue with the fact that Toben did
    not yet reside on the property in its Hansen Exchange—nor
    is that issue raised on appeal. Accordingly, it is not necessary
    for this court to address whether this particular statutory lan-
    guage was properly applied; rather, we address only whether
    the PSC correctly found that Toben was not receiving, and
    would not receive within a reasonable time, advanced tele-
    communications capability service from Windstream for his
    property within Windstream’s Hansen Exchange as set forth
    in § 86-136(1).
    We first observe that the Legislature recently amended
    § 86-136(1) as follows (new language underscored; former
    language struck through):
    (1) That such applicant is not receiving, and at the
    time of the application is not able to receive, will not
    within a reasonable time receive, reasonable advanced
    telecommunications capability service from the telecom-
    munications company which furnishes telecommunica-
    tions service in the local exchange area in which the
    applicant resides.
    2019 Neb. Laws, L.B. 268, § 1 (effective September 1, 2019).
    Thus, the issue of what might constitute a reasonable time
    for a local exchange to make advanced telecommunications
    capability service available to an applicant residing in its
    exchange is possibly an issue of last impression. As of its
    September 1, 2019, effective date, the amended § 86-136(1)
    places the focus on when the application to change exchange
    boundaries is filed rather than whether service can be made
    available within a reasonable time.
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    As pertinent here, Windstream argues it could fulfill the
    reasonable time requirement because of plans to provide serv­
    ice by the end of 2018. It asserts that despite unexpected
    delays, it demonstrated “good faith efforts to provide Toben
    with internet service quickly” and had “executable designs and
    plans to build the required service towers.” Brief for appellant
    at 8. But the PSC argues that the record shows “Windstream
    failed to meet its own promised time frame to provide serv­
    ice.” Brief for appellee at 8.
    [5] Neither party directs us to a prior appellate case that
    has had to interpret the meaning of “within a reasonable time”
    under § 86-136(1) (Reissue 2014), and we find none. We
    are thus faced with a case of first, and possibly last, impres-
    sion, although Windstream’s brief does indicate there may
    be other cases of a similar nature pending on appeal: “In re
    Application of Skrdlant, No. A18-877, and In re Application of
    Poppe, No. A18-878.” See brief for appellant at 1. In exam-
    ining the language of a statute, its language is to be given
    its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will
    not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statu-
    tory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. AT&T
    Communications v. Nebraska Public Serv. Comm., 
    283 Neb. 204
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 666
    (2012). While we agree with Windstream
    that the statutory language “‘within a reasonable time’” is
    “forward-looking,” reply brief for appellant at 2, it is nev-
    ertheless open to interpretation. On the face of § 86-136(1)
    alone, there is no plain and ordinary meaning to define the
    parameters of “within a reasonable time.” And the phrase is
    not defined in any relevant definition section in the Nebraska
    Telecommunications Regulation Act. See § 86-103 (definitions
    found in §§ 86-103.01 to 86-121).
    [6-9] A court may inquire into legislative history when
    a statute is open to construction because its terms require
    interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous.
    See Salem Grain Co. v. City of Falls City, 
    302 Neb. 548
    , 
    924 N.W.2d 678
    (2019). When construing a statute, an appellate
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    court must look to the statute’s purpose and give to the statute
    a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose,
    rather than a construction which would defeat it. TracFone
    Wireless v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., 
    279 Neb. 426
    , 
    778 N.W.2d 452
    (2010). An appellate court looks to the statutory
    objective to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to
    be remedied, and the purpose to be served. 
    Id. And an
    appel-
    late court construes statutes relating to the same subject matter
    together to maintain a sensible and consistent scheme, so that
    effect is given to every provision. 
    Id. Section 86-136(1)
    was originally located at Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 75-613(1) (Cum. Supp. 1969). In 1969, the Legislature estab-
    lished a process under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 75-612 to 75-615
    (Cum. Supp. 1969) for applicants who were not receiving
    and would not “within a reasonable time” receive reasonably
    adequate exchange telephone service from the company fur-
    nishing such service in the exchange service area in which
    the applicants resided or operated. See § 75-613(1). See,
    also, 1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 601, § 2, p. 2457. There is nothing
    enlightening in the corresponding legislative history about the
    Legislature’s decision to use “within a reasonable time” as part
    of the standard for § 75-613(1). Even if there were, the facts
    at hand involve the question of how long is too long to wait to
    obtain broadband service, not merely telephone service—the
    subject technology in 1969.
    The version of § 86-136(1) at issue here was established
    in 2012, pursuant to 2012 Neb. Laws, L.B. 715. Before that
    amendment, the PSC could order a boundary change based only
    on the “quality of the voice-grade [(landline telephone)] serv­
    ice the customer [was] receiving.” See Introducer’s Statement
    of Intent, L.B. 715, Transportation and Telecommunications
    Committee, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 13, 2012). The 2012
    amendment updated boundary change provisions so that an
    application for a change is based on “broadband service.”
    
    Id. See, also,
    L.B. 715, § 3 (advanced telecommunications
    capability service definition added); 
    id., §§ 4
    to 7 (term
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    added elsewhere to reflect application was for broadband serv­
    ice). The phrase “within a reasonable time” in § 86-136(1)
    remained unchanged. L.B. 715, § 5. Clearly, the Legislature’s
    amendments were meant to account for technological advance-
    ments, and it did not find it necessary (at least at that time)
    to amend the language at issue here. Compare L.B. 715, with
    2019 Neb. Laws, L.B. 268, § 1 (replacing “within a reasonable
    time receive” in § 86-136(1) with “at the time of the applica-
    tion is not able to receive”).
    At a preliminary hearing on L.B. 715, counsel for the
    Transportation and Telecommunications Committee said:
    The state has experienced situations where a customer on
    one side of a boundary line receives high-speed broad-
    band with one provider, while the provider on the other
    side of the boundary line does not offer broadband to
    another customer. Although these two customers live in
    close proximity to each other, the one with inadequate
    service is being held hostage by the outdated statute from
    receiving broadband from the one provider on the other
    side of the boundary line.
    Transportation and Telecommunications Committee Hearing,
    L.B. 715, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. 2 (Feb. 13, 2012). Counsel
    asserted, “In a large geographic state with a sparse population,
    broadband has become a necessity to Nebraska.” 
    Id. During floor
    debate, the chairperson of the committee reiterated that
    exact statement. See Floor Debate, L.B. 715, 102d Leg., 2d
    Sess. 17 (Mar. 21, 2012). The chairperson also pointed out,
    “Broadband is the service customers want, and in many rural
    areas it is not available.” 
    Id. While the
    legislative materials for L.B. 715 do not provide
    insight about the phrase “within a reasonable time” under
    § 86-136(1), the phrase remaining intact shows that, at least
    at that time, the Legislature preferred to leave the matter
    to the PSC’s discretion to analyze on a case-by-case basis.
    See, also, In re Application No. OP-0003, 
    303 Neb. 872
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 653
    (2019) (even under de novo standard of review,
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    it is appropriate to adhere to common practice among appel-
    late courts to afford appropriate deference to findings of
    agency before which record was created). In its order in the
    present case, the PSC stated, “given the utility and necessity
    of access to broadband internet in today’s world, even short
    delays may present significant inconveniences and challenges
    to Nebraska residents.” The PSC related that the length of
    time it would consider to be reasonable within the context
    of §§ 86-135 to 86-138 was “relatively short” and “certainly
    shorter than the nearly eight months [Toben’s] docket [had]
    been pending.”
    We agree with the PSC’s determination that the timeframe
    at issue here did not meet the requirement of “within a rea-
    sonable time.” Windstream was on notice of Toben’s applica-
    tion in April 2018. In July, Toben asked for a continuance of
    the August hearing because Windstream represented that it
    expected to complete the project in Toben’s area in September.
    Windstream failed to meet that deadline, and at the time of
    the hearing in November, the timeline was no more apparent
    due to unexpected zoning delays involving Adams County.
    Although Hedrick estimated the project would be completed
    by the end of the year, he acknowledged that was “not a
    guarantee.” Windstream’s zoning dispute was a relatively new
    delay; how fast it could be resolved (and whether resolution
    would impact the project) was vague. There was also evidence
    the Harvard project would take priority over the Doniphan-
    Hansen project, although it was not clear if or how that might
    delay the estimated goal to have service available to Toben at
    the end of 2018.
    Windstream argues there was no evidence about the “quality
    of Hamilton’s service or timeframe for its deployment.” Brief
    for appellant at 7. However, the pertinent statutory language
    does not require such evidence. Section 86-136(1) relates to
    whether an applicant is receiving or will receive within a
    reasonable time broadband service “from the telecommunica-
    tions company which furnishes telecommunications service
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    in the local exchange area in which the applicant resides”; it
    unambiguously refers solely to the applicant’s current tele-
    communications company, the one whose territory covers the
    area where the applicant resides. See AT&T Communications
    v. Nebraska Public Serv. Comm., 
    283 Neb. 204
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 666
    (2012) (language of statute is to be given its plain and
    ordinary meaning). The record supports that the requirements
    of § 86-136(1) were met, although as noted previously, we
    do not address whether the “local exchange area in which the
    applicant resides” includes property upon which an applicant
    presently owns and on which the applicant does not presently
    reside, but has demonstrated an intent to reside on such prop-
    erty in the future. Also, we need not address whether the other
    two elements of § 86-136 were satisfied, because Windstream
    does not dispute the PSC’s conclusions under § 86-136(2) or
    § 86-136(3).
    Finally, Windstream argues that it was not necessary to
    modify Windstream’s Hansen Exchange so that Hamilton
    could provide Toben service. Although Windstream did not
    specifically assign this as an error, it did generally assign
    error to the PSC’s determination that Toben would not receive
    reasonable advanced telecommunications capability service
    within a reasonable time “absent a change of Windstream’s
    Hansen Exchange boundary.” The PSC disagrees there was
    any error on this basis, arguing, “Whether Hamilton could or
    could not provide service without a boundary change is irrel-
    evant, as a change in exchange area boundaries is required by
    the statute when the PSC finds the evidence warrants granting
    the application.” Brief for appellee at 11. Although we do not
    agree that the statute requires the PSC to make a boundary
    change, see § 86-136 (“the commission may grant the applica-
    tion . . . if the evidence establishes the following”), we agree
    with the PSC that whether Hamilton could have provided
    service to Toben without a boundary change is not relevant
    to the PSC’s decision. Section 86-136 does not contain lan-
    guage that would preclude a boundary change simply because
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    an adjacent local exchange could provide service without a
    boundary change. While there are other factors for the PSC to
    consider besides whether service can be made available within
    a reasonable time, see § 86-136(2) (requires consideration of
    whether revision of exchange service area is economically
    sound) and § 86-136(3) (requires consideration of costs of
    construction and rates), as noted previously, Windstream has
    not challenged the PSC’s order as to either of those statu-
    tory factors.
    CONCLUSION
    Under our de novo review, we affirm the December 18,
    2018, order of the PSC granting Toben’s application to modify
    his exchange service area from Windstream’s Hansen Exchange
    to Hamilton’s Doniphan Exchange.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-19-054

Citation Numbers: 27 Neb. Ct. App. 773

Filed Date: 11/19/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/19/2019