In re Estate of Evertson ( 2016 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    04/07/2016 12:10 PM CDT
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    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of A ppeals
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    IN RE ESTATE OF EVERTSON
    Cite as 
    23 Neb. Ct. App. 734
    In re Estate of Bruce F. Evertson, deceased.
    Travelers Indemnity Company, appellant, v.
    Julie A. Wamsley, personal representative
    of the Estate of Bruce F. Evertson,
    deceased, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 8, 2016.    No. A-15-104.
    1.	 Workers’ Compensation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Distribution
    of the proceeds of a judgment or settlement under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 48-118.04 (Reissue 2010) is left to the trial court’s discretion and is
    reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of that discretion.
    2.	 Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion requires
    that the reasons or rulings of a trial judge be clearly untenable, unfairly
    depriving a litigant of a substantial right and a just result.
    3.	 Statutes. To the extent there is conflict between two statutes on the
    same subject, the specific statute controls over the general statute.
    4.	 Courts: Appeal and Error. The authority to dismiss an appeal con-
    ferred by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-1601(3) (Cum. Supp. 2014) is permissive
    or discretionary in nature.
    Appeal from the County Court for Morrill County: Paul G.
    Wess, Judge. Affirmed.
    Gregory W. Plank, of Ray Lego & Associates, for appellant.
    R. Kevin O’Donnell, of Law Office of R. Kevin O’Donnell,
    P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
    Moore, Chief Judge, and Irwin and Inbody, Judges.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF EVERTSON
    Cite as 
    23 Neb. Ct. App. 734
    Inbody, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) appeals the order
    of the Morrill County Court finding that Travelers was to
    receive no proceeds in a fair and equitable distribution of third-
    party settlement proceeds.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On February 4, 2014, Bruce F. Evertson, chief executive
    officer of Evertson Well Service, Inc., was killed after being
    involved in a motor vehicle accident with a tractor-trailer unit
    driven by Dennis Dobrinski. Evertson was killed while acting
    in the course and scope of his employment. Travelers provided
    insurance for Evertson Well Service pursuant to the Nebraska
    Workers’ Compensation Act. Travelers is paying benefits to
    Darla Evertson (Darla), Evertson’s surviving spouse, of $728
    per week, which benefits will be paid until she dies or remar-
    ries. If Darla remarries, Travelers will pay her a 2-year lump
    sum settlement. According to the life expect­ancy table found
    in the “Nebraska Workers[’] Compensation Rules of Procedure
    Addendum 2,” Darla has a life expectancy of 27.6 years.
    The Estate of Bruce F. Evertson (Estate) resolved the wrong-
    ful death claims with Dobrinski’s insurance carrier, Employers
    Mutual Casualty (EMC). Travelers consented to the settlement.
    EMC paid $500,000 from the policy to the Estate, of which
    $125,000 was allocated to Evertson’s adult son, $125,000 was
    allocated to Evertson’s adult daughter, and $250,000 was allo-
    cated to Darla.
    On August 4, 2014, Travelers filed a statement of claim
    asserting a workers’ compensation lien and future credits. A
    hearing was held on November 17 to determine a fair and equi-
    table division of the $250,000 of settlement proceeds between
    Travelers and Darla and the amount, if any, of Travelers’ future
    credit. See Neb. Rev. Stat § 48-118.04 (Reissue 2010).
    At the hearing, Travelers claimed a subrogation interest
    in the entire $250,000 allocated to Darla pursuant to Neb.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF EVERTSON
    Cite as 
    23 Neb. Ct. App. 734
    Rev. Stat. § 48-118 (Reissue 2010) of the Nebraska Workers’
    Compensation Act. Six exhibits were received into evidence
    at the hearing: exhibit 1, the settlement agreement reached,
    inter alia, between EMC, Dobrinski, Darla, Evertson’s son,
    and Evertson’s daughter; exhibit 2, Darla’s affidavit with
    Evertson’s obituary attached; exhibit 3, an affidavit by the
    chief financial officer of Evertson Operating Company, Inc.,
    the insured administrative company, setting forth premiums
    paid by Evertson Operating Company for workers’ compen-
    sation insurance between May 1, 2009, and May 1, 2015;
    exhibit 4, an affidavit setting forth that the attorney fees,
    expenses, and court costs billed by Darla’s attorneys in this
    case were $42,583.31; exhibit 5, a negotiation letter; and
    exhibit 6, the affidavit of the workers’ compensation adjuster
    with attachments. The evidence showed that EMC had paid
    $26,208 in indemnity payments to Darla and $10,000 in
    funeral expenses. In addition to the EMC settlement, the
    parties stipulated that the agreement referenced an underin-
    sured motorist (UIM) policy for Evertson Well Service with
    a policy limit of $1 million. Travelers requested that a second
    supplemental transcript be filed with this court which showed
    that on March 18, 2015, the county court entered orders
    approving the settlement of the UIM claim and approving
    the distribution of $500,000 of UIM settlement proceeds.
    However, these were obviously not considered by the county
    court at the hearing on November 17, 2014, and we likewise
    do not consider them on appeal. An appellate court reviews
    a case upon the evidence actually received and considered
    in the trial court. See In re Estate of Baer, 
    273 Neb. 969
    ,
    
    735 N.W.2d 394
    (2007) (reason for rule presuming that, in
    absence of record of evidence considered by trial court, trial
    court’s order was supported by evidence and was correct is to
    ensure that appellate court reviews case upon evidence actu-
    ally received and considered in trial court). See, also, Lincoln
    Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 
    248 Neb. 221
    , 
    533 N.W.2d 898
    (1995)
    (before appellate court can consider issue of fact, evidence
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    must have been offered at trial and embodied in bill of excep-
    tions filed with appellate court). Accord Kellner v. Kellner, 
    8 Neb. Ct. App. 316
    , 
    593 N.W.2d 1
    (1999).
    On December 29, 2014, the county court filed an order find-
    ing that a “fair and equitable” distribution of the settlement
    proceeds was for Darla to receive $207,416.69; for the Estate
    attorneys to receive $42,583.31 for their fees; and for Travelers
    to receive nothing. The county court set forth in its order that
    it considered factors contained in Evertson’s obituary, includ-
    ing his 25-year marriage to Darla; their enjoyment of travel,
    family time, and fishing trips to Canada and Alaska; and their
    purchase of a “‘dream home’” in California in 2013. The court
    also considered factors such as there was no evidence that
    Travelers helped finance the settlement between EMC and the
    Estate; there was evidence Travelers had charged and received
    the necessary premiums to provide workers’ compensation
    coverage for Evertson Operating Company; and under all the
    circumstances, Travelers’ financial risk was minimal and insur-
    ance companies are in the business of assuming risk.
    On January 23, 2015, Travelers timely appealed that deci-
    sion to this court. On February 2, the county court held that
    no supersedeas bond was required by Travelers in pursuing
    its appeal. Despite the court’s ruling that no supersedeas
    bond was required, the following day Travelers paid a $75
    cost bond.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Travelers’ assignments of error, consolidated and restated,
    are that the county court erred (1) in failing to consider the
    potential settlement proceeds from the UIM policy in determin-
    ing its award and (2) in denying Travelers any portion of the
    third-party settlement for amounts paid or future credits.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] Distribution of the proceeds of a judgment or settle-
    ment under § 48-118.04 is left to the trial court’s discretion
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    and is reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of that dis-
    cretion. Sterner v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 
    19 Neb. Ct. App. 339
    ,
    
    805 N.W.2d 696
    (2011). See Burns v. Nielsen, 
    273 Neb. 724
    ,
    
    732 N.W.2d 640
    (2007). A judicial abuse of discretion requires
    that the reasons or rulings of a trial judge be clearly untenable,
    unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and a just
    result. 
    Sterner, supra
    . See 
    Burns, supra
    .
    ANALYSIS
    Jurisdiction.
    Before addressing the merits of the assignments of error
    raised by Travelers, we address the Estate’s claim that this
    court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. The Estate argues that
    Travelers failed to timely file a cost bond, which the Estate
    contends was required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1914 (Reissue
    2008). The Estate raised this same claim in a motion for sum-
    mary dismissal which was denied.
    [3] Contrary to the Estate’s argument that a cost bond under
    § 25-1914 is applicable in the instant case, the probate code
    provides its own requirement for a supersedeas bond under
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-1601(3) (Cum. Supp. 2014) in probate and
    trust appeals which supplants in such appeals the provisions
    of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1916 (Reissue 2008) (general statute
    regarding supersedeas bonds). See In re Interest of Kayla F.
    et al., 
    13 Neb. Ct. App. 679
    , 
    698 N.W.2d 468
    (2005). Section
    30-1601 applies to appeals “[i]n all matters arising under the
    Nebraska Probate Code . . . .” To the extent there is conflict
    between two statutes on the same subject, the specific statute
    controls over the general statute. Jeffrey B. v. Amy L., 
    283 Neb. 940
    , 
    814 N.W.2d 737
    (2012).
    [4] A supersedeas bond is mandatory in a probate appeal
    unless the appellant is a party specifically exempted from
    the requirement pursuant to § 30-1601(3). Section 30-1601(3)
    provides:
    When the appeal is by someone other than a personal
    representative, conservator, trustee, guardian, or guardian
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    ad litem, the appealing party shall, within thirty days after
    the entry of the judgment or final order complained of,
    deposit with the clerk of the county court a supersedeas
    bond or undertaking in such sum as the court shall direct,
    with at least one good and sufficient surety approved by
    the court, conditioned that the appellant will satisfy any
    judgment and costs that may be adjudged against him or
    her, including costs under subsection (6) of this section,
    unless the court directs that no bond or undertaking need
    be deposited. If an appellant fails to comply with this
    subsection, the Court of Appeals on motion and notice
    may take such action, including dismissal of the appeal,
    as is just.
    The authority to dismiss an appeal conferred by § 30-1601(3)
    is permissive or discretionary in nature. See In re Trust Created
    by Isvik, 
    274 Neb. 525
    , 
    741 N.W.2d 638
    (2007).
    In the instant case, on January 23, 2015, Travelers filed
    its notice of appeal and docket fee, which was the same date
    it filed a motion to require the personal representative of the
    Estate to hold a portion of EMC funds in the attorney trust
    account. On February 2, the county court denied Travelers’
    motion and determined that no supersedeas bond was required
    by Travelers in pursuing its appeal. The authority to dismiss
    an appeal is permissive, and it would not be just to dismiss
    Travelers’ appeal because the determination that Travelers was
    not required to post a supersedeas bond was made more than
    30 days after the entry of the final order. Thus, the Estate’s
    claim that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal is with-
    out merit.
    Failure to Consider Potential
    UIM Policy Proceeds.
    Travelers contends that the county court erred in failing
    to consider the potential settlement proceeds from the UIM
    policy in determining its award. At the hearing, the parties
    stipulated that the settlement agreement referenced a UIM
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    IN RE ESTATE OF EVERTSON
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    policy for Evertson Well Service and that the UIM had a
    policy limit of $1 million. However, in Turco v. Schuning,
    
    271 Neb. 770
    , 
    716 N.W.2d 415
    (2006), the Nebraska Supreme
    Court rejected a claim that the district court erred in failing
    to consider UIM insurance available because the record did
    not establish that those benefits had been received or would
    be received. Likewise, in the instant case, although the parties
    indicated the presence of a UIM policy, the record at the time
    of the hearing did not establish that those benefits had been
    received or would be received. Therefore, this assignment is
    without merit.
    Failure to Award Travelers Anything
    on Subrogation Claim.
    Travelers also contends that the county court erred in deny-
    ing Travelers any portion of the third-party settlement for
    amounts paid or future credits.
    Section 48-118 provides that when a third party is liable to
    an employee or employee’s dependents for the injury or death
    of the employee, “the employer shall be subrogated to the
    right of the employee or to the dependents against such third
    person.” Accord Burns v. Nielsen, 
    273 Neb. 724
    , 
    732 N.W.2d 640
    (2007). Section 48-118.04 provides that a settlement is
    void unless agreed to in writing by the employee and employer
    or the court determines that the settlement is “fair and reason-
    able.” Specifically, § 48-118.04 provides:
    If the employee or his or her personal representative or
    the employer or his or her workers’ compensation insurer
    do not agree in writing upon distribution of the proceeds
    of any judgment or settlement, the court, upon applica-
    tion, shall order a fair and equitable distribution of the
    proceeds of any judgment or settlement.
    Although Travelers claims that the county court erred in
    applying a “made whole” analysis instead of a “rule of pro-
    portionality” analysis, § 48-118.04 does not prescribe an exact
    formula for the trial court to apply when making a fair and
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    IN RE ESTATE OF EVERTSON
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    equitable distribution. 
    Turco, supra
    . The Nebraska Supreme
    Court has refused to read such a formula into the statute and
    has specifically rejected the adoption of the “made whole”
    doctrine or the “rule of proportionality” to determine what con-
    stitutes a fair and equitable distribution. 
    Turco, supra
    ; Sterner
    v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 
    19 Neb. Ct. App. 339
    , 
    805 N.W.2d 696
    (2011) (abuse of discretion for court to apply “made whole”
    analysis in dividing settlement). Under the plain language of
    § 48-118.04, the trial court shall make a fair and equitable dis-
    tribution; the distribution is left to the court’s discretion and is
    to be determined by the trial court under the facts of each case.
    See, 
    Turco, supra
    ; 
    Sterner, supra
    .
    In the instant case, the county court conducted a fair and
    equitable analysis, taking into consideration various factors
    including Evertson’s long-term marriage to Darla, their enjoy-
    ment of travel and family trips both in and out of this country,
    and their purchase of a “‘dream home’” in California in 2013.
    The county court also considered factors such as that Travelers
    had charged and received the necessary premiums to pro-
    vide workers’ compensation coverage for Evertson Operating
    Company and that under all the circumstances, Travelers’
    financial risk was minimal and insurance companies are in
    the business of assuming risk. We disagree with Travelers’
    assessment that the county court was considering an equitable
    assessment in considering there was no evidence that Travelers
    helped finance the settlement between EMC and the Estate;
    rather, the county court’s language indicates that the court was
    considering that Travelers did not expend any funds in securing
    the settlement.
    Further, regarding Travelers’ claim that the district court
    erred in failing to grant Travelers a future credit, Travelers
    claims that an employer or workers’ compensation carrier
    is entitled under § 48-118 to treat amounts recovered by
    an employee from a settlement with a third-party tort-feasor
    exceeding the compensation benefits the employer or com-
    pensation carrier has paid as “advances against possible future
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    compensation.” Brief for appellant at 17. In support of its
    claim, Travelers relies upon language contained in § 48-118
    which provides:
    Any recovery by the employer against such third per-
    son, in excess of the compensation paid by the employer
    after deducting the expenses of making such recov-
    ery, shall be paid forthwith to the employee or to the
    dependents and shall be treated as an advance payment
    by the employer on account of any future installments
    of compensation.
    The plain language of this portion of the statute refers to
    “[a]ny recovery by the employer against such third person
    . . . .” In this case, the recovery against the tort-feasor was
    not made by the employer or workers’ compensation carrier;
    rather, it was made by the employee’s personal representative
    on behalf of the Estate, which recovery would then be distrib-
    uted to Darla, Evertson’s son, and Evertson’s daughter. Thus,
    the language relied upon by Travelers is not applicable to the
    instant case.
    CONCLUSION
    After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the county
    court abused its discretion. Therefore, the decision of the
    county court determining a fair and equitable distribution of
    settlement proceeds is affirmed.
    A ffirmed.