In re Estate of Robb ( 2013 )


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  •             Decisions     of the    Nebraska Court of Appeals
    IN RE ESTATE OF ROBB	429
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 429
    Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the district court
    which modified custody by awarding Kyle primary physical
    custody of the children.
    In re Estate of Mason D. Robb, deceased.
    Linda Hahn and Shawn Eichman, appellees, v.
    Theodore J. Robb, Personal R epresentative
    and Trustee, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed October 22, 2013.    No. A-12-1002.
    1.	 Decedents’ Estates: Trusts: Appeal and Error. In trust administration and pro-
    bate cases, an appellate court uses an “issue-specific approach” to determine the
    appropriate standard of review.
    2.	 Decedents’ Estates: Trusts: Equity: Appeal and Error. Both probate and trust
    administration matters are reviewed for error appearing on the record, absent an
    equity question.
    3.	 ____: ____: ____: ____. Both probate and trust administration matters are
    reviewed de novo, where an equity question is presented.
    4.	 ____: ____: ____: ____. The removal of a trustee is a question of equity.
    Accordingly, in a trust proceeding, an appellate court reviews de novo the ques-
    tion of whether a trustee was properly removed.
    5.	 Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. The removal of a personal representative
    is not an equity question. The removal of a personal representative is reviewed
    for error appearing on the record.
    6.	 Decedents’ Estates: Executors and Administrators: Appeal and Error. A trial
    court’s decision whether to appoint a special administrator is not a question of
    equity. Appointment of a special administrator is reviewed for error appearing on
    the record.
    7.	 Decedents’ Estates: Executors and Administrators. When an executor has
    a personal interest in the administration of an estate and in the disposition of
    the estate property, and when the circumstances disclose that those interests
    prevent him from performing his duties in an impartial manner, he should
    be removed.
    8.	 Trusts. A trustee commits a breach of trust if he violates any of the duties owed
    to beneficiaries.
    9.	 ____. A trustee has the duty to administer the trust in good faith, in accordance
    with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accord­
    ance with the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code.
    10.	 ____. Transactions involving the investment or management of trust property
    entered into by the trustee for the trustee’s own personal account or which is
    other­ ise affected by a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary and personal
    w
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    430	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    interests are voidable unless they are authorized, are approved, or were entered
    into before the trustee contemplated becoming a trustee.
    11.	 Decedents’ Estates: Executors and Administrators. A trial court has the
    authority to appoint a special administrator under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2457
    (Reissue 2008).
    12.	 ____: ____. After a special administrator is appointed, the administrator has the
    same powers as a personal representative, except the power is limited to the
    duties prescribed in the trial court’s order.
    Appeal from the County Court for Hall County: Arthur S.
    Wetzel, Judge. Affirmed.
    David C. Huston, of Huston & Higgins, for appellant.
    Ronald S. Depue, of Shamberg, Wolf, McDermott & Depue,
    for appellees.
    Inbody, Chief Judge, and Irwin and Riedmann, Judges.
    Riedmann, Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Theodore J. Robb appeals the order of the county court for
    Hall County removing him as the personal representative of his
    deceased father’s estate and as the trustee of his father’s inter
    vivos trust. The issue raised is whether the trial court erred in
    determining that it was in the best interests of the estate and the
    trust to remove Theodore from his fiduciary positions. Because
    Theodore’s individual interests conflicted with the interests of
    the estate and the trust, we affirm the trial court’s decision to
    remove him from his fiduciary positions.
    II. BACKGROUND
    Mason D. Robb passed away in March 2010. Pursuant to
    his last will and testament and his trust documents, his son,
    Theodore, became the personal representative of his estate and
    the trustee to the inter vivos Mason D. Robb Revocable Living
    Trust (the Trust). The Trust included three pieces of real estate:
    the Tri Street house, the Hall County farm, and the Sherman
    County pastures.
    The Trust declared that the trustee should hold and use the
    Trust property for two purposes: to pay administrative costs
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    IN RE ESTATE OF ROBB	431
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 429
    and the settlor’s debts and for the benefit of the Mason D.
    Robb QTIP Family Trust (the Family Trust). The Trust directed
    the trustee to separate the funds in the Family Trust into two
    equal shares: one for the benefit of Theodore and one for the
    benefit of Theodore’s sister, Linda Hahn (Linda). The share
    created for Theodore was to be delivered to him outright,
    and the share created for Linda was to be held in trust for
    Linda’s benefit. The Family Trust stated that Linda should
    receive income from her share of the Family Trust periodically
    throughout her lifetime.
    In September 2011, Linda and her son, Shawn Eichman
    (Shawn), filed a motion to remove Theodore as the personal
    representative. In December, Linda and Shawn filed an addi-
    tional motion to remove Theodore as the trustee. Linda and
    Shawn also filed a petition to appoint a special administrator to
    administer the estate and the Trust in the event that Theodore
    was not removed. The county court of Hall County heard the
    matter in September 2012.
    1. Theodore’s Actions as
    P ersonal R epresentative
    The evidence presented at trial indicates that Theodore
    received a $50,000 “death-bed transfer” from his father.
    Theodore admitted receipt of the payment and agreed that the
    payment should be treated as an estate asset, but he stated that
    he had not deposited it in the estate account at the time of trial.
    Theodore also failed to include it in either the inventory or the
    amended inventory filed with the court.
    The evidence also reveals that Theodore sold several items
    of personal property belonging to his father, in the amount of
    approximately $900, but that he had not included that amount
    in any accounting filed with the court as of the date of the
    hearing. Theodore had, however, deposited the funds into the
    estate account.
    Theodore was also untimely in his filing of his original
    inventory and accounting. Despite a court order, Theodore
    failed to file an amended inventory or an accounting that
    included funds and assets through June 15, 2012; rather, his
    amended filings were current through only 2011.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    432	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    2. Theodore’s Management
    as Trustee
    The evidence presented at trial showed that after becoming
    the trustee, Theodore undertook efforts to improve the Trust
    properties. He compensated himself and others he hired for
    their efforts in improving the real property. At times, he com-
    pensated himself by using the property, determining a rental
    price to charge himself for that use, and offsetting the rent he
    owed the Trust against the compensation the Trust allegedly
    owed him for improving the property. The efforts to improve
    the three properties were substantial.
    Theodore claimed the Trust owed him $7,461.26 for improv-
    ing the Tri Street house. Some of his expenses for the property
    included painting the house and paying the utilities and taxes.
    After improving the house, Theodore began renting it to a third
    party in October 2011 for $650 per month. At the time of trial,
    Theodore had received $7,800 in rent from the property but
    had deposited only 3 months of rent ($1,950) into the Trust
    account. He also credited 3 months of rent ($1,950) against his
    costs for improving the property. After crediting $1,950 against
    the $7,461.26 he claimed he was owed, Theodore determined
    that the Trust owed him $5,511. At the time of trial, 6 months
    of rent from the Tri Street property were not accounted for in
    Theodore’s accounting.
    Theodore claims the Trust owed him $41,675 for his work
    improving the Hall County farm and $37,175.54 for his work
    improving the Sherman County pastures. The Hall County
    farm had fallen into a state of disrepair before Theodore
    began improving it. Theodore hired laborers to help remove
    “junk” from the farm, including tires and overgrown trees. The
    Sherman County pastures required pressure spraying, installa-
    tion of water lines, and other labor to make the land suitable
    for rental.
    Theodore completed a large portion of the work on these
    properties himself, but he also hired others to help. Robert
    Boyd testified that he worked for Theodore improving both
    properties. According to Boyd, Theodore paid him a flat rate
    of $2,500 per month, either in cash or by check written
    on Theodore’s personal checking account. Boyd testified that
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    IN RE ESTATE OF ROBB	433
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 429
    Theodore hired other men to work as well, but he did not pro-
    vide details. Boyd also testified that he sometimes worked on
    Theodore’s property in addition to the Trust property and that
    his compensation covered work on both properties. Theodore
    did not issue W-2 or 1099 forms to the workers.
    After working to improve the Hall County farm and Sherman
    County pastures, Theodore generated income from the proper-
    ties by renting them to himself and crediting the Trust with the
    rental value. The parties dispute whether Theodore charged the
    fair market rental values of the properties.
    In 2011 and 2012, Theodore rented the Hall County farm
    and charged himself $29,062 per year, which equates to $200
    per acre. He had not paid any rent for 2012 at the time of trial
    but acknowledged that he did owe that amount to the Trust.
    He testified that he determined the rental amount of $200 per
    acre because that is the price another individual paid to rent the
    property in 2010. Theodore’s appraiser placed the annual rental
    value at $6,700 higher than Theodore was paying. Linda and
    Shawn’s appraiser determined the rental value of the property
    to be around $43,000, which is well over $10,000 more than
    Theodore paid. As a result of the litigation surrounding the
    estate and the Trust, Theodore executed a contract to sell the
    Hall County farm to an acquaintance for $6,000 per acre, but
    Linda and Shawn’s appraiser determined that the property was
    worth $10,000 per acre.
    Theodore also rented the Sherman County pastures to him-
    self at a price of $6,400 per year. Theodore determined this
    rent based on the amount he charged someone else to rent
    one of his pastures. He did not deposit this amount into the
    Trust account, but, rather, credited that amount to the Trust
    against the amount he claimed the Trust owed him for his
    work improving the property. Theodore hired an appraiser,
    who determined the rental value of the property to be $14,554
    per year.
    In addition to the real estate, Theodore also received a
    $50,000 “death-bed transfer” from his father’s account. Both
    parties agree that the money should be deposited into the Trust
    account, but Theodore had not yet deposited it at the time of
    trial, 21⁄2 years after his father’s death. As of the date of trial,
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    434	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    Theodore claimed the Trust still owed him $112,896.87. As
    a result, Linda had not yet received any payments from the
    Family Trust.
    3. Trial Court Determination
    The court found that Theodore should be removed from
    his positions as the personal representative and as the trustee,
    because his actions in commingling his individual funds with
    the funds and assets of the estate and the Trust caused irrecon-
    cilable conflict and could continue to do so. Accordingly, the
    trial court determined that removing Theodore from his posi-
    tions as the personal representative and as the trustee was in
    the best interests of the estate and the Trust.
    This timely appeal followed.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    On appeal, Theodore argues that the county court erred in
    removing him from his role as the personal representative and
    as the trustee, because removal was not in the best interests
    of the estate and the Trust. In the alternative, Theodore argues
    that the trial court failed to use a less intrusive method, such as
    appointing a special administrator, to limit Theodore’s role as
    the personal representative and as the trustee.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In trust administration and probate cases, an appel-
    late court uses an “issue-specific approach” to determine the
    appropriate standard of review. See In re Margaret Mastny
    Revocable Trust, 
    281 Neb. 188
    , 198, 
    794 N.W.2d 700
    , 710
    (2011). Consequently, the applicable standards of review
    regarding issues arising in probate and trust cases can be enig-
    matic. Accordingly, we set forth below the applicable standards
    of review in a slightly unorthodox manner.
    1. P robate and Trust Issues Not
    Involving Equitable Issues
    [2] Both probate and trust administration matters are
    reviewed for error appearing on the record, absent an equity
    question. See 
    id.
    Decisions   of the    Nebraska Court of Appeals
    IN RE ESTATE OF ROBB	435
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 429
    2. P robate or Trust Issues Involving
    Equitable Issues
    [3] Both probate or trust administration matters are reviewed
    de novo, where an equity question is presented. See id.
    3. P robate     Trust Administration Issues:
    and
    Equitable or Not
    (a) Trust Administration Cases—Removal
    of Trustee Is Equitable Issue
    [4] The removal of a trustee is a question of equity. See
    Burnham v. Bennison, 
    121 Neb. 291
    , 
    236 N.W. 745
     (1931).
    Accordingly, in a trust proceeding, an appellate court reviews
    de novo the question of whether a trustee was properly
    removed.
    (b) Probate Cases—Removal of Personal
    Representative Is Not Equitable Issue
    [5] The removal of a personal representative is not an equity
    question. See In re Estate of Krumwiede, 
    264 Neb. 378
    , 
    647 N.W.2d 625
     (2002). The removal of a personal representative
    is reviewed for error appearing on the record. See In re Estate
    of Webb, 
    20 Neb. App. 12
    , 
    817 N.W.2d 304
     (2012).
    (c) Probate Cases—Appointment of Special
    Administrator Is Not Equitable Issue
    [6] A trial court’s decision whether to appoint a special
    administrator is not a question of equity. See In re Estate of
    Evans, 
    20 Neb. App. 602
    , 
    827 N.W.2d 314
     (2013) (noting that
    trial court erred in ordering removal of appellant as personal
    representative rather than making independent determination).
    Therefore, appointment of a special administrator is reviewed
    for error appearing on the record.
    V. ANALYSIS
    1. R emoval From Role as
    P ersonal R epresentative
    Theodore argues that the trial court erred in removing him as
    the personal representative. We disagree.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    436	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    [7] 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2454
    (a) (Reissue 2008) states that
    a court may remove a personal representative from an estate if
    “removal would be in the best interests of the estate, or if it is
    shown that a personal representative . . . has mismanaged the
    estate or failed to perform any duty pertaining to the office.”
    See, also, In re Estate of Seidler, 
    241 Neb. 402
    , 
    490 N.W.2d 453
     (1992). When an executor has a personal interest in the
    administration of an estate and in the disposition of the estate
    property, and when the circumstances disclose that those inter-
    ests prevent him from performing his duties in an impartial
    manner, he should be removed. See In re Estate of Marconnit,
    
    119 Neb. 73
    , 
    227 N.W. 147
     (1929).
    In this case, Theodore failed to impartially perform his
    duties as the personal representative. In particular, as the per-
    sonal representative, Theodore was entrusted with the duty to
    manage and properly account for the property that was part of
    the estate. The record reveals that Theodore has failed to prop-
    erly account for estate assets, particularly the $50,000 “death-
    bed transfer.” While Theodore acknowledged that this money
    should be considered property of the estate, he had not depos-
    ited it into the estate’s account during the 21⁄2 years between
    his father’s death and the hearing. In addition, Theodore sold
    items of personal property belonging to his father without
    notification to the remaining heirs and had not accounted for
    the income. Furthermore, Theodore did not timely file his
    original inventory and accounting, nor was it complete. These
    actions disclose that Theodore’s personal interest in the estate
    prevented him from impartially performing his duties as the
    personal representative. We agree with the trial court that
    allowing Theodore to continue as the personal representative
    was not in the best interests of the estate and that his removal
    was proper.
    2. R emoval From Role
    as Trustee
    Theodore argues that the trial court erred in removing him
    from his role as the trustee. We disagree.
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3862
    (b) (Reissue 2008) states that the
    court may remove a trustee if:
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    IN RE ESTATE OF ROBB	437
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 429
    (1) the trustee has committed a serious breach of trust;
    (2) lack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially
    impairs the administration of the trust;
    (3) because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent
    failure of the trustee to administer the trust effectively, the
    court determines that removal of the trustee best serves
    the interests of the beneficiaries; or
    (4) there has been a substantial change of circum-
    stances or removal is requested by all of the qualified
    beneficiaries, the court finds that removal of the trustee
    best serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is
    not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a
    suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.
    The language of § 30-3862 is identical to that of Unif. Trust
    Code § 706, 7C U.L.A. 575 (2006). The comments to § 706
    of the Uniform Trust Code are helpful in evaluating whether
    a trustee has committed a “serious breach of trust.” The com-
    ment to § 706 provides:
    The breach must be “serious.” A serious breach of trust
    may consist of a single act that causes significant harm
    or involves flagrant misconduct. A serious breach of
    trust may also consist of smaller breaches, none of which
    individually justify removal when considered alone, but
    which do so when considered together.
    7C U.L.A. at 576. See, also, In re Charles C. Wells Revocable
    Trust, 
    15 Neb. App. 624
    , 
    734 N.W.2d 323
     (2007).
    [8,9] A trustee commits a breach of trust if he violates
    any of the duties owed to beneficiaries. See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3890
    (a) (Reissue 2008). A trustee has the duty to “admin-
    ister the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and
    purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accord­
    ance with the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code.” 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3866
     (Reissue 2008). The Nebraska Uniform Trust Code,
    in turn, states that trustees owe the beneficiaries duties that
    include the duty of loyalty, impartiality, prudent administration,
    protection of trust property, proper recordkeeping, and inform-
    ing and reporting.
    [10] The duty of loyalty requires a trustee to administer
    the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. Neb. Rev.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    438	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    Stat. § 30-3867(a) (Reissue 2008). Transactions involving the
    investment or management of trust property entered into by
    the trustee for the trustee’s own personal account or which is
    otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary
    and personal interests are voidable unless they are authorized,
    are approved, or were entered into before the trustee contem-
    plated becoming a trustee. See § 30-3867(b).
    To further help prevent conflicts of interests, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3875
     (Reissue 2008) requires trustees to keep adequate
    records of the trust administration and to keep trust property
    separate from the trustee’s property. Trust property must be
    designated so that the trust’s interest, “to the extent feasible,
    appears in records maintained by a party other than a trustee or
    beneficiary.” 
    Id.
    Trustees can run afoul of these requirements when they com-
    mingle their personal property with trust property. In Sherman
    v. Sherman, 
    16 Neb. App. 766
    , 
    751 N.W.2d 168
     (2008), for
    example, we found that a trustee’s action in leasing land to
    himself ran afoul to the general prohibitions on self-dealing by
    a trustee. In that case, the trial court found that the trustee’s
    action in leasing the land to himself for a lower amount than he
    could have otherwise received violated the trustee’s duty to act
    for the beneficiaries and remaindermen. Accordingly, we deter-
    mined that the trial court did not clearly err when it removed
    the trustee. 
    Id.
    Nebraska law supports the trial court’s decision to remove
    Theodore as the trustee. As discussed above, § 30-3862(b)
    authorized the trial court to remove Theodore if he committed
    a serious breach of trust. Theodore committed a breach of trust
    by commingling his personal property with that of the Trust
    and by engaging in self-dealing by renting the property to him-
    self at favorable rates. This self-dealing brought his personal
    interest in a favorable rental price into conflict with Linda’s
    interest in profiting from the property.
    Theodore also engaged in self-dealing by compensating
    himself for improvements he made to the property. He has
    given the Trust credit against its alleged debt in the form of
    free rent, but continues to claim that the Trust owes him com-
    pensation for his services.
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    IN RE ESTATE OF ROBB	439
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 429
    Although his substantial improvements of the Trust property
    may have been in the best interests of the Trust, when Theodore
    is collecting compensation from the Trust for his actions, it is
    not clear that he is acting solely for the benefit of the Trust
    beneficiaries. Theodore’s determination of his own level of
    compensation places his interests directly at odds with Linda’s.
    His actions are akin to the trustee’s actions in Sherman, supra,
    and therefore constitute a serious breach of trust.
    In addition to the above, Theodore’s failure to account for 6
    months of rent from the Tri Street property also raises serious
    concerns about his ability to effectively fulfill his basic duties
    as the trustee. Failure to effectively administer the trust consti-
    tutes a separate ground for removal under § 30-3862(b).
    Theodore’s multiple failures to impartially perform the
    duties owed to the Trust beneficiaries are grounds for his
    removal. Because of these failures, removal of Theodore as the
    trustee was proper.
    3. Failure to Appoint Special
    Administrator
    In his brief, Theodore argues that even if the trial court
    had concerns about his ability to administer the estate and the
    Trust, the trial court should have appointed a special adminis-
    trator to deal with the sale of the Hall County farm and com-
    pensation to Theodore for his improvements to the property
    rather than removing Theodore as the personal representative
    and as the trustee.
    [11] A trial court has the authority to appoint a special
    administrator
    in a formal proceeding by order of the court on the peti-
    tion of any interested person and finding, after notice and
    hearing, that appointment is necessary to preserve the
    estate or to secure its proper administration including its
    administration in circumstances where a general personal
    representative cannot or should not act.
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2457
     (Reissue 2008).
    [12] After a special administrator is appointed, the admin-
    istrator has the same powers as a personal representative,
    except the power is limited to the duties prescribed in the trial
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    440	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    court’s order. In re Estate of Wilson, 
    8 Neb. App. 467
    , 
    594 N.W.2d 695
     (1999).
    Although the trial court had the authority to appoint a spe-
    cial administrator in this case, the trial court also had the dis-
    cretion to make the determination to simply remove Theodore
    as the trustee. Section 30-2457 authorizes the trial court to
    appoint a special administrator to act in specific, limited
    situations where the general personal representative cannot
    properly fulfill his duty. The problem with appointing a spe-
    cial administrator in this case, however, is that the conflict of
    interest between Theodore and the duties of the personal rep-
    resentative and the trustee was so substantial that the limited
    order envisioned in In re Estate of Wilson, 
    supra,
     would not
    remedy the problem.
    Theodore argues that the trial court could have issued an
    order appointing a special administrator for the limited pur-
    poses of selling one property and compensating Theodore for
    his improvements to the property. Appointing a special admin-
    istrator for these purposes would not remedy all of the issues
    the court considered in reaching its conclusion that it was in
    the best interests of the estate and the Trust that Theodore
    be removed.
    We also note that if Theodore had remained the personal
    representative and the trustee, conflict likely would continue as
    a result of Theodore’s personally repairing or further improv-
    ing the Trust property. With a third-party personal representa-
    tive and trustee, Theodore can continue to work to improve
    the property and be fairly compensated for those efforts if the
    personal representative and the trustee determine that doing so
    is in the best interests of the estate and the Trust.
    Because Theodore committed a serious breach of trust, the
    trial court had the authority to remove him as the personal rep-
    resentative and as the trustee. In this case, where Theodore’s
    conflict of interest permeated almost every aspect of his man-
    agement of the estate and the Trust, we cannot find error in
    the trial court’s decision to exercise its authority to remove
    Theodore as the personal representative and as the trustee
    rather than appointing a special administrator.
    Decisions     of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    IN RE INTEREST OF SARAH H.	441
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 441
    VI. CONCLUSION
    The trial court did not err in removing Theodore from his
    positions as the personal representative and as the trustee,
    because his actions reveal that his interests irreconcilably con-
    flicted with the interests of the estate and the Trust. Accordingly,
    the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    In   re I nterest of   Sarah H., a child under 18 years of age.
    State   of   Nebraska, appellee, v. Alicia F., appellant,
    and Brian H., intervenor-appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed October 22, 2013.     No. A-12-1197.
    1.	 Juvenile Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Cases arising under the
    Nebraska Juvenile Code, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-245
     through 43-2,129 (Reissue
    2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012), are reviewed de novo on the record, and an appellate
    court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the trial court’s findings.
    However, when the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court will consider and
    give weight to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted
    one version of the facts over the other.
    2.	 Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. In reviewing questions of law arising under
    the Nebraska Juvenile Code, an appellate court reaches conclusions independent
    of the lower court’s rulings.
    3.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. The Nebraska Juvenile
    Code defines “parties” as the juvenile over which the juvenile court has jurisdic-
    tion under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
     (Reissue 2008) and his or her parent, guard-
    ian, or custodian.
    4.	 Interventions: Pleadings. Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter
    in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, in
    any action pending or to be brought in any of the courts of the State of Nebraska,
    may become a party to an action between any other persons or corporations,
    either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by
    uniting with the defendants in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by demand-
    ing anything adversely to both the plaintiff and defendant, either before or after
    issue has been joined in the action, and before the trial commences.
    5.	 Interventions. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-328
     (Reissue 2008) provides a right to inter-
    vene before trial has commenced.
    6.	 Interventions: Time. A right to intervene should be asserted within a reasonable
    time, and the applicant must be diligent and not guilty of unreasonable delay after
    knowledge of the suit.