In re Interest of Treasean J. ( 2018 )


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  •                           IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
    (Memorandum Web Opinion)
    IN RE INTEREST OF TREASEAN J. ET AL.
    NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
    AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
    IN RE INTEREST OF TREASEAN J. ET AL., CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE.
    STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
    V.
    CASEY L., APPELLANT, AND SEAN J., APPELLEE.
    Filed November 6, 2018.      No. A-17-724.
    Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County: CHRISTOPHER E. KELLY,
    Judge. Affirmed.
    Joseph E. Kuehl, of Lefler, Kuehl & Burns Law Office, for appellant.
    Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, Anthony M. Hernandez, and David Ceraso,
    Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee State of Nebraska.
    MOORE, Chief Judge, and BISHOP and ARTERBURN, Judges.
    ARTERBURN, Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Casey L. appeals from an order of the separate juvenile court of Douglas County that
    terminated her parental rights as to her minor children. Sean J. seeks to cross-appeal from a
    separate order of the juvenile court of Douglas County that terminated his parental rights as to his
    minor children. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court’s order that terminated the parental
    rights of Casey. We further find that arguably, Sean did not properly cross-appeal the case, but
    that even if he did, we can find no plain error in the court’s order and therefore affirm termination
    of his parental rights as well.
    -1-
    II. BACKGROUND
    1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Casey is the natural mother of the minor children Treasean J. and Ariana J. who were born
    in August 2012, and Jonathan B. who was born in November 2013. Sean is the natural father of
    the twins, Treasean and Ariana, but is not the father of Jonathan. The father of Jonathan is not a
    party to this action.
    On December 30, 2015, the State filed a petition alleging the children were within the
    meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016) and asked that the children immediately
    be placed in the custody of the State. The State’s filing followed on the heels of an officer
    responding to a disturbance call from the Open Door Mission on December 29 and encountering
    Casey and her three young children. The officer noticed Casey’s red, bloodshot eyes, slurred
    speech, and the odor of alcoholic beverage. Casey was also unable to follow instructions and had
    a BAC of .228. Because Casey was banned from the Open Door Mission premises, the officer
    booked her for trespassing and three counts of child neglect. The court ordered the children into
    the immediate temporary custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (the
    Department) by order dated December 30, 2015. On January 11, 2016, the court ordered that the
    children remain in the temporary care of the Department.
    Shortly thereafter, the children were placed in the foster care of Diane J., in whose care
    they remained through the termination hearing except for a brief period. Upon Casey’s motion, the
    children were placed with Casey in her apartment at a treatment facility on December 19, 2016,
    and removed again on December 27, following the previous day’s incident.
    Sean filed a complaint/petition in intervention with the court on February 2, 2016, seeking
    leave to intervene for the purpose of obtaining placement and custody of his children, Treasean
    and Ariana. The court granted Sean leave to intervene on February 22. On February 25, the State
    filed a supplemental petition alleging the children fell within § 43-247(3)(a) due to Sean’s failure
    to provide proper parental care and his acts of domestic violence upon Casey in the children’s
    presence.
    The children were thereafter adjudicated as minors under § 43-247(3)(a) with respect to
    Casey by order dated March 15, 2016, and ordered to remain in the care of the Department. The
    children were also adjudicated as minors under § 43-247(3)(a) with respect to Sean by order dated
    July 14, 2016. The court further found it would be in the children’s best interest to remain in the
    care of the Department.
    By order dated August 30, 2016, following further hearing, the court directed Sean to
    complete a rehabilitation plan designed to reunify him with his children. The tenets of the
    rehabilitation plan included maintaining a legal source of income and providing written
    verification to the Department; undergoing a psychological evaluation, an initial diagnostic
    interview, and a chemical dependency evaluation; completing a domestic violence class and
    parenting education class; maintaining safe and adequate housing for himself and his children and
    providing monthly written verification of the same; abstaining from domestic violence; meeting
    with the family permanency specialist monthly; and being allowed reasonable rights of supervised
    visitation. Sean was present at the August 30, 2016, hearing while Casey was absent.
    -2-
    By order dated October 26, 2016, the court directed Casey to continue to meet all her
    children’s basic needs; maintain a legal source of income and provide written verification to the
    Department; participate in and successfully complete the Family Works program; submit to
    random drug and alcohol testing; continue participating in AA/NA meetings; successfully
    complete a domestic violence course; attend all scheduled psychiatric appointments; take all
    medications as prescribed; successfully complete a parenting education class; abstain from
    domestic violence; and be allowed reasonable rights of semi-supervised visitation (10%), which
    may transition to unsupervised visits after 15 days. In the same order, the court also directed that
    the Department “need undertake no further reasonable efforts” toward reunifying the children with
    their father, Sean. Casey was present at the October 26 hearing while Sean was absent.
    On February 27, 2017, the State filed motions for termination of parental rights with respect
    to both Casey and Sean. A hearing on the termination motions was held on June 14. Casey did not
    appear for the hearing but was represented by counsel. Sean, who was at that time incarcerated,
    did appear with counsel. He orally requested new counsel and a continuance. Both requests were
    denied.
    2. TERMINATION HEARING EVIDENCE
    At the termination hearing, the State called five witnesses while Sean called one witness
    and took the stand himself. No other testimony was elicited. It should further be noted that counsel
    for Casey was asked regarding Casey’s whereabouts. Counsel responded that he had discussed the
    hearing with Casey but did not know Casey’s whereabouts.
    The witnesses largely testified to Casey’s and Sean’s failure to consistently engage as
    parents. Evidence presented at the termination hearing demonstrated that Casey and Sean failed to
    utilize the rehabilitative services that they were offered and ordered to complete, neglected their
    children, failed to take advantage of the parenting time afforded them, and exhibited general
    instability. During their times away from the children, neither Casey nor Sean sent the children
    any cards or gifts for their birthdays or other holidays, called the children, or provided any type of
    financial support.
    (a) Evidence Regarding Sean
    Sean did not consistently engage in visitation with the children. Sean scheduled visitation
    on four occasions in September 2016, but only appeared for one visit. He cancelled two others,
    and simply did not show up for the remaining visit. Similarly, in October, Sean scheduled five
    visits, three of which he cancelled, and two of which he attended. Sean was eventually
    unsuccessfully discharged from the visitation provider, Heartland Family Services, after his last
    visit in October due to cussing and being generally disrespectful toward the visitation workers. His
    discharge also stemmed from his failure to set up visits on time or attend previously scheduled
    visits.
    At the time of the termination hearing, Sean was incarcerated on a domestic violence
    charge, which he believed was going to be dismissed. Because of his incarceration, his visitation
    was completely curtailed in or about February 2017. This was because the children’s therapist had
    directed that only therapeutic visits be conducted, which could not be accommodated at the jail.
    -3-
    By order dated August 30, 2016, Sean was directed to complete various programs to
    rehabilitate and strengthen his parenting abilities. Britley Kierscht, a Nebraska Families
    Collaborative (NFC) caseworker, testified that Sean did not complete any court-ordered
    rehabilitative-style programs and evaluations, however. In particular, he never completed a
    psychological or psychiatric evaluation, an initial diagnostic interview, a domestic violence
    batterer’s course, or a parenting class. Kierscht was also unable to verify whether Sean had safe,
    stable, appropriate housing or had maintained stable, legal income despite making efforts to
    contact Sean at least three times each month beginning in January.
    Martha Alcantara-Sanchez, a family permanency specialist with NFC who was the
    children’s caseworker from August 2016 until January 2017, was also never provided any
    information that Sean had completed the above court-ordered programs. Additionally, Sanchez
    had scheduled a home visit to determine whether Sean had safe, stable, appropriate housing. Sean
    did not show up at the address given for the home visit. Instead, he called Sanchez and tried to
    persuade her to meet him elsewhere. Sean never provided proof of earned income even though he
    was asked to provide the same in order for NFC to pay for a psychological evaluation.
    During a visit with his 4-year-old children on October 17, 2016, Sean led them across a
    street in front of oncoming traffic, across another street without using a crosswalk, and across a
    third street without using a crosswalk even after the visitation worker instructed him otherwise.
    During these crossings, Sean did not hold the children’s hands.
    Kierscht opined, based on her professional experience, that it was in the children’s best
    interests that Sean’s parental rights be terminated. She based that opinion on the children’s need
    for a safe, stable, and permanent environment and that Sean took no steps to better position him to
    parent the children.
    (b) Evidence Regarding Casey
    During the pendency of this case, Casey attended an inpatient family counseling and
    addiction treatment program, Nebraska Family Works (NFW). Unfortunately she failed to
    successfully complete the program or maintain sobriety. Donna Lenz, Casey’s therapist at NFW,
    testified that Casey was twice previously admitted to the program. Casey’s first stay at NFW lasted
    approximately 9 months, ending in 2014. She successfully completed alcohol addiction and mental
    health treatment programs at that time. Lenz could not recall the dates of Casey’s first treatment
    period. After Casey’s 2014 stay at NFW, a transition plan was approved whereby Casey was to
    move closer to her mom in Texas and become involved in her church; it was also recommended
    that she attend 12-step meetings.
    Casey most recently returned to NFW in August 2016. Her children were placed with her
    in an apartment at the treatment facility on December 19. As Casey’s treatment progressed with
    her children, she appeared to grow overwhelmed by caring for them, however. In fact, Casey
    specifically stated that she was overwhelmed, and the cleanliness of her apartment worsened as
    she grew less patient with her children. Casey eventually left the NFW facility with the children
    on December 26, against treatment team advice. The children were again removed from her care
    the next day. Of a number of therapeutic treatment goals--including safely parenting her children,
    utilizing and generalizing skills in the community, and demonstrating an ability to manage her own
    -4-
    emotions without resorting to substances, Casey only completed the early recovery learning coping
    skills unit prior to leaving the program according to Lenz.
    Casey was directed to complete a number of rehabilitative-type programs and evaluations
    pursuant to an October 26, 2016, court order. Kierscht testified that she had never received a
    chemical dependency evaluation or initial diagnostic interview with respect to Casey. Moreover,
    Kierscht neither received a certificate indicating Casey completed a parenting class nor a signed
    card showing Casey had actively participated in AA or NA classes. Similarly, Casey never
    provided to Kierscht documentation that showed she completed a domestic violence course or
    inpatient treatment program.
    On December 26, 2016, Casey took the children and left NFW against Sanchez’ specific
    directions, which resulted in re-removing the children from Casey’s care. Earlier that month, Casey
    had informed the NFW staff that her mother would be visiting from Texas around that time. In
    response, Sanchez informed Casey that she could not stay at her mother’s hotel overnight with the
    children because she was uncertain Casey could handle a weekend by herself without any staff
    present. Sanchez was out of town on December 26, but another NFW employee told Casey she
    was not allowed to leave NFW to visit her mother because her apartment was unclean.
    Notwithstanding that instruction, Casey got into an Uber with the children and left NFW. NFW
    employees were unsure whether the Uber had car seats for the children. When Casey left her
    apartment at NFW in December, the kitchen trash was overflowing and there were soiled
    children’s clothes left on one of the beds. Moreover, there was limited food in the apartment, and
    toys were strewn about.
    Later on December 27, 2016, Casey called Sanchez, sounding very agitated and anxious,
    and asked if her mom could take the children back to Texas. Sanchez described this call from
    Casey as a huge red flag. Casey would not tell Sanchez where they were and also said she was not
    going back to NFW. At that point, Sanchez contacted the children’s guardian ad litem, and the
    decision to again remove the children from Casey’s care was made.
    Additionally, when the children were removed from Casey’s care on December 27, 2016,
    Sanchez testified that she offered Casey the opportunity to again have visits with her children if
    she would participate in random urine analyses. Casey was unwilling to comply with that
    condition. Similarly, Kierscht testified that a few weeks prior to trial, Casey asked whether NFC
    would change its recommendation regarding terminating her parental rights. Kierscht advised
    Casey that there was only a small timeframe before trial, but the best thing she could do in order
    to affect the NFC recommendation was to check herself into an inpatient treatment program. Casey
    was also unwilling to comply with that condition.
    On February 17, 2017, Casey met with Kierscht and admitted that she had relapsed on
    drugs--telling Kierscht that she was actually coming down from a high as they spoke. Casey
    admitted to using morphine, methamphetamine, and opiates. Kierscht testified that Casey smelled
    of alcohol and had admitted to drinking alcohol again as well.
    Kierscht opined, based on her professional experience, that it was appropriate to terminate
    Casey’s parental rights. She based that opinion on Casey’s failure to engage with services,
    substance relapses, failure to engage with her children, and failure to engage with her case plan
    goals and treatment plan.
    -5-
    By order dated June 15, 2017, the court held that all three children were within the meaning
    of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(2) and (6) (Reissue 2016) with respect to Casey and that termination
    of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. By separate order dated June 15, 2017,
    the court held that Treasean and Ariana were within the meaning of § 43-292(1), (2), (6), and (9)
    with respect to Sean and that termination of his parental rights was in their best interests.
    Casey filed a notice of appeal on July 13, 2017, at 2:38 p.m., and Sean filed a notice of
    appeal on July 13, 2017 at 4:34 p.m.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Casey’s sole assignment of error is that the juvenile court erred in finding that it was in the
    minor children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights.
    Sean does not assign errors in his brief but argues that the juvenile court violated his due
    process rights and further erred by finding termination to be proper pursuant to § 43-292(1), (2),
    (6), and (9) and by finding termination was in the children’s best interests.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions
    independently of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Ryder J., 
    283 Neb. 318
    , 
    809 N.W.2d 255
    (2012). When the evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court may give weight to the
    fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the
    other. 
    Id. V. ANALYSIS
            Under § 43-292, in order to terminate parental rights, the State must prove, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that one or more of the statutory grounds listed in the section have been
    satisfied and that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Interest of Nicole M., 
    287 Neb. 685
    , 
    844 N.W.2d 65
    (2014). There is a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are
    served by having a relationship with his or her parent. Based on the idea that fit parents act in the
    best interests of their children, this presumption is overcome only when the State has proved that
    a parent is unfit. 
    Id. The best
    interests analysis and the parental fitness analysis are fact-intensive
    inquiries. 
    Id. And while
    both are separate inquiries, each examines essentially the same underlying
    facts as the other. 
    Id. 1. CASEY’S
    APPEAL
    Casey does not contest the juvenile court’s finding that the State met its burden of proof
    regarding her children falling within the meaning of § 43-292(2) and (6). Casey only assigns that
    the juvenile court erred in finding that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests.
    Specifically, Casey argues that the court erred in finding termination was in the children’s best
    interests because the State did not provide evidence showing she could not be rehabilitated or
    reunited with her children. Moreover, Casey argues the State did not show what the children might
    gain or lose through a continued relationship with her or through a relationship with foster parents.
    On the other hand, the State argues the court correctly found it was in the children’s best interests
    to terminate Casey’s parental rights, emphasizing Casey’s continued illicit drug use and inability
    -6-
    to provide a stable place of residency. We agree with the court’s best interest determination and
    thus affirm.
    The evidence clearly shows Casey has been unable to permanently avoid illicit drug use,
    which has resulted in detriment to her children’s well-being. Casey has been treated for substance
    addiction on numerous occasions in the past, but lasting sobriety remains elusive. The present
    court action was only begun after Casey and her three children arrived at the Open Door Mission,
    which Casey was banned from entering, in December 2015. At that time, Casey’s eyes were red
    and bloodshot; her speech was slurred, and she smelled of alcohol. A breath test revealed her BAC
    to be .228. Thus, the evidence shows that the action to terminate her parental rights actually began
    due to her lack of sobriety.
    The evidence also shows Casey’s continuing lack of parental fitness. As recently as
    February 2017, Casey acknowledged her continued use of morphine, methamphetamine, opiates,
    and alcohol. Casey has routinely been afforded the opportunity to engage in additional substance
    addiction treatment but declined those opportunities. After the children were again removed from
    Casey’s care in December 2016, she was offered visitation if she would participate in random urine
    analysis testing. Casey declined to be tested however. Even when she was told the NFC may
    change its recommendation regarding terminating her parental rights if she willingly checked
    herself into an inpatient treatment program, Casey still declined treatment. The rehabilitation
    successes Casey has experienced have proved only temporary, and she has repeatedly chosen to
    not engage in more recent rehabilitative efforts.
    Additionally, because of Casey’s parental unfitness, the children have already spent
    significant time in foster care. Courts have found this a relevant factor in determining whether
    termination is in children’s best interests. See, e.g., In re Interest of Walter W., 
    274 Neb. 859
    , 872,
    
    744 N.W.2d 55
    , 66 (2008) (“[c]hildren cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care or be
    made to await uncertain parental maturity”). Even if Casey were to immediately begin treatment
    and fully engage in rehabilitative efforts, Lenz testified that it would take 9 months to a year of
    treatment under the best circumstances before Casey should be reunified with the children.
    Termination, therefore, is in the children’s best interests as it will prevent them from languishing
    in foster care while awaiting Casey’s uncertain maturing. Accordingly we find termination of
    Casey’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests and thus affirm.
    2. SEAN’S CROSS-APPEAL
    At the outset, we must first discuss the irregularities of Sean’s brief, which was filed on
    February 5, 2018. On the brief’s cover, Sean identified himself as an appellant and cross-appellant.
    Sean is actually an appellee in this matter because his notice of appeal was filed approximately 2
    hours after Casey’s appeal was filed on July 13, 2017. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1913 (Reissue
    2016). We note that Sean does not address Casey’s claims but only seeks affirmative relief by
    arguing that error was committed by the juvenile court in terminating his parental rights. However,
    Sean did not assign any specific errors nor did he set forth his arguments of error in a separate
    division of the brief as required by Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(D)(4) (rev. 2014). That rule states:
    Where the brief of appellee presents a cross-appeal, it shall be noted on the cover of the
    brief and it shall be set forth in a separate division of the brief. This division shall be headed
    -7-
    “Brief on Cross-Appeal” and shall be prepared in the same manner and under the same
    rules as the brief of appellant.
    Sean’s brief does not completely comport with court rules governing cross-appeals by appellees.
    He identifies himself on the cover of the brief as “Appellant and cross appellant.” This error alone
    may not be fatal to his case in that this error only partially misidentifies him. However, he has not
    set forth his claims for relief in a separate section of his brief entitled “Cross-Appeal” as required
    by the court rule.
    In In re Interest of Natasha H. & Sierra H., 
    258 Neb. 131
    , 
    602 N.W.2d 439
    (1999), the
    Nebraska Supreme Court refused to consider a father’s assignments of error in a termination of
    parental rights case because he failed to properly set forth his assignments in the context of a
    cross-appeal as required by the rule. In that case, the father’s brief was entitled “Brief of Appellee,”
    which was appropriate as he filed his appeal after the mother. 
    Id. However, along
    with resisting
    the mother’s claims, the father also sought affirmative relief despite failing to properly designate
    his argument as a cross-appeal. 
    Id. The court
    in In re Interest of Natasha H. & Sierra H. would not
    consider the father’s assignments of error because “appellate courts of this state have always
    refused to consider a prayer for affirmative relief where such a claim is raised in a brief designated
    as that of an 
    appellee.” 258 Neb. at 146
    , 602 N.W.2d at 451. The father’s brief was only designated
    as an appellee’s brief even though he sought affirmative relief.
    This case differs somewhat from In re Interest of Natasha H. & Sierra 
    H., supra
    , in that
    Sean has designated himself as a cross-appellant and has presented argument in support of his
    request for relief. While his arguments are not set forth in a “separate section” it is at least arguable
    that a separate section would not be required where, as here, he does designate himself as a
    cross-appellant and he presents no argument in response to Casey. In this case however, even if
    Sean’s brief is not considered to be fatally defective under the procedural rule described above, he
    still cannot be provided relief by this court.
    In his brief on appeal, Sean does not set forth any assignments of error, but merely sets
    forth his claims within the argument section of his brief. This practice has been repeatedly
    disapproved by the appellate courts of this state. See e.g. Logan v. Logan, 
    22 Neb. Ct. App. 667
    , 
    859 N.W.2d 886
    (2015). A cross-appellant’s failure to include a separate section for assigned errors
    will result in an appellate court proceeding as though the party failed to file a brief or, alternatively,
    examining the arguments for plain error. 
    Id. As such,
    if Sean’s appeal is to be considered, it can
    only be considered for plain error. The record, as recounted above, clearly supports termination of
    Sean’s rights. Therefore, we find no plain error in the decision of the juvenile court with respect
    to Sean.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the State proved statutory grounds for termination of Casey’s parental
    rights to Treasean, Ariana, and Jonathan and that termination is in the children’s best interests. We
    further conclude that no plain error exists in the juvenile court’s findings with respect to Sean and
    therefore affirm the termination of his parental rights as well.
    AFFIRMED.
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-17-724

Filed Date: 11/6/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021